mirror of
https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks.git
synced 2025-10-10 18:36:50 +00:00
Add content from: Research Update: Enhanced src/windows-hardening/active-direc...
This commit is contained in:
parent
cec78bcdf8
commit
431f25c0fc
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The same technique applies to any handset that has a publicly available NexMon p
|
||||
* NexMon Magisk ZIP or self-compiled patch providing:
|
||||
* `/system/lib*/libnexmon.so`
|
||||
* `/system/xbin/nexutil`
|
||||
* Hijacker ≥ 1.7 (arm/arm64) – https://github.com/chrisk44/Hijacker
|
||||
* Hijacker ≥ 1.7 (arm/arm64) – [https://github.com/chrisk44/Hijacker](https://github.com/chrisk44/Hijacker)
|
||||
* (Optional) Kali NetHunter or any Linux chroot where you intend to run wireless tools
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@ -130,4 +130,4 @@ Performance on the Galaxy S10 is comparable to external USB NICs (~20 dBm TX, 2-
|
||||
* [NexMon – firmware patching framework](https://github.com/seemoo-lab/nexmon)
|
||||
* [Hijacker (aircrack-ng GUI for Android)](https://github.com/chrisk44/Hijacker)
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ Recent Frida releases (>=16) automatically handle pointer authentication and oth
|
||||
|
||||
### Automated dynamic analysis with MobSF (no jailbreak)
|
||||
|
||||
[MobSF](https://mobsf.github.io/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/) can instrument a dev-signed IPA on a real device using the same technique (`get_task_allow`) and provides a web UI with filesystem browser, traffic capture and Frida console【†L2-L3】. The quickest way is to run MobSF in Docker and then plug your iPhone via USB:
|
||||
[MobSF](https://mobsf.github.io/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/) can instrument a dev-signed IPA on a real device using the same technique (`get_task_allow`) and provides a web UI with filesystem browser, traffic capture and Frida console【】. The quickest way is to run MobSF in Docker and then plug your iPhone via USB:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
docker pull opensecurity/mobile-security-framework-mobsf:latest
|
||||
|
@ -139,4 +139,4 @@ After a shell is obtained remember that **TTYs are usually dumb**; upgrade with
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include /banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
@ -2,60 +2,108 @@
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
There are several blogs in the Internet which **highlight the dangers of leaving printers configured with LDAP with default/weak** logon credentials.\
|
||||
This is because an attacker could **trick the printer to authenticate against a rouge LDAP server** (typically a `nc -vv -l -p 444` is enough) and to capture the printer **credentials on clear-text**.
|
||||
There are several blogs in the Internet which **highlight the dangers of leaving printers configured with LDAP with default/weak** logon credentials. \
|
||||
This is because an attacker could **trick the printer to authenticate against a rogue LDAP server** (typically a `nc -vv -l -p 389` or `slapd -d 2` is enough) and capture the printer **credentials in clear-text**.
|
||||
|
||||
Also, several printers will contains **logs with usernames** or could even be able to **download all usernames** from the Domain Controller.
|
||||
Also, several printers will contain **logs with usernames** or could even be able to **download all usernames** from the Domain Controller.
|
||||
|
||||
All this **sensitive information** and the common **lack of security** makes printers very interesting for attackers.
|
||||
|
||||
Some blogs about the topic:
|
||||
Some introductory blogs about the topic:
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://www.ceos3c.com/hacking/obtaining-domain-credentials-printer-netcat/](https://www.ceos3c.com/hacking/obtaining-domain-credentials-printer-netcat/)
|
||||
- [https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856](https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Printer Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
- **Location**: The LDAP server list is found at: `Network > LDAP Setting > Setting Up LDAP`.
|
||||
- **Behavior**: The interface allows LDAP server modifications without re-entering credentials, aiming for user convenience but posing security risks.
|
||||
- **Exploit**: The exploit involves redirecting the LDAP server address to a controlled machine and leveraging the "Test Connection" feature to capture credentials.
|
||||
- **Location**: The LDAP server list is usually found in the web interface (e.g. *Network ➜ LDAP Setting ➜ Setting Up LDAP*).
|
||||
- **Behavior**: Many embedded web servers allow LDAP server modifications **without re-entering credentials** (usability feature → security risk).
|
||||
- **Exploit**: Redirect the LDAP server address to an attacker-controlled host and use the *Test Connection* / *Address Book Sync* button to force the printer to bind to you.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Capturing Credentials
|
||||
|
||||
**For more detailed steps, refer to the original [source](https://grimhacker.com/2018/03/09/just-a-printer/).**
|
||||
|
||||
### Method 1: Netcat Listener
|
||||
|
||||
A simple netcat listener might suffice:
|
||||
### Method 1 – Netcat Listener
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sudo nc -k -v -l -p 386
|
||||
sudo nc -k -v -l -p 389 # LDAPS → 636 (or 3269)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
However, this method's success varies.
|
||||
Small/old MFPs may send a simple *simple-bind* in clear-text that netcat can capture. Modern devices usually perform an anonymous query first and then attempt the bind, so results vary.
