hacktricks/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates.md

# AD Certificates

{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

## Introduction

### Components of a Certificate

- The **Subject** of the certificate denotes its owner.
- A **Public Key** is paired with a privately held key to link the certificate to its rightful owner.
- The **Validity Period**, defined by **NotBefore** and **NotAfter** dates, marks the certificate's effective duration.
- A unique **Serial Number**, provided by the Certificate Authority (CA), identifies each certificate.
- The **Issuer** refers to the CA that has issued the certificate.
- **SubjectAlternativeName** allows for additional names for the subject, enhancing identification flexibility.
- **Basic Constraints** identify if the certificate is for a CA or an end entity and define usage restrictions.
- **Extended Key Usages (EKUs)** delineate the certificate's specific purposes, like code signing or email encryption, through Object Identifiers (OIDs).
- The **Signature Algorithm** specifies the method for signing the certificate.
- The **Signature**, created with the issuer's private key, guarantees the certificate's authenticity.

### Special Considerations

- **Subject Alternative Names (SANs)** expand a certificate's applicability to multiple identities, crucial for servers with multiple domains. Secure issuance processes are vital to avoid impersonation risks by attackers manipulating the SAN specification.

### Certificate Authorities (CAs) in Active Directory (AD)

AD CS acknowledges CA certificates in an AD forest through designated containers, each serving unique roles:

- **Certification Authorities** container holds trusted root CA certificates.
- **Enrolment Services** container details Enterprise CAs and their certificate templates.
- **NTAuthCertificates** object includes CA certificates authorized for AD authentication.
- **AIA (Authority Information Access)** container facilitates certificate chain validation with intermediate and cross CA certificates.

### Certificate Acquisition: Client Certificate Request Flow

1. The request process begins with clients finding an Enterprise CA.
2. A CSR is created, containing a public key and other details, after generating a public-private key pair.
3. The CA assesses the CSR against available certificate templates, issuing the certificate based on the template's permissions.
4. Upon approval, the CA signs the certificate with its private key and returns it to the client.

### Certificate Templates

Defined within AD, these templates outline the settings and permissions for issuing certificates, including permitted EKUs and enrollment or modification rights, critical for managing access to certificate services.

## Certificate Enrollment

The enrollment process for certificates is initiated by an administrator who **creates a certificate template**, which is then **published** by an Enterprise Certificate Authority (CA). This makes the template available for client enrollment, a step achieved by adding the template's name to the `certificatetemplates` field of an Active Directory object.

For a client to request a certificate, **enrollment rights** must be granted. These rights are defined by security descriptors on the certificate template and the Enterprise CA itself. Permissions must be granted in both locations for a request to be successful.

### Template Enrollment Rights

These rights are specified through Access Control Entries (ACEs), detailing permissions like:

- **Certificate-Enrollment** and **Certificate-AutoEnrollment** rights, each associated with specific GUIDs.
- **ExtendedRights**, allowing all extended permissions.
- **FullControl/GenericAll**, providing complete control over the template.

### Enterprise CA Enrollment Rights

The CA's rights are outlined in its security descriptor, accessible via the Certificate Authority management console. Some settings even allow low-privileged users remote access, which could be a security concern.

### Additional Issuance Controls

Certain controls may apply, such as:

- **Manager Approval**: Places requests in a pending state until approved by a certificate manager.
- **Enrolment Agents and Authorized Signatures**: Specify the number of required signatures on a CSR and the necessary Application Policy OIDs.

### Methods to Request Certificates

Certificates can be requested through:

1. **Windows Client Certificate Enrollment Protocol** (MS-WCCE), using DCOM interfaces.
2. **ICertPassage Remote Protocol** (MS-ICPR), through named pipes or TCP/IP.
3. The **certificate enrollment web interface**, with the Certificate Authority Web Enrollment role installed.
4. The **Certificate Enrollment Service** (CES), in conjunction with the Certificate Enrollment Policy (CEP) service.
5. The **Network Device Enrollment Service** (NDES) for network devices, using the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP).

Windows users can also request certificates via the GUI (`certmgr.msc` or `certlm.msc`) or command-line tools (`certreq.exe` or PowerShell's `Get-Certificate` command).

```bash
# Example of requesting a certificate using PowerShell
Get-Certificate -Template "User" -CertStoreLocation "cert:\\CurrentUser\\My"
```

## Certificate Authentication

Active Directory (AD) supports certificate authentication, primarily utilizing **Kerberos** and **Secure Channel (Schannel)** protocols.

### Kerberos Authentication Process

In the Kerberos authentication process, a user's request for a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is signed using the **private key** of the user's certificate. This request undergoes several validations by the domain controller, including the certificate's **validity**, **path**, and **revocation status**. Validations also include verifying that the certificate comes from a trusted source and confirming the issuer's presence in the **NTAUTH certificate store**. Successful validations result in the issuance of a TGT. The **`NTAuthCertificates`** object in AD, found at:

```bash
CN=NTAuthCertificates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>
```

is central to establishing trust for certificate authentication.

