hacktricks/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/reversing-native-libraries.md
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# Reversing Native Libraries
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**For further information check:** [**https://maddiestone.github.io/AndroidAppRE/reversing_native_libs.html**](https://maddiestone.github.io/AndroidAppRE/reversing_native_libs.html)
Android apps can use native libraries, typically written in C or C++, for performance-critical tasks. Malware creators also abuse these libraries because ELF shared objects are still harder to decompile than DEX/OAT byte-code.
This page focuses on *practical* workflows and *recent* tooling improvements (2023-2025) that make reversing Android `.so` files easier.
---
### Quick triage-workflow for a freshly pulled `libfoo.so`
1. **Extract the library**
```bash
# From an installed application
adb shell "run-as <pkg> cat lib/arm64-v8a/libfoo.so" > libfoo.so
# Or from the APK (zip)
unzip -j target.apk "lib/*/libfoo.so" -d extracted_libs/
```
2. **Identify architecture & protections**
```bash
file libfoo.so # arm64 or arm32 / x86
readelf -h libfoo.so # OS ABI, PIE, NX, RELRO, etc.
checksec --file libfoo.so # (peda/pwntools)
```
3. **List exported symbols & JNI bindings**
```bash
readelf -s libfoo.so | grep ' Java_' # dynamic-linked JNI
strings libfoo.so | grep -i "RegisterNatives" -n # static-registered JNI
```
4. **Load in a decompiler** (Ghidra ≥ 11.0, IDA Pro, Binary Ninja, Hopper or Cutter/Rizin) and run auto-analysis.
Newer Ghidra versions introduced an AArch64 decompiler that recognises PAC/BTI stubs and MTE tags, greatly improving analysis of libraries built with the Android 14 NDK.
5. **Decide on static vs dynamic reversing:** stripped, obfuscated code often needs *instrumentation* (Frida, ptrace/gdbserver, LLDB).
---
### Dynamic Instrumentation (Frida ≥ 16)
Fridas 16-series brought several Android-specific improvements that help when the target uses modern Clang/LLD optimisations:
* `thumb-relocator` can now *hook tiny ARM/Thumb functions* generated by LLDs aggressive alignment (`--icf=all`).
* Enumerating and rebinding *ELF import slots* works on Android, enabling per-module `dlopen()`/`dlsym()` patching when inline hooks are rejected.
* Java hooking was fixed for the new **ART quick-entrypoint** used when apps are compiled with `--enable-optimizations` on Android 14.
Example: enumerating all functions registered through `RegisterNatives` and dumping their addresses at runtime:
```javascript
Java.perform(function () {
var Runtime = Java.use('java.lang.Runtime');
var register = Module.findExportByName(null, 'RegisterNatives');
Interceptor.attach(register, {
onEnter(args) {
var envPtr = args[0];
var clazz = Java.cast(args[1], Java.use('java.lang.Class'));
var methods = args[2];
var count = args[3].toInt32();
console.log('[+] RegisterNatives on ' + clazz.getName() + ' -> ' + count + ' methods');
// iterate & dump (JNI nativeMethod struct: name, sig, fnPtr)
}
});
});
```
Frida will work out of the box on PAC/BTI-enabled devices (Pixel 8/Android 14+) as long as you use frida-server 16.2 or later earlier versions failed to locate padding for inline hooks.
### Process-local JNI telemetry via preloaded .so (SoTap)
When full-featured instrumentation is overkill or blocked, you can still gain native-level visibility by preloading a small logger inside the target process. SoTap is a lightweight Android native (.so) library that logs the runtime behavior of other JNI (.so) libraries within the same app process (no root required).
Key properties:
- Initializes early and observes JNI/native interactions inside the process that loads it.
- Persists logs using multiple writable paths with graceful fallback to Logcat when storage is restricted.
- Source-customizable: edit sotap.c to extend/adjust what gets logged and rebuild per ABI.
Setup (repack the APK):
1) Drop the proper ABI build into the APK so the loader can resolve libsotap.so:
- lib/arm64-v8a/libsotap.so (for arm64)
- lib/armeabi-v7a/libsotap.so (for arm32)
2) Ensure SoTap loads before other JNI libs. Inject a call early (e.g., Application subclass static initializer or onCreate) so the logger is initialized first. Smali snippet example:
```smali
const-string v0, "sotap"
invoke-static {v0}, Ljava/lang/System;->loadLibrary(Ljava/lang/String;)V
```
3) Rebuild/sign/install, run the app, then collect logs.
