Add content from: Research Update: Enhanced src/pentesting-web/deserialization...

src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-java-deserialization-objectinputstream-readobject.md

@@ -2,16 +2,26 @@
 
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-In this POST it's going to be explained an example using `java.io.Serializable`.
+In this POST it's going to be explained an example using `java.io.Serializable` **and why overriding `readObject()` can be extremely dangerous if the incoming stream is attacker-controlled**.
 
 ## Serializable
 
-The Java `Serializable` interface (`java.io.Serializable` is a marker interface your classes must implement if they are to be **serialized** and **deserialized**. Java object serialization (writing) is done with the [ObjectOutputStream](http://tutorials.jenkov.com/java-io/objectoutputstream.html) and deserialization (reading) is done with the [ObjectInputStream](http://tutorials.jenkov.com/java-io/objectinputstream.html).
+The Java `Serializable` interface (`java.io.Serializable`) is a marker interface your classes must implement if they are to be **serialized** and **deserialized**. Java object serialization (writing) is done with the [`ObjectOutputStream`](http://tutorials.jenkov.com/java-io/objectoutputstream.html) and deserialization (reading) is done with the [`ObjectInputStream`](http://tutorials.jenkov.com/java-io/objectinputstream.html).
+
+### Reminder: Which methods are implicitly invoked during deserialization?
+
+1. `readObject()` – class-specific read logic (if implemented and *private*).
+2. `readResolve()` – can replace the deserialized object with another one.
+3. `validateObject()` – via `ObjectInputValidation` callbacks.
+4. `readExternal()` – for classes implementing `Externalizable`.
+5. Constructors are **not** executed – therefore gadget chains rely exclusively on the previous callbacks.
+
+Any method in that chain that ends up invoking attacker-controlled data (command execution, JNDI lookups, reflection, etc.) turns the deserialization routine into an RCE gadget.
 
 Lets see an example with a **class Person** which is **serializable**. This class **overwrites the readObject** function, so when **any object** of this **class** is **deserialized** this **function** is going to be **executed**.\
-In the example, the **readObject function** of the class Person calls the function `eat()` of his pet and the function `eat()` of a Dog (for some reason) calls a **calc.exe**. **We are going to see how to serialize and deserialize a Person object to execute this calculator:**
+In the example, the **readObject** function of the class Person calls the function `eat()` of his pet and the function `eat()` of a Dog (for some reason) calls a **calc.exe**. **We are going to see how to serialize and deserialize a Person object to execute this calculator:**
 
-**The following example is from [https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/java-deserialization-tool-gadgetinspector-first-glimpse-74e99e493649](https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/java-deserialization-tool-gadgetinspector-first-glimpse-74e99e493649)**
+**The following example is from <https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/java-deserialization-tool-gadgetinspector-first-glimpse-74e99e493649>**
 
 ```java
 import java.io.Serializable;
@@ -84,11 +94,63 @@ public class TestDeserialization {
 }
 ```
 
-### Conclusion
+### Conclusion (classic scenario)
 
-As you can see in this very basic example, the "vulnerability" here appears because the **readObject** function is **calling other vulnerable functions**.
+As you can see in this very basic example, the “vulnerability” here appears because the **readObject()** method is **calling other attacker-controlled code**. In real-world gadget chains, thousands of classes contained in external libraries (Commons-Collections, Spring, Groovy, Rome, SnakeYAML, etc.) can be abused – the attacker only needs *one* reachable gadget to get code execution.
+
+---
+
+## 2023-2025: What’s new in Java deserialization attacks?
+
+* 2023 – CVE-2023-34040: Spring-Kafka deserialization of error-record headers when `checkDeserExWhen*` flags are enabled allowed arbitrary gadget construction from attacker-published topics. Fixed in 3.0.10 / 2.9.11. ¹
+* 2023 – CVE-2023-36480: Aerospike Java client trusted-server assumption broken – malicious server replies contained serialized payloads that were deserialized by the client → RCE. ²
+* 2023 – CVE-2023-25581: `pac4j-core` user profile attribute parsing accepted `{#sb64}`-prefixed Base64 blobs and deserialized them despite a `RestrictedObjectInputStream`. Upgrade ≥ 4.0.0.
+* 2023 – CVE-2023-4528: JSCAPE MFT Manager Service (port 10880) accepted XML-encoded Java objects leading to RCE as root/SYSTEM.
+* 2024 – Multiple new gadget chains were added to ysoserial-plus(mod) including Hibernate5, TomcatEmbed, and SnakeYAML 2.x classes that bypass some old filters.
+
+## Modern mitigations you should deploy
+
+1. **JEP 290 / Serialization Filtering (Java 9+)**  
+   *Add an allow-list or deny-list of classes:*  
+   ```bash
+   # Accept only your DTOs and java.base, reject everything else
+   -Djdk.serialFilter="com.example.dto.*;java.base/*;!*"
+   ```
+   Programmatic example:
+   ```java
+   var filter = ObjectInputFilter.Config.createFilter("com.example.dto.*;java.base/*;!*" );
+   ObjectInputFilter.Config.setSerialFilter(filter);
+   ```
+2. **JEP 415 (Java 17+) Context-Specific Filter Factories** – use a `BinaryOperator<ObjectInputFilter>` to apply different filters per execution context (e.g., per RMI call, per message queue consumer).
+3. **Do not expose raw `ObjectInputStream` over the wire** – prefer JSON/Binary encodings without code execution semantics (Jackson after disabling `DefaultTyping`, Protobuf, Avro, etc.).
+4. **Defense-in-Depth limits** – Set maximum array length, depth, references:
+   ```bash
+   -Djdk.serialFilter="maxbytes=16384;maxdepth=5;maxrefs=1000"
+   ```
+5. **Continuous gadget scanning** – run tools such as `gadget-inspector` or `serialpwn-cli` in your CI to fail the build if a dangerous gadget becomes reachable.
+
+## Updated tooling cheat-sheet (2024)
+
+* `ysoserial-plus.jar` – community fork with > 130 gadget chains:
+  ```bash
+  java -jar ysoserial-plus.jar CommonsCollections6 'calc' | base64 -w0
+  ```
+* `marshalsec` – still the reference for JNDI gadget generation (LDAP/RMI).  
+* `gadget-probe` – fast black-box gadget discovery against network services.
+* `SerialSniffer` – JVMTI agent that prints every class read by `ObjectInputStream` (useful to craft filters).
+* **Detection tip** – enable `-Djdk.serialDebug=true` (JDK 22+) to log filter decisions and rejected classes.
+
+## Quick checklist for secure `readObject()` implementations
+
+1. Make the method `private` and add the `@Serial` annotation (helps static analysis).
+2. Never call user-supplied methods or perform I/O in the method – only read fields.
+3. If validation is needed, perform it **after** deserialization, outside of `readObject()`.
+4. Prefer implementing `Externalizable` and do explicit field reads instead of default serialization.
+5. Register a hardened `ObjectInputFilter` even for internal services (compromise-resilient design).
+
+## References
+
+1. Spring Security Advisory – CVE-2023-34040 Java Deserialization in Spring-Kafka (Aug 2023)
+2. GitHub Security Lab – GHSL-2023-044: Unsafe Deserialization in Aerospike Java Client (Jul 2023)
 
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