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Translated ['src/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/do
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ return 0;
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#### **`/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe`**
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- Dettagliato in [proc(5)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/proc.5.html).
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- Contiene il percorso per il caricatore di moduli del kernel, invocato per caricare i moduli del kernel.
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- Contiene il percorso del caricatore di moduli del kernel, invocato per caricare i moduli del kernel.
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- **Esempio di Controllo Accesso**:
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```bash
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@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ echo b > /proc/sysrq-trigger # Riavvia l'host
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- Fornisce informazioni sui punti di montaggio nello spazio dei nomi di montaggio del processo.
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- Espone la posizione del `rootfs` o dell'immagine del container.
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### Vulnerabilità in `/sys`
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### Vulnerabilità di `/sys`
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#### **`/sys/kernel/uevent_helper`**
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@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ the other containers' filesystems are available under a different base path:
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```bash
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$ docker info | grep -i 'docker root\|storage driver'
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Driver di archiviazione: overlay2
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Directory principale di Docker: /var/lib/docker
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Storage Driver: overlay2
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Docker Root Dir: /var/lib/docker
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```
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So the filesystems are under `/var/lib/docker/overlay2/`:
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@ -273,10 +273,10 @@ So the filesystems are under `/var/lib/docker/overlay2/`:
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```bash
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$ sudo ls -la /var/lib/docker/overlay2
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 9 gen 22:14 00762bca8ea040b1bb28b61baed5704e013ab23a196f5fe4758dafb79dfafd5d
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 11 gen 17:00 03cdf4db9a6cc9f187cca6e98cd877d581f16b62d073010571e752c305719496
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 9 gen 21:23 049e02afb3f8dec80cb229719d9484aead269ae05afe81ee5880ccde2426ef4f
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 9 gen 21:22 062f14e5adbedce75cea699828e22657c8044cd22b68ff1bb152f1a3c8a377f2
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 9 Gen 22:14 00762bca8ea040b1bb28b61baed5704e013ab23a196f5fe4758dafb79dfafd5d
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 11 Gen 17:00 03cdf4db9a6cc9f187cca6e98cd877d581f16b62d073010571e752c305719496
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 9 Gen 21:23 049e02afb3f8dec80cb229719d9484aead269ae05afe81ee5880ccde2426ef4f
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drwx--x--- 4 root root 4096 9 Gen 21:22 062f14e5adbedce75cea699828e22657c8044cd22b68ff1bb152f1a3c8a377f2
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<SNIP>
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```
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@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ Mounting certain host Unix sockets or writable pseudo-filesystems is equivalent
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/run/containerd/containerd.sock # socket CRI di containerd
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/var/run/crio/crio.sock # socket di runtime CRI-O
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/run/podman/podman.sock # API di Podman (con privilegi o senza privilegi)
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/run/buildkit/buildkitd.sock # daemon di BuildKit (con privilegi)
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/var/run/kubelet.sock # API di Kubelet sui nodi Kubernetes
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/run/firecracker-containerd.sock # Kata / Firecracker
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```
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@ -328,7 +329,7 @@ When the last process leaves the cgroup, `/tmp/pwn` runs **as root on the host**
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### Mount-Related Escape CVEs (2023-2025)
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* **CVE-2024-21626 – runc “Leaky Vessels” file-descriptor leak**
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runc ≤1.1.11 leaked an open directory file descriptor that could point to the host root. A malicious image or `docker exec` could start a container whose *working directory* is already on the host filesystem, enabling arbitrary file read/write and privilege escalation. Fixed in runc 1.1.12 (Docker ≥25.0.3, containerd ≥1.7.14).
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runc ≤ 1.1.11 leaked an open directory file descriptor that could point to the host root. A malicious image or `docker exec` could start a container whose *working directory* is already on the host filesystem, enabling arbitrary file read/write and privilege escalation. Fixed in runc 1.1.12 (Docker ≥ 25.0.3, containerd ≥ 1.7.14).
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```Dockerfile
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FROM scratch
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@ -339,11 +340,17 @@ CMD ["/bin/sh"]
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* **CVE-2024-23651 / 23653 – BuildKit OverlayFS copy-up TOCTOU**
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A race condition in the BuildKit snapshotter let an attacker replace a file that was about to be *copy-up* into the container’s rootfs with a symlink to an arbitrary path on the host, gaining write access outside the build context. Fixed in BuildKit v0.12.5 / Buildx 0.12.0. Exploitation requires an untrusted `docker build` on a vulnerable daemon.
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* **CVE-2024-1753 – Buildah / Podman bind-mount breakout during `build`**
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Buildah ≤ 1.35.0 (and Podman ≤ 4.9.3) incorrectly resolved absolute paths passed to `--mount=type=bind` in a *Containerfile*. A crafted build stage could mount `/` from the host **read-write** inside the build container when SELinux was disabled or in permissive mode, leading to full escape at build time. Patched in Buildah 1.35.1 and the corresponding Podman 4.9.4 back-port series.
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* **CVE-2024-40635 – containerd UID integer overflow**
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Supplying a `User` value larger than `2147483647` in an image config overflowed the 32-bit signed integer and started the process as UID 0 inside the host user namespace. Workloads expected to run as non-root could therefore obtain root privileges. Fixed in containerd 1.6.38 / 1.7.27 / 2.0.4.
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### Hardening Reminders (2025)
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1. Bind-mount host paths **read-only** whenever possible and add `nosuid,nodev,noexec` mount options.
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2. Prefer dedicated side-car proxies or rootless clients instead of exposing the runtime socket directly.
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3. Keep the container runtime up-to-date (runc ≥1.1.12, BuildKit ≥0.12.5, containerd ≥1.7.14).
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3. Keep the container runtime up-to-date (runc ≥ 1.1.12, BuildKit ≥ 0.12.5, Buildah ≥ 1.35.1 / Podman ≥ 4.9.4, containerd ≥ 1.7.27).
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4. In Kubernetes, use `securityContext.readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`, the *restricted* PodSecurity profile and avoid `hostPath` volumes pointing to the paths listed above.
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### References
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@ -353,5 +360,7 @@ A race condition in the BuildKit snapshotter let an attacker replace a file that
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- [https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/sensitive-mounts](https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/sensitive-mounts)
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- [Understanding and Hardening Linux Containers](https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ncc_group_understanding_hardening_linux_containers-1-1.pdf)
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- [Abusing Privileged and Unprivileged Linux Containers](https://www.nccgroup.com/globalassets/our-research/us/whitepapers/2016/june/container_whitepaper.pdf)
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- [Buildah CVE-2024-1753 advisory](https://github.com/containers/buildah/security/advisories/GHSA-pmf3-c36m-g5cf)
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- [containerd CVE-2024-40635 advisory](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/GHSA-265r-hfxg-fhmg)
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{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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