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Add content from: Automating MS-RPC vulnerability research
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@ -89,8 +89,89 @@ It is possible to execute remote code on a machine, if the credentials of a vali
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The **rpcdump.exe** from [rpctools](https://resources.oreilly.com/examples/9780596510305/tree/master/tools/rpctools) can interact with this port.
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### Automated Interface Enumeration & Dynamic Client Generation (NtObjectManager)
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PowerShell guru **James Forshaw** exposed most of the Windows RPC internals inside the open–source *NtObjectManager* module. Using it you can turn any RPC server DLL / EXE into a **fully-featured client stub** in seconds – no IDL, MIDL or manual unmarshalling required.
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```powershell
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# Install the module once
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Install-Module NtObjectManager -Force
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# Parse every RPC interface exported by the target binary
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$rpcinterfaces = Get-RpcServer "C:\Windows\System32\efssvc.dll"
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$rpcinterfaces | Format-Table Name,Uuid,Version,Procedures
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# Inspect a single procedure (opnum 0)
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$rpcinterfaces[0].Procedures[0] | Format-List *
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```
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Typical output exposes parameter types exactly as they appear in **MIDL** (e.g. `FC_C_WSTRING`, `FC_LONG`, `FC_BIND_CONTEXT`).
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Once you know the interface you can **generate a ready-to-compile C# client**:
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```powershell
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# Reverse the MS-EFSR (EfsRpc*) interface into C#
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Format-RpcClient $rpcinterfaces[0] -Namespace MS_EFSR -OutputPath .\MS_EFSR.cs
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```
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Inside the produced stub you will find methods such as:
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```csharp
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public int EfsRpcOpenFileRaw(out Marshal.NdrContextHandle ctx, string FileName, int Flags) {
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// marshals parameters & calls opnum 0
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}
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```
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The PowerShell helper `Get-RpcClient` can create an **interactive client object** so you can call the procedure immediately:
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```powershell
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$client = Get-RpcClient $rpcinterfaces[0]
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Connect-RpcClient $client -stringbinding 'ncacn_np:127.0.0.1[\\pipe\\efsrpc]' `
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-AuthenticationLevel PacketPrivacy `
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-AuthenticationType WinNT # NTLM auth
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# Invoke the procedure → returns an authenticated context handle
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$ctx = New-Object Marshal.NdrContextHandle
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$client.EfsRpcOpenFileRaw([ref]$ctx, "\\\127.0.0.1\test", 0)
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```
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Authentication (Kerberos / NTLM) and encryption levels (`PacketIntegrity`, `PacketPrivacy`, …) can be supplied directly via the `Connect-RpcClient` cmdlet – ideal for **bypassing Security Descriptors** that protect high-privilege named pipes.
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---
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### Context-Aware RPC Fuzzing (MS-RPC-Fuzzer)
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Static interface knowledge is great, but what you really want is **coverage-guided fuzzing** that understands *context handles* and complex parameter chains. The open-source **MS-RPC-Fuzzer** project automates exactly that workflow:
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1. Enumerate every interface/procedure exported by the target binary (`Get-RpcServer`).
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2. Generate dynamic clients for each interface (`Format-RpcClient`).
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3. Randomise input parameters (wide strings length, integer ranges, enums) while respecting the original **NDR type**.
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4. Track *context handles* returned by one call to feed follow-up procedures automatically.
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5. Fire high-volume calls against the chosen transport (ALPC, TCP, HTTP or named pipe).
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6. Log exit statuses / faults / timeouts and export a **Neo4j** import file to visualise *interface → procedure → parameter* relationships and crash clusters.
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Example run (named–pipe target):
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```powershell
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Invoke-MSRPCFuzzer -Pipe "\\.\pipe\efsrpc" -Auth NTLM `
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-MinLen 1 -MaxLen 0x400 `
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-Iterations 100000 `
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-OutDir .\results
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```
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A single out-of-bounds write or unexpected exception will be surfaced immediately with the exact opnum + fuzzed payload that triggered it – perfect starting point for a stable proof-of-concept exploit.
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> ⚠️ Many RPC services execute in processes running as **NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**. Any memory-safety issue here usually translates to local privilege escalation or (when exposed over SMB/135) *remote code execution*.
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---
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## References
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- [Automating MS-RPC vulnerability research (2025, Incendium.rocks)](https://www.incendium.rocks/posts/Automating-MS-RPC-Vulnerability-Research/)
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- [MS-RPC-Fuzzer – context-aware RPC fuzzer](https://github.com/warpnet/MS-RPC-Fuzzer)
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- [NtObjectManager PowerShell module](https://github.com/googleprojectzero/sandbox-attacksurface-analysis-tools/tree/master/NtObjectManager)
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- [https://www.cyber.airbus.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-1-remote-enumeration-of-network-interfaces-without-any-authentication/](https://www.cyber.airbus.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-1-remote-enumeration-of-network-interfaces-without-any-authentication/)
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- [https://www.cyber.airbus.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-2-accessing-a-remote-object-inside-dcom/](https://www.cyber.airbus.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-2-accessing-a-remote-object-inside-dcom/)
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- [https://0xffsec.com/handbook/services/msrpc/](https://0xffsec.com/handbook/services/msrpc/)
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