mirror of
https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks.git
synced 2025-10-10 18:36:50 +00:00
Merge pull request #1095 from HackTricks-wiki/research_update_src_pentesting-web_rate-limit-bypass_20250711_012858
Research Update Enhanced src/pentesting-web/rate-limit-bypas...
This commit is contained in:
commit
ad720976e8
@ -54,11 +54,74 @@ If the target system applies rate limits on a per-account or per-session basis,
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Note that even if a rate limit is in place you should try to see if the response is different when the valid OTP is sent. In [**this post**](https://mokhansec.medium.com/the-2-200-ato-most-bug-hunters-overlooked-by-closing-intruder-too-soon-505f21d56732), the bug hunter discovered that even if a rate limit is triggered after 20 unsuccessful attempts by responding with 401, if the valid one was sent a 200 response was received.
|
Note that even if a rate limit is in place you should try to see if the response is different when the valid OTP is sent. In [**this post**](https://mokhansec.medium.com/the-2-200-ato-most-bug-hunters-overlooked-by-closing-intruder-too-soon-505f21d56732), the bug hunter discovered that even if a rate limit is triggered after 20 unsuccessful attempts by responding with 401, if the valid one was sent a 200 response was received.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Tools
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- [**https://github.com/Hashtag-AMIN/hashtag-fuzz**](https://github.com/Hashtag-AMIN/hashtag-fuzz): hashtag-fuzz is a fuzzing tool designed to test and bypass WAFs and CDNs. By leveraging advanced features such as random User-Agent and header value, random delays, handle multi-threading, selective chunking of wordlists and Round Robin proxy rotation for each chunked, it offers a robust solution for security professionals aiming to identify vulnerabilities in web applications.
|
### Abusing HTTP/2 multiplexing & request pipelining (2023-2025)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Modern rate–limiter implementations frequently count **TCP connections** (or even individual HTTP/1.1 requests) instead of the *number of HTTP/2 streams* a connection contains. When the same TLS connection is reused, an attacker can open hundreds of parallel streams, each carrying a separate request, while the gateway only deducts *one* request from the quota.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```bash
|
||||||
|
# Send 100 POST requests in a single HTTP/2 connection with curl
|
||||||
|
seq 1 100 | xargs -I@ -P0 curl -k --http2-prior-knowledge -X POST \
|
||||||
|
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||||
|
-d '{"code":"@"}' https://target/api/v2/verify &>/dev/null
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If the limiter protects only `/verify` but not `/api/v2/verify`, you can also combine **path confusion** with HTTP/2 multiplexing for *extremely* high-speed OTP or credential brute-forcing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
> 🐾 **Tip:** PortSwigger’s [Turbo Intruder](https://portswigger.net/research/turbo-intruder) supports HTTP/2 and lets you fine-tune `maxConcurrentConnections` and `requestsPerConnection` to automate this attack.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### GraphQL aliases & batched operations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
GraphQL allows the client to send **several logically independent queries or mutations in a single request** by prefixing them with *aliases*. Because the server executes every alias but the rate-limiter often counts only *one* request, this is a reliable bypass for login or password-reset throttling.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```graphql
|
||||||
|
mutation bruteForceOTP {
|
||||||
|
a: verify(code:"111111") { token }
|
||||||
|
b: verify(code:"222222") { token }
|
||||||
|
c: verify(code:"333333") { token }
|
||||||
|
# … add up to dozens of aliases …
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Look at the response: exactly one alias will return 200 OK when the correct code is hit, while the others are rate-limited.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The technique was popularised by PortSwigger’s research on “GraphQL batching & aliases” in 2023 and has been responsible for many recent bug-bounty payouts.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Abuse of *batch* or *bulk* REST endpoints
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Some APIs expose helper endpoints such as `/v2/batch` or accept an **array of objects** in the request body. If the limiter is placed in front of the *legacy* endpoints only, wrapping multiple operations inside a single bulk request may completely sidestep the protection.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```json
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
{"path": "/login", "method": "POST", "body": {"user":"bob","pass":"123"}},
|
||||||
|
{"path": "/login", "method": "POST", "body": {"user":"bob","pass":"456"}}
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Timing the sliding-window
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A classic token-bucket or leaky-bucket limiter *resets* on a fixed time boundary (for example, every minute). If the window is known (e.g. via error messages such as `X-RateLimit-Reset: 27`), fire the maximum allowed number of requests **just before** the bucket resets, then immediately fire another full burst.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|<-- 60 s window ‑->|<-- 60 s window ‑->|
|
||||||
|
###### ######
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This simple optimisation can more than double your throughput without touching any other bypass technique.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Tools
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [**https://github.com/Hashtag-AMIN/hashtag-fuzz**](https://github.com/Hashtag-AMIN/hashtag-fuzz): Fuzzing tool that supports header randomisation, chunked word-lists and round-robin proxy rotation.
|
||||||
|
- [**https://github.com/ustayready/fireprox**](https://github.com/ustayready/fireprox): Automatically creates disposable AWS API Gateway endpoints so every request originates from a different IP address – perfect for defeating IP-based throttling.
|
||||||
|
- **Burp Suite – IPRotate + extension**: Uses a pool of SOCKS/HTTP proxies (or AWS API Gateway) to rotate the source IP transparently during *Intruder* and *Turbo Intruder* attacks.
|
||||||
|
- **Turbo Intruder (BApp)**: High-performance attack engine supporting HTTP/2 multiplexing; tune `requestsPerConnection` to 100-1000 to collapse hundreds of requests into a single connection.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## References
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- PortSwigger Research – “Bypassing rate limits with GraphQL aliasing” (2023) <https://portswigger.net/research/graphql-authorization-bypass>
|
||||||
|
- PortSwigger Research – “HTTP/2: The Sequel is Always Worse” (section *Connection-based throttling*) (2024) <https://portswigger.net/research/http2>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user