Merge pull request #1246 from HackTricks-wiki/research_update_src_macos-hardening_macos-security-and-privilege-escalation_mac-os-architecture_macos-kernel-extensions_20250806_082904

Research Update Enhanced src/macos-hardening/macos-security-...
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Kernel extensions (Kexts) are **packages** with a **`.kext`** extension that are **loaded directly into the macOS kernel space**, providing additional functionality to the main operating system.
### Deprecation status & DriverKit / System Extensions
Starting with **macOS Catalina (10.15)** Apple marked most legacy KPIs as *deprecated* and introduced the **System Extensions & DriverKit** frameworks that run in **user-space**. From **macOS Big Sur (11)** the operating system will *refuse to load* third-party kexts that rely on deprecated KPIs unless the machine is booted in **Reduced Security** mode. On Apple Silicon, enabling kexts additionally requires the user to:
1. Reboot into **Recovery***Startup Security Utility*.
2. Select **Reduced Security** and tick **“Allow user management of kernel extensions from identified developers”**.
3. Reboot and approve the kext from **System Settings → Privacy & Security**.
User-land drivers written with DriverKit/System Extensions dramatically **reduce attack surface** because crashes or memory corruption are confined to a sandboxed process rather than kernel space.
> 📝 From macOS Sequoia (15) Apple has removed several legacy networking and USB KPIs entirely the only forward-compatible solution for vendors is to migrate to System Extensions.
### Requirements
Obviously, this is so powerful that it is **complicated to load a kernel extension**. These are the **requirements** that a kernel extension must meet to be loaded:
@ -34,16 +45,41 @@ In Catalina it was like this: It is interesting to note that the **verification*
If **`kextd`** is not available, **`kextutil`** can perform the same checks.
### Enumeration (loaded kexts)
### Enumeration & management (loaded kexts)
`kextstat` was the historical tool but it is **deprecated** in recent macOS releases. The modern interface is **`kmutil`**:
```bash
# Get loaded kernel extensions
# List every extension currently linked in the kernel, sorted by load address
sudo kmutil showloaded --sort
# Show only third-party / auxiliary collections
sudo kmutil showloaded --collection aux
# Unload a specific bundle
sudo kmutil unload -b com.example.mykext
```
Older syntax is still available for reference:
```bash
# (Deprecated) Get loaded kernel extensions
kextstat
# Get dependencies of the kext number 22
# (Deprecated) Get dependencies of the kext number 22
kextstat | grep " 22 " | cut -c2-5,50- | cut -d '(' -f1
```
`kmutil inspect` can also be leveraged to **dump the contents of a Kernel Collection (KC)** or verify that a kext resolves all symbol dependencies:
```bash
# List fileset entries contained in the boot KC
kmutil inspect -B /System/Library/KernelCollections/BootKernelExtensions.kc --show-fileset-entries
# Check undefined symbols of a 3rd party kext before loading
kmutil libraries -p /Library/Extensions/FancyUSB.kext --undef-symbols
```
## Kernelcache
> [!CAUTION]
@ -78,7 +114,7 @@ It's usually composed of the following components:
Decompress the Kernelcache:
```bash
# img4tool (https://github.com/tihmstar/img4tool
# img4tool (https://github.com/tihmstar/img4tool)
img4tool -e kernelcache.release.iphone14 -o kernelcache.release.iphone14.e
# pyimg4 (https://github.com/m1stadev/PyIMG4)
@ -140,14 +176,68 @@ kextex_all kernelcache.release.iphone14.e
nm -a binaries/com.apple.security.sandbox | wc -l
```
## Debugging
## Recent vulnerabilities & exploitation techniques
## Referencias
| Year | CVE | Summary |
|------|-----|---------|
| 2024 | **CVE-2024-44243** | Logic flaw in **`storagekitd`** allowed a *root* attacker to register a malicious file-system bundle that ultimately loaded an **unsigned kext**, **bypassing System Integrity Protection (SIP)** and enabling persistent rootkits. Patched in macOS 14.2 / 15.2. |
| 2021 | **CVE-2021-30892** (*Shrootless*) | Installation daemon with the entitlement `com.apple.rootless.install` could be abused to execute arbitrary post-install scripts, disable SIP and load arbitrary kexts. |
- [https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-enable-third-party-kernel-extensions-apple-silicon-mac/](https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-enable-third-party-kernel-extensions-apple-silicon-mac/)
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGKOskSiaQo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGKOskSiaQo)
**Take-aways for red-teamers**
1. **Look for entitled daemons (`codesign -dvv /path/bin | grep entitlements`) that interact with Disk Arbitration, Installer or Kext Management.**
2. **Abusing SIP bypasses almost always grants the ability to load a kext → kernel code execution**.
**Defensive tips**
*Keep SIP enabled*, monitor for `kmutil load`/`kmutil create -n aux` invocations coming from non-Apple binaries and alert on any write to `/Library/Extensions`. Endpoint Security events `ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_KEXTLOAD` provide near real-time visibility.
## Debugging macOS kernel & kexts
Apples recommended workflow is to build a **Kernel Debug Kit (KDK)** that matches the running build and then attach **LLDB** over a **KDP (Kernel Debugging Protocol)** network session.
### One-shot local debug of a panic
```bash
# Create a symbolication bundle for the latest panic
sudo kdpwrit dump latest.kcdata
kmutil analyze-panic latest.kcdata -o ~/panic_report.txt
```
### Live remote debugging from another Mac
1. Download + install the exact **KDK** version for the target machine.
2. Connect the target Mac and the host Mac with a **USB-C or Thunderbolt cable**.
3. On the **target**:
```bash
sudo nvram boot-args="debug=0x100 kdp_match_name=macbook-target"
reboot
```
4. On the **host**:
```bash
lldb
(lldb) kdp-remote "udp://macbook-target"
(lldb) bt # get backtrace in kernel context
```
### Attaching LLDB to a specific loaded kext
```bash
# Identify load address of the kext
ADDR=$(kmutil showloaded --bundle-identifier com.example.driver | awk '{print $4}')
# Attach
sudo lldb -n kernel_task -o "target modules load --file /Library/Extensions/Example.kext/Contents/MacOS/Example --slide $ADDR"
```
> KDP only exposes a **read-only** interface. For dynamic instrumentation you will need to patch the binary on-disk, leverage **kernel function hooking** (e.g. `mach_override`) or migrate the driver to a **hypervisor** for full read/write.
## References
- DriverKit Security Apple Platform Security Guide
- Microsoft Security Blog *Analyzing CVE-2024-44243 SIP bypass*
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