### Secure Channel (Schannel) Authentication

Schannel facilitates secure TLS/SSL connections, where during a handshake, the client presents a certificate that, if successfully validated, authorizes access. The mapping of a certificate to an AD account may involve Kerberos’s **S4U2Self** function or the certificate’s **Subject Alternative Name (SAN)**, among other methods.

### AD Certificate Services Enumeration

AD's certificate services can be enumerated through LDAP queries, revealing information about **Enterprise Certificate Authorities (CAs)** and their configurations. This is accessible by any domain-authenticated user without special privileges. Tools like **[Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify)** and **[Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy)** are used for enumeration and vulnerability assessment in AD CS environments.

Commands for using these tools include:

```bash
# Enumerate trusted root CA certificates and Enterprise CAs with Certify
Certify.exe cas
# Identify vulnerable certificate templates with Certify
Certify.exe find /vulnerable

# Use Certipy (>=4.0) for enumeration and identifying vulnerable templates
certipy find -vulnerable -dc-only -u john@corp.local -p Passw0rd -target dc.corp.local

# Request a certificate over the web enrollment interface (new in Certipy 4.x)
certipy req -web -target ca.corp.local -template WebServer -upn john@corp.local -dns www.corp.local

# Enumerate Enterprise CAs and certificate templates with certutil
certutil.exe -TCAInfo
certutil -v -dstemplate
```

---

## Recent Vulnerabilities & Security Updates (2022-2025)

| Year | ID / Name | Impact | Key Take-aways |
|------|-----------|--------|----------------|
| 2022 | **CVE-2022-26923** – “Certifried” / ESC6 | *Privilege escalation* by spoofing machine account certificates during PKINIT. | Patch is included in the **May 10 2022** security updates. Auditing & strong-mapping controls were introduced via **KB5014754**; environments should now be in *Full Enforcement* mode.  |
| 2023 | **CVE-2023-35350 / 35351** | *Remote code-execution* in the AD CS Web Enrollment (certsrv) and CES roles. | Public PoCs are limited, but the vulnerable IIS components are often exposed internally. Patch as of **July 2023** Patch Tuesday.  |
| 2024 | **CVE-2024-49019** – “EKUwu” / ESC15 | Low-privileged users with enrollment rights could override **any** EKU or SAN during CSR generation, issuing certificates usable for client-authentication or code-signing and leading to *domain compromise*. | Addressed in **April 2024** updates. Remove “Supply in the request” from templates and restrict enrollment permissions.  |

### Microsoft hardening timeline (KB5014754)

Microsoft introduced a three-phase rollout (Compatibility → Audit → Enforcement) to move Kerberos certificate authentication away from weak implicit mappings. As of **February 11 2025**, domain controllers automatically switch to **Full Enforcement** if the `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` registry value is not set. Administrators should:

1. Patch all DCs & AD CS servers (May 2022 or later).
2. Monitor Event ID 39/41 for weak mappings during the *Audit* phase.
3. Re-issue client-auth certificates with the new **SID extension** or configure strong manual mappings before February 2025. 

---

## Detection & Hardening Enhancements

* **Defender for Identity AD CS sensor (2023-2024)** now surfaces posture assessments for ESC1-ESC8/ESC11 and generates real-time alerts such as *“Domain-controller certificate issuance for a non-DC”* (ESC8) and *“Prevent Certificate Enrollment with arbitrary Application Policies”* (ESC15). Ensure sensors are deployed to all AD CS servers to benefit from these detections. 
* Disable or tightly scope the **“Supply in the request”** option on all templates; prefer explicitly defined SAN/EKU values.
* Remove **Any Purpose** or **No EKU** from templates unless absolutely required (addresses ESC2 scenarios).
* Require **manager approval** or dedicated Enrollment Agent workflows for sensitive templates (e.g., WebServer / CodeSigning).
* Restrict web enrollment (`certsrv`) and CES/NDES endpoints to trusted networks or behind client-certificate authentication.
* Enforce RPC enrollment encryption (`certutil –setreg CA\InterfaceFlags +IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQ`) to mitigate ESC11.

---

## References

- [https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf](https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)
- [https://comodosslstore.com/blog/what-is-ssl-tls-client-authentication-how-does-it-work.html](https://comodosslstore.com/blog/what-is-ssl-tls-client-authentication-how-does-it-work.html)
- [https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16)
- [https://advisory.eventussecurity.com/advisory/critical-vulnerability-in-ad-cs-allows-privilege-escalation/](https://advisory.eventussecurity.com/advisory/critical-vulnerability-in-ad-cs-allows-privilege-escalation/)

{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}