Log paths (checked in order):
```
/data/user/0/%s/files/sotap.log
/data/data/%s/files/sotap.log
/sdcard/Android/data/%s/files/sotap.log
/sdcard/Download/sotap-%s.log
# If all fail: fallback to Logcat only
```
Notes and troubleshooting:
- ABI alignment is mandatory. A mismatch will raise UnsatisfiedLinkError and the logger wont load.
- Storage constraints are common on modern Android; if file writes fail, SoTap will still emit via Logcat.
- Behavior/verbosity is intended to be customized; rebuild from source after editing sotap.c.
This approach is useful for malware triage and JNI debugging where observing native call flows from process start is critical but root/system-wide hooks arent available.
---
### See also: inmemory native code execution via JNI
A common attack pattern is to download a raw shellcode blob at runtime and execute it directly from memory through a JNI bridge (no ondisk ELF). Details and readytouse JNI snippet here:
{{#ref}}
in-memory-jni-shellcode-execution.md
{{#endref}}
---
### Recent vulnerabilities worth hunting for in APKs
| Year | CVE | Affected library | Notes |
|------|-----|------------------|-------|
|2023|CVE-2023-4863|`libwebp` ≤ 1.3.1|Heap buffer overflow reachable from native code that decodes WebP images. Several Android apps bundle vulnerable versions. When you see a `libwebp.so` inside an APK, check its version and attempt exploitation or patching.| |
|2024|Multiple|OpenSSL 3.x series|Several memory-safety and padding-oracle issues. Many Flutter & ReactNative bundles ship their own `libcrypto.so`.|
When you spot *third-party* `.so` files inside an APK, always cross-check their hash against upstream advisories. SCA (Software Composition Analysis) is uncommon on mobile, so outdated vulnerable builds are rampant.
---
### Anti-Reversing & Hardening trends (Android 13-15)
* **Pointer Authentication (PAC) & Branch Target Identification (BTI):** Android 14 enables PAC/BTI in system libraries on supported ARMv8.3+ silicon. Decompilers now display PACrelated pseudo-instructions; for dynamic analysis Frida injects trampolines *after* stripping PAC, but your custom trampolines should call `pacda`/`autibsp` where necessary.
* **MTE & Scudo hardened allocator:** memory-tagging is opt-in but many Play-Integrity aware apps build with `-fsanitize=memtag`; use `setprop arm64.memtag.dump 1` plus `adb shell am start ...` to capture tag faults.
* **LLVM Obfuscator (opaque predicates, control-flow flattening):** commercial packers (e.g., Bangcle, SecNeo) increasingly protect *native* code, not only Java; expect bogus control-flow and encrypted string blobs in `.rodata`.
---
### Resources
- **Learning ARM Assembly:** [Azeria Labs ARM Assembly Basics](https://azeria-labs.com/writing-arm-assembly-part-1/)
- **JNI & NDK Documentation:** [Oracle JNI Spec](https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/guides/jni/spec/jniTOC.html) · [Android JNI Tips](https://developer.android.com/training/articles/perf-jni) · [NDK Guides](https://developer.android.com/ndk/guides/)
- **Debugging Native Libraries:** [Debug Android Native Libraries Using JEB Decompiler](https://medium.com/@shubhamsonani/how-to-debug-android-native-libraries-using-jeb-decompiler-eec681a22cf3)
### References
- Frida 16.x change-log (Android hooking, tiny-function relocation) [frida.re/news](https://frida.re/news/)
- NVD advisory for `libwebp` overflow CVE-2023-4863 [nvd.nist.gov](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863)
- SoTap: Lightweight in-app JNI (.so) behavior logger [github.com/RezaArbabBot/SoTap](https://github.com/RezaArbabBot/SoTap)
- SoTap Releases [github.com/RezaArbabBot/SoTap/releases](https://github.com/RezaArbabBot/SoTap/releases)
- How to work with SoTap? [t.me/ForYouTillEnd/13](https://t.me/ForYouTillEnd/13)
- [CoRPhone — JNI memory-only execution pattern and packaging](https://github.com/0xdevil/corphone)
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