|
||||
|
||||
### Method 2: Full LDAP Server with Slapd
|
||||
### Method 2 – Full Rogue LDAP server (recommended)
|
||||
|
||||
A more reliable approach involves setting up a full LDAP server because the printer performs a null bind followed by a query before attempting credential binding.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **LDAP Server Setup**: The guide follows steps from [this source](https://www.server-world.info/en/note?os=Fedora_26&p=openldap).
|
||||
2. **Key Steps**:
|
||||
- Install OpenLDAP.
|
||||
- Configure admin password.
|
||||
- Import basic schemas.
|
||||
- Set domain name on LDAP DB.
|
||||
- Configure LDAP TLS.
|
||||
3. **LDAP Service Execution**: Once set up, the LDAP service can be run using:
|
||||
Because many devices will issue an anonymous search *before* authenticating, standing up a real LDAP daemon yields much more reliable results:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
slapd -d 2
|
||||
# Debian/Ubuntu example
|
||||
sudo apt install slapd ldap-utils
|
||||
sudo dpkg-reconfigure slapd # set any base-DN – it will not be validated
|
||||
|
||||
# run slapd in foreground / debug 2
|
||||
slapd -d 2 -h "ldap:///" # only LDAP, no LDAPS
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
When the printer performs its lookup you will see the clear-text credentials in the debug output.
|
||||
|
||||
> 💡 You can also use `impacket/examples/ldapd.py` (Python rogue LDAP) or `Responder -w -r -f` to harvest NTLMv2 hashes over LDAP/SMB.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Recent Pass-Back Vulnerabilities (2024-2025)
|
||||
|
||||
Pass-back is *not* a theoretical issue – vendors keep publishing advisories in 2024/2025 that exactly describe this attack class.
|
||||
|
||||
### Xerox VersaLink – CVE-2024-12510 & CVE-2024-12511
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware ≤ 57.69.91 of Xerox VersaLink C70xx MFPs allowed an authenticated admin (or anyone when default creds remain) to:
|
||||
|
||||
* **CVE-2024-12510 – LDAP pass-back**: change the LDAP server address and trigger a lookup, causing the device to leak the configured Windows credentials to the attacker-controlled host.
|
||||
* **CVE-2024-12511 – SMB/FTP pass-back**: identical issue via *scan-to-folder* destinations, leaking NetNTLMv2 or FTP clear-text creds.
|
||||
|
||||
A simple listener such as:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sudo nc -k -v -l -p 389 # capture LDAP bind
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
or a rogue SMB server (`impacket-smbserver`) is enough to harvest the credentials.
|
||||
|
||||
### Canon imageRUNNER / imageCLASS – Advisory 20 May 2025
|
||||
|
||||
Canon confirmed a **SMTP/LDAP pass-back** weakness in dozens of Laser & MFP product lines. An attacker with admin access can modify the server configuration and retrieve the stored credentials for LDAP **or** SMTP (many orgs use a privileged account to allow scan-to-mail).
|
||||
|
||||
The vendor guidance explicitly recommends:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Updating to patched firmware as soon as available.
|
||||
2. Using strong, unique admin passwords.
|
||||
3. Avoiding privileged AD accounts for printer integration.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Automated Enumeration / Exploitation Tools
|
||||
|
||||
| Tool | Purpose | Example |
|
||||
|------|---------|---------|
|
||||
| **PRET** (Printer Exploitation Toolkit) | PostScript/PJL/PCL abuse, file-system access, default-creds check, *SNMP discovery* | `python pret.py 192.168.1.50 pjl` |
|
||||
| **Praeda** | Harvest configuration (including address books & LDAP creds) via HTTP/HTTPS | `perl praeda.pl -t 192.168.1.50` |
|
||||
| **Responder / ntlmrelayx** | Capture & relay NetNTLM hashes from SMB/FTP pass-back | `responder -I eth0 -wrf` |
|
||||
| **impacket-ldapd.py** | Lightweight rogue LDAP service to receive clear-text binds | `python ldapd.py -debug` |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Hardening & Detection
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Patch / firmware-update** MFPs promptly (check vendor PSIRT bulletins).
|
||||
2. **Least-Privilege Service Accounts** – never use Domain Admin for LDAP/SMB/SMTP; restrict to *read-only* OU scopes.
|
||||
3. **Restrict Management Access** – place printer web/IPP/SNMP interfaces in a management VLAN or behind an ACL/VPN.
|
||||
4. **Disable Unused Protocols** – FTP, Telnet, raw-9100, older SSL ciphers.
|
||||
5. **Enable Audit Logging** – some devices can syslog LDAP/SMTP failures; correlate unexpected binds.
|
||||
6. **Monitor for Clear-Text LDAP binds** on unusual sources (printers should normally talk only to DCs).
|
||||
7. **SNMPv3 or disable SNMP** – community `public` often leaks device & LDAP config.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [https://grimhacker.com/2018/03/09/just-a-printer/](https://grimhacker.com/2018/03/09/just-a-printer/)
|
||||
- Rapid7. “Xerox VersaLink C7025 MFP Pass-Back Attack Vulnerabilities.” February 2025.
|
||||
- Canon PSIRT. “Vulnerability Mitigation Against SMTP/LDAP Passback for Laser Printers and Small Office Multifunction Printers.” May 2025.
|
||||
|
||||
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user